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704 F.3d 1323
11th Cir.
2013
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Notes

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WASHINGTON DATA RESOURCES, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants, Richard A. Bishop, Individually and as a member of Optimum Business Solutions, LLC, Brent McDaniel, individually and as an officer of Washington Data Resources, Tyna Caldwell, individually, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-13392

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 16, 2013.

704 F.3d 1323

Non-Argument Calendar.

obtain unlawfully another means of identification. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 673 F.3d 680, 686-87 (7th Cir.2012) (holding that district court did not plainly err in applying enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C)(i) because defendant utilized actual individuals’ social security numbers unlawfully to obtain PINs, another means of identification, to execute an unemployment benefits scheme). As such, the word “use” has a definite, clear meaning.3

We conclude the guideline, its commentary, and application notes indicate that the mere transfer of unauthorized identifying information is not the equivalent to the actual use of the identifying information for a fraudulent purpose. There is nothing in the commentary or the application notes that contradicts this meaning of the text of the guidеline at issue. See United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240, 1245 (11th Cir.2006) (“When it comes to the interpretation of the guidelines, Commentary and Application Notes of the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the courts unless they contradict the рlain meaning of the text of the Guidelines.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that the plain language of the sentencing guideline at issue does not apply to Hall‘s mere sale or transfer of the patients’ identifying information. The § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement is the appropriate one in Hall‘s sentencing because the purpose of the conspiracy was realized when the conspirators used the 12 patients’ identifying ‍​​​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‍information to obtain the fraudulent credit cards. Hence, we conclude that the district court procedurally erred in imposing Hall‘s sentence.

The district court imposed an unreasonable sentence because it misinterpreted the sentencing guideline enhancement. We are aware that a misapplication of thе guidelines will not ordinarily result in a reversal of an otherwise reasonable sentence if it is clear from the record that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent any error. See United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir.2006). However, it is not clear in this case whether the error affected the district court‘s sentence. Accordingly, we vacate Hall‘s sentence and remand this case fоr the district court to resentence Hall consistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

Michael Daniel Bergman, John F. Daly, FTC, Office of Gen. Counsel, Mark S. Hegedus, FTC, Washington, DC, Sara Catherine DePaul, Jonathan L. Kessler, Michaеl Milgrom, Christopher D. Panek, Michael B. Rose, Harris A. Senturia, FTC, Cleveland, OH, Robert E. O‘Neill, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marlow Vincent White, Lewis & White, PLC, Tallahassee, FL, Richard L. Wilson, Orlando, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before HULL, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants and codefendants Richard Bishop, Brent McDaniel, and Tyna Caldwell appeal the district court‘s order awarding damages to Plaintiff-Appellee Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for engaging in deceptive marketing practices, in violation of section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and the FTC‘s Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1-.9. Specifically, Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it calculated damages based on the net revenue, rather than the profits, Appellants received during the time they controlled the offending enterprise. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The facts leading up to this appeal are detailed in full in the district court‘s April 23, 2012 order. FTC v. Wash. Data Res., 856 F.Supp.2d 1247 (M.D.Fla.2012). We recount only those facts pertinent to this appeal.

Appellants were each involved in the same mortgage loan modification enterprise (the Enterprise), which solicited financially distressed homeowners and offered the possibility of relief through either a loan modification or bankruptcy. The Enterprise ‍​​​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‍caught the eye of the FTC and in 2009, the FTC filed a cоmplaint against Appellants, three other individual defendants, and three corporate defendants. The complaint alleged that Appellants violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act аnd the TSR, §§ 310.1-.9, by engaging in deceptive activities relating to their sale and marketing of mortgage relief and home foreclosure services. Following a bench trial in April 2011, Appellants were found liаble for violating both section 5(a) and the TSR. In an order dated April 23, 2012, the district court found Bishop and McDaniel jointly and severally liable for $1,974,270, and Caldwell liable for $644,704. The only issue before us today is whether the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Appellants to pay damages equal to the net revenues they received during the period they controlled the Enterprise.

II.

We review a district court‘s order granting equitable monetary relief for abuse of discretion. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or tо follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” In re Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beaсh, 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir.1990). “We review a district court‘s factual findings for clear error, and its application of law to facts de novo.” Wilshire Inv. Mgmt., 531 F.3d at 1343.

III.

