193 A. 801 | N.J. | 1937
On July 24th, 1932, Nicola Armenti was killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and the question for decision is whether his dependent niece "by marriage" is embraced within the class entitled to compensation under the provisions of paragraph *517 12(g), section 2, of the Workmen's Compensation act of 1911, as amended by chapter 135 of the laws of 1928. Pamph. L. 1911,pp. 134, 139; Pamph. L. 1928, pp. 281, 286. The infant respondent is the daughter of a sister of the deceased's wife. It is stipulated that at the time of the employe's death, she was approximately seven years of age, and was, and for five years prior thereto had been, a member of his family, actually dependent upon him.
The primary question at issue is the legislative intention, as expressed in the statute. The reason and spirit of the act, or, in other words, the apparent legislative intent evinced by the language employed, considered in relation to the subject of the legislation, prevail over its letter. And the words used to declare the legislative purpose, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification, unless modified by the context. But a word having a technical significance as well is given that sense where the nature of the subject indicates, or the context suggests, that it has been so used. The general object of a particular act is always to be looked to in aid of a correct comprehension of its intention. The sense in which the words were intended to be used, as gleaned from the context, provides the key to the understanding of the statute; and their ordinary meaning may be enlarged, restricted or qualified to give effect to the intention so disclosed. Hackensack Trust Co. v. Hackensack,
In their primary technical sense, the words "nephews" and "nieces" import a consanguineous relationship. Bouvier's LawDictionary (Rawle's 3d ed.) defines "niece" as the "daughter of a brother or sister. Ambl. 514, 1 Jac. 207." It is so defined in Black's Law Dictionary. According to the civil law, a nephew or niece is in the third degree of consanguinity; *518 at the common law, in the second degree. 2 Bl. Com. 206. The rule of the civil law seems to prevail in this county. 2 HillR.P. 194.
And by modern usage, the word "niece" means "the daughter * * * of a brother or sister." Goddard v. Amory,
Although the general dictionary definition is not conclusive, it is well to point out that the lexicographers seem to be *519 in accord on the meaning of the term. Dr. Johnson's Dictionary defines "nephew" as "the son of a brother or sister," and "niece" as "the daughter of a brother or sister." Webster'sInternational Dictionary (2d ed.) defines "niece" as "a daughter of one's brother or sister, or, somewhat loosely, of one's brother-in-law or sister-in-law." But, in the interpretation of legislative enactments, the term is to be given its usual legal, and not its loose, irregular, sense and significance, unless the context exhibits an intention to employ it in the latter or a broader sense.
We see no force to the contention that the normal significance of the term is one thing when used in legislative enactments and another — much narrower — when employed to express a testamentary purpose. In either case, the quest is for the intention; and, in its ascertainment, words are to be given their generally understood meanings, unless qualified by the context or the general object. "In a will, as in a statute, the spirit is to prevail, and the letter is not to be adhered to if a different signification can be gathered from the whole context of the instrument." In re Hunt's Estate,
Moreover, there is a characteristic difference in popular understanding between consanguinous and affined relationships. In common usage, the qualifying words "by marriage" are employed to mark the distinction.
We do not discern in the enactment under review a purpose to embrace in the category of "nieces and nephews" those holding that relation by mere affinity. True, the primary requisite is actual dependency. But a secondary requirement, equally vital, is that the dependent shall also bear one of the enumerated relationships. The two elements must combine to entitle the claimant to compensation. And the legislature plainly had in mind the distinction between consanguinous *520
and affined relationships; it specifically listed those of the latter class entitled to the benefits of the act. While it was held in Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz,
The legislative direction for a liberal construction does not warrant the extension of the scope and sweep of the statute beyond that expressly provided, or reasonably to be implied. Compare Public Service Electric and Gas Co. v. City ofCamden,
The judgment of the Hudson Common Pleas, affirming the award of compensation made in the compensation bureau, is accordingly reversed, but without costs. *521