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Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,777, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 781 Chemetron Corporation, Cross-Appellant v. Business Funds, Inc., Cross-Appellees
682 F.2d 1149
5th Cir.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 CORPORATION, CHEMETRON

Plaintiff-Appellee

Cross-Appellant, FUNDS, INC., al.,

BUSINESS et Defend-

ants-Appellants Cross-Appellees.

No. 80-1658. Appeals,

United Court of States

Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 16, 1982.

Rehearing Rehearing En Banc Sept.

Denied

H51 *4 Seikel, Houston, Tex., Funds, for Business & Inc. Elkins, Reasoner,

Vinson Harry & M. Smith, Snodgrass, Jr., John C. B. James Stephen Schwartz, Tarry, C. Charles W. Murchison,Jr., Lents, Houston, John L. Ann Tex., Austin, Tex., Charles A. Wright, David Bintliff. C.

Wood, Gibbs, Campbell, Moody Gary & C. Miller, Ratliff, Gibbs, Debora D. Robin C. Houston, Tex., Austin, F. for Estate of John Jr. Cook, Reynolds, Joe H.

Reynolds, Allen & Jr., Lloyd Cunningham, Murphey R. P. J. Harmon, Tex., Buchanan, Houston, Inger- soll, Rodewald, E. Kyle Buerger, & Carl Deluzio, Jr., Rothenberger, Vincent C. Park, Pa., for Pittsburgh, James G. Cheme- Corp. tron *5 REAVLEY, GEE, Before and WIL- LIAMS, Judges. Circuit GEE, Judge: Circuit

I. INTRODUCTION long-run- We review the latest act in the ning Equities, drama of the Western Inc. (“Westec”) stock scandal. The characters defendants-appellants, cross-appel- include Funds, (“BFI”), a small lees Business Inc. company, business investment John Austin BFI, (“Austin”), and David chairman of (“Bintliff”), Bintliff a businessman and in- plaintiff-ap- The final character is vestor. Corpora- pellee, cross-appellant Chemetron (“Chemetron”). appeal tion The defendants $18,413,160 judgment from a in actual exemplary damages and for violations of laws en- the federal and Texas securities against them on answers tered based special an able interrogatories.1 Despite to Shearman Wade, & Sterling, George job very complex J. in a case the district New York City, Alan R. court, requiring Bromberg, Dallas, we discern several errors Tex., Kenneth Morris, Morris, M. Campbell reversal and remand. prosecuting filing appeal, Austin died after the it. of this his estate is and company, president, new Hall became BELOW AND DISPOSITION

II. FACTS Austin made a director. with the Wes- quite familiar This court is We sketch only those tec stock scandal.2 September August 1964 until From disposition of this necessary facts for the engaged and Hall in massive Williams case. in- operations designed stock complex stock. These crease the value of Westec BFI, was a small corporation, a Maryland example, For operations many took forms. prior formed company investment business on a debt to a business associate repaid (Hall Texas, Houston, principal as its to 1961 with money the condition that be used cap- BFI loaned venture business.3 place of open Westec stock on the market purchase exchange ital for stock companies 1964; Williams aided in the financ- during warrants, management ex- providing often deal, although it is not clear ing of this on the representatives pertise placing funds. BFI was the source of the whether companies as boards of directors of these instance, guar- defendant Austin In another growth encourage In order to their well. from a anteed a loan in December 1964 investment, helped BFI also and enhance its pur- to Hall that Hall used to party third for these arrange mergers acquisitions compa- portfolio Westec stock. BFI chase companies. bought nies and Westec subsidiaries also Williams In late BFI hired James addition, pur- In stock was Westec shares. (“Williams”) president supervise a vice chased in the name of various relatives and chairman of some of its investments. The associates of Hall and Williams. In most Austin. BFI at time was defendant transactions, appears BFI money these chairman, While he was not a full-time played have a role. each week with spending substantial time resigned from April Williams business, principal mortgage-banking his BFI, ap- although his connections with firm, he did meet with Williams and discuss have a short time pear to continued for his times a week. activities several have been departure may thereafter. His mergers acquisi- Through series of terms, unfriendly but this is not alto- Williams, Geo-Space, tions orchestrated *6 time, gether clear. About this Austin also company a in which BFI had invested and BFI distributed left the Westec board and grew for which responsibility, Williams had De- its Westec shares to its shareholders. began considering merger and in 1963 however, may, these actions BFI have spite Westec, with the Amer- company listed on to influence control continued and Westec Exchange. merger ican A with a Stock 1965. until December company substantially listed would enhance September appearance 1965 marked the Geo-Space. the value of BFI’s investment in acquisition Bintliff with the of defendant Williams, (“Hall”) by assisted Ernest Hall by Compa- Westec of Camerina Petroleum Geo-Space, undertook to consummate the ny, owned Bintliff. Bintliff partially merger. They acquired a in Wes- foothold exchanged his Camerina shares for Westec private tec with a purchase nonmarket have appears shares. This transaction in August Westec stock 1963 and elected manipula- price been unrelated to the stock Williams to the Westec board there- shortly operation. tion after. Negotiations merger on a concluded Chemetron, corporation with successfully September 1964. BFI ex- a Delaware Chicago, changed Geo-Space principal place its stock warrants for its of business Wil- Westec, involvement when leaving began stock in BFI in control of sought acquire a Cheme- Westec. became chairman of the liams and Hall Williams See, Commissioner, denied, banc), e.g., Williams v. cert. Hall, (5th 1978); 31 L.Ed.2d 231 Cir. United States v. 1972); F.2d 1324 United States suit, Williams, become of this BFI has 1971) (en 3. Since initiation 447 F.2d 1285 Corp. part Penn of the Central

H55 Corporation price of Westec stock subsidiary, through Pan Geo Atlas tron actual negotia- apparent trading, thereby inducing for (“PGAC”), Lengthy Westec. transac- others, deal leading injury to an October 1965 tentative tions to its when tions led discovery boards. subject approval by parties’ collapsed. lengthy both Westec After 14, 1966, received January voluntary and settlement with or dismissal On Chemetron defendants, and notes. stock for its of 53 of against Westec PGAC stock case nonmarket, defendants, BFI, Austin, Bintliff, and a was four and The transaction (“Brazos trial that Cotton Valley Company official testified at Brazos Oil Chemetron played no price Valley”), market of Westec to trial in the Dis- came Southern shares the deal. role in Chemetron’s evaluation of jury trict of Texas before a in 1979. The told claims it was never of the Chemetron legal had been narrowed to viola- claims manipulation would not stock scheme and (1) tions three statutes: section 9 of have made deal had it known. Exchange Act of 15 U.S.C. Securities (2) (1976); 10(b) section of the 1934 § manipulative activities of Hall and Act, 78j(b) (1976), 15 U.S.C. and SEC Williams continued after the Chemetron 10b-5, Rule (1981), C.F.R. 240.10b-5 They transaction. ordered Westec stock in thereunder; and Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. loans parties, seeking the names third (Vernon 1966), art. 4004 the Texas anti- purchases. loan finance One such was fraud statute.4 Bintliff, secured defendant which he for Westec received stock as a fee. Bintliff response special In interrogatories, bought party also Westec stock third from a Val- completely exonerated Brazos arranged by in a sale Williams. ley and found section 9 violation. How- scheme, August part ever, judge judgment the trial entered for placed Williams and Hall stock or- large 10b-5, 10(b), Chemetron section under Rule they der could not finance. Bintliff de- and article based on jury’s remain- ap- to finance it. clined Chemetron ing responses. The three defendants were proached to in- finance it but declined and jointly severally held liable for actual Exchange formed Securities Com- $4,726,128 damages of under federal Exchange, mission the American Stock law, state prejudgment $4,817,- interest of suspended trading in Westec stock. 276, exemplary art. damages under At that time largest Chemetron was the $9,452,256, $582,- 4004 of less settlement of Shortly shareholder Westec. after the 500, $18,413,160. liability a total All suspension trading, went into Westec judgment defendants moved n. o. v. or a Chapter reorganization, emerging X as a trial, new which were denied. All now reorganized company in appeal to this court. Chemetron lodges exchanged its Westec with the bank- shares cautionary cross-appeal. *7 trustee in ruptcy receiving shares and reorganized notes in the company. III. ISSUES ON APPEAL failure of an ava- spawned Westec Law A. Federal Securities Claims. litigation. of lanche This suit in 1967 began when Chemetron sued seek- alleged appellants 57 defendants ing recovery many provi- illegally manipulated of its losses under the national securities sions the federal exchange of and Texas securities market for Westec stock plan, laws. Chemetron basically alleged or misleading failed to disclose made state scheme, or conspiracy manipulate to the ments that scheme in two about violation of repealed September pro- disposition. consistency prior 4. Art. 4004 was effective For with 1967, shortly case, complaint ceedings after Chemetron’s in this we refer to the Texas 21, 1967, August by arising throughout. filed on § ch. claim under art. 4004 as Laws, and Tex.Bus. Tex.Gen. reenacted as & (Vernon Comm.Code § 27.01 There change was no in the statute to our relevant (1981), laws, C.F.R. 240.10b-5 enacted 9(a)5 pursuant section of the § federal securities Act, 10(b)7 of the 1934 Exchange Act of to section 15 U.S.C. U.S.C. Securities 9(e)8 of 78j(b) (1976). the 1934 Section 10b-5,6 17 78i(a) (1976), and SEC Rule offering person selling purchas- for sale or provides: or 9(a) 5. Section ing purchase security, (a) any person, offering di- or to the to unlawful for It shall be any security indirectly, by purchase rectly any use or induce sale of the of the mails the or or instrumentality registered exchange or of means on a national securities interstate commerce, facility any any by of national or of the or dissemination of infor- circulation any exchange, price any or for member of a securities mation such the of to the effect that exchange— likely security national securities to fall will or is rise or (1) purpose creating of false or any For the operations because or more of security. the market of one of trading misleading appearance of active in purpose persons for conducted the any security registered aon national securi- price raising depressing the of such or misleading ap- exchange, a false or ties or any pearance respect with to the market for (6) To either alone or with one more effect or any security, (A) effect transaction such to persons any of for other the series transactions security change which involves such the beneficial enter an order or purchase any security reg- of and/or sale thereof, (B) ownership or exchange istered the for on a national securities purchase orders for of stabilizing fixing, purpose pegging, or of security knowledge such order or orders of size, with the security price in contravention of the such sion of such substantially the same regulations as the Commis- rules and substantially time, the same necessary may prescribe appropri- or as price, substantially the same the sale of protection public ate in interest or for any by security, been or entered such has will be of investors. (C) parties, for the same or different or or any to any security or orders sale of enter order for the 6. Rule 10b-5 states: knowledge with the that an or- directly any person, It shall unlawful for size, substantially der at of or orders the same any indirectly, by means or the use of or instru- time, substantially at sub- the same commerce, mentality of the of interstate or stantially price, purchase of the same any any facility or national securi- mails of security, or will such has been be entered exchange, ties parties. or for' the same or different scheme, device, (a) employ any To artifice or (2) effect, with To alone or one or more other defraud, persons, any a series of transactions in secur- any (b) untrue statement of a mate- To make ity registered on a national ex- securities fact rial fact to omit to state material or change creating apparent actual or active necessary in to make the statements order security raising depress- trading in such or or made, light of the circumstances under security, purpose ing price of such for the made, misleading, they or were inducing purchase se- or such sale of act, (c) any practice, engage To or course curity by others. operate operates or would of business which broker, person If a dealer or or other any person, upon in connec- a fraud or deceit selling offering purchasing or for sale or or security. any purchase tion or sale with the offering purchase security, to induce purchase any security regis- the tered on a national securities the circulation or nary or sale of 10(b) declares: 7. Section exchange directly any person, or It shall be unlawful for indirectly, mentality mails, in the ordi- dissemination any means instru- or the use of course of business of information to commerce or of interstate price any security effect that will such any any facility national securi- or likely or is to rise or fall of market because exchange— ties operations any persons one or con- more (b) employ, in connection with the To or use depress- purpose raising ducted for the or any security registered purchase or sale of security. ing (4) prices of such exchange or a ty securi- national securities broker, person If a dealer or or other any manipulative registered, de- or not so (cid:127) selling offering purchasing for sale or ceptive in contraven- or contrivance device make, offering purchase security, *8 regulations as the and tion of such rules security regarding any registered on a nation- necessary may prescribe or as Commission appropriate exchange, purpose al securities of the public the interest or for in the inducing purchase or sale securi- the of such protection investors. ty, any statement which was at the time and light in the circumstances under 9(e) 8. Section reads: made, respect it misleading false or with willfully (e) Any person participates in fact, who any to material and knew or which he any act in violation of ground or transaction subsection had reasonable false or was so believe section, (a), (b), any person (c) this shall liable to misleading. or any purchase consideration, directly or sell se- who shall price For a or received curity broker, which was affected such indirectly or from a dealer or other

H57 Act, of the trial 78i(e) (1976), creates an court does not specify 15 which of § U.S.C. express private remedy for violations Rule 10b-5’s subsections or combination of 9(a), private an implied However, section cause subsections it on. relies since the long recognized action has been under sec jury manipulative found that there was a 10b-5, 10(b) tion and Rule see Ernst & stock scheme and that the scheme was not Hochfelder, 185, 196, Ernst v. 96 425 U.S. Chemetron, disclosed to the trial court’s 1382, 1375, Ct. 668 S. L.Ed.2d judgment could have been based on Rule (c) 10b-5(a) (banning or fraudulent schemes While specifically alleged vio- in general), 10b-5(b) on Rule (prohibiting 9(a)(1), (2), (4), lations of subsections misrepresentation/nondisclosure), or on (6), the judge jury trial submitted to the both. very jury findings Thus the 9(a)(2) allegation, the subsection di- section permitted, barred 9 relief without manipulative rected at stock the scheme any inconsistency, relief under Rule 10b-5. itself. all three subsections submitted, permitting Rule 10b-5 were result, Appellants assail claiming jury appellants to hold liable under Rule overlap that this private imper- remedies (Rule 10b-5 for either the stock scheme missibly express remedy nullifies the 10b-5(a) (c)), misrepresen- and/or its limitations of section 9. question This (Rule 5(b)), tation/nondisclosure 10b— remedy whether an implied private is avail- both. able under Rule 10b-5 for activities covered In response Special No. Interrogatory express private remedy section 9’s is one 6, the found that not impression Chemetron had of first in this circuit.9 Our task proven the stock scheme “affected” possible is to examine both of bases for stock, it price paid for the Westec a neces- liability, Rule 10b-5 existence of a stock sary claim, of a element section see sec- and misrepresentation/nondisclo- scheme its finding 9(e), 78i(e). sure, tion impermis- 15 U.S.C. This they to determine whether any foreclosed relief 9. nullify under section remedies. sibly express section 9 Nevertheless, 9, judg- nullify trial court entered If both section the trial court’s ment for Chemetron on its federal law judgment legal based on Rule 10b-5 has no claim based on Rule The judgment support 10b-5. and must be reversed. transaction, person injured analysis act or and the so it without missed a footnote. may equity any 1975, sue in law or in court id. at 351 & n.14. In the Seventh Circuit competent jurisdiction damages to recover in Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincoln any sustained as a result of act such or transac- wood, 1287, 1975), 509 F.2d Cir. 1291-93 any may, tion. In such suit court denied, cert. 425 U.S. 96 S.Ct. discretion, require undertaking pay- for the (1976), plaintiff L.Ed.2d held that a could suit, ment of the costs of such and assess file claims under both Rule 10b-5 and In costs, including reasonable reasonable attor- Raytheon Mfg. Fischman v. fees, neys’ Every against party litigant. either (2d 1951), suggested the court in dicta person any pay- who becomes liable make remand, plaintiffs could, amend ment under this subsection recover contri- complaint see, their to state both But claims. any person bution as in cases contract from Lizars, e.g., Amdur v. 39 F.R.D. 36 n.13 who, joined suit, original if in the would have (D.Md.1965), aff’d, 1967), 372 F.2d 103 payment. been liable to make the same No that, despite where court dicta in declared action shall be maintained to enforce liabil- Fischman, prepared was “not ... hold the ity section, brought created under this unless remedies, express 9(a) such . . . Section .... year discovery within one after the of the facts made available Act .. . can be the [1934] constituting the violation and within three ignored by-passed implied in favor of an years after such violation. remedy passed by derived from rule the Com precise ques- New courts have confronted this mission under the Act.” same tion, primed do recently, we are the first to so with Wolgin Magic More Marker significant the benefits of several recent Corp., (E.D.Pa.1979), 82 F.R.D. in- Supreme denied, Court securities law cases. terlocutory appeal F.Supp. Charnay, (E.D.Pa.1979), plaintiffs plead permitted United States v. (9th Cir.), denied, acknowledged cert. but both causes of action court, though (1976), L.Ed.2d question was a close and difficult one. claim, directly confronted with this dis-

1158 17(a) sage by its terms limited to analysis, § we will address purposes of For securities, we purchasers and sellers of (1) is subsection specific questions: two a cause extremely imply reluctant are prohibits misrepresenta- 9(a)(4), which 17(a) significantly that is of action § tion/nondisclosure, by the similar nullified Congress that remedy than the broader 10b-5(b), and do the in Rule prohibition provide. chose to and schemes general bans on fraudulent (c) 574, (citations and 10b-5(a) and at 2488 in Rule Id. at 99 S.Ct. courses of business added). omitted, It also emphasis manipula- stock footnotes specific on nullify the bans that history legislative noted evidence in 9(a)(1), in subsections tion schemes found the exclu- 18(a) was intended to be section (2), (6)?10 n.15, 99 at remedy, sive id. at 573 & S.Ct. even the “re- 2487 & n.15 and warned that Guidance Circuit Supreme Court laws “will purposes” medial of the securities Precedent. broadly more justify reading provision not be questions of these analysis Our statutory scheme language than its “it is an elemen gins premise with the that 578, at permit,” id. at 99 S.Ct. reasonably statutory tal canon of construction partic expressly provides where a statute Ernst, scienter is proof of Under Ernst & remedies, be remedy ular a court must Rule 10b-5. private in a suit under required chary reading others into it.” Trans conclusion, found reaching In this the Court Advisors, Lewis, Inc. v. Mortgage america Act of the 1933 significant that sections 242, 247, 11, 19, U.S. S.Ct. are negligence for mere allowing recovery L.Ed.2d 146 to sec- applicable subject to restrictions Supreme first Court for Looking at 10(b), tion 425 U.S. S.Ct. direction, that, although we find it has not and observed: maintaining yet question addressed the in- procedural We think these limitations implied cause in the face of an of action private judicially created dicate action, Ernst, express cause of see Ernst & 10(b) damages remedy under § —which n.31; n.31, at 211 at 1389 U.S. S.Ct. comparable has no restrictions —cannot Stores, Chip Stamps Drug Blue v. Manor extended, intent consistently with the n.15, 95 S.Ct. Congress, premised negli- to actions on n.15, (1975); 44 L.Ed.2d 539 infra note extension would gent wrongdoing. Such provide its decisions In guidance. some allow causes of action covered §§ Touche Redington, Ross & Co. v. 12(2), brought and 15 to be instead under (1979), 61 L.Ed.2d 82 10(b) thereby nullify the effective- § Court declined to action imply cause of carefully procedural ness of the drawn Act, 17(a) under section of the 1934 express these actions. We restrictions on 78q(a) (1976), for customers of se- bring U.S.C. about unwilling § would be brokerage against support curities firms account- in the result absent substantial is none. 17(a) legislative history, ants and there reports. who audit section support statutory Court found in the 210-11, (footnotes Id. at 1388-89 by Congress: scheme created omitted, added). emphasis and citations Congress But we need not decide whether Chip Supreme Blue Court Finally, in 18(a) expressly provide intended § offering whether stock offerees considered exclusive remedy for misstatements con- maintain a Rule 10b-5 cause of action can 17(a) reports. tained in For where the pur- neither despite they were fact express principal remedy civil mis- the offered shares as chasers nor sellers of reports statements created terms of Rule required by express Con- 10(b). gress contemporaneously pas- holding with 10b-5 and section question specific allegations “prophecies,” of their nullification 10. Because there were no (5), 9(a)(3) prohibit our violations of Rule 10b-5 is not before us. equal analysis applies predicted with force to them dissemination information entire commonly yield trading, stock would the same conclusions. values or known as