Appellants first argue that the district court improperly awarded damagеs based on consumer losses. Appellants are correct that here, a damages award based on consumer losses would be improper. “The equitable remedy of restitution doеs not take into consideration the plaintiff‘s losses, but only focuses on the defendant‘s unjust enrichment.” Id. at 1345. But the district court did not award damages based on consumer loss. ‍​​​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‍The district court awarded damаges based on Appellants’ unjust gains.

Because each Appellant was liable for a violation of section 5(a) and the TSR, the FTC was entitled to seek relief under both section 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and section 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 57b, of the FTC Act. In the district court, the FTC conceded that the record lacked evidence to accurately determine consumer loss and chose not to establish consumer loss. The FTC sought only to disgorge Appellants’ net revenue and thus proceeded to seek relief under section 13(b). Section 13(b) provides “an unqualified grant of statutory authority” to issue “the full range of equitable remediеs,” including disgorgement, which considers only the defendants’ unjust gain and ignores consumer loss. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir.1996). Said another way, section 13(b) permits disgorgement measured by the Appellants’ unjust enrichment but prohibits disgorgement meаsured by consumer loss. Here, the district court properly measured disgorgement by Appellants’ unjust gains, not consumer loss.

Appellants further contend that here, “net revenue is tantamount to consumer loss” because the total net revenue and the total consumer loss is the same.1 This argument fails. The district court expressly calculated Appellants’ unjust gains as the measure of equitable relief. See Wash. Data Res., 856 F.Supp.2d at 1281. As the Second Circuit found in FTC v. Verity Intern., Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 68 (2nd Cir.2006), “in many cases in which the FTC seeks restitution, the defendant‘s gain will be equal to the consumer‘s loss because the consumer buys goods or services directly from the defendant.” Thus, it is of no consequence that the measure of Appellants’ unjust gains happens to equal the amount of consumer loss. The district court ultimately—and properly—based its calculation of damages on Appellants’ unjust gains.

IV.

Lastly, Appellants aver that the district court erred when it considered the net revenue (gross receipts minus refunds) when it calculated damages. They contend thаt the district court should have instead considered Appellants’ profits (net revenue minus expenses) when it calculated ‍​​​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‍damages. Appellants are incorrect.

Other circuits have bеen presented with this issue and have found a damages award based on net revenue rather than profit proper under Section 13(b). See FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 375 (2d Cir.2011) (holding that defendant was “not entitled tо deduct its expenses from the restitutionary baseline“); FTC v. Direct Mkg. Concepts Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 14-16 (1st Cir.2010) (finding no error when district court “rest[ed] its damages determination on Defendants’ gross receipts rather than their net profits“); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir.1997) (upholding district court‘s acceptance of magistrate‘s finding the appropriate measure of restitution was consumers’ net payments to defendants rather than defendants’ prоfits.).

We agree with our sister circuits and today hold that the amount of net revenue (gross receipts minus refunds), rather than the amount of profit (net revenue minus expenses), is the correct measurе of unjust gains under section 13(b). We echo the Second Circuit‘s sentiment that “defendants in a disgorgement action are not entitled to deduct costs associated with committing their illegal acts.” Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d at 375. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it considered Appellants’ ‍​​​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‍net revenues, instead of their profits, in its calculation for damages.

The district court‘s order is AFFIRMED.

Notes

1
The FTC claimed that $3,941,588 was both the Enterprise‘s net revenue and the consumers’ injury. Wash. Data Res., 856 F.Supp.2d at 1281. The FTC, however, conceded below that the record lacked evidence to accurately determine consumer loss, chose not to establish consumer loss, and stated that “consumer losses far exceed Defendants’ net revenue. The FTC seeks only to disgorge that net revenue.” Id.
3
Furthermore, an amendment to the Guidelines Manual provides сlarification into the meaning of the word “use” in the sentencing guideline at issue. Amendment 726 amended portions of § 2B1.1, and it became effective in November 2009. It provides that the definition of “victim” includes an individual whose means of identification is used unlawfully or without authority. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 726 (Nov. 2009) (emphasis added). It clarifies that “[t]his new category of ‘victim’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2) is appropriately limited, however, to cover only those individuals whose means of identification are actually used.” Id.

Case Details

Case Name: Federal Trade Commission v. Washington Data Resources, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jan 16, 2013
Citations: 704 F.3d 1323; 2013 WL 163416; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1078; 12-13392
Docket Number: 12-13392
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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