38 Conn. 197 | Conn. | 1871
This is an action of assumpsit on the comInon counts, and comes before us by reservation for our advice on a very detailed statement of facts found by the Court of Common Pleas. The questions discussed at the bar are mixed questions of law and fact. In order to a full understanding of the case the entire statement of the facts is needed, and is as follows:
The plaintiffs are a copartnership, doing business in Hartford, and s'old the goods described in their bill of particulars, which were delivered by the plaintiffs on board the boats of the defendants, and were used thereon. The defendants were a corporation, organized under a charter of the State of Comiecticut, and engaged in running steamers which carried passengers and freight between New York and Hartford. Two of the steamers so used were severally named “ The City of Hartford,” and “ The State. of New York.” The defendants had been so engaged in business for several years, and employing said boats (among others which they were accustomed to run on said route) each season from the opening of navigation till its close in the Pall. Prior to] the Spring of 1868 the defendants had been accustomed to furnish their own provisions and supplies, to board their own officers and crews on said boats, and supply meals to passengers thereon, and had required and employed stewards, or persons acting in that capacity, on each of them.
It is well settled that where a general authority has once been conferred, its revocation takes effect as to third persons only after it becomes known to them, unless indeed the principal has done his full duty in making it known; and where an authority is' revoked, it is in general the duty of the principal to liotify those persons who have had dealings with the agent as such; the rules on this subject being substantially the same as those relating to the dissolution of a copartnership, and the power of a partner after dissolution to bind the firm. Story Agency, § 470, 471. 1 Parsons Contracts, 59,60.
Now in regard to Smith, it appears that he for several seasons was authorized to bind the defendants by contracts with the plaintiffs similar to that on which this suit i's brought, and that the defendants have done nothing to notify the public in general, or these plaintiffs in particular, of any revocation of authority, and that the plaintiffs were not in fact aware of a revocation.
The defendants however insist that there were circumstances which ought to have put the plaintiffs on inquiry, and it is certainly true that the manner of dealing under which the
In respect to the goods purchased by Silloway, the facts are very different from those in Smith’s case. Silloway had never acted as the defendants’ agent, and never was in fact, their servant. The plaintiffs’ claim in this branch of the case, is that the defendants had by their previous conduct given a general authority to their stewards, as such to bind them by the purchase of provisions to be used on the boats; that the defendants gave to Silloway the apparent place of steward, and are therefore bound by his contracts as such. The case is likened to that of a bank which allows some one to appear as its teller at the teller’s desk, and thereby holds him out as authorized to act in that capacity. It is undoubted and familiar law that if I hold one out to the world as my agent I am bound-by his acts as such, and there are some facts which tend to show that Silloway was held out to the plaintiffs as being steward, and thereby authorized to bind the defendants by the contract relied on. But it does not appear that the defendants ever intentionally represented Silloway as their servant. They did not clothe him with the appearance of being steward in order to give him credit. They merely, made a contract, which we suppose is not unusual, whereby the duties which had previously been performed by stewards as agents of the company, were now performed by contractors not agents of the defendants. It may pertain to the office of the teller of a bank to perform certain functions for the bank, but we do not know that it pertains to the office of- steward of a boat as such to bind the owners by contracts for supplies. Nor can
In order to charge the defendants for Silloway’s contracts, the plaintiffs must show, first, that he was in fact their servant, which it is admitted he was not, or, second, that the defendants voluntarily and purposely gave him an appearance of authority to bind them, which cannot be claimed, or, third, that the defendants’ acts were such as naturally to give Silloway the appearance of having authority, so much so that the defendants must be regarded as negligent and blameworthy in allowing such appearances to exist. We cannot say that there is evidence of such blameworthiness. It seems indeed that the plaintiffs charged the goods to the defendants believing that Silloway was their authorized servant. But we think that belief must have arisen more from over confidence in Silloway’s assurances than from any conduct of the defendants justifying such belief.
We advise that judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs for the goods delivered to Smith, and for the defendants in respect to the supplies furnished to Silloway.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.