Steven Jakubowski, a bankruptcy lawyer at Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, decided to make some money on the side by lining up stock from savings associations that were abandoning the mutual form. From this endeavor he reaped only $51,500, substantially less than his income from practicing law. The risk-return ratio was unfavorable. These dealings led to his discharge from the law firm, his suspension from the practice of law for 18 months, and a judgment (in this case) that he committed securities fraud. The district court enjoined Jaku-bowski from further securities offenses and ordered him to pay double his profits from the scheme, plus prejudgment interest.
When a financial intermediary such as a savings and loan association is organized as a
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mutual, the depositors nominally own its net worth. Because a mutual lacks formal equity and can issue only debt, it may encounter trouble raising money — and federal bank regulators want financial institutions to generate capital in order to reduce the risk born by the deposit insurance funds. Because financial institutions owned in stock form tend to take additional risk (widespread owners can diversify better), see Lawrence R. Cordell, Gregor D. McDonald & Mark E. Wohar,
Corporate Ownership and the Thrift Crisis,
36 J.L. & Econ. 719 (1993), regulators seek to ensure that conversion from mutual to stock form is accompanied by the injection of substantial new money. But the managers of mutual S&Ls have the opposite incentive. By issuing stock at a low price, they can appropriate much of the S&L’s net worth for themselves. Suppose a S&L with $200 million in assets has a net worth of $10 million. The managers could take the firm public by issuing one million shares at $10 per share. After the sale the firm would have a net worth of $20 million, and with one million shares in circulation each would trade for $20. The “original issue discount” of $10 per share would accrue to the initial buyers, among whom managers could figure prominently. Seeking to give managers an incentive to take their S&Ls public at higher prices (and thus lower original issue discounts), and to share any remaining discounts with the depositors, the Office of Thrift Supervision promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 563b.3, which among other things limits managers’ ability to invest when a mutual converts to stock form and gives each account holder a right to purchase some of the stock. For descriptions of this regulation and its background, see
Ordower v. OTS,
Acquisition of the securities of converting and converted savings associations—
(1) Prior to the completion of a conversion, no person shall transfer, or enter into any agreement or understanding to transfer, the legal or beneficial ownership of conversion subscription rights, or the underlying securities to the account of another.
(2) Prior to the completion of a conversion, no person shall make any offer, or any announcement of an offer, for any security of the converting savings association issued in connection with the conversion nor shall any person knowingly acquire securities of the converted savings association issued in connection with the conversion in excess of the maximum purchase limitations established in the association’s approved plan of conversion pursuant to paragraph (c)(7) or (d)(4) of this section.
Like many a regulation, this one relies on broad application to thwart evasion. As written, § 563b.3(i) goes beyond arrangements between managers and depositors and forbids any third-party acquisition of depositors’ subscription rights and executory contracts to purchase subscribers’ shares when issued. This makes it hard for managers to acquire stock through nominees, at the expense of reducing market opportunities for the depositors. It is this regulation that Jakubowski set out to evade.
In May 1991 Jakubowski received a call from Frank E. Hart, president of Generation Capital Associates, a venture capital firm. Hart told Jakubowski that Cragin Federal Bank for Savings was converting from mutual to stock form and asked Jakubowski to find a depositor eligible to purchase its stock, which Hart estimated carried an original is *678 sue discount of $3 per share. Hart offered to supply the capital necessary to buy as much stock as Jakubowski could find, paying Jakubowski 3.5% of any profit as a commission — but Hart’s profit depended on lining up the stock before it was issued, for afterward the initial buyers then could sell to the market (reaping the original issue discount) rather than to Hart. Jakubowski was authorized to offer a 10% cut of Hart’s profit to depositors eligible to purchase the stock, with Hart to bear all risk of loss. Jakubow-ski found a secretary at his law firm eligible to purchase stock in the Cragin offering, and she agreed to let Jakubowski use her subscription rights in exchange for 6.75% of the profits (increasing Jakubowski’s take from 3.5% to 6.75%). The secretary gave Jaku-bowski an order form, which he filled out in her name with a request for 35,000 shares. The form instructed Cragin to send the shares to Jakubowski at Skadden Arps, as if he were the secretary’s lawyer or trustee. Hart supplied the money. Jakubowski had the secretary sign the stock subscription form plus two documents that Cragin never saw- — a stock power assigning ownership of the stock to Generation Capital Associates; and a contract awarding 6.75% of any eventual profit to the secretary. Cragin issued the stock as requested for $10 per share; trading after the conversion opened at $13.50 per share, and Hart sold the 35,000 shares at an average price of $14 per share. Generation Capital Associates paid $10,073 to each of Jakubowski and the secretary. Jakubow-ski engaged in several similar transactions over the next year, taking the initiative to espy converting S&Ls and receiving a larger cut of the profits as a reward. The last came in March 1992, when Calumet Federal Savings and Loan Association converted. One of the Calumet depositors Jakubowski located was the sister of Lynn McGovern, a lawyer in Skadden Arps’ banking group. When McGovern learned that Jakubowski was trying to persuade her sister to let him use her subscription rights, McGovern reminded Ja-kubowski that an order could be placed only for the account of the depositor. At approximately the same time an officer of one converting S&L visited a depositor with whom Jakubowski was dealing and warned the depositor that he could not sell his subscription rights; the depositor relayed this warning to Jakubowski — whose response to McGovern’s advice and the officer’s warning was to create documents purporting to show that the account holders were buying the stock themselves with borrowed money.