1159 81-680, (Nos. 81-1076),11 agreed such offerees have no Rule 10b-5 cause of with the action, express it reviewed the various rem- used in approach and Second District of Acts, edies 1934 Wachovia Bank under the 1933 and includ- Columbia Circuits. & 9, would Trust Co. v. National ing section and declared that Marketing Student “[i]t Congress Co., impute indeed be cert. denied (D.C.Cir.1980), anomalous to 650 F.2d 342 Peat, an Marwick, nom. Mitchell expand plaintiff intention to sub & Co. v. class Co., for a cause of action be- Wachovia Bank & White judicially implied Trust & Case Co., yond the bounds it delineated for compara- v. Wachovia Bank Joy & Trust and v. Co., express ble Wachovia Bank Trust causes of action.” 421 & 954, U.S. 452 U.S. 736, (footnote 95 omitted). 3098, (1981); S.Ct. at 1925 Ross 101 S.Ct. 69 965 L.Ed.2d Co., A. H. v. Robins (2d 607 F.2d 545 Cir. decisions, From these we conclude that denied, cert. 1979), 946, 446 U.S. our questions examination of these must 2175, Huddle (1980). 64 The L.Ed.2d 802 focus on permitting whether a Rule 10b-5 case, ston analysis in this applied must be action here will broaden impermissibly we are it by since bound it until is reversed nullifying section 9 remedy by its restric Supreme Court or overruled tions in congressional defiance of the man Riggers Erectors, banc. S & H & en circuit issue, date. In this court addressing that in OSHRC, v. 1273, Inc. (5th 659 F.2d MacLean, Huddleston v. & Herman 640 1981).12 Cir. modified on denial F.2d 534 1981), Cir. banc, of rehearing rehearing Huddleston, and of en sought 5th In plaintiffs damages - granted, 815, cert. Cir. 650 F.2d alleged misleading U.S. materially state- -, 1766, 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 173 ments in a 640 prospectus. F.2d at 539. grant requires, The exchange of certiorari was limited to tional two securities 9§as questions. 81-680, question In No. is: therefore did not the conflict we consider face Rubin, implied Judge Huddleston, remedy here. Does of exist under either the author 10(b) Exchange opinion § of 1934 did Securities Act or not consider in his Alabama Farm 17(a) purchasers dispositive § of presented 1933 Securities Act for Bureau in the conflict express remedy Huddleston, securities who have under nor do we believe it resolves the 11§ 1933 Act virtue fact that securi- presented conflict here. purchased pursuant regis- ties were issued We also note that Fifth some Circuit cases required by tration statement filed 5 of § holding have been cited as that “remedies of 1933 Act? the two [1933 and Acts are cumulative 1934] question 50 U.S.L.W. at 3796 plaintiffs and that have a choice the event of 1076, No. 81 which is irrelevant in this case n.33, overlap.” Wachovia, F.2d at 357 cit 650 disposition, due to our vincing is: “Is clear and con- Frank, 467, ing (5th Cir.), Wolf v. 477 F.2d 475 appropriate proof standard burden of 975, denied, cert. 414 94 S.Ct. 38 private Rule 10b 5 actions?” id. at 3797. Desser, (1973), L.Ed.2d 218 and Rekant F.2d permit Cir. Prior cases in do this circuit not us to forego analysis. in Wolf the district court held and the Huddleston (1) plaintiffs this court affirmed that had no In Alabama Farm Bur. Mut. Cas. Co. v. individual claim under 10b-5 but that de- Rule Co., Fidelity American (5th Life Ins. 606 F.2d 602 rivative relief under- Rule 10b-5 was available 1979), denied, cert. (2) plaintiffs an had individual claim (1980), plaintiffs L.Ed.2d Act, under 12 of the 1933 brought § § U.S.C. a derivative action under Rules 10b-5 (1976), but no derivative claim. See against and 14a 9 defendant directors and offi 471-73, 475-76, Thus, 478-79. Wolf held repurchase program. cers for their stock Un those der remedies cumulative insofar as it plaintiffs alleged Rule 10b that the re permitted plaintiffs purchase different program to maintain caus- was an undisclosed “mani action, pulative implied express, es price one one corporate device” to boost capacities, thereby protect stock different and deriva- manage as individuals incumbent tively. corporation. ment’s control of the Id. at 605. Rekant, although grant court this court cited the reversed the district court’s summary Raytheon judgment Second Circuit dicta in Fischman v. for the defendants on this issue, Mfg. (2d 1951), holding program id. at Wachovia, Ross, concerning nondisclosure of facts underlies and Huddle material 10b-5, ston, “unnecessary could violate Rule id. at 611-13. The court held it to deter court presented implied in Alabama Bureau mine” Farm was not whether cause of action ex pursuant promulgated with a 9 cause action since the ists under § Rule 15d- apparently registered 15(d) Act, stock 78o(d) on a na- 15 U.S.C. statute and rule. 9(a)(4) existed a conflict between sections 11 Subsection con There *11 Act, 12(2) of the 1933 77k U.S.C. §§ provision forbidding misrepresenta tains a (2) (1976), an each of which creates quite tion that similar to that found express remedy misrepresenta for such Rule 10b — 5: tions, and Rule 10b-5.13 The court com (a) any person, It shall be unlawful for pared competing causes of action to indirectly, by or directly the use of determine requires whether Rule 10b-5 any instrumentality mails or means or proof necessary recovery” of facts “not to commerce, any facility or interstate action, express under the causes of reason any exchange, national securities or for ing requires if Rule 10b-5 additional any member of a ex- national securities creating higher facts proof, burden change— action is available. See implied Rule 10b-5 permitted 640 F.2d at 542. The court

implied requires action because Rule 10b-5 (4) broker, If a dealer or or other scienter, deceit with elements committed person selling offering or for sale or id.14 12(2). not found in sections 11 and See purchasing offering purchase or make, Supreme security, regarding any

With these Court and Fifth Cir- securi- us, guide cuit cases to we turn ty registered now to the on a national securities specific questions before us. purpose inducing for the exchange, purchase security, or sale of such

2. The Misrepresentation and Nondisclo- any statement which was at the time sure Remedies. light and in the of the circumstances made, under which it was false or mis- Our examination of this issue be gins with a comparison of the texts of the leading respect any with material (1976). allegations Since the court failed to cross that with Wachovia dealt of artificial threshold, question price through it did not reach the analo- stock inflation numerous oral gous presented to the one here of misrepresentations, including press whether two and written implied overlap may pursued remedies that releases, be reports, reports. and unfiled SEC-filed simultaneously. See 425 F.2d at 882. Absent, however, See 650 F.2d at 345. was a requires Neither Wolf nor Rekant us to rec- claim, probably § 9 and there was no basis for ognize remedy forego 9§ here and the Hud- one, appears since that the stock at issue was analysis. dleston traded over the counter and on a not national exchange. securities See v. National Stu SEC opinion claim, 13. The does not mention a 9§ Marketing Corp., F.Supp. dent probably and there was no basis for one since (D.D.C. 1978). The court held that Rule 10b-5’s misleading alleged statements were not requirement, imposes “higher fraud part scheme, manipulation be of a stock proof,” burden of was a “trade-off” for the apparently regis- the stock at issue was not 12(2) restrictions of 11 and of the 1933 Act §§ exchange tered on a national securities 9§ Act, 77k, 18 of the 1934 15 U.S.C. § §§ requires. (2), and 78r See 650 F.2d at 355-58. Huddleston, Wachovia, posited an- and Ross Ross, price the claims involved stock ma- reason, here, present permitting other not nipulation price through and artificial inflation implied an If cause of action. those courts had misleading dissemination of false and informa- remedies, permitted only express the availabili- releases, reports, press pro- tion in annual ty depended of those would remedies have forms, spectus, and -K10 some of which were part containing on whether the documents filed with the SEC. See 607 F.2d at 547. There misrepresentations were filed with the SEC. claim, apparently despite 9§ the fact opinions all three concluded that bas- that some of the statements have violated liability ing vagary on such a would be irration- registered § the stock was on a national permitted implied al and therefore cause requires. securities market as permitted The court § filing despite action under Rule 10b-5 free of re- a Rule 10b-5 action a conflict quirements express express remedy with the Act, of the remedies. See 640 in § 18 of the 1934 542-43; 357; (1976), F.2d at 650 F.2d at 607 F.2d at U.S.C. 78r § false state- require ments in SEC-filed documents because documents to Rule 556. Since does required SEC, permit- 10b 5 the “far more difficult task” of be filed with the this rationale for proving justified ting fraud and scienter that dis- a Rule 10b-5 action in the instant case is pensing requirement. with 18’s reliance inapplicable. 607 F.2d at 555 56. fact, or (hereinafter and which he knew had reason- Item 18 cited as to believe was so false or ground able Mahar); Ellenberger & S.Rep.No.792, 73d misleading. reprinted in Cong., (1934), 2d Sess. 12-13 Mahar, Ellenberger & Item 17. Whether added). 78i(a)(4) (emphasis 15 U.S.C. § 10b-5(b) applied Rule can be misrep- also for any person, It shall unlawful resentations in the of a manipulative course by the directly indirectly, any use of scheme banned section 9 on the turns instrumentality means of interstate Huddleston analysis. results commerce, or of the mails facili- *12 ty any exchange, of national As the Huddleston court stated: securities necessary prove

The elements to a Sec- 10(b) tion claim any To make statement of a ap- have been so often untrue (b) material fact or to to state a plied the lower federal omit materi- courts that al necessary fact in order to make the they can be in black stated letter fashion. made, light statements in of cir- To out the the 10(b), make a claim under Section made, they cumstances under which were is which based on the common action law misleading not deceit, plaintiff (1) .... of must establish a misstatement (2) or an omission of ma- added). 17 240.10b-5(b) (emphasis C.F.R. § (3) (4) terial fact with on made scienter15 prohibition 9(a)(4) The in cer- subsection is (5) plaintiff proxi- which the relied tainly to apply misrepresenta- intended to mately injury. caused his in manipulative tions made course See schemes 9. H.R.Rep. (footnote banned section omitted). 640 F.2d at 543 Subsec- No.1383, Cong., (1934), 73d 10-11 9(a)(4), 2d tion as privately through Sess. enforced reprinted in 5 Ellenberger 9(e), J. S. & P. requires (1) E. subsection misstatement 16 Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities (2) or of material (3) omission fact17 made 18 Act of 1983 and Exchange Securities Act of (4) the purpose with scienter of induc- (“The 15. The definition of in pro scienter this fol expressly circuit Senate amendment . . . Supreme lows that of the Court in & Ernst vides that a shall statement be construed to embracing Ernst: “A any mental to state intent include omission state a fact. material deceive, defraud,” manipulate, provision or 425 at The latter omitted substi from the n.12, 193 96 S.Ct. at 1381 surplusage, n.12. Broad v. Rock tute as view of the fact that a Corp., well Internat'l 961 obviously misleading statement be be Cir.) (en banc), denied, - U.S. -, cert. materia] omission.”); cause aof cf. In re Penn S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 380 F.Supp. Litigation, Central Securities circuit, others, permits like the Rule 10b--5 (E.D.Pa.1973), 'd, (3d 494 F.2d 528 aff requirement scienter ness, to be fulfilled reckless 1974) (identical 18(a) phrase § Act, 78r(a) (1976), 15 U.S.C. construed § highly omissions). limited to those unreasonable omis- include misrepresentations sions or merely simple that involve not negli- or even inexcusable 9(a)(4) 17. Subsection addresses or statements gence, departure but an extreme from the misleading omissions that are “false or respect with care, ordinary present standards and that any material fact.” danger buyers misleading or sellers which is either known defendant or is 9(a)(4) covers Subsection statements or so obvious that must have defendant speaker omissions made if or “knew had been aware of it. they ground reasonable to believe" that were Supreme id. at 961 62. The Court re has false,or misleading, (emphasis added). Sub- question served the scienter whether under 9(e) “[a]ny applies person section who will- Rule 10b 5 includes recklessness. See Aaron fully participates act or transaction in SEC, n.5, ” (a) (emphasis violation of added). . . .. subsection n.5, Ernst, (1980); 64 L.Ed.2d 611 Ernst & n.12, 425 U.S. at 193 1381 n.12. interplay 9(a)(4) (e) yields The Although express language 9(a)(4) most two standards for actionable behavior. only first, misleading” addresses “false or state a statement or omission known to be omissions, made, Congress clearly misleading willfully ments intended false or second, to cover omissions as well. See constitutes H.R.Conf. scienter. a statement Rep.No. Cong., (1934), misleading 73d 2d Sess. 32 or omission believed to false or Mahar, made, reprinted Ellenberger in 5 & Item at the time and under the circumstances 9(a)(4) under section than that borne under purchase security19 of a

ing a sale (6) that affected plaintiff 10b-5(b). which the relied20 Rule selling price.21 purchase or plaintiffs Finally, 9(a)(4)’s subsection causation implied perceive We thus tougher plaintiff standard is also for a —the 10b-5(b) cause of action under Rule plaintiff’s purchase price or sale must be 9(a)(4) differ express remedy of subsection “affected,” require- while “the causation scienter, intent to respects, in at least three ment is satisfied in a Rule 10b-5 case sale, and causation. purchase induce if the misrepresentation upon touches While Rule recklessness to permits 10b-5 reasons in val- investment’s decline supra see requirement, fulfill its scienter Huddleston, (emphasis ue.” 640 F.2d at 549 9(a)(4) (e) legis and its note section added). presents This case the classic ex- loosen its permit lative do not us to history ample liability difference under reck by permitting scienter requirement causation standards. The found these S.Rep.No.792, suffice. 73d lessness to manipulative that the nondisclosure of the (1934), reprinted in 5 Cong., 2d Sess. not “affect” the price scheme did 17; Mahar, Ellenberger H.R.Rep. Item & *13 negotiated Chemetron in its nonmarket No.1383, (1934), Cong., 2d re 73d Sess. purchase of Westee stock—thus no subsec- Mahar, printed Ellenberger in 5 & Item 18. 9(a)(4) remedy. the tion nondis- Therefore, requirement section 9’s scienter obviously upon closure touched the reason is stricter than Rule 10b-5’s. for the decline in value of Chemetron’s Furthermore, the “intent to induce” re- stock because the nondisclosure hid Westee 9(a)(4) quirement subsection is distinct manipulative scheme. from the scienter requirement of Rule 10b- 10b-5(b) requires Rule therefore no addi- 5(b). While one intend to a fraudu- do proof creating higher tional of facts a bur- 10b-5(b)’s thereby fulfilling lent act Rule when proof compared den to subsection scienter requirement, the intent that fact, 9(a)(4). 10b-5(b) Rule creates a a purchase act induce or sale is a distinct proof lower burden of than subsection does and more specific requirement. Thus 9(a)(4)22 and contains elements that “intent requirement to induce” creates a compensate higher proof plaintiff change. Lacking burden of for the for this a made, yet willfully misrepresentation also constitutes scienter. securities law remedies for Prosser, 685-86, See Torts 105 at 107 at § § are rooted in the common law tort cause of see, Huddleston, 700 01 ed. deceit, e.g., action for 640 F.2d (Rule at 547 n.21 10b-5 derived from deceit 9(a)(4) applies 19. Subsection to statements or action), a basic element of which was reliance purpose inducing omissions made “for the Prosser, by plaintiff. Torts 105 at 685- § purchase security. (Emphasis or sale” of a 1971); 108 at 714-18 ed. Restate § added). 9(e) applies “[a]ny per- Subsection (Second) (1977); ment of Torts cf. Ro willfully § participates son who act ” Hano, (3d senberg (a) transaction violation of subsection .. .. 1941) (§ added). implements (emphasis common law doctrine of limitation). time Huddleston, Judge 20. As Rubin stated in re- liance and causation are related but distinct liability any per- 9(e) “to Subsection extends concepts. See 640 F.2d at 549. Under § any security purchase son or sell at a who shall by “affecting causation is established price by act or transac- which was affected [an] price” requirement. infra n.21. (a)].” (empha- of subsection tion violation [in 9(a)(4) requires We hold that also reliance § added). sis legis- on the omissions or misstatements. history Congress lative 9 makes clear that Lowenfels, Bromberg Se- 22. Accord 1 & L. A. desired that reliance be established. “[T]he 2.5(4) curities Fraud Fraud § & Commodities plaintiff burden is on fact to show . . . the (1968) (“Proof requirements appear much easi- misleading, that the statement was false or and civil-liability express er under than under 10b-5 he relied his detriment.” thereon (em- manipulation.”) provisions market for S.Rep.No. (1934), Cong., 73d 2d Sess. 13 added, omitted). phasis citing footnote 9§ reprinted Mahar, Ellenberger in 5 Item 17. & This is in accord with the observation a. 10b-5(a) Elements of Rule easing trade-off for this of the burden of (c). and proof enlargement and concomitant class,23 we hold that plaintiff permitting a To 10b-5(a) (c), violate Rule and a person judgment for under a Rule 10b- (1) device, scheme, employ must or arti- 5(b) implied misrepresentation engage action fice to defraud or in a course of operates (2) business that as a fraud with impermis- nondisclosure of the stock scheme (3) plaintiff scienter25 on which the relied26 and care- sibly Congress’ nullifies deliberate (4) that proximately injury, caused his/her express statutory ful limitations on the 9(a)(1). b. The Elements of Subsection 9(a)(4).24 remedy of subsection To make out a violation of subsec 9(a)(1) tion in a private action under subsec Manipulation The Stock Remedies. 9(e), plaintiff tion prove must the exist Because there are some differences be- (1) ence of a wash sale or matched orders in 9(a)(1), (2), (6), tween subsections we (2) with security27 done scienter28 compare must each separately to Rule 10b- the purpose creating a false or mislead 5(a) (c) Huddleston to fulfill the analy- ing appearance of active trading in that sis. (4) on which security29 plaintiff relied30 broadening Huddleston, 23. This concern over “inexorable 26. See 640 F.2d at 547-48. Under Ob-5, plaintiffs” Huddleston, invoking 10b-5(a) class of under Rule 1 Blue conduct Rule Chip, 421 U.S. (c) has presumption by creates of reliance consistently expressed by Supreme been plaintiff, leaving proof to the defendant of non- see, Court, e.g., Ernst, Ernst & 425 U.S. at 214 reliance as an affirmative defense. n.33, n.33; Industries, 96 S.Ct. at 1391 Santa Fe Green, 462, 478-79, Inc. v. 9(a)(1)(A), 27. Wash sales are banned (1977), 51 L.Ed.2d 480 9(a)(1)(B) (C). matched orders *14 § circuit, see, e.g., Wallace, Herpich 430 792, 1970). F.2d Cir. very language 9(a)(1) requires 28. The of § (e.g., any transaction,” scienter “effect “enter by 24. While we have reached our conclusion knowledge”). order . .. with the In addi- focusing solely proof, on the burden of there tion, 9(e) applies any person subsection who procedural are also limitations on 9§ remedies “willfully participates” in an act or transaction present 9(e) in Rule 10b-5 actions. See § 9(a). violating S.Rep.No. 792, Cong., § 73d (discretionary security fees, right costs and (1934), reprinted Ellenberger 2d Sess. 17 in 5 & contribution, uniform federal statute of limita- Mahar, 17; 1383, H.R.Rep.No. Cong., Item 73d tions). Supreme emphasized Court has (1934), reprinted Ellenberger 2d Sess. 20 in 5 & respect that courts must both the substantive Mahar, 18; Minuse, Item United States v. 114 procedural imposed by and gress. limitations Con- 36, (2d F.2d 39 Cir. e.g., Ernst, Ernst & See. 425 U.S. at 29, 30, nn.29, 210 11 & nn. 96 at S.Ct. 1389 & 9(a). 29. § procedural 30. Consideration of these limits reinforces our conclusion. legislative history 30. The of § 9 erects a re- Finally, presence we also note the of an “ad- requirement: liance weigh[s] heavily ditional that ] consideration against permitting a provides cause of action under Rule any person bill [T]he that who un- 5,” Industries, 477, 10b Santa Fe 1302, 430 U.S. at 97 lawfully manipulates price security, of a S.Ct. at dy, the existence of a state law reme- security by or who induces transactions in a infra, Chip, discussed see Blue 421 U.S. at misleading means of fraud or statements . . . n.9, 738 95 S.Ct. at 1927 n.9. The Texas reme- damages shall be liable in to those who have advantages dies offer several over the federal bought security prices or sold the affected Bateman, Litigation: remedies. See Securities by such violation or statement. In such case The 1977 Modernization of Section 33 plaintiff the burden is on to show the Act, Texas Securities 15 Houston L.Rev. 839 violation or the fact that the statement was (1978); Bordwine, Civil Remedies Under the misleading, false or and that he relied there- Laws, Texas Securities 8 Houston L.Rev. 657 on to his detriment. (1971); Comment, Section 27:01: Alternative 792, S.Rep.No. Cong., 73d 2d Sess. 12-13 Remedies, to Federal Securities Fraud 33 Sw. (1934), reprinted Mahar, Ellenberger in 5 & L.J. 703 Item 17. Ernst, 199, 25. See Ernst & 425 212 U.S. 14 & n.20, 1383, n.20; supra 96 S.Ct. at 1390 1391 & n. 15.

1164 (5) (4) plaintiff,35 relied on or sell- plaintiff’s purchase affected (5) that selling or plaintiff’s purchase affected ing price.31 price.36 9(a)(2). c. The Elements of Subsection 9(a)(6). The Elements Subsection d. of sub to show a violation order subsection a violation of prove suit under sub To 9(a)(2) private

section in a suit under subsection 9(a)(6) private in a 9(e), plead must plaintiff section (1) a required to show (1) 9(e), plaintiff transactions in a a series of prove (2) security37 trading of transactions apparent or series security creating actual fixing, pegging, or purpose raising depressing made for security in that in vio security of that (2) stabilizing price carried out with price security,32 of that (3) with scient rules38 done (3) purpose inducing for the lation of SEC scienter33 (5) others,34 plaintiff on which the relied40 er39 security’s purchase sale or necessity proving Brief of 9(e). scienter. See 31. § Piper v. Chris- as Amicus Curiae SEC 9(a)(2). 926, It noted Inc., 1, § should Industries, 97 S.Ct. 430 U.S. Craft 9(a)(2)’s reach be limited SEC rules (1977), n.*. 51 L.Ed.2d 124 at 33 & legiti permitting manipulative activities sharply circum- Ernst and Aaron have Ernst & See, e.g., stabilizing purposes. Rule mate SEC rules, power to enact such scribed the SEC’s (1981). Prior to 10b 17 240.1Ob-7 C.F.R. since both the SEC cannot discard held adoption had held Rule courts 10b-7’s statutorily of ac- elements of a cause defined activity during legitimate stabilizing power That the SEC’s tion under Rule 10b-5. violative of stock distribution otherwise particularly Aaron clear from is limited is See, 9(a)(2) e.g., Perga is not actionable. § ment v. aff’d, negligence to where would not allow the Court Frazer, (E.D.Mich.1950), F.Supp. 13 93 injunctive under Rule 10b-5 suffice for relief denied, 1953), 315 Cir. cert. required when the statute scienter. (1953); L.Ed. 355 rules of SEC status Whatever the current Kaiser, (S.D.N.Y.1948). F.Supp. Stella v. actions, that an the extent SEC enforcement private express rule is basis for SEC See, Westinghouse Air e.g., Crane Co. v. may not be that rule cause of action under § 1969), (2d Brake expressed defy Congress as will used to denied, cert. discarding 9(e) by cause elements of that in § grounds, (1970), on other L.Ed.2d 50 on remand make be used to An rule cannot of action. SEC (S.D.N.Y.1971), F.Supp. other rev'd on language of a and intent around the an end-run 1973); supra (2d grounds, 490 F.2d 332 213-14, Ernst, U.S. at & statute. See Ernst n.28. *15 1391; Piper Indus- v. Chris-Craft 96 S.Ct. at 1, 41, 45-46, tries, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 9(a)(2). 34. § (1977); text infra L.Ed.2d 124 & n.27 Congress accompanying has That nn. 52-55. supra n.30. 35. See private requirement for a a scienter created rule of an SEC of action for violation cause 9(e). 36. § beyond perad- 9(a)(6) (e) is clear under and § Indeed, supta words n.28. venture. See 9(a)(6). 37. § stabilizing” fixing, of art “pegging, are terms or and their markets of securities in the context any currently have 38. Id. The does not SEC meaning or intentional connotes commonsense exclusively although published § rules under Ernst, U.S. at Ernst & willful conduct. Cf. 10(b) promulgated either several pursuant rules are § (word “manipu- 197-99, at 1382-1383 10(b) pursuant or to both 9 and §§ 10(b) art in securi- a term of in held § lative” See, e.g., covering 10 but 9 activities. § § connoting intentional market context ties 6, 7, 8, 13, 240.10b- Rules 10b 17 C.F.R. § behavior). willful 6, 7, 8, Thus, (1981). must be reference by the observa- conclusion is buttressed Our they any had to and conditions those rules Congress activities banned that intended tion by, 9(a)(6) impose plaintiff pursuing if a § a instance, 9(a)(1) (wash and sales for § may claim. those rules none of situations, orders) illegal in all to be matched statutorily-im- Congress’ used to circumvent very 9(a)(1) requires yet language of § 9(a)(6) posed requirements and as found Congress’ intent about scienter and doubt (e). See infra n.39. requirement scienter removed S.Rep.No. 9(e) private actions. See it can enact that has maintained The SEC (1934), reprinted in 5 Cong., 2d Sess. 17 73d 10b-6, rules, prophylactic Rule as such page 1165. per note 40 on illegal without 40. See particular practices se brand of the burden purchase selling proof and plaintiff’s accompanying that affected price.41 class,46 enlargement plaintiff of the we hold permitting verdict for Chemetron 10b-5(a) Comparison

