FEDERAL LUMBER CO., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
G. A. HANLEY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
FOUR CORNERS VACATION PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Carolyn J. FITZGERALD et al., Defendants-Appellants (two cases).
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.
*481 Hamilton, Sherman, Hamilton & Shand, P. C., E. B. Hamilton, Jr., Durango, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Berge, Martin & Clark, Harry M. Williams, Denver, for defendants-appellants G. A. Hanley, Judy Hanley and Patricia J. Hanley.
Al H. Haas, Durango, for defendant-appellant Carolyn J. Fitzgerald.
Selected for Official Publication.
COYTE, Judge.
Defendants appeal from an order of the trial court refusing to vacate a default judgment entered on May 10, 1971, in a consolidated suit wherein plaintiffs sought foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, possession of the property, and a decree quieting title to the property. For the reasons stated below the appeal must be dismissed.
The underlying facts of this case are set out in Fitzgerald v. District Court, Colo.,
C.A.R. 3(a) provides that an appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by C.A.R. 4(a). The pertinent provision of C.A.R. 4(a) provides that notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order appealed from. This time limitation is jurisdictional, and the appeal must be dismissed when appellant has failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Chapman v. Miller,
Here, the default judgment was entered on May 10, 1971, and the order denying defendants' motion to vacate that judgment was entered on September 8, 1971. However, no timely appeal was taken from that order. Even though the court held an evidentiary hearing on the second motion, the filing of the second motion did not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Reale v. People,
Defendants' argument that they are appealing from the second denial by the trial court of their motion to set aside the default judgment is rejected. When no appeal was taken from the order of September 8, 1971, all matters in controversy were finally adjudicated and defendants' second motion to set aside the default judgment was a nullity and should have been stricken. Fraka v. Malernee, supra.
The appeal is dismissed.
SILVERSTEIN, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