The form Jakubowski submitted to Cragin in the secretary’s name - provided, directly above the signature line:
All rights exercisable hereunder are not transferable and shares purchased upon exercise of such rights must be purchased for the account of the person exercising such rights.
The prospectus for the offering contained a similar but much longer restriction. All of the stock-purchase forms Jakubowski completed during the year he worked with Hart had functionally identical language; 10 of the 12 added that the depositors could not make agreements to sell the shares either. By filling out the form and procuring the secretary’s signature, and adding his own name as the person to whom the stock should be sent, Jakubowski represented that this statement was true. But it was not. The stock was being purchased for the account of Generation Capital Associates, not of the secretary. Whether this transaction is best characterized as a transfer of the secretary’s subscription rights, and thus a violation of § 563b.3(i)(1), as a pre-issuance offer to buy the secretary’s stock, in violation of § 563b.3(i)(2), as both, or even (as Jakubow-ski insists) as neither, does not matter, for the OTS is not the plaintiff and § 563b.3 is not the fulcrum of the suit. The plaintiff is the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the regulation Jakubowski violated is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, the ubiquitous Rule 10b-5. Section 563b.3(i) is why the savings associations required purchasers to certify that they had not transferred their subscription rights or agreed to transfer the shares themselves. Rule 10b-5(b), which forbids a purchaser of securities “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact”, catches Jaku-bowski’s false representations on the forms. The district court granted summary judgment to the SEC after concluding that any reasonable trier of fact would be compelled *679 to find that these representations were made in connection with the issuance of securities, that the S&Ls would not have issued the stock had they known the truth about their beneficial ownership (hence that the lies were material), and that Jakubowski acted with scienter. He argues on appeal that each step of the district court’s reasoning is mistaken.
Let us start with the requirement that the false statement be “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”— language from § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which authorized the SEC to promulgate Rule 10b-5. See generally
Blue Chip Stamps; Isquith v. Caremark International, Inc.,
Gurwara attempted to exercise a stock option issued by his employer, which responded that he was no longer eligible to do so, having taken part-time status on account of disability. He sued under Rule 10b-5, contending that he had been inveigled into disqualifying himself from exercising the options. We held that the statements made to Gurwara concerning his status as an employee were not “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” even though they turned out to have adverse consequences with respect to the options.
Gurwara
was foreordained by
Blue Chip Stamps,
which held that a misrepresentation that induces a decision
not
to purchase securities is outside the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Whether or not LyphoMed’s statements amounted to fraud, cf.
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,
If a misrepresentation must concern the value of the security in order to meet the “connection” requirement, then
United States v. O’Hagan,
— U.S.-,
Many of this court’s cases say that a misrepresentation can be “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities only if it influences an investment decision. E.g.,
Isquith,
What we have said about the “connection” requirement suffices to establish materiality as well. The S&Ls would not have issued the stock had they known the identities of the real purchasers. Some proved this point by examining the applications, concluding that the proposed purchases were excessive in relation to the assets of the depositors in whose names Jakubowski had submitted applications to purchase stock, and contacting these depositors to inform them that a transfer of subscription rights was forbidden. At least two depositors withdrew
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from the scheme as a result. Jakubowski’s response?: he increased the purchases made in the names of other depositors that the S&Ls did not suspect of selling their subscription rights. To the extent
Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
Last comes the question of scienter. Under
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
First, all of the forms Jakubowski completed explicitly stated that subscription rights could not be transferred, and all but two explicitly stated that depositors could not enter into pre-issuance agreements to resell shares they received. Reading these forms, and the prospectuses for the other two, did not require legal research. Over and again we say that people claiming to be
victims
of securities fraud may not claim to rely on oral statements inconsistent with written documents (even tedious prospectuses) available to them. E.g.,
Carr v. CIGNA Securities, Inc.,
Second, the fact that Jakubowski was paid $50,000 for locating 12 holders of deposit accounts at S&Ls was enough by itself to put him on notice that something was amiss. Why did' Jakubowski think that' Hart was paying for depositors’ names and subscription forms? Why, indeed, were forms being submitted in depositors’ names? If subscription rights were transferable, then Hart could have obtained depositor lists from the S&Ls or placed an ad in the paper, and the purchase applications would have been submitted in the name of Generation Capital Associates. A secondary market in subscription rights would have developed, providing depositors with a greater portion of the anticipated gains. Jakubowski has no explanation, consistent with genuine belief in their propriety, for the structure of these transactions.
Third, Jakubowski received notice from at least two S&Ls, plus another lawyer at Skad-den Arps, that depositors could not transfer their subscription rights. His response was to reroute purchases through the accounts of depositors whose applications the banks had not identified as suspicious and to create bogus documents to cover his trail. These steps yield irrefutable evidence of intent to deceive. In the Calumet transaction, for example, Jakubowski prepared papers purporting to show that Generation Capital Associates was loaning money to the depositors so that they could purchase the shares for their own accounts. The documents were fictions, no money was loaned; the depositors never received the shares and took no risk of loss (and stood to reap only small fractions of any gain). The documents did not state the duration of the loans or the rates of interest to be paid, for such details were irrelevant given the absence of an extension of credit. Adding icing to the cake, Jakubowski backdated some of these documents so that it would appear that the “loans” preceded the banks’ inquiries.
What there is to be said on Jakubowski’s behalf — that he was busy, that he was not a securities or banking lawyer, and so on— could not persuade a reasonable trier of fact on any of the disputed questions. Summary judgment therefore was in order and is
AFFIRMED.