e. A of Rule and 10b-5(a) (c) implied under a Rule and action (c) 9(a)(1), and and Subsections impermissibly Congress’ nullifies deliberate (2), (6). and express and careful limitations on the statu 9(a)(1), (2), tory remedy of subsections and We note several elements 9(a)(1), (2), (6).47 make a violation of subsections

and more difficult to prove than viola 10b-5(a) (c). Legislative tion of Rule and History of 1933 and Proper Scope 1934 Acts and the First, causation, previously, as discussed Rule 10b-5. is much easier prove under Rule 10b-5 Second, than under section 9.42 under Rule Any doubts about the results reached un- 10b-5, recklessness can fulfill the scienter analysis der Huddleston are laid to rest requirement. However, may by analysis recklessness an not undertaken in Huddle- ston, Wachovia, not be used to fulfill section 9’s scienter or Ross—the intent of Con- requirement, as we gress legislative history noted our discussion revealed Third, 9(a)(4).43 of subsection while Rule and structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 10b-5(a) (c) structure, and presumption Reviewing history create a and we plaintiff reliance conclude that in the coherent compre- can be rebut- and defendant, ted by controlling section 9 hensive scheme for securities aids established,48 plaintiff Congress with fraud that presumption.44 no such section Fourth, 9(a)(2), only remedy and as to subsection is the for the fraud in this there is an requirement intent to induce case. (c). 10b-5(a)

found in Rule very 9 is Section considered heart “[t]he 10b-5(a) (c) SEC, require Report Proposals Rule therefore of the Act.” proof creating high additional of facts Amendments of the Act of 1933 Securities proof compared Exchange er burden of when sub Act of and the Securities fact, 9(a)(1), (2), (6). Print, sections Cong., Rule H.R. 77th 1st Comm. Sess. 10b-5(a) (c) procedural create a lower burden of With its and substantive Lacking limitations, proof.45 easing specific trade-off for this it takes aim at several Mahar, Ellenberger plain- & Item 18. To have it oth- 44. Shores also further reduce the could, Judge long proof erwise as Chief Cardozo said tiffs burden of of reliance under Rule ago, 10b-5(a) (c) render “in permits defendants liable an indetermi- insofar as it reliance nate amount for an indeterminate time “integrity marketplace.” on the See 647 Corp. indeterminate class.” Ultramares interpreted, F.2d at 471. If Shores is so and we Touche, 170, 179-80, 255 N.Y. 174 N.E. thusly, interpreting forbear from our conclu- (1931), Ernst, quoted in Ernst & proof is rein- sion as to the relative burden of n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 1391 n.33. forced. supra 40. See n.30. Lowenfels, Accord, *16 Bromberg 45. 1 su- A. & L. 9(e). 41. § pra n.22. Sklar, 42. In the wake of Shores v. supra 46. See n.23. 1981) (en banc), petition 471 72 - docketed, U.S. -, cert. 102 S.Ct. supra 47. See n.24. (1981), proof 71 L.Ed.2d 646 of causation under -5(a) and(c) may Rule 10b be easier than it is Judging by holds, 48. its own mem- 10b-5(b). the comments of under Rule If and Shores so bers, Exchange express opinion the Securities Act of 1934 is we no on this issue since we not, probably one of the better statutes terms need our conclusion as to the relative 10b-5(a) (c), emerge proof thoroughness coherence ever to burdens of under Rule and and See, 9(a)(1), (2), e.g., Cong.Rec. Congress. and and § is reinforced. from 78 8164 Fletcher). (1934) (remarks of Sen. supra nn.15, 43. See 18. 1166 Ernst, Congress 425 schemes,49 to do so. See Ernst & vir manipulation of stock

types 1389; Ruder, 210-11, 96 U.S. at S.Ct. at acknowledged tually all to be known and Liability Civil Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial addition, section 9 in 1934. harmful Legislative Revision of Intent? 57 Nw.L. rulemaking power to reach gives SEC (1963). Rev. 649 not known in manipulation of stock types per se at that proven or not harmful 1934 Not clear intent is such of nullifica- (c), 9(a)(6), (b), and 15 See U.S.C. time. § 10(b)’s legislative tion absent from section (c). However, 78i(a)(6), (b), Con and § history, history but that demonstrates wisdom, laid legislative in its down gress, opposite 10(b) in- section was never —that private liability under section limits on supplant tended to traduce the remedies SEC, private nor parties, Neither and limitations of section 9 or the other limits, those go courts around express of the 1933 and Acts. remedies 1934 rulemaking power how matter broad inception through From its various amend- "form, Court Supreme 10(b) since the has made final appears, ments and into its section always provi- clear that the “administration of a feder was intended as a “catchall” sion to reach not power statute is not the to make law.” activities covered or antici- al Ernst, pated provisions in other of the Acts. & at 96 at Ernst 425 U.S. S.Ct. 1391; Aaron, at see hearings, In House committee Thomas 1952; Industries, Piper v. Chris-Craft Corcoran, an official of the ad- Roosevelt Inc., n.27, S.Ct. U.S. drafting ministration who assisted in the n.27, (1977). Equally 51 L.Ed.2d 124 obvi Act, provisions described of section promulgated is that a rule under section ous 9(c), 10(b), forerunner section 10(b) cannot be to evade section 9. used these terms: 45-47, Piper, S.Ct. at U.S. (c) says, Subsection “Thou shalt de- not 951-952. cunning vise other Of devices” .... (e) course is a Congress very

That concerned about subsection catch-all clause prevent manipulative scope by devices. I do section 9 evidenced any objection think there kind legislative to that drafting, history, meticulous and of a clause. The Commission have should investigation the massive led to it. authority manipula- deal with See, new e.g., S.Rep.No.1455, Cong., 73d 2d Sess. tive devices. (1934), reprinted Ellenberger in 5 54-55 & Mahar, (known Item 21 as the Fletcher Exchange Regulation, Stock Be Hearings Comm, Report); Cong., 73d H.R.Rep.No.1383, 2d fore the House on Interstate (1934), reprinted in 5 Sess. Ellenber- Commerce, Foreign Cong., 73d 2d Sess. Mahar, nullify & To ger Item 18. section (1934), Mahar, reprinted Ellenberger in 8 & implication violate the by would “cardinal Landis, added). Item (emphasis J. M. repeals principle by construction FTC Commissioner one of the Act’s implication are not favored.” Silver v. New draftsmen, interpretation substantiated this 341, 357, Exchange, York Stock 10(b): gives general section “[I]t 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 power prescribe to the Commission to rules Congress’ principle great regulations governing This care any other mani investigation through passage pulative from final Id. at reprinted devices.” in 8 Mahar, against Ellenberger of section 9 (emphasis militates nullification & Item 23 implication added).50 by express by without desire 9(a)(1)(A), by “persons responsible “Wash 50. As made § sales” are banned comments bill,” 9(a)(1)(B) (C), preparation drafting “matched for the or the orders” mar- [the] Ernst, 9(a)(2), n.24, operations by “prophecies” Ernst & ket 425 U.S. at 203 96 S.Ct. at *17 n.24, 9(a)(3) (5), during misleading by and § and false state- 1386 and cross-examination by committee, 9(a)(4), pegging, fixing, congressional see ments or stabiliz- comment from a § Piper, ing 9(a)(6), n.20, prices by “puts,” § securities 430 31 & 944 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at & n.20, “calls,” “straddles,” “options,” “privileg- Messrs. views of Corcoran and Landis by 9(a)(6), (b), (c), (d). weight. See 2A C. D. es” are of § considerable

1167 report the Senate committee securities acts unless committed by an proposed which studied bill summarized over-the-counter broker or dealer. 8 SEC 10(b) (b) as Ann.Rep. (1943); section follows: “Subsection 10 see Securities Ex- by reg- change 1934, authorizes the Commission rules and 15(c), Act of 15 § U.S.C. prohibit regulate 78o(c). the use of ulations Viewing § the rule as an “addi- any manipulative deceptive prac- other protection tional investors,” 8 SEC tices which it finds detrimental to the inter- Ann.Rep. (1943), 10 the Commission fash- S.Rep.No.792, ests of the investor.” 73d ioned it to applicable “make to the pur- Cong., (1934), 18 reprinted securities, 2d Sess. in 5 chase of the same broad anti- Mahar, Ellenberger (emphasis provisions & Item 17 fraud which the Congress has added). Fletcher, Finally, imposed Senator 17(a) Sen- in Section of the Securities Act, sponsor 1933, ate of the declared in the floor Act of in connection with the sale of 10(b) gave debates that section securities.” SEC' Ward La France Truck “power forbid-any Corp., 373, other devices.” 78 13 S.E.C. n.8 To ac- Cong.Rec. added). complish 2271 (emphasis this end the Commission . . . copied the language 17(a) of section purpose In line with the catchall of sec- the Securities Act . . . and applied it “in 10(b), tion the conference committee broad- connection with purchase or sale of rulemaking power ened the SEC’s to in- any security,” being the reach of interest, protection public clude of the 10(b). section See also Birnbaum v. New- protection well as of investors. H.R.Conf. port Cir., 1952, Steel Corp., 2 193 F.2d Rep.No.1838, Cong., 73d 2d Sess. 32-33 ; Loss, 463 3 and 6 Securities Regula- (1934), Mahar, reprinted Ellenberger in 5 & (2d tion 1961), 1424-1427 ed. 3617 (Supp. Supreme Item 20. The Court and this cir- 1969). 2d ed. cuit have consistently interpreted section 430 F.2d at (emphasis added); ac See, 10(b) Aaron, e.g., as a catchall. 446 cord, Ernst, Ernst & n.32, 425 U.S. at 212 96 1952; U.S. at 100 at Ernst & S.Ct. at 1390 n.32. Ernst, 1385; U.S. S.Ct. at Wallace, Herpich years four adoption after the 1970). 10b-5, Rule came the landmark decision Judge Kirkpatrick that there existed an power From this to enact catchall rules implied private right of action under the 10(b) under section came Rule 10b-5. Rule. Kardon v. Gypsum National Judge Ainsworth, thorough in his and schol- F.Supp. (E.D.Pa.1946). The Supreme opinion arly Herpich, captured pre- Court subsequently acquiesced judi in this origins original cise purpose of the cial implication. Ross, Touche Rule: n.19, 99 S.Ct. at 2490 n.19. adopted The SEC Rule 10b-5 in 1942 to Judge Kirkpatrick close a confronted a novel “loophole protections in the is- again sue against one apposite fraud to our administered case. Com- In Rosenberg v. Globe by prohibiting Corp., mission Aircraft individuals or com- F.Supp. (E.D.Pa.1948), panies plaintiffs from buying securities if they en- assert- ed a Rule 10b-5 gage in claim that purchase.” duplicated fraud in their SEC coverage of sections 11 and 12 1942). Sec.Exch.Act of the (May Rel.No.3230 Act, 77k, 15 U.S.C. purpose rule, clear, 777. His §§ it seems resolution of this conflict between the express to afford sellers of securities the implied remedies is worth protections quoting: same already pur- afforded chasers by the federal scheme securi- It supposed cannot be Congress in- regulation. ties Previously, fraud on sell- tended to abolish regulations and [the] ers, purchasers, as distinct from fraud on limitations 77k and §§ when it [of 777] see 17(a), Securities Act of enacted § Sec. 10 of the Act of 1934. By 77q(a), U.S.C. was not covered reasonable rule statutory interpre- Sands, Statutory 48.06, Sutherland Construction at 203 ed. *18 making a

tation, completely incongruous avoid require express it would either an piece legislation out of the repeal so two stat- repeal implication or an question. utes in The two strong inescapable. as to be materia unquestionably pari are Acts 124-25; accord, F.Supp. at Ernst & together construed to make and must be Ernst, 210-11, 425 U.S. at at 1389. S.Ct. Looking at them as a consistent whole. Judge Kirkpatrick thereupon held that simply possible one statute it is subject under Rule 10b-5 suit would be to Congress, having prescribed in elaborate of the express restrictions remedies that which procedural requirements detail applied. F.Supp. at 124-25. Thus the enforce civil fulfilled in order to must be plaintiffs could not evade the restrictions of attaching carefully to a defined liability express by pleading remedies Rule 10b- violation, casually would have type of 5.51 all in a later section. Nor nullified them reasoning Judge Kirkpatrick in from can an intention to do so be deduced Rosenberg applied has been by two recent 29 of the general provisions Sec. Supreme opinions, Chip Pip- Court Blue 78bb, is, 1934,15 Act of U.S.C.A. which Chip, er. In Blue the Court held that provided by this rights “The and remedies 10b-5, acquire standing under Rule private chapter shall in addition to and all plaintiffs purchasers must be either or sell- exist rights other and remedies securities, ers of the so-called Birnbaum ” equity .. .. As a matter of at law or in holding rule.52 This relied part on the chapter” provide any fact “this does not principle that would indeed be anoma- “[i]t 10(b). the violation of remedies for Sec. impute Congress lous to an intention to general law Those remedies arise expand plaintiff class for a judicially torts, liability to implied which attaches civil cause of beyond action the bounds comparable express the violation of a criminal statute. delineated causes Co., of action.” 421 at point Gypsum in Kardon v. National S.Ct. at 1925. D.C., Act F.Supp. was not that the remedy, provided itself a civil but Piper, the Supreme Court was con- nothing there was in it to indicate that fronted with a claim that the Birnbaum in- Congress intended to withhold from rule applies plaintiffs pursuing private

jured parties right recover dam- Court, remedies under Rule 10b-6.53 The ages normally violations of attends however, decided the standing issue on a “The Undoubtedly a criminal statute. ground, narrower holding that a frustrated rights provided by and remedies tender offeror has no Rule 10b-6 cause of chapter” referred to in Sec. 29 were in- against action the successful offeror based rights tended to be the and remedies solely gain on a failure to control. 430 U.S. did, which the Act of 1934 Sec. Alternatively, 78r, 78i, 78p U.S.C.A. argued private §§ SEC as amicus curiae that a expressly provide for violations of those plaintiff relying on Rule 10b-6 can avail 9(e)’s interpretation standing sections. No other can itself of section requirement case, early Mon- 51. To like effect is another to such cases as are not within the tague America, Corp. v. Electronic former. F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y.1948), (citations omitted); Id. see In re Bache & where 10(b) Fed.Sec.L.Rptr. court concluded that “Section ... [1972-73 Transfer Binder] clearly sup- 93,571 (CCH) (§ remedy Rule X-10B-5 were not intended to 9 exclusive for activ ¶ plant covers, coverage) (N.Y. Section 11 of the 1933 Act.” In so hold- ities it no Rule 10b-5 ing, the court observed: Sup.Ct.1972). statutory The settled rule of construction is 52. The rule is named after the case in which it that, special statutory provi- there is a where Newport Corp., originated, Birnbaum v. Steel affording remedy particular specif- sion denied, (2d Cir.), cert. 193 F.2d 461 general ic where there is cases and also (1952). 96 L.Ed. 1356 provision comprehensive enough which is former, in the include what embraced 10b-6, special provision prevail general Rule SEC 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6 will over the provision, apply and the latter will be held to

1169 provided precisely the (the “any security”) remed[y] or sale of it con- purchase grounded part appropriate.” sidered Middlesex County since Rule 10b-6 is true, Sewerage Authority v. National Supreme 9. If that is Sea Clam- section Association, 1, reasoned, (1981). mers plaintiff Court must also response the correct attempts Thus such 9(e) standing the other section re- meet pioneered as this to evade section 9 is that quirements.54 plaintiff Since failed to by Rosenberg and endorsed in Blue 9(e)’s Chip price” criteri- meet section “affected Piper: and if the action styled as one on, standing. there was no section 9 A 10b-5, under Rule yet addresses section 9 party may selectively pick choose and activities, section 9’s limitations ap- should among requirements, depending on ply.55 Rule 10b-5 has been extended well they whether aid his case. See 430 U.S. at beyond its gap-filling purpose as originally 45-46, 97 S.Ct. at 951. by Congress 10(b) envisioned in section Piper, pri From we conclude that a proposed by the eagerness SEC. their plaintiff pursuing remedy vate an implied improve upon scheme, the statutory a prac- by congressional bound limits on the tice by Supreme Court, condemned express remedy it from which is derived. courts have created law that does not fol- Chip, princi From Blue we derive a similar intent, low congressional which is the “ulti- ple: implied remedies are limited question” mate in these cases. See Touche provisions comparable express remedies. Ross, 578, 2490; at at S.Ct. Despite legislative history of sections Ruder, 55, supra case, note at 628. In this 10(b) Rosenberg- 9 and that underlies the Rule 10b-5 has been extended until it cuts Chip-Piper Blue principles limiting implied Act, out the heart of the 1934 section remedies, courts have permitted private thereby crossing the line between adminis- plaintiffs promulgated to use rules under congressional tration of a statute and mak- 10(b) section to reach section 9 activity ing new law by Congress. unauthorized imposing without section 9’s restrictions. See, e.g., supra cases cited note 9. 5. Conclusion

This is such a case. Section 9 encom- Because we have found that permitting a passed scheme. granted this Yet relief was Rule remedy 10b-5 impermissi- here would 10b-5, defying under Rule the intent of bly nullify the section 9 remedy and is Congress legislative as revealed in the his- “unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of tory the Acts. history, From that “we Congress’ purposes” enacting the 1934 compelled Act, are Congress Industries, to conclude that 477,97 Santa Fe atU.S. urged position may 54. SEC on the Court. since the SEC administer Curiae, supra See Brief of the SEC Amicus securities laws in conformance with con- intent, Aaron, gressional note at 191-94. see 446 U.S. at 1952; Piper, n.27, 100 S.Ct. at 430 U.S. at 41 n.27; Accord, Ruder, Ernst, Liability S.Ct. at 949 Ernst & Civil Under Rule 425 U.S. at 213-14, Intent?, Legislative at S.Ct. it 10b-5: Judicial Revision of not “make 627, 660, promulgating law” rules that 57 Nw.L.Rev. avoid the limi- comparable express private tations of reme- recognize We that Rule 10b-5 was not ex dies, Chip, see Blue 421 U.S. at 95 S.Ct. at pressly promulgated pursuant 9 as was Thus, 40-year-old the mere fact Ob-5, Piper. Compare Rule 10b-6 in Rule 1 expressly promulgated pur- Rule 10b-5 was not (1942), reprinted SEC Exch.Act Rel. No. 3230 suant 9 while more recent rules such as Lowenfels, n.21, Bromberg supra in A. & L. Ob-6, -7, were, logic and -8 does not alter the app. (Rule promulgated “pursuant B to authori Rosenberg, Chip, Piper. Blue Nor does ty upon conferred the Securities Ex [SEC] prevent attaching us from 9§ limits to Rule change particularly 10(b) Act of Sections beyond 10b-5 when it is stretched far its “mod- Ob-6, 23(a) thereof’) with Rule 1 SEC origins" (“closing est aims and an unforeseen (1955), reprinted Exch.Act Rel. No. 5194 loophole”) private right to “extend a of action Fed.Sec.L.Rep. Transfer [1952-56 Binder] Congress ... to those whom excluded from 76,350 Ob-6, (CCH) (Rules -7, pro and -8 ¶ express civil remedies ... to cover such a vio- “pursuant mulgated provisions lation," Chip, n.8, Blue 421 U.S. at Exchange particularly Securities Act of at 1926 n.8. 3(b), 9(a)(6), 10(b) 23(a) thereof”). Sections we reverse the trial faulty court’s mitted special interrogatories judgment as it was insofar based on Rule three elements of an article (1) 4004 claim: 10b-5 and remand for dismissal of the fed- disclose, duty (2) action, intent to induce eral claims.56 Further, material inducement. ap *20 pellants claim that it was error not to sub B. Texas Securities Law Claims. mit separate a interrogatory requesting ex alleged Chemetron violations of article emplary damages as to each appellant. (Vernon 1966).57 Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. initially rejoins appellants’ appeal, On several claims of error are made request failure to object or special against judgment the trial court’s based on interrogatories submitted below waives a art. 4004. jury trial on those issues under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a),58 c 1. Errors in the Special Submission of i t Instructions, Interrogatories and i n Special Interrogatories. a. g (5th 1971); and First Cir. Bank, SBA, National Henrietta v. Appellants assert the trial 429 F.2d erroneously court (5th failed to submit or 1970). sub- Cir. deny cross-appeal

