368 Pa. 463 | Pa. | 1951
Opinion by
As the court below properly held, plaintiffs in these cases did not meet the statutory requirements which, if complied with, would have entitled them to refunds of taxes allegedly paid under an erroneous interpretation of the law.
The determination of the questions here presented depends principally upon the chronology of the proceedings from which they arose.
The Emaus National Bank filed with the Department of Revenue a shares tax report for the year 1939 for taxes imposed by the Act of July 15, 1897, P.L. 292, as amended. Settlement was made by the Department in November, 1940. The tax was paid in January, 1943 by the application by the Department
The facts in the case of The First National Bank of Susquehanna against the ■ Board ■■ of Finance and
Section 503 of The Fiscal Code of 1929, P.L. 343, as amended, provides that “The Board of Finance and Revenue shall have the power, and its duty shall be, (a) To hear and determine any petition for the refund of taxes . . . paid to the Commonwealth and to which the Commonwealth is not rightfully or equitably entitled .... All such petitions must be filed with the board within two years of the payment of which refund is requested, or within two years of the settlement in the case of taxes . . . , whichever period last expires, except (1) . . . where a petition for refund filed by a bank, title insurance or trust company involves the valuation of its shares of stock, such petition must be filed with the board within one year of the payment of which refund is requested, or within one year of the settlement of such taxes . . . , whichever period last expires. ... (4) When any tax or other money has been paid to the Commonwealth, under a provision of an act of Assembly subsequently held by final judgment
We fail to find the ambiguity in this provision which appellants would ascribe to it; on the contrary, the intendment and the phraseology are, in our opinion, entirely clear. Ordinarily a refund of taxes to which the Commonwealth is not rightfully or equitably entitled must be applied for within two years of the settlement or the payment of the tax, but within one year if the claimant be a bank or trust company and the alleged error be in regard to the valuation of its shares of stock. However, a special case is provided for, namely, where the tax is apparently properly paid under a statutory provision, but subsequently a court of competent jurisdiction decides that the statute had been erroneously interpreted and the Commonwealth was not entitled to the tax; the taxpayer under those circumstances may obtain a refund, and “in such case” is allowed five years from the payment or settlement of the tax in which to file a petition to the Board claiming the refund. It would seem obvious, therefore, that in the petition to obtain a refund in such a case it is necessary for the taxpayer to aver, and to establish the fact, that, by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, it had been held that the tax payment was made under an erroneous interpretation of the statute which imposed it, it being solely on the ground of such a decision having been renderéd that the five year extension privilege is granted; only by reason of such decision is á claim for refund warranted under section 503(a) (4) of thé Code. In the presént instances the petitions for refunds filed in 1946 by Federal Deposit
We understand the clear meaning of Section 503(a) (4) of the Fiscal Code to be that, in order to entitle a taxpayer to obtain a refund, two conditions must be met— (1) the petition must be filed within five years of the settlement or payment of the tax, and (2) the claim for refund must be based upon averment and proof that it had been held, since the payment of the tax, by a court of competent jurisdiction, that the statute under which payment was made had been erroneously interpreted. It was this second condition that was not met, and could not have been met, by appellants. These requirements were not merely procedural provisions, but express conditions of the right to obtain a refund, failure to comply with which operated as an absolute bar to the right itself: cf. Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 242, 245-247, 156 A. 749, 750, 751; Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 38, 45, 46, 1 A.2d 839, 842, 843; Rowles v. State Workmen’s Insurance Fund, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 193, 199, 14 A.2d 551, 554; Lewis, Administratrix, v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 226, 228, 229, 48 A.2d 120, 122; Compagnie Generale
Appellants earnestly urge that consideration should be given to the fact that over a long course of years it was the practice of the Board of Finance and Revenue, where an issue had been raised in litigation concerning the interpretation of a taxing statute, to permit the filing of cautionary petitions for refunds and to withhold action thereon until the legality of the assessment might thereafter be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, and, if and when that occurred, to grant the refunds. It is argued, therefore, that that same interpretation should now be given to section 503 (a) (4) of the Fiscal Code, — in other words, that it should be held that the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon which the claim for refund is based need not be rendered before the filing of the petition for refund but at any time thereafter. It is true, of course, that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight and should not be disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous: 25 R.C.L. 1043, §274; 42 Am. Jur. 392, §78; Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613, 627; Commonwealth v. Mann, 168 Pa. 290, 301, 302, 31 A. 1003, 1006; Commonwealth v. Paine, 207 Pa. 45, 48, 56 A. 317, 318; Estate of Henry Scheutz, Jr., Deceased, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 602, 607, 174 A. 832, 833, 834; Cammie v. I.T.E. Circuit Breaker Co., 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 246, 250, 30 A.2d 225, 227. Indeed the Statutory Construction Act of May 28,1937, P.L. 1019, section 51, provides that “When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the Legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters — ■ ... (8) legislative and administrative interpretations of such law.” But it will be noted that the principle of giving
Appellants call attention the fact that while the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County in the First National Bank & Trust Co. of Easton case was not handed down until May, 1949, it appears in the record of the hearing therein that as early as December, 1944 the Deputy Attorney General who represented the Commonwealth stated to the court that “There is really no issue here because we have admitted that the actual value of the stocks and bonds and of the loans and discounts should be used in making the settlement, and we agree that charitable holdings shall not be included . . . We are perfectly willing that the Court make a consent decree in this case, with judgment for the defendant.” But no form of decree was presented to the court and no decree entered by it other than the adverse decree of some four or five years later. Even if, however, the proposed consent decree had been
Since appellants cannot rely upon the decision in the First National Bank & Trust Co. of Easton case as being the “final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction” rendered prior to the filing of the petitions for refunds, they search for other judicial decisions to satisfy that requirement, and in that connection they cite the cases of Commonwealth v. City National Bank, 52 Dauph. 87, and Commonwealth v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 55 Dauph. 235, — decisions in which were rendered on November 3, 1941 and February 21, 1944 respectively, and in which it was held that the actual value of a bank’s assets must be employed rather than the book value in determining the tax on its shares. Appellants refer also to the case of Commonwealth v. First National Bank of Scranton, 53 Dauph. 245, decided under date of September 21, 1942, in which it was held that the shares of bank stock owned by religious, charitable and educational institutions were not taxable under the Act of 1897. However, the City National Bank case and the First National Bank of Scranton case were decided before the taxes here involved were paid,
We pass to a consideration of the appeal of the Nazareth National Bank & Trust Company. Here, too, the facts raise the same questions as those in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and First National Bank of Susquehanna appeals. The Nazareth National Bank & Trust Company filed a shares tax report for the year 1937, and in October, 1938 paid the tax as imposed by the settlement. In computing the assessment book values were allegedly used instead of actual values and the fiscal officers included as taxable the shares of the bank owned by religious and charitable institutions. On June 1, 1943 the bank filed with the Board of Finance and Revenue a petition for the refund of the portions of the tax thus improperly assessed. In 1949 the Board refused the petition and the bank then brought action in mandamus against the Board in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. The Board filed preliminary objections to the complaint. The court sustained the objections and dismissed the action, from which decree the bank now appeals.
The only additional question raised on this appeal arises from the fact that the decision in the Common
The decrees of the court below dismissing the actions in mandamus are affirmed at the cost of the respective appellants therein.
The payments in the case of the First National Bank of Susquehanna were made before the decision in the First National Bank of Scranton case, but a refund was not claimed in the First National Bank of Susquehanna case on the ground of an erroneous inclusion in the tax of the shares of religious and charitable organizations which was the subject of the decision in the First National Bank of Scranton case.