93 Pa. 470 | Pa. | 1879
delivered the opinion of the court, October 6th 1879.
This bill was filed by some of the heirs-at-law of Joseph Fellows, deceased. It prayed the court to decree certain instruments in writing, executed by said Fellows, and dated respectively the 3d, 10th and 15th October 1868, had been duly revoked, and become null and void. The case was heard on bill and answer, and the bill was dismissed. So far as the present inquiry is concerned, all these writings may be considered as parts of one instrument. The first is a deed whereby Mr. Fellows conveyed all his real and personal estate situate in eight different states named, in trust to John Heermans, his heirs and assigns for ever, in consideration of the grantor’s infirmities of advanced age, and of one dollar to him in
There is no power of revocation reserved in either of the deeds. It is not shown that either of these conveyances was procured by fraud or unfair dealing. They appear to have been the result of the deliberate judgment and unconstrained will of Mr. Fellows. The trust was accepted and acted upon by the appellee. The title of a trustee under a deed of trust is complete and irrevocable by the settler, although the transaction be purely voluntary: Hill on Trustees *82. Nor does the fact that the grantor reserved an interest during life in the proceeds of the property, and gave a future benefit to other persons named, give an implied right of revocation : Reese et al. v. Ruth, 13 S. & R. 434; Eckman v. Eckman, 18 P. F. Smith 460. It controverts no rule nor policy of law, but executes the intention of the grantor: Lewin on Trusts 137. In December 1868, and again in January 1879, Mr. Fellows executed an instrument of writing purporting to revoke the deeds of trust and the order of distribution. He after-wards instituted proceedings in equity in tho Common Pleas of Luzerne county, against John Heermans and Edmonds Heermans, to set aside the deed of the 10th and 15th October 1868, respectively ; and a like proceeding against John Heermans in the Supreme Court of the state of New York. In June 1871, an agreement under seal, duly acknowledged, was entered into between
The withdrawal in 1871 of the attempted revocation of the trust deeds made to Heermans is so clear, express and unequivocal as to admit of no doubt in regard to the intention of Mr. Fellows. He used no language indicating that he considered or intended them to be letters of attorney or instruments of a testamentary character. He designated them as “deeds,” and declared they “should have full force and effect,” and that Heermans should be no further hindered or impeded in the due execution of all the powers therein given to him. If doubt existed before as to the irrevocable character of these deeds, the compromise of the suit brought to revoke
It is claimed by the appellants that the deeds executed in October 1868 are testamentary in their character under the authority of Frederick’s Appeal, 2 P. F. Smith 338. We think' that case distinguishable from the present in many particulars. The deeds in the present case show a clear intent to take effect immediately. In Turner v. Scott, 1 P. F. Smith 126, the deed declares “ this conveyance in no way to take effect until after the decease of the said John Scott, the grantor.” The controlling effect of these words is pointed out by the present chief justice in Eckman v. Eckman, supra. This last case, we think, fully sustains the conclusion that the deeds in question were not revocable by the settler. Heermans so claimed. The suit commenced by Fellows was to test the validity of that claim. Conceding it was doubtful, the compromise of the suit settled the question in favor of Heermans’s view. The instruments thereupon became fixed and irrevocable.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.