56. Because we Chemetron’s condition it is delivered at the time of the judge’s (1) of the trial denial of a persons directed making repre- contract. All the false judgment notwithstanding verdict and the ver- promises persons sentations or ing and all deriv- regarding Special Interrogatory (the dict No. 6 fraud, jointly the benefit of said shall be answer to which foreclosed 9§ relief because severally damages, and liable in actual and in jury found that the scheme had not “affect- thereto, persons wilfully making addition all price paid stock) ed” the for its Westec and representations promises such false or or (2) denial of a federal securities law claim aris- knowingly taking advantage of said fraud ing out of its 1969 sale of its Westec stock to exemplary damages shall be liable in to the trustee, bankruptcy IV, see infra section we person defrauded in such amount as shall be pretermit discussion of numerous other issues by jury, assessed not to exceed double appeal they raised on insofar as are directed at damages the amount of the actual suffered. the federal securities law claims. 49(a) provides: 58. Rule 57. Former Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4004 Special (Vernon 1966)(reenacted may require Verdicts. The court as Tex.Bus. a & Comm. jury (Vernon n.4, 1968), special supra to return Code 27.01 a see verdict in the special finding upon declared: form of a written each issue of may fact. In that regard event the court Actionable fraud in this State with jury questions suscepti- submit to the to transactions in written real estate or in stock in corporations joint categorical companies or ble of may stock shall or other brief answer or representation consist of either a false of a submit spe- written forms of the several fact, past existing prom- or findings material or might false properly cial which be made ise to do some act in the future which is pleadings evidence; may under the or it made as a material inducement to another use submitting such other method of the is- party to enter into a contract' and but for requiring sues and findings the written there- promise party said would not have appropriate. on as it deems most The court entered into said contract. Whenever a give jury explanation shall to the such promise complied thus made has not been concerning instruction the matter thus sub- by party making with ble falsely it within a reasona- may necessary mitted as to enable the time, presumed it shall be that it was jury findings upon to make its each If issue. made, fraudulently and the bur- doing in so the court omits issue of fact party making den shall be on the it to show by pleadings by evidence, raised or good pre- that it was made in faith but party right by jury each waives his to a trial complying vented from therewith the act of the issues so omitted unless before the God, public enemy equita- some jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such persons guilty ble reason. All of such fraud person shall be liable to the defrauded for all or, finding; demand the court make a if suffered, damages damages actual the rule of so, it faiis to do it shall be deemed to have being the difference between the value of the finding judgment made a in accord with the property represented or as it would have special on the verdict. promise fulfilled, been worth had the been (emphasis added). property and the actual value of the in the apply We in light these criteria of several no merit in this claim. We see circuit, holdings preserves clarify meaning. a claim their party “[T]he being judge denied must submit all material issues by proposing either raised error evidence,” interrogatory by objecting pleadings Simien special interrogatory Kresge before special v. S. S. 566 F.2d proposed Huddleston, 640 F.2d 1978),60 although has retired. none must be sub- Lewis, Fredonia, and Hen John R. through special at 550. mitted twice redundant in- contrary. Either are not terrogatories, rietta Angelina Casualty Co. v. purpose of di Bluitt, serves the ultimate method attention to the

recting the trial court’s requirement The limits the submission is to assist the preferred method issue. recently were outlined: interrogato by proposing special trial court There is no doubt judge must ries, long fatal so failure to do so is not but *21 clearly and properly jury instruct the timely, comprehensible objection is as a regard with to the resolution key is- jury. the id. before submission to See made given sues in a case. there is party each requirement A is that de final [appellant’s] no basis for apparent as- must siring preserve the claim error sumption that because an issue impor- et v. Rodri object. L’Urhaine la Seine See case, tant to the outcome of a the jury 1, 1959). (5th Our 268 F.2d 4 Cir. guez, must be instructed to supply specific a that all of the record indicates examination informing answer the court how they re- preserved their claims of error appellants solved that party one issue. No is enti- timely objections.59 with special tled to a verdict on each of the turn now to the asserted errors. We multi-faceted, multitudinous issues essen- tial to the a given resolution of case. 49(a) special allows ver Rule Co., Miley Oppenheimer 318, v. & 637 F.2d the trial court. dicts at the discretion of (5th 334 Cir. the trial court also has discretion over submitted, a scope of the issues nature holdings, Guided these we turn only for abuse. Loff discretion reviewable law to the of fraud in Texas. Each of the 540, Roberts, 386 F.2d land Brothers Co. v. following elements must be established in denied, 1967), cert. 546 permit (1) order to recovery: charged the 778, 1040, 88 19 L.Ed.2d 830 party representation made false material appellate used in evaluation of The criteria positive that consisted of either a untrue adequacy special interrogatories are: fact, statement of material concealment of whether, (i) when read as a whole and fact, a material or nondisclosure of a mate conjunction general charge with the charged rial fact that party duty had a interrogatories adequately presented disclose; (2) charged party knew that (ii) jury; the contested issues to representation the material was false or the submission of the issues to whether recklessly any knowledge made it without “fair”; (iii) jury was whether truth; (3) charged party of its made the clearly fact” were questions “ultimate representation false material with the in jury. submitted tent that it upon by should be acted Co., charging party; (4) charging Dreiling party v. Electric act General thereon; 768, 1975) (citations omitted). ed in reliance the charging 774 reading points appeal. 59. After the of the instructions to the that covered all of their on retirement, judge objections repeated jury and its the trial enter- These those made at an charge objections tained on the record the instruc- off-the-record conference in chambers proposed jury. tions. Counsel for Chemetron before submission to the objections all file at a later time. The counsel court, instance, 60. Thus the Huddleston agreed, as did counsel for BFI on trial court found reliance and causation were contest- behalf of all defendants. ed material issues in a Rule 10b-5 case and subsequently timely All defendants filed ob- required their submission. 640 F.2d at 549-50. jections interrogatories to the instructions and injury. Chemetron cites several thereby suffered See Cus Texas cases in party Leasing, nonfiduciary relationships Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust have been tom disclose, 138, (Tex.1974); duty see, held to e.g., Ro create a S.W.2d 142-43 Booth, 207, Campbell 167, v. McCullough, v. S.W.2d S.W.2d land (Tex.Civ.App. writ n. r. (Tex.Civ.App. writ ref’d Antonio — Dallas — San e.); Butler, Chandler v. e.); Drilling S.W.2d n. r. Moore & Moore Co. ref’d (Tex.Civ.App. writ), White, no 555 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d — Texarkana or where “active” concealment was actiona e.). n. r. —Dallas writ ref’d disclose, being ble without there a duty to Appellants assert first this see, 172; e.g., Campbell, S.W.2d at nondisclosure, only Bowden, was case of and hence Crofford v. 311 S.W.2d special inter error not to submit (Tex.Civ.App. Worth writ — Fort rogatory duty ref’d). on the to disclose.61 Cheme inapposite The latter cases are since responds was a case involving tron that this concealment was not submitted to the positive cases, concealment or untrue state here. As to the E former Southwest ments, duty Suppliers and therefore to disclose & T held the Texas law apply. permitted exceptions examination of the fraud does Our to the above- quoted indicates that while concealment or rule. record F.2d at 1166. “Once positive panel untrue statements have been of this Court has settled case, state case, nondisclosure was the law to be applied issues a diversity *22 only precedent type misrepresentation of under Texas be by should followed other panels .. . jury.62 subsequent law submitted to the Since nondis a absent state court only liability statutory was the basis for decision or closure under amendment which law, of duty Texas the existence a to dis makes this clearly wrong.” Court’s decision However, Inc., was a issue. Lee v. Express, close material a Frozen Food 592 F.2d 271, duty to particular 1979) curiam). disclose arises (per court has held Chemetron circumstances. This that has cited to us only one Texas law is if there is Campbell—decided “Texas clear that no confi since Southwest case— E fiduciary Suppliers dential or relation between the & T that broadens the rule duty disclose], more, parties [creating a to mere announced. Without this in single misrep opinion, does not amount to fraud or termediate appellate silence on which rests Suppliers, E & T reasoning resentation.” Southwest that the Texas Supreme Court Corp., Inc. v. American Enka refused adopt, to see Tex.R.Civ.P. 483 (West 1980), persuade is to us insufficient premise underlying Compare Schiller, The this assertion Dean is that Keeton. 240 S.W.2d at duty always existence (fiduciary relationship fact), of a disclose is a question a of jury premise issue. This is not valid in all Moore, with Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. duty depends The such a cases. on whether there is a relationship ally existence of (Tex.1980) (four-justice S.W.2d 507-09 fiduciary or confidential plurality opinion arguably fiduciary creating re- parties, between the which is usu lationship family between members as a matter See, question jury. e.g., a of fact for the law). Texas, Despite the state of the law in Elick, (Tex. Schiller 240 S.W.2d authority creating Chemetron cites no a fiduci- Keeton, 1951). But see Fraud —Concealment ary relationship or confidential and its concom- Non-Disclosure, and (1936) (arguing 15 Tex.L.Rev. duty itant here to disclose as a matter law. duty to disclose should Therefore, accept appellants’ premise. we always question judge). be a relationships been certain have held to be fidu Special Interrogatory upon No. which ciary or confidential as a matter of law and can liability premised, under Texas law is asked: jury withdrawn be ney-client, from consideration: attor you preponderance “Do find from trust, que trustee-cestui and so evidence that at the time and the occasion Sample, forth. See Trevino v. 96 e.). 565 S.W.2d purchase Equities Chemetron’s stock on of Western (Tex.Civ.App. writ Paso ref’d n.r. — El 14, 1966, January that there was no fiduciary The kinds existence of other or plan, disclosure to Chemetron of said relationships apparently scheme is confidential question still a (emphasis fact, conspiracy?” added). law but Texas be in flux may moving urged by in the direction interrogatory on their intent “clearly induce ac- Suppliers T E & that Southwest by tion Chemetron. argues Chemetron wrong.” by taking this element is established Thus, by the defendants silence alone interrogatories instructions and as a whole. liability. Premis- create case does not needlessly Hence it have would been redun- an- jury’s affirmative liability on the ing special interrogatory dant to submit a Interrogatory No. 20 was Special swer arguing, this issue. In so Chemetron claims finding that a confi- jury error without necessarily part this element is of the relationship existed. dential alleged manipulative scheme directed at the law on Texas did jury instructions investing public large, which included special failure to submit a cure the not Chemetron. some factual interrogatory that addressed While Special Interrogatory No. 1 cover- They sim- duty of a to disclose. predicate ed the issue of intent to induce by action “an liability is created for ply stated public large,63 clearly Texas law re- material fact or concealment of omission quires an intent to induce action duty with a to disclose.” There person plaintiff liability. for article 4004 Oilwell duty, when it explanation was no Division, Corp. United States v. Fryer, Steel arises, discharged, how it is and so forth. (Tex.1973). Thus, S.W.2d jury reasonably not have made could trial court failed to submit to the finding of a factual required threshold material issue —the defendants’ intent duty for a to disclose before answer- basis induce action Chemetron. Appellants’ Special Interrogatory No. 20. It was ing claim error well taken.64 so, Special to do nor was instructed Appellants’ spe third attack on the in such form as to Interrogatory No. cast interrogatories complains cial of the burden Therefore, special either a in- one. require proof placed Special Interrog on them in concerning the basis of de- terrogatory inducement, atory No. 25 on material duty to disclose fendants’ stated in full: jury, submitted to the should have been No. 20 should have Special Interrogatory *23 DEFENDANTS’ BURDEN it, issue. since it was a material addressed SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 25 any opinion express and do not We need not duty the had such a on whether defendants you preponderance Do find from a of an issue here. We hold such the evidence that Chemetron’s decision to jury. the have been submitted to should purchase January, Westec securities in remand, liability if under Texas law is On 1966 would have been the same decision part or in jury solely submitted to the based scheme, comprising if all transactions the nondisclosure, prove must on Chemetron plan conspiracy manipulate or had relationship the existence of a confidential been prior disclosed interpreted of Texas as we under the law purchase? Suppliers. E & T Southwest jury The answered “no.” challenge the fail

Appellants requires also review of this Our issue some special explanation special submit a of the instructions and ure of the trial court to purchase Special Interrogatory inducing of No. 1 asked: or sale such stock 63. by others ? you preponderance of the Do find from (emphasis added). September during period evidence that 25, 1966, August through James W. Special Interrogatory 64. 1 is not No. defective Williams, directly indirectly, alone or with or jury in what it does —ask the whether there others, participated plan in a or scheme to conspiracy. was a scheme or But as our dis- Equities by manipulate the stock of Western reveals, cussion of Texas law infra the exist- effecting of transactions in the stock n a series conspiracy ence of a civil alone does not create creating ap- Equities, of Western actual or liability under art. 4004: at least one of the trading raising price parent of active conspirators specifically must defraud Equities purpose stock for the of Western plaintiff. proof every trial the burden of interrogatories used court. element correctly that Cheme- jury was instructed plaintiff. action for is fraud on the Brooks conten- proving of tron had the burden Parr, 507 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Civ.App. conspiracy since was also tions.65 writ). Thus, Special —Amarillo them- alleged, could avail the defendants No. 25 Interrogatory erroneously placed the defense withdrawal from of the selves on proof burden the defendant. jury was correct- conspiracy. such jury This court cannot assume that the defendants had ly instructed that proof Special realized that the burden of proof on this defense.66 As burden Interrogatory No. 25 was erroneous throughout moved back and forth burden ignored therefore it. The trial had court special interrogatories, phrases the 31 pattern established a clear written for the (abbreviated BURDEN” “PLAINTIFF’S here) jury “DE- to follow when deliberating, “PB” for our discussion and it is (or DEFENDANT’S) BUR- FENDANTS’ they reasonable to believe that so de did (“DB”) jury were to tell DEN” used spite what their verbal instructions had there in the change when burden been. See Cann v. Ford Motor Thus, at the proof. top PB found denied, (2d 1981), cert. page interrogatories. precedes DB first -, 2036, 72 L.Ed.2d Interrogatory 9 on Special No. Austin’s (1982). Thus, the jury cannot instructions withdrawal, but PB itself before reasserts cure this error. reap- Special Interrogatory No. DB However, it is clear from record evi- pears Special Interrogatory before No. 15 manipulative dence of a massive scheme gives way BFI’s but to PB on withdrawal that the would special have answered a Special 16. DB’s next Interrogatory on No. interrogatory stating the correct burden of appearance Special final Inter- before proof way. the same rogatory No. 25 the one attacked here.67 Given the scale of this Special appears again Interroga- scheme, PB before corporate no reasonable investor No. tory would have behaved as Chemetron if it did scheme, knew about the and no reasonable Erie, is a proof Under burden juror could have reached a different conclu- governed by substantive state in a issue law Therefore, improper placement sion. diversity Wright case such as this. See 9 C. proof the burden Miller, here is not reversible & A. Federal Practice & Procedure Sheppard 2405 and 2409 Under Texas law error. See §§ Federal Credit Union Jury 65. Burden of Proof Instruction No. 11. proving Plaintiff has the burden of its con- 66. The court’s preponderance instruction this issue de- tentions of the evidence *24 evidence, clared: taking into account the both direct circumstantial, testimony and the wit- Withdraw you nesses that have heard. In connection with term the “withdraw” or you important It is now that understand conspir- or “withdrew” “withdrawal” from a preponderance what means. of the evidence acy case, you in as used this are instructed prove something It means to that is more person conspiracy that a withdraws from a if likely greater weight so not so. the than It is engages he in affirmative acts inconsistent upon any ques- of the If believable evidence. object conspiracy, with the of the is to you, you tion submitted to should find that say purpose acts which disavow or defeat the balanced, equally is the evidence then the conspiracy, by communicating of the plaintiff proof its has not sustained burden of reasonably in abandonment a manner calcu- preponderance of the evidence on that co-conspirators. lated to reach Because question. you does It not mean that have to defense, prov- is a withdrawal burden of witnesses, believe the side with the most but ing conspiracy" “withdrawal from a on the is you weigh it means that should all the testi- defendants. which, mony compared when considered and Jury Instruction No. 27. it, testimony opposed with the has the produces your convincing most force and in special interrogatory 67. There is no on Bintliff’s sought minds a that what is to be belief withdrawal. proved likely than true. is more true not

1175 Palmer, 1369, (5th 26, v. In Special Interrogatory Cir. No. jury 1969).68 applied article 4004’s willfulness or knowl- edge requirement to each defendant:

Appellants’ final complaint about special interrogatories is the failure to or you If have found that scheme required submit one that to appor manipulate stock Western plan to exemplary damages tion among them.69 Equities existed In- Special in answer there is no jurisprudence Since Texas 1, you No. if found terrogatory or have squarely on we point, are Erie-bound to in conspiracy that a existed answer guess” make an “educated as to how the 7, Special Interrogatory you No. and if Supreme Texas Court would rule. See have the existence of that found Chemical, U.S.A., Nobs Koppers Co., Inc. v. was plan, conspiracy scheme or a material 212, F.2d 1980). Before fact was not disclosed Cheme- making this guess,” “educated we must ex Special Interrogatories tron answer to in plain this issue further so that it can be 22, you a preponder- do find from properly analyzed. ance of the evidence that of the damages purposes exemplary are willfully defendants concealed the exist- act by of an intentional punishment knowingly ence or of such material fact deterrence of future mis defendant and the advantage activity? took of said McEwen, Pace v. 574 S.W.2d behavior. See defendants, naming Answer said if 1978, writ (Tex.Civ.App. Paso — El any. Miller, e.); n. r. v. 443 S.W.2d ref’d Collins (Tex.Civ.App. writ — Austin Therefore, e.). requires n. r. art. 4004 ref’d knowledge part of the willfulness or on damages are exemplary before

defendants

permitted.70 holding exemplary damages relies on the infra and note here We stress that 68. phrase be used be should that while as to the in this case. evidence record misleading implications, comprising possible the transactions extent cause clear, per sole reversible error is the issue scheme not constitute its use does Interrogatory Special opinions No. We no se, appellate intuit often have Texas since sufficiency damages. of the evidence on exemplary here on the view persons to” “entitled held liability scheme. Pena, See, S.W.2d e.g., Wise v. cases, majority of the evidence In the vast writ (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi — here, it clear as and an will not as Whirley, dism’d); 538 S.W.2d Irwin proof placement of the will burden incorrect 1976, writ); Briggs v. (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco General mandate reversal. Connecticut (Tex.Civ.App. Rodriguez, 236 S.W.2d Breslin, Life Ins. Co. v. n.r.e.). 1951, writ ref’d —San Antonio 70. Art. 4004 declares: Interrogatory exemplary Special 31 on No. rep- making persons wilfully such false [A]ll together: damages lumped all the defendants knowingly taking promises resentations money, any, paid if if sum of now “What advantage liable in fraud shall be said cash, you preponderance do find from of the person damages exemplary defrauded plaintiff evidence that entitled by the be assessed such amount as shall damages?” Appellants complain exemplary jury, double the amount not to exceed phrase the use of the “entitled to” because damages suffered. actual imply purpose may improperly of ex added). (emphasis reenacted Tex.Bus. & As *25 emplary damages compensation is for the (Vernon 1968), 27.01(c) these re- Comm.Code punishment plaintiff of for the defend instead quirements are maintained: Pontiac, Ragsdale, Courtesy See Inc. v. ants. willfully repre- person a who makes false A 118, (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 122 S.W.2d — person promise, false and a who sentation or 1975, n.r.e.). the of writ ref’d use representa- knowingly from a false benefits itself, phrase, of is not reversible this in and promise, commit the fraud de- tion or false “whether, long so as when read as a error (a) and in of this section scribed Subsection conjunction general the and in with whole charge person exem- to the defrauded for are liable plary damages interrogatorjy] adequately the exceed twice the not to jury.” present[s] the contested to the issue[] damages. of actual amount Dreiling, 774. the of 511 F.2d at We review use added). (emphasis phrase conjunction the this with instructions jury impose joint and added). response, liability the several for exem- (emphasis BFI, Austin, and each have plary damages.72 held Bintliff knowingly or taken ad- willfully concealed ample support There is in the case law claims vantage of the scheme. Chemetron interpretation for this of the statute. Tex- re- 4004’s finding this fulfills article long as courts have followed several criteria and sever- quirement justifies joint and exemplary damage for evaluation of damages imposed in liability punitive al for by awards made a in its discretion. Special No. Interrogatory first, exemplary The damages rea- hold disagree We for several reasons and sonably proportional damages, to actual see Special answers to In- the affirmative Neeley, Southwestern Investment Co. v. were terrogatory No. 26 but threshold 705, (Tex.1970), governed pri- is S.W.2d dam- exemplary further consideration of marily by statute in cases of fraud —art. First, ages is the lan- by jury. there permits exemplary damages to be no guage of the statute itself. Article damages more than double the actual suf- expressly requires joint liability several and remaining fered. The criteria are: damages express actual but has no such wrong, the nature the character of requirement exemplary damages: involved, the conduct the degree culpa- persons making representa- All the false bility wrongdoer, the situation and or promises persons deriving tions and all concerned, parties sensibilities and fraud, jointly the benefit shall be of said the extent which such conduct offends damages, severally liable in actual public justice sense of propriety. thereto, persons and in all addition wilful- Morris, (Tex. v. Schutz 201 S.W.2d ly making false or representations such Civ.App. writ). Texas — Austin promises taking knowingly the advan- imposes law additional criteria for evaluat tage of said fraud shall be liable in exem- corporate ing liability for exemplary dam damages plary person defrauded in Services, ages. See Ledisco Financial Inc. amount shall by such be assessed Viracola, (Tex.Civ. 533 S.W.2d jury, not to exceed double amount App. accord, no writ); — Texarkana damages the actual suffered. Wooley v. Southwestern Portland Cement (emphasis added).71 parallel language These exemplary damage provi- the actual and criteria demand individual consideration of striking sions is and renders differences conduct, situation, each defendant’s sensi significant, particularly since the statute is bilities, and culpability jury, consid penal strictly in nature and must be con- eration that failing appor denied Wall, strued, Westcliff Co. v. 153 Tex. exemplary tion damages. S.W.2d elements In a case like this with conspira- several knowledge express- willfulness and were (and many tors ly conspirators other not damage added to the be- exemplary provi- sion, court) fore who joint liability while the have varying several had requirement degrees Ex- of intent or conspicuously knowledge, absent. who partic- ipated amination of art. 4004 us to leads conclude the scheme ways in different over Legislature long period time, the Texas chose performed and who promise, 71. Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code 27.01 retains sentation or false commit the fraud difference: (a) described in Subsection of this section 0s) person represen- person A who makes a false and are liable to the defrauded for person promise, exemplary tation or damages false who not to exceed twice the representation benefits from that false damages. amount of actual promise, false commit the fraud described (emphasis added). (a) jointly Subsection section and are severally person liable to the defrauded Legisla- 72. This conclusion is reinforced damages... for actual . ture’s reenactment of art. 4004 in § 27.01 (c) person willfully A who false makes a parallel where the same structure was retained. representation promise, person or false and a supra nn. knowingly repre- who benefits from a false *26 (an investor, (citations capacities corpo- a S.W.2d at 147 variety omitted); a see ration, chairman), purposes the Refrigerated Express, Norton Inc. v. Ritter by ren- exemplary damages are ill served Co., (Tex.Civ. Brothers 552 S.W.2d severally dering jointly all defendants App. e.); writ ref’d n. r. — Texarkana liability for exem- Joint and several liable. Kellar, (Tex. Walker v. 226 S.W. damages in these circumstances en- plary Civ.App. Antonio ref’d). writ — San coconspirators to shift the burden of ables separate consideration; Schutz sustained damages culpable their less con- those onto recognized Norton may that it be necessary their deterrent federates. This undermines in some cases but held it unnecessary under purposes. Cf. Northwestern punitive case; the “unusual” facts of that and Walk Casualty McNulty, v. National Co. required late-joining er it for one conspira 1962)(insurance puni- for tor against whom the evidence was weaker. damages punishment blunts and deter- tive Chemetron cites Crisp v. Southwest shifting purposes by burden from rent Leasing Bancshares 586 S.W.2d Each wrongdoer company). to insurance (Tex.Civ.App. writ — Amarillo vigorously contested his own lia- defendant e.), ref’d n. r. for the proposition that appeal, on and the evi- bility at trial and a party to fraudulent transaction is “[e]ach varies con- liability as to the of each dence responsible the for acts of others done in siderably. jury per- should have been furtherance of the scheme.” exemplary damages mitted to assess Crisp inapposite. is It only joint involved with against each defendant in accordance liability and several for actual damages, that defendant. its evaluation of exemplary damages since apparently were by the line of Our conclusionis buttressed not awarded at trial. See id. at 612-13. upheld sepa- cases that have either Texas Crisp joint does not create and several lia exemplary damages rate consideration of bility punitive damages. each defendant in a multi-defendant Statutory interpretation, law, Texas case supported principle separate case or and our evaluation of the facts in this case Schütz, In the court said: consideration. separate indicate that consideration of the wrongdoers together Where two or more exemplary amount of damages for each de- part wrong, entirely take required.73 fendant is possible may prompted by that one Jury b. Instructions. malice, while the other is not. Or it though guilty, culpa- they be that both be defendants claim that prejudiced were bility greater of one is much than that of because the jury was not other, instructed, warranting greater pen- correctly thus in Jury Instruction No. 32,74 alty. purposes on the of exemplary damages conspiracy parent exemplary In a recent civil case cumstances. To be entitled to seeking damages damages, plaintiff prove for emotional distress due to must that such child, willfully the abduction of a federal district court defendant or defendants failed to applying apportioned exemplary Texas law disclose a material fact or that such defend- damages among conspirators. Although knowingly advantage ant or defendants took apportionment challenged appeal, was not of the failure to disclose a material fact. disposition interpreta- is in accord with our jury permitted such instances to award Dawkins, Fenslage tion of Texas law. See exemplary damages not to exceed twice the 1107, 1109, damages. amount of actual you, jury, prepon- If should find from a Jury Instruction No. said full: derance of the evidence in this case that Exemplary Damages plaintiff Under Texas Law is entitled to a verdict for actual or you plaintiff compensatory you damages, If find that is entitled to and should fur- damages having proved actual as a result of ther find that the act or omission of the against defendant or defendants all of defendants or defendant which caused the required injury damage plaintiff elements of the Texas actionable actual statute, permits willfully fraud Texas law done or with an intention to know- plaintiff exemplary such, damages ingly you, jury, may award the benefit from discretion, damages your addition to actual under certain cir- the exercise of add to the *27 1178 they compensatory purposes exemplary dam- of but damages

