587 So. 2d 1061 | Ala. Crim. App. | 1991
The appellant, Cedric Bernard Fells, was convicted of burglary in the third degree. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
"I went over to Ensley after I got paid and I met Jo Ann Smith. She told me if I bought her some crack cocaine she would give me some sex for it. I spent all my money on drugs and we ended up in Roderick's house with Jo Ann and some other people. Jo Ann went in Roderick's through the front door because it's [sic] unlocked. Jo Ann said Roderick's moving and he's going to sell all this stuff. Me and Jo Ann and another girl took a sofa, an air conditioner, a little chair and mirror down to the crack house and sold it to the dope man for drugs. They call the dope man Red. The girl that helped us is named Diane Young and they call her Tish."
A person commits the crime of burglary in the third degree if, "he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein." Section
Before an accused's confession can be received into evidence against him, both voluntariness and a Miranda predicate must be shown. Carpenter v. State,
Mitchell, 508 So.2d at 1198. (Emphasis in Eakes.)" 'A confession is presumed to be involuntary. Before its admission into evidence there must be evidence addressed to the trial judge sufficient to rebut that presumption and a showing that the confession was made without influence of either hope or fear, unless the attending circumstances affirmatively disclose the voluntariness of the confession. Wallace v. State,
290 Ala. 201 ,275 So.2d 634 (1973); Bush v. State,282 Ala. 134 ,209 So.2d 416 (1968). In order to be admissible a confession must be free and voluntary and cannot be the result of any direct or implied promises, however slight. Malloy v. Hogan,378 U.S. 1 ,84 S.Ct. 1489 ,12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States,371 U.S. 341 ,83 S.Ct. 448 ,9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963); Bell v. Alabama, 5 Cir.,367 F.2d 243 , cert. denied,386 U.S. 916 ,87 S.Ct. 859 ,17 L.Ed.2d 788 (1966); Wallace, supra. The question of whether a confession was obtained by coercion or improper inducement can be determined only by examination of all the attendant circumstances. Boulden v. Holman,394 U.S. 478 ,89 S.Ct. 1138 ,22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); Wallace, supra. Each case must stand or fall on its own merits for the constitutional inquiry into the issue of voluntariness requires more than a mere "color-matching of cases." Beecher v. Alabama,389 U.S. 35 ,88 S.Ct. 189 ,191 ,19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967). The true test of determining whether extrajudicial confessions are voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed and therefore not the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Townsend v. Sain,372 U.S. 293 ,83 S.Ct. 745 ,9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Elliott v. State,338 So.2d 483 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976).1"Eakes v. State,
387 So.2d 855 ,858-59 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978)."
Detective Steven Corvin, of the Birmingham Police Department, testified that the appellant made a statement to him concerning the burglary. Corvin stated that he read the appellant hisMiranda rights and that he read the appellant a waiver of rights form, which the appellant signed in Corvin's presence. He further stated that he did not smell alcohol on the appellant's breath but that the appellant's eyes appeared bloodshot. Officer Corvin denied that he told the appellant that he would not be able to make bond if he did not confess. The arresting officer testified that when she arrested the appellant, he did smell of alcohol but that he did not appear to be drunk. The appellant testified at the hearing that he had been drinking and taking drugs all night. The appellant further stated that Officer Corvin coerced him into making the statement by telling him he would not be able to make bond.
Carr, 545 So.2d at 825." '[I]n order for intoxication to render a confession inadmissible, it must be shown that the mind of the defendant was substantially impaired when the confession was made.' (citations omitted) . . . the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession."
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing was conflicting. When evidence as to voluntariness is conflicting, a *1064
fact question is presented which must be decided by the court. We do not disturb a court's decision unless it is "palpably contrary" to the evidence. Dixon v. State,
Stout, 547 So.2d at 896."Requested jury charges must be considered in the light of, or in connection with, all other charges given by the trial court. Page v. State,
487 So.2d 999 ,1008 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). The trial court's refusal to give written requested charges does not constitute error when the charges are covered in the trial court's oral charge, are confusing or misleading, are inapplicable or abstract, or are an incorrect statement of applicable law."
The appellant also argues that the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt violated the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. ___,
Gaskins v. McKeller, ___ U.S. ___,"In Cage, the jury was instructed that a reasonable doubt 'must be a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty . . .' Id. at ___,
111 S.Ct. at 329 . Because the instructions to the jury in this case did not contain this improper language, the question whether Cage announced a new rule is not actually presented here."
The court in the instant case did not use the language that the United States Supreme Court found to be offensive inCage. No error occurred here.
For the foregoing reasons, this case is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Judges concur.