This case results from the sustaining of motions to dismiss by each defendant in a suit for damages against the defendants’ alleged negligent installation of a boothettetype teleрhone on the sidewalk of the other defendant’s drugstore on the outer wall of the building, fоr the convenience of the public. The petition alleged it was advantagеous to have the pay telephone installed for the use and benefit of the customers and the general public, and on a named date, another party drovе an automobile into the plaintiff as she stood at the boothette telephone making a call, causing her grievous injuries. The basis of her suit against these defendants is that they knew, or reasonably should have known, that such occurrences could take place, in that they have, in fact, occurred previously, and that the defendants were negligent in failing to install proper protective devices to protect the general public as invitees upon the property. It is also noted that the petition shows that plaintiff and her husband executed a covenant not to sue in fаvor of the party driving the automobile and an insurance company, upon receipt of the sum of $22,000. However, she alleges further that she has incurred additional medical expenses since that time, and that the defendants are liable to her, not only by commission of acts of negligence, but further, by omissions in not providing proper safeguards on or about the premises for her safety, and that the said acts were the proximate and direct cause of the injuries which she sustained. Held:
1. Since detailed pleadings are no longer required, the only question for decision here is whether or not, under the facts alleged, the plaintiff is entitled to any relief against the defendants.
Code Arm.
§§ 81A-108 (a), 81A-112 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619, 622; 1967, pp. 226, 230, 231);
Harper v. DeFreitas,
2. One is bound to anticipate and provide agаinst what usually happens and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is uhusual and unlikely to happen, оr what is only remotely and slightly probable. See
Powell v. Waters,
3. But the proprietor of premises is not the insurer of persons thereon against all acts of co-invitees, and when said proprietor has used or exercised ordinary care to keep the premises safe, he is not guilty of negligence.
Watson v. McCrory Stores,
4. The general rule in such cases is not whether injuries result or the consequences were possible, but whether they were probable, that is, likely to occur according to the usual experience of persоns. It is not necessary that a person be required to anticipate or foresеe and guard against what is unusual and not likely to happen, but to anticipate and foresee and provide against that which usually happens or is likely to happen.
Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith Pew Co.,
5. Ordinarily persons who maintain places of business adjacent to sidewalks are not under a duty to protect persons on the sidewalk from vehicles in the streets or co-invitees. In the case at bar, the authority most emphasized and relied upon by thе plaintiff-appellant is that of
Blunt v. Spears,
Judgment affirmed.