or how differ from is not review on issue reversible error and of ages. supra The standard of this in itself. See recently sought note 69. Finally, puni- was summarized: and, damages complaint tive its in we note charge was test is not whether the “[T]he intimating any without view the on suffi- but whether every particular faultless evidence, ciency of present this did evidence way and jury any the was misled in support of its claim. understanding it of the is- whether had is- duty sues to determine those Against backdrop, the defendants jurisprudence Our mandates that sues.” to point jury Texas and federal standard whole, charge we the as a view- consider exemplary damages proof instructions on as ing light allegations the of the it in of the of the trial court’s error.75 it is evidence, argu- and the complaint, the scarcely per error se to decline follow ments of counsel. pattern or form book instructions. Nor Corp., 384, Borg-Warner compel v. 626 F.2d Erie the pattern Smith does use of state (5th instructions, 1980) (citations omitted), quot 386 Cir. since the of giving manner v. ing Paper Borel Fibreboard Products is jury instructions controlled federal Corp., 1076, (5th 1973), law, Co., 715, 493 F.2d 1100 Cir. Foster v. Motor Ford 621 F.2d denied, 127, (5th 1980), cert. 419 42 717 pattern charge Cir. and a (1974). procedure one instructing L.Ed.2d 107 but While standards evaluating jury- procedures jury may long instructions in a diversi be used so —other they federal, correctly as ty applicable case are describe the the substance of those Stockwell, state law. See Platis v. instructions must law. F.2d adhere state (7th 1980); Laboratories, Cir. v. Reyes Wyeth Wright Albu- v. 498 F.2d Plaza, querque denied, Stop Auto-Truck (5th Cir.), cert. 1979); Stafford South- (1974). L.Ed.2d ern Farm Casualty Bureau Insurance instruction, at the Looking contested we 1972) (per cu- (1) the following: jury see the was never riam). Pattern merely instructions are exemplary of the purposes informed of some evidence instruction is advisa- (deterrence damages punishment of ex- ble. (2) traordinary misconduct); jury was correctly Although cautioned several times that an it close question, is a we hold discretionary; award was was that these language instructions and the properly Special told what criteria article re- Interrogatory No. 31 not are errone- (intent quired knowledge) or for exemplary they ous under did not mislead the Smith — In damages. arguments or jury Cheme- create misunderstanding the is- tron’s we counsel find instances where sues. The special interrogatory and the jury counsel informed nature instructions clear made that an Next, punitive damages. we have the “en- of exemplary award damages discre- language titled Special Interrogatory tionary. to” The special interrogatory and in- may misleading No. which erroneously structions did not the jury tell you Texas, damages punishment.” award actual such amount as 1 State Bar of Texas agree proper exemplary. Jury Charges shall to be as Pattern 11.10 event, any may amount exceed twice judges jury: Federal are advised to tell damages. the amount of actual permits jury, law under certain [T]he exemplary Whether to make award of circumstances, injured per- ... award the damages damages in addition to actual punitive exemplary damages, son in or- exclusively province matter within the punish wrongdoer der to for some extra- jury. ordinary misconduct to serve an ex- ample warning engage pattern others not suggest 75. The Texas instructions following exemplary damages: such conduct. instruction on “ Blackmar, Jury ‘Exemplary damages’ 3 Devitt & Federal Practice & means an amount (3d you your ed. as an Instructions 85.11 discretion award example penalty by way to others and aas *28 exemplary damages that he not involved in the imply even that serts since was transaction, 74 with mandatory. Compare nn. his were Chemetron conduct does Caldwell, Publishing elements, Co. v. particularly not fulfill those Crowell-Collier (5th & Cir. n.9 requirement having fraudulently in- course would be for preferable Chemetron, public large, While not the duced purposes judge trial to instruct on the purchase supra to Westec shares. See ease exemplary damages, this Cheme- 1173; Division, United States p. Oilwell consistently sought exemplary dam- tron Steel, at 491. S.W.2d through evi- ages presented its case conspiracy the Texas common law of civil argument way in a that made dence provide legal does mechanism that could purposes exemplary damages clear to render Bintliff liable to for Chemetron jury. presentation Given the of Cheme- purchase of Westec shares. We de- case, jury tron’s we hold that express scribe this mechanism but opin- no to” by misled or confused “entitled lan- ion on whether the evidence in this case guage Special Interrogatory No. 31 or liable, renders Bintliff leaving that jury instructions. finder of fact if there is a new trial. the, we holding, While so reiterate recognizes Texas the ancient judge is close and that a trial must be issue common-law doctrine conspiracy that civil extremely keep exemplary careful to dam- “ consists of ‘a combination two or more ages proper sphere prevent within their to persons accomplish an purpose unlawful assessing from them for invalid or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlaw Lee speculative reasons. See v. Southern ” Dawkins, ful means.’ Fenslage v. Corp., Home Sites F.2d 1980), quoting 1970). In future trials and particularly Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nor retried, if this cause is the “entitled to” tex Corp., Oil & Gas 435 S.W.2d addition, phrase should not be used. we (Tex.1968). conspiracy, Unlike criminal civ suggest an purposes instruction on the il conspiracy itself does not create liabili exemplary damages will often be found ty conspirators pursue must inde helpful jury, enabling it better to —the pendently purpose unlawful distinguish proper their or use an inde function from that pendently unlawful means before compensatory they awards. can See, e.g., be held liable. Markman v. Lach 2. Article 4004 and Texas Common Law man, (Tex.Civ.App.— S.W.2d Conspiracy. of Civil 1980, writ). Texarkana challenge liability defendants their case, In this alleged and of- conspirators violating article 4004. proof fered the continuing conspiracy we already Since have found reversible er- joined Bintliff had both an unlawful pur- judgment, ror in the Texas it is necessary to pose manipulation was pur- —market —and only discuss one of these challenges, that of means, sued via unlawful including induc- Bintliff. Bintliff claims that even if he ing public buy or sell Westec stock in joined the alleged conspiracy, joined he violation of article 4004. None of the con- well after purchase Chemetron’s of Westec spirators specific buyers had sellers or stock, and therefore he cannot as a matter mind when the conspiracy began or as it of law be held liable for fraud in con- progressed. occurred, As each transaction purchase nection with that under article however, conspirators could meet 4004. We address this claim to resolve it violating criteria for article 4004 de- clarify law Texas should this case be frauding particular buyer or seller. retried on the remand that we order. This case only deals with one fraudulent act necessary liability The elements under conspiracy in this broad and with one defrauded, already public article 4004 have been outlined. member of the Cheme- correctly as- Bintliff tron. supra p. is where Bintliff misunder Bintliff satisfies This the conditions im stands the interaction of article 4004 and posed by joined section 19. He the conspir He conspiracy Texas civil law. claims that acy inception after its before but its con he cannot liable to Chemetron unless he “A summation. conspiracy, especially one all of article 4004’s crite personally fulfills which contemplates continuity purpose nonconspiracy true in a case. ria. That is and a performance acts, continued accept argu were his But if court presumed to continue until there has been case, conspiracy we would ment in this com an affirmative showing that it has termi *29 civil law in pletely conspiracy abolish Texas. ” nated . . . . United v. Etheridge, States purpose conspiracy of civil law is to 951, (6th 424 964 Cir. Consum conspirators knowingly joint hold who mation of the market manipulation scheme ly pursue illegal illegal or use purpose had not occurred before Bintliff’s member though conspira means even liable all ship conspiracy ample in the because record tors know perform do not even of all the evidence demonstrates the purpose acts the conspiracy. done in furtherance of the conspiracy, manipulation, market See, State, 350, e.g., v. 528 Bourland S.W.2d pursued by still 1975, conspirators well after (Tex.Civ.App. 354 writ ref’d — Austin e.); Knox, n. McCarthy, continuing r. H. Inc. v. his This Glenn entrance. conspiracy 832, (Tex.Civ.App 186 S.W.2d 838 many illegal acts, involved some occurring . —Galves 1945, m.). ton ref’d w. writ o. before and some after Bintliff’s entrance. The defrauding of Chemetron was but one principle late-join This also covers illegal act in done furtherance the con See, ing conspirators e.g., such as Bintliff. spiracy, Co., 313, v. not its State Standard Oil 130 Tex. 107 consummation. 550, (1937). S.W.2d 560 Standard Oil cited Civil conspiracy do principles require Corpus this authority proposi Juris for that Bintliff have intended to defraud a Turning Secondum, tion. to Corpus Juris specific party, only that he knowingly have we find rule of having this law: “Persons joined conspiracy intending to defraud knowledge a conspiracy who enter into it general its targets. See, e.g., Schlumber after inception and before its consumma ger, 855-57; 435 at S.W.2d Switzer v. Jo

tion are for all previously liable acts seph, 845, 442 (Tex.Civ.App.— S.W.2d 849 done subsequently pursuance thereof.” 1969, writ). Austin principles These do Conspiracy 19, (1967), 15A C.J.S. 659 § not render Bintliff regard liable without citing, Accord, e.g., Oil. 12 Standard Tex. his conspiracy intent —Texas law (1981); Jur.3d in fact Conspiracy Civil 4 16 Am. § Jur.2d, Conspiracy (1979); 1 Eddy 56 on substitutes two intent requirements for the (1901). 376 Combinations This immemo article 4004 intent requirement. Cheme rial principle common-law widely has been tron prove (1)- must one his cocon see, accepted, e.g., Building Industrial Ma spirators violated article 4004 and that terials, Corp., Inc. v. Interchemical 437 F.2d knowingly joined Bintliff the conspiracy in 1336, (9th 1970); Cir. Ratner v. Scien tending to investing defraud the public. 325, tific Corp., Resources 53 F.R.D. 329 We repeat need not the elements of the (S.D.Fla.1971), appeal dism’d want of former requirement, and the Texas Su juris., 1972) (per F.2d 616 preme has Court laid out the criteria for the Industries, curiam); Blackstone Inc. v. An latter: dre, (1974), Ga. S.E.2d “A ‘conspiracy to on the part defraud’ simply restatement another well- two persons or more means a common settled principle conspiracy law “that one purpose, supported by a concerted action joins who knowingly conspiracy even at a defraud, that each has the intent to do later conspiracy date takes the as he finds it, it,” them, and that each common to Myzel Fields, 738 n.12 1967), denied, and that each has the understanding cert. 19 L.Ed.2d 1143 the other has that purpose.” quoting jointly severally be held liable for the Schlumberger, 435 S.W.2d Mo damages resulting previous actual from the Chattanooga Speedway & Brumley v. conspirators, act of his fellow the defraud- Tenn. 198 S.W. tordrome ing of Chemetron.76 opinion). in Texas (1917) (emphasis proof argument Bintliff raises a final on this jury accepts Chemetron’s If issue that we must address. He claims that agreed participate knowingly Bintliff damages while he be liable for actual public defraud the alleged conspiracy to conspiracy Texas law under article that one of his also finds coconspirators, he based on the acts of his article 4004 de coconspirators violated exemplary held cannot be liable dam- Chemetron, must be held frauding Bintliff their ages based on acts. long-estab under liable person] having lished rule in Texas: “[A we opinion, Earlier held that late, however conspiracy, entered the once article wording of 4004 and Texas case law party every previ act in law a becomes require individual of exemplary assessment subsequently by any done ous or supra under article damages of it.” Standard Oil pursuance others law conspiracy civil *30 p. 1177. While Co., (cited in, e.g., Logan at 560 107 S.W.2d liable for to render Bintliff can be used 863, Barge, v. (Tex.Civ.App. 568 S.W.2d 868 damages 4004, actual under article we Mims 1978, e.); writ ref’d n. r. agree punitive —Beaumont with him that damages can Bohn, 568, v. (Tex.Civ.App. on his only against 536 570 be assessed him based S.W.2d Thus, 1976, writ)). purpose punishment no Bintliff can conduct. of —Dallas Laws, 657, (1971); 8 Houston We that the interaction of art. 4004 and L.Rev. 658 & n.6 note conspiracy exemplary damages law to render Bintliff Texas civil were also available in Tex process arguably due statutory liable here raise as at common law without authoriza problems. think not. tion, 510, We Briggs Rodriguez, v. 236 S.W.2d 515 conspiracy Although 1951, (Tex.Civ.App. and the law art. 4004 Antonio writ ref’d — San criminal, nature, civil, applied here are in n.r.e.); conspirators jointly civil have been quasi-criminal they penal or can be labelled severally damages liable for actual since the they permit punitive fraud and because address century, Sattley 19th see State v. Racine damages In to err on the for violation. order 663, 400, Tex.Civ.App. (1911, 134 S.W. caution, apply we will criminal law side writ); exemplary damages been have analysis. process in our due standards conspiracy available for civil in Texas since at possible process problem due is one of 1908, Ry. least St. see Louis & Southwestern statute, vagueness. person Under a criminal a 144, Thompson, 102 Tex. Co. 113 S.W. “criminally responsible held for con- cannot be (1908). reasonably which he could not understand duct Art. 4004 codified the common law of fraud Locke, proscribed.” Rose v. 423 U.S. to 49, exemplary damages, and concomitant see 243, 244, (1975) (per L.Ed.2d Bordwine, n.7, supra, changing (en at 658 & requires curiam). process The due clause only larging) damages, the measure of actual give warning the law sufficient of forbidden Ravel, Development see El Paso Co. v. right Id. at 96 S.Ct. at 244. This conduct. (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d Paso — El warning ways: fair can be violated in two n.r.e.), approval writ ref’d with cited statutory language (2) vague unforesee- O'Boyle, (Tex. Stanfield v. 462 S.W.2d judicial expansion nar- able and retroactive 1971), conspiracy but the common law of civil precise statutory language. row and Bouie v. displaced Columbia, 347, 352, has never City Texas been statute or 1697, 1701, precedent, Texas altered court. Given this 12 L.Ed.2d 894 Since art. today judi statute based on the common 4004 is an old our decision is not an unforeseeable quite precise statute; expansion merely in its terms and the doctrine law of a cial narrow it is conspiracy of civil is well-defined the com- application principles of time-honored Texas, possibility the former is not mon law of Texas law that Texas courts have used to the possibility presented It is here. the latter See, present day. e.g., Fenslage, 629 F.2d at brought meshing about our of art. 4004 (1980 diversity law); applying case Texas per- conspiracy law. we civil Bourland, (1975 holding 528 S.W.2d at 354 case process problems, ceive no due because our conspirators despite are liable civil failure today certainly holding result. a foreseeable perform know of all acts done in further Texas, before enactment of art. even Inc., conspiracy); McCarthy, ance of Glenn H. provided remedy law the common (1945 holding 186 S.W.2d at 838 case with fraud, Bordwine, damages actual for stock see Bouriand). identical to Under the Texas Securities Civil Remedies lic. by imposing would not be served If fraud is deterrence worked between regard lawsuit, to Bint- exemplary damages parties without public is not If, however, here, conduct.77 No Texas case liff’s individual affected. the fraud ignored which we are aware has ever affected the public, pari use of in delicto is culpability and awarded exem- individual disfavored because it will bringing hinder damages conspirators 602-03; civil on plary against of securities fraud cases. See id. See, joint e.g., Fen- and several basis. 521 F.2d at 227-28. This circumstance (Texas slage, 629 F.2d at diversi- given weight” must be “substantial in de- ty apportioning exemplary damages case termining permit whether to this defense. among civil conspirators). 515 F.2d at 604. in a case where the fault of plain- [E]ven that, law, This say is not as matter tiff and defendant relatively were equal, punitive Bintliff cannot be liable for dam- mutual, simultaneous and might the court ages joined here since the conspiracy he reject still appeared defense if it permits exemplary

late. Article 4004 dam- the defendant’s unlawful activities were against persons ages “knowingly who tak[e] likely of a sort to have a substantial Thus, . advantage” . . fraud. if Cheme- impact investing public, on the knowingly tron prove can that Bintliff took primary legal responsibility for and abili- defrauding Chemetron, advantage of the ty impact to control that is with defend- exemplary can be held dam- he liable for ant. ages. Id. opinion petition In the Woolf Appeal. C. Other Issues on rehearing, the court equal- likened this simultaneous criterion to the “vital” cooper- We allegations address three other or- *31 coconspirators ation of required to accom- guide to the if is a new der trial court there plish conspiratorial scheme. 521 F.2d trial on remand. In Pari Delicto Instruction. standards, Given these the evidence Appellants claim that it was error persuade that, does not us even if Cheme deny pari to them an in delicto instruction party tron was a conspiracy, to the it was a to grant as Chemetron. The of this defense party. “vital” The trial court well could court, is within the discretion of the district have “primary concluded that the legal re Baker, 1074, v. Wolfson F.2d 1082-83 sponsibility” conspiracy lay for the with the denied, 1980), 966, (5th Cir. cert. Therefore, defendants. he did not abuse his 1483, (1981), 101 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d and discretion in denying this defense. review this discretion is limited its limit, abuse. Prior cases this discretion and 2. Use of the Zero-Value Theory in Mea- hold that defense is available to suring Damages. defendants under circumstances out Special 30, Interrogatory Nos. lined in v. D. & Woolf S. Cohn 515 F.2d addressing law, federal and Texas respec- (5th Cir.), petition 601-05 for on tively, the jury found had there been

rehearing, (per F.2d 226-28 disclosure of manipulative scheme prior curiam), vacated and remanded other on receipt Chemetron’s of Westec stock on grounds, 426 U.S. 14, 1966, January “the real and actual val- L.Ed.2d 1181 ue” of that stock would have been zero. important One circumstance is the appeal Defendants use the zero-value investing pub- effect of on dispute theory presentation in Chemetron’s possible Lines, Inc., proc- 1964) 77. This result also avoids an due problems imposing exemplary (criminal penalties damages, require conduct); ess intentional nature, Prosser, punitive 1971) (puni- which on 2§ are Bintliff with- Torts ed. regard damages concept). out to his intent the act commit for tive a criminal law punished. which he is See Marshall v. Isthmi- case, the answers to scheme been theory upon Appellants disclosed. argue 30 are Interrogatory Nos. that even if the Special Westec stock had no mar- points on the They appeal value, also other based. ket it had an intrinsic value repre- damages. assets, measure senting the tangible and intangible, Westec, article 4004 includes exclusively almost The briefs are directed this intrinsic value in the term “actual val- validity theory of the zero-value ue.” points under federal law. We need related questions federal law since not decide The resolution requires of this debate an has no feder- we have held that Chemetron inquiry initial damages into the nature of action for this fraud. Therefore al cause of under article 4004. The seminal case on analysis theory of this and the other our damages Texas, common law for fraud in performed according points appeal Hesse, George v. 100 Tex. 93 S.W. 107 guide Texas law to a trial on remand. (1906), clearly distinguished between the first consider an issue other than the two We remedies available to pur defrauded theory allege itself. Defendants chasers. The first is an action for cancella expert Chemetron’s who advanced the zero- tion and rescission of the contract induced theory improperly incorporated post- value fraud, by the one which par restores both purchase damage events in his assessment. ties quo. second, status a tort expressly The text of article 4004 describes deceit, action compensates for the defraud damage what evidence relevant to a cal- purchaser ed difference between the culation: actual value of the property received and persons guilty

