Opinion by
This bill was filed by some of the heirs at law of Joseph Fellows, deceased. It prayed the court to decree that certain instruments in writing, executed by said Fellows, and dated respectively the 3d, 10th and 15th of October, 1868, had been duly revoked, and became null and void. The case was heard on bill and answer, and the bill was dismissed. So far as the present inquiry is concerned, all these writings may be considered as parts of one instrument. The first is a deed, whereby Mr. Fellows conveyed all his real and personal estate, situate in eight different States named, in trust to John Ileermans, his heirs and assigns forever, in consideration of the grantor’s infirmities of advanced age, and of one dollar to him in hand paid. It contains a proviso that the grantee shall sell the lands therein conveyed, by retail, for the best-prices obtainable^ and convey the same in fee simple to the purchasers, with covenants of warranty binding Fellows’ heirs to warrant and defend the title thereto ; that the avails of the real and personal estate shall be paid, distributed and disposed of as follows : During Mr. Follows’ life all moneys shall be paid over to him; afterwards they shall be applied, first, to the
' The title of a trustee under a deed of trust is complete and irrevocable by the settler, although the transaction be purely voluntary: Hill on Trustees, *82. Nor does the fact that the grantor reserved an interest during life in the proceeds of the property, and gave a future benefit to other persons named,give an implied right of revocation: Reese et al. v. Reith, 13 S. & R. 432; Eckman v. Eckman, 18 P. F-Smith, 460. It controverts no rule nor policy of law, but executes the instruction of the grantor: Lewin on. Trusts, 137.
In December, 1868, and again in January, 1879, Mr. Fellows executed an instrument of writing, purporting to revoke the deeds of trust and the order of distribution. lie
The withdrawal in 1871 of the attempted revocation of the trust deeds made to Ileermans, is so clear, express and unequivocal, as to admit of no doubt in regard to the intention of Mr. Eellows. He used no language indicating that he considered or intended them to be letters of attorney or instruments of testamentary character. He designated them as “deeds,” and declared they “should have full force and effect,” and that Heermans should be no further hin.dered or impeded in the due execution of all the powers therein given to him. If doubt existed before as to the irrevocable character of these deeds, the compromise of the suit brought to revolee them removed that doubt. The payment to him of the one hundred dollars, and his agreement in consideration thereof, show a clear ratification and confirmation that they conveyed the legal estate in fee for the purposes of the trust therein declared.
It is claimed by the appellants that the deeds executed in October, 1868, are testamentary in their character, under the authority of Fredericks’ Appeal, 2 P. F. Smith, 338. We think that case distinguishable from the present in many particulars. The deeds in the present case show a clear intent to take effect immediately. In that case the deed declares, “this conveyance in no way to take effect until after the decease of the said John rcott, the grantor.” The controlling effect of these words is pointed out by the present Ohict Justice, in Eckman vs. Eckman, supra. 'Ibis last case, we think, fully sustains the conclusion that the deeds in question were not revocable by the settler. Heermans so claimed, '(he suit commenced by Eellows was to test the validity of that claim. Conceding it was doubtful, the compromises of the suit settled the question in favor of Ileermans’ view. 'I he instruments tucrefore became fixed mid irrevocable.
Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant. — Intellegencer.