All of such fraud shall be paid amount property. This person liable to the defrauded for all ac- action, second cause of sounding in tort and suffered, damages tual the rule of dam- using out-of-pocket measure damages, ages being the difference between the expanded by article 4004 into a benefit- property represented value of the or as of-the-bargain measure of damages in stock prom- it would have been worth had the and real estate fraud cases. See El Paso fulfilled, ise been and the actual value of Ravel, Development Co. v. 339 S.W.2d property in the it is deliv- condition 363 (Tex.Civ.App. Paso writ ref’d — El ered at the time of the contract. e.), n. r. approval cited with Stanfield added). (emphasis O’Boyle, (Tex.1971). at 272 S.W.2d *32 It is clear from article 4004 that In assessing damages in stock fraud cases occurring January events after under either article 4004 or the common may assessing not be considered in actual law, employed Texas courts have the stan damages. Thus, experts damages the on by dard of value used damaged the party. consider, jury may instance, the Thus, if damaged party a used the market date, manipulative transactions after that value in striking bargain, its that became SEC, the revelation of the scheme to the See, e.g., the standard. Butler, Chandler v. stock, trading the cessation of in Westec or 284 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d 388 — Texarkana bankruptcy the of Westec. Other consider- 1955, writ); no cf. Wizowaty, Patterson v. ations, assumption prepur- such as an that 505 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston illegal, may chase transactions were be used 1974, writ) (measure no damages in stock they if meet the standard tests for the conversion suit based on market value of evidence, adequate admission of foundation stock conversion). However, time of and the like. We leave these issues to the where there is no market for the stock or judge discretion of the trial on remand. worthless, where it is allegedly the intrinsic assets, tangible value of the theory, intangible, As to the zero-value Chem See, represented by etron the stock is e.g., contends that “actual value” in article used. only Manufacturing McMahon, 4004 refers to the market K. W. value of the S. Co. v. stock, (Tex.Civ.App. Westec and the market value of Wes 565 S.W .2d 368 — Waco e.); Powers, tec stock would have been zero had the writ n. r. ref’d Beckwith v. damages. windfall rather than (Tex.Civ.App. Paso We find S.W. — El writ). cases where a dam no And in those that Texas law cannot countenance a zero- by reference to the aged party valued stock theory damages. value assets, damages are underlying value of remand, Therefore, on zero-value to the value of calculated reference Indeed, theory market not be used. no v. See, e.g., Holloway, Reed those assets. theory that market value uses to set dam- writ). (Tex.Civ.App.1910, S.W. used, ages can be market played since value standard of val Using damaged party’s striking no role in the of the bargain. sensible, since it eminently ue is awards prove Chemetron must that the value it anticipated benefit of the party its placed (which ignored on the Westec stock avoiding speculative bargain while and con value) market was reduced the fraud. unanticipated on jectural damages based The difference between amount Cheme- speculative bargain. benefits of the Such paid (representing tron placed the value it damages conjectural are forbidden un stock) on the Westec val- this reduced der both article 4004 and Texas common ue, any, represents if damages “actually 108; George, law of fraud. 93 S.W. at El suffered” and recoverable Chemetron. Paso, 339 S.W.2d at 363-64. law, principles Based these Texas The Admission of theory use of the zero-value here was Williams’ Securities parties

erroneous. The established a trad- Fraud Conviction. ing value different from and below the argue Defendants the proba market value of stock on the Westec date of tive admitting value of Williams’ securities the transaction. is no evidence There fraud into conviction evidence was out contemplated higher market weighed by prejudicial its effect. The con bargain. as a benefit price Cheme- viction short, came into evidence in a two- Westec, tron making an investment question colloquy at conclusion of Wil why company’s which is it used the assets in lengthy, complicated liams’ testimony on establishing price transaction. the scheme and was also mentioned in clos expected Unless Chemetron to benefit from ing argument. price, speculative the market it is and con- In assessing the relevance jectural damages prejudice based on it. award of this evidence in civil case under Fed.R. anticipate Even if Chemetron did 403,78 judge Evid. the trial has broad discre- price bargain, market as a benefit of the tion, reviewable for abuse. Rozier the damages speculative here would still be Ford Motor theory posits conjectural. The zero-value The threshold issue here after the during panic disclosure relevance of the conviction. If it is irrele- aof scheme the stock will have no value. vant, question we need not reach the panic unpredictable is an period Such probative substantially whether its value is duration, phenomenon effect on stock —its *33 outweighed prejudicial by its We effect. prices, highly speculative and so forth are believe that the conviction is certainly rele- conjectural. Able, Beecher v. See vant. Two crucial elements of Chemetron’s F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y.1977). Ag- 402-06 (1) case the plan were to manipulate gravating these characteristics is fact illegal the market was that Wil- selling Chemetron would be an un- illegal. liams’ conduct was usually large Williams’ con- percent amount stock —ten viction is Selecting of all Westec relevant both elements. stock. a measure of While damages length based explore on such unreliable and did with the volatile awarding plaintiff market risks the scope manipulation, of the pur- its relevant, “Although delay, evidence be ex- or of undue considerations waste time, substantially presentation probative cluded if its value is needless cumulative outweighed by danger prejudice, of unfair evidence.” issues, misleading jury, confusion of the results, limiting the defend instruction would have effectively and its ultimate poses, appellants’ alleviated the concerns in the existence and the hotly ants contested case. We also note that illegality began, and the defendants illegality of the scheme abandoned, but value of cross-examination Wil- probative conduct. The Williams’ conviction, liams on the issue of his another rose when these issues were his conviction they method could have used to minimize vigorously contested. See United States any prejudicial effect. Beechum, 914-15 denied, 1978) (en bane), cert. The Notes also mention consideration of (1979). 59 L.Ed.2d 472 proof. aspect other means of One of such consideration must be whether Williams’ threshold, relevancy Having passed conviction preju- is redundant of other less now consider whether the trial we must dicial evidence. Rozier is instructive on this judge abused his discretion when he decided issue. In Rozier issue was defendants’ prejudice” posed “danger that the of unfair negligence in manufacturing the car “substantially the conviction did not out- plaintiff’s decedent was killed when “The task for weigh” probative its value. ignited being after hit from behind probative the court in ascertainment another ear. The trial court admitted into prejudice unfair under rule 403 value and guilty plea charges evidence the on of man- a commonsense assessment of all calls for slaughter of the driver of the other car. On surrounding the extrinsic circumstances appeal, this court held this to be an abuse of We find this advice Id. at 914. offense.” discretion. The court noted that the crimi- prejudice” in the meaning of “unfair probative nal conviction had limited value Advisory on the Notes of the Committee duplicated already ample since it evidence rules: federal evidence of the obvious cause of the auto accident in within its context prejudice” “Unfair that case. 573 F.2d at 1348. The court tendency suggest de- means an undue also held its legal relevance as evidence of basis, improper commonly, cision on an best,” cause “attenuated at since it had necessarily, an emotional though nothing to with do the issue in the case: the reaching one.... a decision whether legal liability allegedly negligent de- grounds prejudice, to exclude on of unfair fendant auto injuries manufacturer for in a given prob- should be consideration car accident. Id. This limited relevance of effectiveness able effectiveness or lack outweigh was held to the confusion it could Rule 106 limiting of a instruction. See cause the jury legal as it assessed the causes Advisory Committee’s [now 105] Therefore, of the tort. Id. the auto com- availability Note thereunder. The of oth- pany’s introduction of the conviction was proof may appro- er means of also be an barred. factor. priate quite This case is different from Rozier. of Evidence 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. Rule While the cause of the accident was obvious Rozier, legality here the of the alleged request The defendants could have strongly disputed scheme was between the not, ed, limiting in apparently but did parties. The relevance of this conviction is right is their under Rule struction not at all attenuated. In Rozier there was Once evidence admissible for one 105.79 danger causation, the two forms of purpose but inadmissible for another is ad the obvious cause of the accident and the mitted, the trial court cannot refuse a re disputed proximate (legal) cause of the death, quested limiting instruction. Lubbock Feed would be confused. The conviction Processors, Lots, dispute Inc. v. Iowa Beef 630 F.2d was not at all relevant to the over *34 likelihood, Here, however, 1980). proximate Cir. In all cause. Williams’ admitted, court, Admissibility pose upon request, 79. Limited is proper scope as to shall When evidence which is admissible restrict evidence to its party purpose jury accordingly. one or for one but not admissi- and instruct added). pur- (emphasis party ble as to another or for another law, interpretation, were the crucial Chemetron cites no case pivotal proving in activities cause and proximate only general passages legislative in this case: from the issue liability. importance Unless he done some- the 1934 legal history had of Act on the illegal, alleged his and co- thing superiors and honest open securities markets. could not liable. Final- conspirators be held 9(e) interpretation This of section confusion ly, jury was little chance of there requirement. would obviate causation rele- outweigh the evidence’s sufficient Congress’ Given numerous careful substan repeatedly jury clearly was vance. procedural tive a section restrictions on sepa- was a liability defendants’ told that action, 9(e) private cause of we cannot liability. from rate Williams’ issue 9(e) interpretation countenance an prejudice have resulted Undue could also cross-purposes works at intent Congress’ empha- repeatedly the conviction been had effectively reading 9(e)’s section causa intro- jury or had Chemetron sized requirement tion out of the statute. At a conspirators. the conviction of duced other minimum, by” “affected mean plainly must Fleetwood, 528 F.2d United States v. See manipulated price influenced or Cir. neither responsible was for or sell purchaser’s events therefore of these occurred. We price.80 er’s See Crane Co. American v. judge the trial abuse his hold that did not Standard, Inc., (2d admitting of Wil- discretion evidence 1979) (transaction manipulation before not liams’ securities fraud conviction. actionable; manipulation transaction after proof not actionable absent allegation IV. CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES price); Rosenberg Hano, on sale effect lodges cautionary cross-ap- Chemetron (3d 1941) (price appeal trig- is peal on several issues. This purchased alleged manipula stock before judgment gered since we have reversed tion not occurred “affected” section under 10(b) section and Rule 10b-5. under 9); Kerrigan Pierce, v. Merrill Lynch, Fen Smith, (S.D.N.Y. F.Supp. ner & J. A. Denial of Directed Verdict and N. O. (sale 1978) predetermined net book value Special on Interrogatory V. No. 6. price alleged cannot be by” “affected ma Special jury 6 the Interrogatory In No. nipulation under 9(e)). section The Su price that the paid by found Chemetron preme Court has characterized section 9 as by” stock was its Westec not “affected designed premium to recover an “improper Therefore, scheme. the defend- fraudulent for . . . Piper, exacted stock.” ants could be liable under section 46, 97 at 951. 9(e), 78i(e). Chemetron U.S.C. § § the denial of verdict or appeals a directed definition, Under this minimum judgment withstanding the on this verdict amply verdict was supported of “af- interpretation issue and advances Whitnell, evidence. W. W. an officer of by” in support. fected Chemetron, testified at trial he was gist interpretation person primarily of Chemetron’s “the charge deter every price being manipulat- mining of a what price stock would be a fair for the price manipulation false “leading ed is a until the stock.” He served as the [Westec] Therefore, and the market negotiator revealed reacts. connection transactions, off the all whether on or mar- with the In dep Chemetron/Westec deal.” ket, during manipulation testimony before its osition that he reaffirmed at tri al, are at and all are prices, negotiators relevation false Whitnell said that the struck by” manipulation bargain “affected a matter for the nonmarket transaction in support far-reaching law. bargain approved this October This 9(e) quired this cannot 80. Since minimum definition be sat- or the of other existence re- case, opinions express 9(e) requirement. isfied we on the strictions causation degree responsibility or influence re- *35 It January necessary to detail the parties and led facts some purposes length exchange analyze question of stock. For in order to Westec were to be valued at bargain, correctly. shares Cosmos Bank was one of the share, price below its market per many arising cases out of the Westec $14 col- trading price January. case, in both October and lapse. Bank, The instant Cosmos figure asked how the was arrived When many $14 others were for pur- consolidated at, felt that was responded: he a poses $14 pretrial proceedings in 1970. “[W]e Cos- value price fair based on fundamental mos Judge Bank came to trial before Han- were company. of the We not influenced nay 17,1974, without a from December long ago the market. I have learned February until 1975. May On prices nothing that market have to do with judge the trial filed and entered a lengthy fundamental values.” “Memorandum and detailing Order” his findings of fact and conclusion of law. Thus, Crane, just Rosenberg, as in findings conclusion, Based on those Kerrigan, allegedly it is clear that the mani- judgment $700,000 for over in damages and pulated price market of the Westec shares interest plaintiff. was to be awarded to the responsible for way in no influenced or was Plaintiff filed a judgment motion for on price paid for its the nonmarket Chemetron 9,May May and on 16 Bintliff filed his Westec stock. Chemetron did not base opposition motion in entry judgment. to price the market or even use it as a price on Therefore, paid “improper factor. it May On Bintliff’s counsel wrote the premium” pur- for the stock it Westec Clerk, United States District saying that apparently chased. While Chemetron was Bintliff and CosmosBank would settle only price, complete- the market it aware of if the judge sign trial would an pre- order totally discounted in its Wes- ly ignored venting use as offensive estoppel collateral negotiations. tec Mere awareness of the of the findings and May conclusions.81 On allegedly manipulated price market will not 30, Cosmos Bank and Bintliff filed their 9(e). suffice under section joint proposed motion and order. judge the trial sign refused to the order Estoppel.

B. Collateral because it which, ordered a new trial for argued proposed pretrial in its judge counsel, the trial said a letter to is, collaterally estopped “[tjhere order that Bintliff be my opinion, no basis.” The relitigating from judge proposed certain factual issues ad trial a different order and judicated adversely him in Bank plaintiff’s Cosmos threatened to act on pending mo- Bintliff, (S.D. judgment Civ. Action No. 67-H-590 tion for proposed unless his order Tex.1975). The trial promptly agreed court denied Cheme was parties to.82 The ac- order, proposal, appeals. tron’s and it cepted signed and the judge your 81. This is the text of the letter: I have studied Joint Motion for dis- last, you missal of the above matter. While I favor Since I talked to Mr. Bintliff has your agreement willing offered to settle and am settle this matter for a sum which sign agreed accept. provides Cosmos has order dismissal that settle- is, however, contingent Judge’s my previous findings ment on the withdrawal of clusions, and con- entering protect proposed a form of granting order which will form of order against Judge’s is, unacceptable. Mr. Bintliff findings the use my a new trial is There litigation. opinion, and conclusions in other no basis for newa trial. Accordingly, attorney for I [the enclosing Cosmos] acceptable I am an order that is filing promptly joint will be motion for you to me. If want me to enter this order as designed prob- relief to meet Mr. Bintliff’s part your agreed you settlement each of appreciate Judge lems and I would if the approve place should it at the indicated and previously would consider our filed motion promptly. return it district [the clerk] judgment only in the event that he de- Otherwise, up I will take for consideration deny joint cides to motion which is about pending judgment Plaintiffs’ motion for to be filed. my findings and conclusions. (emphasis added). (emphasis added). read, pertinent part: 82. The letter to counsel *36 17, 1975, dismissing prevent relitigation used to

entered it on June issues and to promote judicial economy. id. at withdrawing and 326- prejudice case with and 31, However, at 649-651. S.Ct. order findings and setting aside the of fact con- problems use, to avoid with the doctrine’s proposed pre- clusion of law.83 Chemetron’s adopted general guide Court a rule to findings trial order contained 158 of fact the lower courts: findings taken verbatim from the 221 general rule should be that in cases by made the court and then set aside fact plaintiff easily joined where a could have judge the trial Cosmos Bank. in the earlier action or where . . . the relitigating Bintliff from estop refused to application estoppel of offensive would be facts, appeals. a those refusal defendant, unfair to a a trial judge we preliminary As a issue must de should allow the use of offensive col- estoppel which offensive collateral cide estoppel. lateral rules, federal, apply. Texas or Because Id. at at 651. S.Ct. brought this case was in federal court based step application The first in the of this question pendent jurisdiction on federal and rule is to determine whether Chemetron estoppel prior and the claim is based on a joined could have the Cosmos Bank suit. court, will apply case in federal we federal We possible. find that that was not As the v. Price rules. See Stovall Waterhouse Westec cases were filed in Houston or 652 F.2d York, transferred from New nearly all of The Supreme Court’s landmark them placed Judge Hannay’s were dock Shore, Hosiery case of Parklane Co. v. Wyndham Bintliff, et. See Associates v. (1979), U.S. 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (2d Cir.), denied, cert. established criteria for the use of offen 21 L.Ed.2d 438 estoppel. sive collateral In Parklane the (1968). He entertained motions to consoli precise question was “whether a party who purposes. date for various Some cases were adjudicated has had adversely issues of fact purposes, consolidated for all including tri equitable it action be collater al, but Judge Hannay expressly consolidat ally estopped relitigating from the same ed Cosmos Bank and Chemetron “for pur subsequent issues in a legal before poses pretrial proceedings and none oth brought against by action it new party.” (emphasis added). order, er.” sup This ques 99 S.Ct. at 648. The ported by thorough the court’s familiarity tion in this case nearly cases, id., identical. The with these see demonstrates to us initially expressed approval Court that carefully consolidation was considered rejected. offensive use of the doctrine if it can be rejection The reasons for are were, 83. The order stated: causes of action which or could have asserted, by been and between them in this Plaintiff, Bank, joint Motion of Cosmos cause, compromised have been and settled Defendant, Bintliff, having David C. been full; paid and the consideration therefore Court; appearing heard and it to the ORDERED, IT IS AND DE- ADJUDGED Plaintiff, Court Bank Cosmos and De- styled CREED that the above cause fendant, be and it Bintliff, agreed upon David C. have hereby prejudice DISMISSED with as to compromise settlement of all claims and Defendants, Bintliff, Lilley, were, David C. Lester L. causes of action which or could have Hall, Jr., Williams, Ernest M. and James W. been asserted and between them in the Findings cause, and the of Fact and above-styled part Conclusion of and as a of such Law heretofore compromise agreement, entered the Court in this settlement have hereby jointly cause and the be same is withdrawn moved the Court be Order entered, being opinion set aside. and the Court of the compromise IT agreement IS FURTHER ORDERED that costs of settlement they hereby fully disposes against court be and are taxed claims of Plaintiff Defendants, jointly against parties, severally approved; includ- all should be $1,500 THEREFORE, ing part appearing Special the sum of as a to the of the Court pursuant Compromise supervised portion Settlement Master’s Fee who Plaintiff, Bank, Agreement discovery Cosmos consolidated of which this case Defendant, Bintliff, part. David C. all claims and was a where it might with far “Still another situation obvious, began since Chemetron apply estoppel unfair to offensive collateral (4), Bank (57) than Cosmos defendants more is where the second affords the action de- transactions, and was in far more involved procedural opportunities fendant unavaila- *37 Basically, complex. much more general ble in the first action that could readily was common participation Bintliffs only cause a different result.” Id. at 630-31 Thus, exper- deference to cases. both (footnote omitted). suggested The Court analysis court and our own of the trial tise procedural that such obstacles could be convinces us that Cheme- the two cases inhibiting inconvenient forum full discovery Bank. joined Cosmos could not have tron availability or the of witnesses. Id. at 631 analysis is step possible in our The second procedural There are no such prob- n.15. to defendant Bintliff. unfairness Indeed, lems here. Bank origi- Cosmos examples of gave several in Parklane Court York, in nally filed New and Bintliff had it the defendant unfairness to possible Houston, lives, transferred to where he collateral block the use of offensive Associates, should Wyndham convenience. See 616-17; if the defend The first was that F.2d at In re Westec estoppel. Corp., 307 F.Supp. (J.P.M.D.L.1969) 563 Sch. B. in the first action “for small ant was sued curiam). We (per perceive Bintliff to be little damages, may he have or nominal disadvantage no due to the Cosmos Bank vigorously, particularly incentive to defend procedures. If anything, in these cases are not foreseeable.” if future suits has been inconvenienced (citations at 651 omit forum as an corporation. out-of-state ted). That is not true in this case. $400, were over damages in Cosmos Bank The Parklane Court did not con interest, eventually totalling over plus sider its list of considerations exhaustive. $700,000, nominal dam See 439 U.S. at 99 S.Ct. at hardly “small or 651. To others, seek we turn prece to our circuit’s terms. In this case on ages” absolute Parklane, dent. Even before the circuit remand, possibility Bintliff face the does “had the importance stressed fairness he faced in damages greater than those particular given circumstances of a case Rank.84 he knew other Cosmos litigant sought when a to invoke offensive bearing on the same cases such as one Quaker estoppel.” collateral Hicks v. Oats were requesting larger damages issues and Co., (5th 1981). 662 F.2d Cir. the common dis pending, evidenced Canvassing precedent, our we discover covery procedure eagerness and his to settle criteria, many repeated these in Parklane: He estoppel. and avoid offensive collateral (1) party against whom estoppel asserted every vigorously incentive to defend had opportunity must have had a “full and fair” Cosmos Bank. case; litigate (2) the issue in the prior unfair is where “the Another situation application of the doctrine must not create estop- judgment upon relied as the basis for “injustice”; (3) application of the doctrine pel itself inconsistent with one or more any must not contravene “overriding public previous judgments in favor of defend- (4) policy”; parties who are defendants in omitted). (footnote There is no ant.” Id. closely both actions must be scrutinized to unfairness; inconsistency (5) here because there are such avoid issue be con previous judgments. cluded must be identical to that involved in damages probably remand in this case Bintliff faces individual. Actual will 84. On remand, reject- liability, opinion state law since this has elimi- reduced on since this court has theory. Finally, liability. He not even ed the zero-value as a late- nated federal joining conspirator, punitive damages liability, Bintliff’s state since we have held that face considerably prove could be less than his fellow de- ele- Chemetron must some additional proven fendants. ments of an art. 4004 claim not in the original art. trial. If Bintliff is held liable under all, exposure higher Bintliff’s All dam- damage liability joint will be his actual ages enough pre- in this case is not severe several, any punitive damages while will be estoppel. offensive vent the use of collateral action; (6) age 1977) action the prior in the prior “actually litigated”; calendar) curiam). have (summary (per must been How issue ever, the determination made issue fully none of our cases have con been neces- “judicial action must have prior finality” requirement in the sidered the resulting judg- essential to the sary and in an offensive collateral case such estoppel States, 576 Johnson v. United ment. See as this Loftin’s summarily one. denied the use of estoppel defensive collateral on a jurisdictional issue the defendant in that 1, 2, 4, 6 have been covered Criteria Raspar judi case. In the issue was the res requires to consider already. Criterion 3 us estoppel prior cata or collateral of a effect “highly that settlements are fa view our judgment dismissing consent a suit between Ecological the law.” Pearson v. vored in parties. Particularly two same relevant *38 171, (5th Corp., Cir. 522 F.2d 176 Science case, to expressly our court acknowl 912, denied, 425 96 1975), cert. U.S. S.Ct. edged require that the “final judgment” 1508, 762 the reason 47 L.Ed.2d But ment relaxed in is the case collateral of they are that that settlements favored is estoppel. See 575 at 538 n.11. Most F.2d litigation. Id. Here Bintliff settled avoid Kaspar important, predated and Lof tin’s estoppel, only avoid offensive collateral to the watershed case on offensive collateral had run litigation, since the entire trial not Parklane, which, estoppel, we stated course, judicial act of only sign recently, created a “need to redefine the final, adverse, judgment known was ing of estoppel,” Migues doctrine collateral v. left.85 Corp., 1182, (5th Fibreboard 662 F.2d 1187 5, criterion there question As to is no Raspar’s Cir. Given reservation of issues Criterion the factual are same. question finality in the collateral 7, appears require “judg- because estoppel guidance context and the of Park- ment,” leads us to an of whether evaluation lane, “judicial finality” the definition of require the final act we should ministerial purposes estoppel offensive collateral entering judgment giving final before open an question this circuit. estoppel findings collateral effect to the the trial fact of court.86 As the Second pointed Circuit in Kur out R., 625, (2d lan v. I. 343 C. F.2d 628 n.1 Cir. general rule in this circuit is 1965), “general expressions final “judicial finality” must be that there before judgments can estoppel ever have collateral estoppel can collateral be invoked. Since considerably effect are overstated.” finality judicial has been assumed without court upheld giving Rurlan the collateral require judgment, analysis entry of final effect estoppel opinion appel to the anof with judgment a settlement no final on the late even though court had been case been estop merits has said to bar collateral settled remand. on The Rurlan court was See, Works, eg., Kaspar pel. Wire Inc. v. acting precedent. based sound Inc., Engineering Machine, 575 Leco & 530, 1978); Capital Co., 538 Cir. Associates In Zdanok v. Glidden Durkee Famous Division, Corp. v. Lof tin’s & (2d Cir.) Services Transfer Stor Food 327 F.2d arguable only significant have It been first Chem- 86. The difference between this trial judgment etron the Cosmos Bank settlement case and Parklane is that in Parklane litigation appeal. avoiding avoided an underlying was entered in the case problems argument. are two appeal, There with this affirmed on see 439 U.S. First, necessary pursue amount of work satisfying toughest S.Ct. at thus even the relatively appeal finality instance, in Cosmos Bank judicial requirement. an seems In this compared judicial adversary small fully litigated, entering while the case was required years discovery effort undertake judgment findings on the and conclusion was Therefore, and several weeks of trial. the sav- prevented by a last-minute settlement made ings legal by settling resources after a full cases, one, including with other and the Second, argument trial were nominal. has looming. estoppel threat offensive collateral now, since this come force issue has before appellate an court. Thus, denied, J.), they 84 etron. have (Friendly, fully cert. been twice 1338, 12 (1964), litigated. Judge L.Ed.2d 298 cited with That Hannay felt he had S.Ct. Johnson, fully fair, 576 F.2d at approval litigated, rendered and correct adjudication held: on the merits in court Cosmos Bank his sign evidenced refusal to an order question of the Dealing very with this granting a new trial because an such order finality judgment necessary kind of had “no basis” and his threat to enter out, estoppel, pointed quite we create judgment. recently, estoppel that collateral does not require judgment “which ends the liti opinion A recent in the Ninth Circuit gation nothing . .. and leaves for the reinforces our conclusion here. In Aetna judgment,” execute the court to do but Casualty Surety Jeppesen Co., & Co. v. & States, 229, 233, Catlin v. United F.Supp. (D.Nev.1977) (ruling on mo (1945), [633], 89 L.Ed. 911 but tion summary judgment), 463 F.Supp. which, though many dispositions includes (1978) (judgment), vacated on other sense, in that have nevertheless final grounds remanded, 642 F.2d 339 fully litigated. Lummus been Co. 1981), the district court confronted an Refining Oil Commonwealth very issue similar to the one we face: can a (2d 1961), denied, cert. 368 U.S. plaintiff party prior not a to a case invoke (1962), L.Ed.2d 524 offensive collateral estoppel against the de “ *39 said, and cases cited. As we there ‘Fi fendant when that case fully had been liti nality’ may in the context here relevant gated liability as to but settled before trial litigation little that mean more than on the damages entry issue of and of final particular of a issue has reached such a judgment? ruling In its on the motion for stage really good that court sees no summary judgment, the trial court careful permitting litigated it to reason for be ly thoroughly and reviewed the need for again. “finality,” discussing concepts and cases cited, we have see F.Supp. 401-06, 440 The Circuit has reaffirmed these Second and held that both See, case law and e.g., equity principles several times. United compelled an affirmative answer DiGiangiemo Regan, ex rel. v. 528 States 1262, question, id. at (2d 1975), denied, 405-06.87 cert. 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 conclusion, In we have held that “al- (1976). agree circuits with Other these though the decision to apply offensive col- “ principles ‘Finality’ as well. in the sense estoppel lateral rests in the discretion of the of 28 1291 is required” U.S.C. not trial . . judge, . this discretion is not un- estoppel. collateral Miller Brewing Co. v. bounded and must through be channeled Joseph Brewing Schlitz the considerations of fairness listed in Park- denied, 1979), cert. lane, along any with other considerations of 62 L.Ed.2d 787 judge fairness which the trial appro- deems Thus, finality requirement Hicks, does priate.” (cita- F.2d at 1172-73 necessarily omitted). demand the ministerial act of tion and footnote We have ana- executing judgment. It does not elevate lyzed the Parklane considerations and this considerations, form over substance in that fashion —the circuit’s and Bintliff neither “finality” points accurate definition of in the of- out nor do we see others that estoppel fensive collateral “fully context would render the use offensive collateral instance, litigated.” the facts of estoppel against this Bintliff in any way unfair Bintliff’s activities in Cosmos Bank particular found “in the circumstances” of this again by jury have been found Tactically Chem- case.88 he litigate fully chose to appeal, opinion only persuasive 87. On the court did not reach the mer- in Aetna for the value ruling estoppel. reasoning. its of the on offensive collateral of its this, Because of we cite the district court’s may 88. One last contention that Bintliff raise Bank, risking possible decision. the defendants on notice of a Cosmos adverse claim risk, arising possible he out of a only bankruptcy He lost on when lost “sale.” that settle, argues notice, further offensive Chemetron if fearing did he decide to necessary, provided by discovery in Au- estoppel. collateral Yet now he seeks to 1974, when gust defendants were informed ele- consequences avoid the loss terms of the of the “sale.” cannot vating form over substance. He ways. have it findings both fact a result complaint As of the dis- against Bintliff in Cosmos Bank are suffi- covery, Chemetron asserts that there was ciently permit final to their use in case. notice adequate of this claim under Fed.R. remand, collaterally On Bintliff should be pleading Civ.P. 8’s liberal doctrine. How- estopped relitigating from those facts. ever, neglects strictures of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9: Against C. Federal Law Securities Claims Mistake, (b) Fraud, Condition of the Alleged Bintliff Based on Chemetron’s Mind. In all averments of fraud mis- Westec “Forced Sale” of take, constituting circumstances Bankruptcy Shares to the Trustee. fraud mistake shall be stated with Malice, intent, particularity. Chemetron claims that it should knowledge, permitted have been other submit to condition of mind of person against 10(b) claims be generally. Bintliff under sections averred 10b-5, arising and Rule out of an While Rules 8 9 must be read alleged “forced sale” of its Westec stock to Powell, conjunction, see Inc. v. Abney, 83 bankruptcy Westec trustee June (S.D.Tex.1979), 9(b) F.R.D. Rule requires still ap- defendants be fairly scope issue can appeal prised them, of this against claims including quickly we held “consequence[s] fraud,” narrowed. Since have Gross gives Investors, fraud at here to a issue rise Diversified Mortgage F.Supp. action, section 9 (S.D.N.Y.1977), cause of the “forced seller” mem., aff’d *40 1201, applied. 1203, (2d doctrine of Rule 10b-5 1980), cannot be 1206 Cir. and That issue of the particularly purchase leaves the whether of “the or sale trans- claim is . . . cognizable under section How- actions effectuated reason ever, we need reach the merits of this misrepresentations,” not Rich v. Touche Ross & claim, quite Co., 243, since (S.D.N.Y.1975). evident from 68 F.R.D. Therefore, proceedings complaint below that Chemetron has been the 1967 in pursuing 9(b) less than diligent satisfy this claim and itself did not Rule because it did gave judge ample deny the trial cause to its not even mention the 1969 sale. Rules jury. 9(b) required submission to the that Chemetron amend supplement complaint short, its with a con- complaint Chemetron’s 1967 asserted cise statement a claim stating based on the many action causes of and described the 1969 transaction. alleged manipulative scheme as How- well. ever, complaint nothing could do we allege discovery Nor think here afforded about a bankrupt- adequate 1969 transaction with the notice claim of this to the defend- cy trustee. reference bank- Its to the ants in the absence aof sufficient com- ruptcy 1974, say plaint. was to current- In apparently the defendants “[Westec] ly undergoing reorganization proceed- in a learned of the through 1969 transaction in- ing X Chapter Bankruptcy under of the terrogatories. merely But learning of “sale,” more, Act” manipulative caused scheme. without did give them claims, This enough, put specific was Chemetron of a arising notice claim out of it problem but has not is denial of his seventh amend- amendment and found this use of of- right estoppel ment to a trial on the at issue facts fensive collateral constitutional. here, n.24, Bank since Cosmos was a bench trial. 439 U.S. at 333-37 & S.Ct. However, Parklane addressed seventh n.24. this & First, planned present that Chemetron the tradi- notice” reasons. at least two such a transaction 9 theory of evidence of such an unusual section use tional damages arising out prove be to jury. would Westec original purchase of Chemetron’s Overall, then, we hold that defendants action.

stock, cause of not to create another never had sufficient notice of this claim fact, to which precisely the use In that is the pretrial shortly until conference held judge put trial evidence August trial and September before set he also judgment, In the transaction. years more than ten after the 1969 in that received off the value Chemetron pro- “sale.” When Chemetron submitted its awarded, damages against transaction posed pretrial containing order claim accepted. setoff that Chemetron conference, naturally defendants were Second, federal rules do not while the objected. surprised response to a legal theory of a require statement order subsequent Chemetron, motion the trial relief, Hostrop see v. Board of to obtain judge, in October barred claim based College District No. Junior on the 1969 transaction and limited use denied, 1975), cert. of evidence about the 1969 “sale” to one (1976), 48 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. issue: claim 9 “forced sale” is so novel section Corpora- ORDERED that Chemetron counsel would have had to defendants’ will tion not be barred from submitting prescient to be on notice of it from most regarding evidence its sale of Westec original complaint discovery. simply 24, 1969, stock June as that sale re- appears of “forced sale” While the doctrine to establishing lates the measure of dam- 10b-5, under Rule see to be well entrenched ages as an element of its cause of action Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372 Alley v. 9(e) for violations of against asserted case, 1980), in a Rule 10b-5 origin Defendant Bintliff Plaintiff’s Com- Finance 374 F.2d 627 v. Beneficial Vine plaint. denied, Cir.), (2d cert. (1967), and Chemetron 19 L.Ed.2d 460 objected Chemetron never to this order are we aware of the use of neither cites nor pursued and never its fall 1979 motion for of Rule 10b-5 cases. the doctrine outside file supplemental pleadings pursu- leave to unprecedented thus makes 15(d),specifically alleg- ant to Fed.R.Civ.P. analogous there is an doc argument ing seeking relief based on the 1969 exchange section 9 and that an trine under Only complain “sale.” now does Chemetron bankruptcy proceeding is such of shares in a grant of the trial court’s failure to a “forced sale.” Our initial reaction is that supplement. motion *41 section 9 and Rule the differences between Granting such a motion is within 10b-5, particularly Congress’strict limits on the discretion of the trial court. Aladdin’s of may preclude development section Castle, Inc. City Mesquite, v. of 630 F.2d We need not decide this such a doctrine.89 (5th 1980), part Cir. rev’d in and point: our question in order to illustrate grounds, - U.S. -, remanded on other discovery, even after defendants could not (1982). any have semblance of “fair 71 L.Ed.2d 152 possibly had Since 100,000 stock, reorganized It far clear that the Rule 10b-5 shares of Westec 89. is from stock, cash, note, preferred trans and forced sale doctrine even covers the 1969 cancellation Thus, “liq- prior have held of indebtedness. even if this was a action. Our cases uidation,” appear liquidations in it does not to be “substan- “substantial” of a shareholders’ tial,” Alley, qualify since retained a sizable inter- See Chemetron terest under this doctrine. 1384-87, of discussed there est in Westec. Our doubts about this cause action of its existence under the remand that we discussion of the F.2d at and cases question may under 9 enhanced this in not are in. have been interest Westec Chemetron’s “substantially liquidated” Rule In view of in the 10b-5. order, transaction, pretermit exchanged we further since Chemetron 411,866 point expressly leave it of “old” common stock and shares unresolved, 41, may 30,000 preferred so that the trial court first shares of “old” stock reorganized consider and address it should it arise. Westec common 866 shares my gave court in circuit the trial further cause to virtually precedent there is our 15(a) cases, 15(d), rely on Rule bring on Rule we this case trial without additional evaluating alike in since the two are treated delay years twelve after filing. For discretion, 6 C. judge’s a trial exercise of reasons, these deny we Chemetron’s cross- Miller, 1504 at 541 Wright & A. appeal on this issue. justify Those factors that cases list several (1) delay, undue denial of leave to amend: V. CONCLUSION (2) dilatory motive the mov- bad faith or summarize, To we hold and order ant, (3) repeated to cure deficiencies failure (1) following: has no section amendments, (4) preju- previous undue 10(b) case, or Rule action in 10b-5 this (5) opposing party, futility dice to the the judgment, as it insofar based on Dussouy amendment. v. Gulf Coast See them, reversed; (2) judgment (5th Corp., Investment 660 F.2d actual exemplary damages based on Mitchell, 1981); Cir. 634 F.2d Gregory Texas law is reversed due to the errors found; on the parties may remand retry factors, these we hold that there Given the Texas claims in accordance with the required were the “substantial reason[s]” rulings on Texas law and other issues found under Rule the motion to deny supple 15 to opinion; this we find merit ment. 660 F.2d at In Dussouy, See only one of cross-appeal Chemetron’s Dunn v. Koehring claims; remand, in a new trial on Bintliff 1198-99, reh’g and denial reh’g clarified on en may be collaterally estopped relitigat- from banc, 1977), upheld 551 F.2d 73 we ing facts found in Bank. Cosmos deny court’s discretion an amend REVERSED AND REMANDED. trial, morning ment offered on the five years case, filing after the and after years pretrial prep

over four WILLIAMS, of “extensive JERRE Judge, S. Circuit Here, trial, aration.” eve of over concurring part and dissenting part. years filed, twelve complaint after the was I concur in all parts Judge opin- Gee’s “sale,” years over ten the 1969 after A, except III, ion Part the Federal Securi- years very after ten pretrial extensive ties Law particularly claims. I my note work, Chemetron to supplement. moved portions concurrence in majori- those delay Given this and lack of diligence undue ty opinion to Judge Reavley which directs in moving supplement, Chemetron had his dissenting views. showing delay burden of Judge opinion Gee’s rules out any liability inadvertence, oversight, due to or excusable under federal law for the stock manipula- neglect. Gregory, F.2d at 203. It has tions of James Williams and par- those who advanced, comprehend, we any nor do ticipated responsible in or are who for his meeting reasons burden. We detect activities. The opinion is meticulously rea- prejudice undue as well. That Chemetron soned. difficulty I have with it is that would immediately add this claim before it leads to a result borders on the trial suggest complaint in search of a spite absurd. the reasoning, I cannot Rich, wrong. F.R.D. at conclude Congress intended such Balanced against these “substantial rea- *42 result. deny possible prejudice sons” to is the The Court, defendants the before Busi- Chemetron of of leave supple- denial Funds, (BFI) ness Inc. and David Bintliff ment. That is prejudice preclusion of a responsible are for the manipulations of section 9 claim on the 1969 based transac- Austin, Williams and John tion. Chairman of legal Given the weakness of that BFI, upon theory which lawsuit is pri- and the fact that Chemetron’s this based. Wil- mary liams was have engaged (1) cause of action arose out of its found to in a origi- purchase securities, nal relating purchase of the Westec scheme this to the or sale of prejudice stock, Finally, judicial is slight. (2) econo- which included misstatements or

H95 facts, (4) (3) made commit than one of material more offense omissions to make scienter, (5) upon which Chemetron with responsibility more prove. difficult to injury, relied, causing (6) Chemetron’s true, quite It as the opinion for touching upon the loss in value out, points 10(b) Court that Section was are We have held these stock. created as a “catch-all.” It was intended to 10(b) of the required by elements Section transgressions cover other than those cover- See, and Rule 10b-5. Huddleston statute by specific requirements ed of Section MacLean, & 640 F.2d Herman 9(a) and of a number other sections of the activities But because Williams’ statute. I cannot wrong But see what is purchase or selling to “affect” failed with the of a use catch-all. As the stock, finding according of price found, 9(a). Williams did not violate Section responsible jury, Williams and those of complete But he inwas and literal violation are Court to by for his actions found this 10(b). of Hence application Section of a of- have committed federal securities “catch-all.” all. fense at that, significant opinion The for the evaluating this case it is of Court concedes have what the result would “Rule been speculate aid to 10b-5 has extended well beyond suit brought only had its purpose been if Chemetron gap-filling as originally envi 10(b) and not referred to under Section by Congress 10(b) sioned in Section 9(a) at all. I the result should think Section proposed by major SEC.” The altera An offense is clear. was committed course, scope 10(b), tion of the of Section 10(b) and Rule defendants under Section finding was the of an implied private right All met. It requisites were 10b-5. Rule action under 10b-5 in Kardon v. only an additional element because National Gypsum F.Supp. (E.D. 9(a) proven under not offense Section was Pa.1946). private remedy is now well respon- that the defendants are freed of all established, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeld having securities sibility for violated federal er, 185, 196, overtly law. This is an unrealistic view of (1976). pattern L.Ed.2d 668 The earlier law, and I cannot that Con- conceive the statute was found in specific provi contemplate gress would such a result. 9(e) sion in Section for a civil remedy If it were true that some un- damaged those manipulation stock manipulation usual kind of stock schemes under Section but with no com cognizable 9(a), could under Section parable remedy provision civil in Section opinion’s majority analysis then the would 10(b), leaving 10(b) gov thus violations to But be correct. such is not this case. The ernmental enforcement. But the subse through engaged Williams in a defendants judicial quent interpretation creation manipulations different kinds of number a civil under remedy 10(b) Section not must designed to the value and deceits enhance narrowing be taken the scope as of Section These and de- manipulations of the stock. 10(b). 10(b), a broadening It was of Section unique ceits were nor unusual such narrowing. not a At least some were “ma- offenses. of them asserted, however, It is that we are bound deceptive” or contri- nipulative devices by the analysis this Court in Huddleston clearly 10(b) vances the core of a Section MacLean, v. Herman & 640 F.2d 534 9(a) violation well as a violation. Section 1981), rehearing modified denial of 9(a) charged violations in this Section banc, Cir., rehearing and of en 5th require a series case of transactions. Sec- granted, - U.S. -, cert. 10(b) requires only surely it tion one. But view, In my 72 L.Ed.2d argued who cannot be that someone com- bound is not case 10(b) the Court in the instant mits violation under must one Section two reasons. by the Huddleston case for go free if he commits more unless than one In the in that case the *43 place, are first Court stringent proofs additional more remedies, even private open upheld proper, met. This would be an invitation to as 1196 both overlap, under Sec- “curtailing sweep giv admitted

with decisions broader 10(b) “catch- en federal 17(a) by and the Section the Securities Acts lower tion .,” 534, major 640 provisions Sec- courts. . . F.2d 541. The The substantive all.” ity opinion beginning discusses found to these cases 17(a) the statute were tion at 10 and also But these MSP MSP 29. pro- from the substantive be different not controlling cases are at all in Cheme Court found 10(b). The visions Section supra, Blue Chip Stamps, tron’s situation. charged 10(b) offense that Section person that a only held who was neither a different, circum- and in some required purchaser nor a seller claim the could not re- than stronger, proof stances 10(b). already benefits of Section had This Therefore, 17(a). quired Section law been the under the rule since Birnbaum the majority in Huddleston which analysis 1952. Birnbaum v. Newport Corp., Steel 10(b) urges is that if does opinion Section (2d Cir.), denied, 461 193 F.2d cert. 343 U.S. requirements not make some additional 956, 1051, 72 96 S.Ct. L.Ed. 1386 charged offenses in section it over the other Hochfelder, 185, v. Ernst & Ernst 425 U.S. was analysis cannot used. But this not a 1375, (1976) 47 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 668 held holding because the part of that case 10(b) scienter, only requires that Section upheld remedy, overlapping nor Court negligence that a mere claim of not cog is holding. necessary was it to the Industries, Green, nizable. Santa Fe v. Inc. second, compelling more rea- But 462, 1292, 430 97 S.Ct. 480 U.S. 51 L.Ed.2d son, analysis that the Huddleston did not (1977) minority that where held' stock at upon all or evaluate detail a focus option to purchase merger holders’ in a case, where, person as in this situation fairly presented situation there was no manipulations in deceitful stock engaged 10(b) Piper violation. v. Indus Chris-Craft clearly be in would violation Section Inc., tries, 1, 926, 430 U.S. 97 51 S.Ct. while who 10(b) person another did the (1977) L.Ed.2d 124 held that there was no thing but was with his ac- charged same 14(e) private cause action under Section having a serious and harmful addition- tions relating practices to fraudulent in a tender go would impact al free. offer situation. Court held also that points clearly in its Huddleston out foot 10(b) apply specific Section did not 7, 542, 640 authority note only tender offer situation because the alle in favor overwhelmingly existence of gation was that the opportunity gain recognizing that conduct covered the target company control of had been express liability provisions the 1933 interpreted defeated. Court Section acts 1934 also be covered Section 10(b) being only maintaining aimed 10(b). This view is confirmed footnote 9 orderly market for the distribution secu majority opinion. v. Ray Fischman manipulative from rities free influences and Mfg. 783, (2d theon 188 F.2d Cir. was aimed at tender offers as such. 1951) established this rule. It was stated as Moving to claimed further restrictive in Bromberg, of law in 1 A. rule Securities terpretations, Reding Touche Ross & v.Co. 2.4(1), Law: Frau d SEC Rule 10b-5 § ton, 560, 442 U.S. 61 L.Ed.2d (1967). Particularly noted should be (1979) only held that the keeping record the case of v. Schaeffer First National requirements 17(a) of Section do not create Lincolnwood, (2d Bank of private provi cause of action under that denied, 1975), cert. S.Ct. Advisors, sion. Transamerica Mortgage (1976) holding 48 L.Ed.2d 186 that a Lewis, Inc. v. 444 U.S. S.Ct. can file plaintiff claims under both Section (1979) L.Ed.2d 146 held Inves 10b-5, Rule the same situation as in 80b-l, tor Act Advisor’s §U.S. the instant case. private did not create cause of action. argued But Huddleston these cases County Sewerage Authority Middlesex Assn., and these authorities are somewhat in now National Sea Clammers Supreme as a result of recent doubt Court 69 L.Ed.2d held

1197 suggested It Federal Water Pollu- is that if we allow that neither the the Sec- 10(b) Act, remedy 1251 nor the tion case Control 33 U.S.C. we tion have Protection, provisions Research and eliminated the of 9(a). Sanctuar- Section Marine argument a The Act of 33 1401 created same can be turned ies U.S.C. around damages. way. for It the other If cause of action we do allow private in remedy 10(b), be noted that these three cases under Section we should have elimi- 10(b) private of ac- nated refusing recognize causes Section as it relates to manipu- deceptive have no lative pur- under the statutes relevance and schemes in the tion situation is chase sale all Chemetron’s because and of securities. And this is private contrary precise established that there is a to the exact well and wording 10(b), of action Section and of the There no denying cause under Section. is majority opinion expansion 10(b) concedes this. of has Section weakened of impact 9(a). Section But expan- that States, Finally, Chiarella United place sion long took before this ease. This 63 L.Ed.2d 348 S.Ct. course, expansion, earlier lessened the employee company (1980) held that the of a significance legislative history of the bids printing materials related takeover upon 1930’s relied heavily so the majority on his infor- who own used confidential opinion. necessary It is not in this case to gained printing buy such mation from decide what other improper kinds of and profit and at a when the stock then sell it fraudulent stock transactions are forbidden public became did not violate takeover bids 9(a) in Section which may not be covered 10(b) duty he was because under no Section 10(b). 9(a) Section Section is a long and purchasers the stock which he sold section, complicated and it cannot be con- relationship there was since trust cluded that suggest hold as I here wipes confidence. out the entire 9(a). Section has None cases summarized above compelling irony in this case is that upon the well estab any impact measurable majority view results in freeing the exemplified law as both commen lished more holding serious offender but the lesser and the lower federal tators courts offender liable for engaging in exactly the 10(b) along violations can stand side Section activities, same manipulative and fraudu- 9(a) violations violations of oth Section lent devices securities transactions. Such sections of This er the law. conclusion interpretation ring does not true. holdings also confirmed recent both the Second and the D.C. Circuits. In Ross are responsible Defendants for the ac- (2d v. A. H. Robins F.2d 545 tions of Williams in manipulative his 1979), denied, cert. wrongdoing 100 S.Ct. deceitful 10(b) under Section (1980), 64 L.Ed.2d held Court statute but which fell short of violation 10(b) 9(a). liability Section cause of action would of Section This is not because would justify any particular lie conduct which also or techniques activities private remedy suit under Section 18 of the which are different under 9(a) Section 10(b), act. Bank Co. v. Wachovia & Trust but solely Section because the jury Marketing Corp., Student National found the activities did not “affect” the denied, (D.C.Cir.1980), (Section 9(a)), cert. 452 U.S. value the stock although it 3098, 3099, obvious, L.Ed.2d and the majority of the Court thoroughly agrees, the Court considered did upon activities “touch problem. overlapping remedies It held reasons the investment’s decline in 10(b) remedy (Section 10(b)). the Section al available value” the same By analy- though 17(a) express person engaged Section was an reme asis in these stock manipu- applicable. also dy Admittedly, charged in this case lations who was acting with inten- (scienter again the Court reiterated the tionally 9(a)) differences under Section 17(a) 10(b) (scienter recklessly between Section Section also 10(b)) under Section Huddleston, supra. Court had done but who is found to acted have not inten- *45 crime, regardless free of stantive tionally recklessly but would be of whether he charged only personally participates with in guilt person while the or even knows of rights of others all the acts taken in disregard reckless furtherance of the state of proved conspiracy. to have been in such a That the guilty defendant is the law. however, would be in violation of conspiracy, mind does not make him guilty of the substantive crimes that his is in the stark facts of Posed as the issue co-conspirators part have committed as case, accept the cases which I cannot the conspiracy. 10(b) catch-all indicate that the Section interpreted way be in such a as to free must To hold a defendant in damages liable to wrong-doing from federal individuals who particular plaintiff a civil conspirator, specifi- literally, offenses which fall commit that, enough prove it is not at some precisely scope within the cally, and Sec- point, he conspir- became member of the 10(b) same activities fall tion when those acy. gist of a civil conspiracy is the “[T]he 9(a). set short of the offenses out Section damage resulting from commission of a respectfully I therefore dissent from another, wrong injures and not the portion majority opinion which rules conspiracy Schlumberger itself.” Well Sur- any liability part out on the of defendants veying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Corp., Gas under federal securities laws for these (Tex.1969). S.W.2d To be liable in obviously manipula- forbidden securities damages as a civil conspirator, conspira- tions. agree tor injure must “to another particular commission of a wrong.” Id. at REAVLEY, Judge, dissenting Circuit part: The majority concedes that Bintliff could join I Judge opinion. most of Gee’s fine I not have agreed “particular wrong” dissent, however, (1) holdings from the Nevertheless, to Chemetron. majority Bintliff be held liable to Chemetron as holds that Bintliff may be liable invok- conspirator a civil that Bintliff is ing principle late-joining that a conspir- collaterally estopped by findings in. ator party “becomes in law a every act case that was settled and dismissed previously or subsequently by any done agreement parties. pursuance the others in the of it.” State v. Conspiracy I. Standard Oil 130 Tex. 107 S.W.2d While this principle broad allegation There is no proof or in this case is sound for many purposes, it clearly too justify holding the court’s that Bintliff broad even for the law of criminal conspir- may be liable to a conspirator Chemetron as acy guilt where conspirator as a does not under 4004. The evi- Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. § itself make the guilty defendant of substan- dence shows that Hall and Williams were tive co-conspirators offenses his have com- engaged manipulative in a scheme to en- part mitted as of the conspiracy. price hance the Sep- Westec stock from August tember 1964 until 1966. The sale to agree I majority with the that a co-con- place January Chemetron took spirator need not have directly participated against The evidence Bintliff is that he in or even have known of all the details of part took in three May transactions —two in the Chemetron transaction to be liable. July 1966 and one in 1966—none of which that, But Schlumberger requires at a mini- concerned Chemetron. There is no evidence mum, he agreed injure must have Chem- any way that Bintliff benefitted in from etron by the particular commission of a the Chemetron sale. wrong. agreement proved by Such could be showing that majority’s holding concepts co-conspirator joined confuses conspiracy. gist of criminal and civil scheme to sell stock specifically to Chemetron, that, conspiracy agreement of criminal is the prior it- to the sale to Chemetron, guilty the defendant the crime of joined self: he in a fraudulent conspiracy agrees if he to commit a sub- scheme to sell Westec stock to all comers. cannot, consistently immediately. expressed Bintliff with half the shares He But Schlumberger, damages held liable in his intent to re-sell the remainder immedi- he could not have particular wrong ately, agreed but then not to sell until directly indirectly, either to com- agreed, November 1966. mit. Hall were in May, Later in Williams and authority hear Texas for the We of no financing need of funds to continue conspirator may that a be held

proposition Bintliff conspiratorial agreed scheme. damages particular wrongs liable in *46 $3,000,000 guarantee days. loan for 30 long committed before his involvement in 3,000 Westec, worth His fee was shares of conspiracy.1 the $150,000on the market. Furthermore, the evidence in this record Bintliff Finally, July guaranteed in prove is insufficient as a matter of law to $3,000,000 He re- day, a 3 loan for Hall. joined that Bintliff in a scheme to create $216,000 guarantee per- ceived fee in, apparent trading actual or active or to half his re- immediately mission to sell of, price raise the Westec stock for the the first maining shares from transaction. purpose unlawful of fraudulently inducing August When Bintliff discovered in purchase general the of Westec stock the by longer get that Williams and Hall could no public. financing purchases, for their Westec he The evidence that and Wil- shows Hall realized that the Westec market was about engaged manipulative liams were in a crash, remaining and he sold his shares. price scheme to enhance the of Westec stock September August from 1964 until prove This evidence does not tend to 1966. As representatives of both Westec joined Bintliff ever in the conspirators’ pur- Funds, and Business which controlled Wes- pose purchase to induce the of Westec stock tec, they had reasons many to desire the general the by public through manipulation long-term price enhancement of the market Rather, of the market. the evidence shows of Westec The only against stock. evidence engaged that Bintliff in three arm’s-length Bintliff part is that he took in three trans- transactions with conspirators actions which occurred months after the high price he exacted a for his services. It January 1966 sale of stock to Chemetron. conspira- was irrelevant to him whether the These three transactions are not sufficient long-range manipulation tors’ scheme was prove circumstantial evidence to that Bint- if, indeed, he was even aware of successful— joined liff ever in the conspirators’ broad scope. acting Bintliff was for his own purpose general public to induce the to buy purposes, conspirators’ not to advance the Westec stock. stock, purpose. the Westec purchasing attempting quick profit

The he was to make a first two Bintliff took transactions place price on the difference between the sale May 1966. Williams offered to sell 60,000 Bintliff and the market price; guaranteeing shares Westec stock at $40 loan, a share when the market price taking advantage was he was of the con- $50 share. Bintliff spirators’ made the deal and re-sold need for desperate financing. by development of a Standard Oil was an action the State of tion the victims land statutory penalties developers’ attorney Texas to recover and obtain fraud. The was liable held injunctive against restitution, despite relief the members of an his for the full amount agreement that violated the state antitrust fraud claim that he first became aware laws; attempt it was not an inception to recover dam- The well after of the scheme. ages particular anti-competitive however, showed, attorney acts. See evidence Thus, only thing 107 S.W.2d at profited incep- had from the scheme from its prove state needed to in Standard tion, Oil fraudulent and that after he learned of its membership conspiracy in the itself. it, joined intending perpetuate nature he against State, his (Tex.Civ. the fraud the investors and to retain Bourland v. 528 S.W.2d 350 contrast, prior, ill-gotten By App. e.), gains. is no there writ refd n. r. was an — Austin by proof Deceptive action in this that Bintliff knew of or bene- the state under the Texas case alia, seeking, any way Trade Practices Act inter restitu- fited in from the sale. enough judgment.” (Second) to show that Bintliff

It is not Restatement it, conspiracy, concealed (1982); accord, knew of the Judgments Ashe Schlumberger, supra. it. profited Swenson, from 436, 443, damages Bintliff liable in as a civil To hold (1970); Quak 25 L.Ed.2d 469 Hicks v. the evidence must show that conspirator, er Oats injure “to another Bintliff intended 1981); Kaspar Works, Wire Inc. v. Leco particular wrong.” commission Mach., Inc., Eng’r & The evi- Schlumberger, 435 S.W.2d at 857. not show that Bintliff ever dence does “judgment” majority on which the purpose the unlawful that caused shared holding bases its was neither final nor on to sell Westec stock to conspirators Nothing the merits. was determined Chemetron. order dismissal in the Cosmos Bank case Estoppel II. Collateral approved but the court parties’ majority holds that Bintliff is collat- settlement and withdrew the findings of erally findings withdrawn in a estopped fact the majority today preclu- finds *47 prior by case that was settled and dismissed sive. parties. holding the agreement ig- of This The majority reasons that findings principles preclusion, nores settled over- fact in Cosmos Bank requirement meet the precedent, rules Fifth Circuit and under- judgment “only of a final because judi- public strong mines the interest in the set- final, cial act signing adverse, a known application tlement of law suits. Its to this judgment was left.” But findings of fact unfortunate, it especially case is de- in operative effect, themselves have no primary prives Bintliff of the benefit of his certainly these withdrawn findings cannot agreement resulting to settle while in al- be considered “essential to the judgment” saving most no in time or resources to the that was in fact rendered: a judgment of litigants or the courts. dismissal. prerequisite The most basic to the use of disposition of Cosmos Bank the ma- valid, preclusion judgment is “a that is fi- jority uses was not “final.” It gener- is the nal, Wright, and on the merits.” 18 C. A. al rule that a decision is not “final” for Cooper, Miller & E. Federal Practice and estoppel purposes collateral 4427, if it Procedure at 269 cannot be § [hereinafter by appellate tested Wright precluded (or review. Wright & An issue is & Miller]. Miller, subject supra, 4433, estoppel) only to collateral when it at § 315-21.2 Bintliff by appeal is “determined a valid and final could not judg- judgment that was never ment, and the determination is essential to entered.3 If he had entry allowed the exception appeals 2. An exists if the decision “is sur- court of had determined as a matter of by protections special rounded alternative plaintiffs’ law that brand name was not entitled policies support preclusion,” id. at 316— protection), denied, to trademark cert. 444 U.S. example, findings adopted Supreme 1102, 1067, (1980); 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 787 original jurisdiction in cases under its Court are Commissioner, (2d Kurlan v. 343 F.2d 625 Cir. effect, given preclusive see id. at 320-21. But 1965) (preclusive given judgment effect exception would swallow the rule if the supreme despite state court settlement after requisite protections special pol- “alternative single issue); remand on a Zdanok v. Glidden nonappealable icies” could be found in the find- Co., Div., 944, Durkee Famous Foods 327 F.2d ings district court. action, (2d Cir.) (in prior appeals court of had reversed a district court dismissal on the unavailability appeal distinguishes 3. The merits, authoritatively had determined the is appellate this case from ail of the court deci- liability, only sue of and remanded for an as majority finding sions on which the relies denied, damages), sessment of cert. 377 U.S. judgment.” only appeal “final Not was an 934, 1338, (1964), 84 S.Ct. 12 L.Ed.2d 298 with prior available action in each of these DiGiangiemo Regan, United States ex rel. v. cases, appeal but in all but one the had in fact 1262, (2d 1975) 528 F.2d 1265 & n.1 appellate been taken and the court had ren- (government right appeal had judgment. Compare Brewing trial court’s dered its Miller earlier, suppression Brewing 990, prosecution), order aborted Co. Jos. Schlitz 991-92, action, denied, 950, 1979) (in prior 3172, rt. 426 U.S. ce ground court appealed, and this that Loftin’s involved and then “defensive” judgment pro estoppel, for further collateral but it fails to explain reversed and remanded had y it in this case how distinction ceedings anything does has to do with toda - —as case the Cosmos Bank findings requirement judgment. of a final then effect. Id. preclusive have no then majority attempts prop up § could this dis- af if this court had 303. And even terming Hosiery tinction Parklane Co. v. pre firmed, would be entitled to finding Shore, 439 U.S. L.Ed.2d neces finding effect unless (1979), clusive “watershed case on offensive grounds on which the sary specific to the estoppel” collateral a ‘need “create[s] Hicks, was based. affirmance court’s to redefine doctrine of collateral estop- ” cases); (collecting at 1168 & n.6 pel.’ But the Parklane decision has abso- Miller, Wright supra, & § nothing to lutely requirement do with Thus, Bank if the at 302. Cosmos judgment.4 of a final Parklane is a land- prevailed in the district court on plaintiff only mark because require- it abandons the legal but this court many theories found mutuality; ment of offensive collateral es- one, necessary pass all toppel See, itself nothing e.g., new. Ma- findings that were not essential Buchtel, son Lumber Co. v. collat of affirmance would have no ground (1880); Wright Miller, L.Ed. 1073 & su- estoppel effect. eral pra, at 138 n.13. The majority fails point to one word justi- in Parklane that Nor was Bank disposition Cosmos departure fies its from the firm rule of this It “on merits.” is well-settled panel circuit cannot overrule a deci- litigation terminated when a consent panel. sion of another decree, judgment may only preclude *48 preclud “the issues intended to be actually the Apparently, majority believes that Works, Kaspar the Wire parties.” ed need not adhere to precedent our because 539; accord, Wright F.2d at 18 & Mil voluntarily Bintliff avoid judgment chose to ler, case, supra, at 382. In this both § essence, forgo appeal. and In what the parties express trial court the and the made majority today holds is once that a trial intent dis their that the settlement and court prepared against is to enter judgment estoppel have no effect. missal collateral that litigant, litigant not settle his purpose avoiding case for the of the collat- Recognizing principles basic of the these eral effect estoppel of the district court’s preclusion, of court law this held in Associ- I findings. think that is bad law and bad Capital Corp. ates v. Trans- Servs. Loftin’s policy. Society strong maintains a (5th interest Co., & Storage fer F.2d stage at every litigation. settlements of 1977), findings in a that Cir. that the case is majority claims that this interest is pursuant to a have not dismissed settlement can served here because effect, “the reason that settle- estoppel collateral even after no they ments are favored is that judgment litiga- has entered is avoid been and the case tion,” savings Today majority legal “the pending appeal. on the not re- only goes settling but to sources after full overrules Loftin’s further trial [a]re preclusive which Even give findings assuming, agree- effect on nominal.” without ing, court entered “the” judgment. has never reason settlements are majority the “distinguishes” they Loftin’s on favored is that legal conserve re- pro- estoppel 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 These decisions no collateral issue all. at The dictum support majority’s holding quoted by majority vide little the for the in the came course of a case, prior where court in the action concerning question discussion the “latent” operative legally never reached a mutuality determination whether the abandonment of in Park- any rights parties, of the and where lane could extended to allow offensive col- appeal was ever available. estoppel against lateral a defendant who was party litigation. Thus, not a to the earlier Migues Corp., 4. Fibreboard 662 F.2d Migues dictum even the concerned the re- (5th 1981), majority Cir. which the also quirement judgment. of a final disregard Loftin’s, cites in its effort to involved place.” Hicks, sources,51 agree estoppel with the eral first majority’s do not savings. potential estimation of the at unnecessary while these And appeals pending, preclusive are effects Certainly majority wrong is in its findings the trial courts’ will remain savings in this estimation of the case.6 But uncertain, since a reversal or an affirmance today’s more decision will de- importantly, on ground prevent an alternative will post-trial ter and force all settlements de- multi-plaintiff litigation gen- facing application fendants estoppel. of collateral appeal finding of every adverse fact made erally Wright supra, Miller, & Even if every trial court. the defendant 311-13. believes that is appeal his unmeritorious— The sole authority the majority finds for because, particular example, plain- Surety is Aetna Cas. & its decision today prevail many tiff is entitled to on one of Co. v. Jeppesen & 440 F.Supp. legal will be forced theories —the defendant grounds, on other (D.Nev.1977), vacated challenge findings all of the alterna- F.2d 339 That district court recovery tive on which bases of he believes decision has not met with favor elsewhere. erroneously the trial court relied. “[F]orc- result questionable [T]he [in Aetna] ing losing litigant appeal to take an he best. The terms settlement and dis- knows he will lose the basis of one missal it impossible would make apply is a ground alternative waste of the re- preclusion issue between courts, parties sources of litigants both and is original contrary judicial prospect action. The principles ap- to the econo- my preclusion the doctrine of plying motivated collat- in favor non-party of a trial,” many only savings Settlements are favored reasons it is be- obvious that in this judicial sides the expense conservation other retrying case will be the time and legal resources. parties already issues that the have tried once. uncertainty ending estimation, my In savings addition to and anxi it is this ety litigants concerning of the compared results of savings “nominal” when litigation, further doubts court’s settlements also resolve agreed resulted when Bintliff to settle the Cos- concerning the correctness of the mos Bank case. is no There reason to believe justness findings fact appeal that an in Cosmos Bank —which in- “ remedy it Because devises. are ‘[t]here “two volved smaller but stakes issues similar to ” disputes,’ sides” to most Howard v. Commis sig- those in this case—would have consumed sioner, 1971)(quot nificantly less time than the over two-and-one- ing (I960)), Corbin on Contracts “[o]ne years elapsed half that have since the district *49 judicial principles of the fundamental of admin judgment During court in entered this case. that, cases, most istration is in the absolute pendency appeal, preclusive of that high quality result of a trial not as of findings effects of the Bank Cosmos would justice freely little, negotiated, give as is the Wright have remained uncertain. See 18 & Will, Merhige take a little settlement.” & Ru Miller, supra, at 311-13. § Since a rever- bin, Judge The of in Role the Settlement sal in Cosmos Bank would have nullified Process, (1976) (remarks 75 F.R.D. findings reliance on the Cosmos Bank in this Judge Will). Frank, generally J. Facts are case, practical see id. as a Guesses, (1949). in Courts on Trial 14 parties matter the relitigate would have been forced to litigants’ protect Settlements also interest issues, appeals’ await the court autonomy, allowing them to reach their own Bank, decision in complex dispute Cosmos or risk having retrial of this solution to their rather than remedy imposed may by legal system case when and if Cosmos on them a Bank was necessarily litigants’ share the own reversed. generally Eisenberg, shared norms. See Pri majority mathematically makes inde- Through Ordering Negotiation: Dispute- vate fensible claim that the Cosmos Bank settlement Rulemaking, Settlement and 89 Harv.L.Rev. savings judicial has resulted in “no” system, because “this issue has now come be- Moreover, long recognized it has been that the appellate ap- fore an pellate court.” What issue? No socially restoration of tionships amicable useful rela- pos- court has even considered whether likely negoti- is more to result after a errors, interpretations sible trial incorrect litigated fight ated settlement after a than law, insufficiency require of evidence would Commissioner, the finish. See Howard v. part judgment reversal of all or that was 158; Eisenberg, supra, F.2d at at 646. never entered Cosmos Bank. Despite majority’s hyperbole about “years discovery” and “several weeks of is little more attractive. Not did the possibility ap-

settlement sacrifice the findings

peal liability, from but the

subsequent preclusion use of may make it pos-

more difficult to settle cases in this

ture. Wright Miller, supra, & at 318

(footnote omitted).

Finally, majority’s holding is unfair

to Bintliff. As the majority acknowledges, primary reason that Bintliff settled

Cosmos Bank was to avoid application estoppel. collateral He well- relied on

settled rules of deciding law in to settle. gave

He up right appeal, his the exercise

of which would either delayed have the trial prevented,

in this case or practical for all

purposes, the use of estoppel collateral judicial

this case. He saved the system a

certain appeal possible and a retrial and appeal,

second and saved his adversary ad- expense

ditional time and collecting dam- Nevertheless,

ages. today majority dis-

regards justifiable his reliance interests and

deprives primary him of the benefit of his

bargain. majority says that the rules estoppel collateral are based on “fair-

ness,” nothing but I see fair about the

majority’s decision.

George BASIARDANES,

Plaintiff-Appellant, *50 GALVESTON,

CITY OF

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-2239. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fifth Circuit.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,777, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 781 Chemetron Corporation, Cross-Appellant v. Business Funds, Inc., Cross-Appellees
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 16, 1982
Citation: 682 F.2d 1149
Docket Number: 80-1658
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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