This appeal emanates from a district court order denying an injunction sought by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) against Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., (Koscot) for allegedly violating the federal securities laws. Specifically, the SEC maintained that the pyramid promotion enterprise operated by Koscot was within the ambit of the term security, as employed by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
1
that as such it had to be registered with the SEC pursuant to the ’33 Act,
2
and that the manner in which Koscot purveyed its enterprise to potential investors contravened the anti-fraud provisions of the
*475
’34 Act.
3
In a comprehensive opinion, reported at
I
A. The Koscot Scheme
The procedure followed by Koscot in the promotion of its enterprise can be synoptically chronicled. 4 A subsidiary of Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Koscot thrives by enticing prospective investors to participate in its enterprise, holding out as a lure the expectation of galactic profits. All too often, the beguiled investors are disappointed by paltry returns.
The vehicle for the lure is a multi-level network of independent distributors, purportedly engaged in the business of selling a line of cosmetics. At the lowest level is a “beauty advisor” whose income is derived solely from retail sales of Koscot products made available at a discount, customarily of 45%. Those desirous of ascending the ladder of the Koscot enterprise may also participate on a second level, that of supervisor or retail manager. For an investment of $1,000, a supervisor receives cosmetics at a greater discount from retail price, typically 55%, to be sold either directly to the public or to be held for wholesale distribution to the beauty advisors. In addition, a supervisor who introduces a prospect to the Koscot program with whom a sale is ultimately consummated receives $600 of the $1,000 paid to Koscot. The loftiest position in the multilevel scheme is that of distributor. An investment of $5,000 with Koscot entitles a distributor to purchase cosmetics at an even greater discount, typically 65%, for distribution to supervisors and retailers. Moreover, fruitful sponsorship of either a supervisor or distributor brings $600 or $3,000 respectively to the sponsor.
The SEC does not contend that the distribution of cosmetics is amenable to regulation under the federal securities laws. ■ Rather, it maintains that the marketing of cosmetics and the recruitment aspects of Koscot’s enterprise are separable and that only the latter are within the definition of a security. That the district court acknowledged the *476 fragmentation discerned by the SEC is witnessed by the following observation:
“Many if not all of the persons, seeking to become Koscot distributors are attracted by the lure of money to be earned by high-pressure recruiting of other persons into the Koscot program, rather than the sale of the cosmetics themselves.”
The modus operandi of Koscot and its investors is as follows. Investors solicit prospects to attend Opportunity Meetings at which the latter are introduced to the Koscot scheme. Significantly, the investor is admonished not to mention the details of the business before bringing the prospect to the meeting, a technique euphemistically denominated the “curiosity approach.” The Koscot manual describes the reasoning behind the approach and its operation in the following manner:
“DON’T GO INTO DETAILS. Never explain the program to a prospect before bringing him to an Opportunity Meeting. Do not mention Kosmetics or give any particulars, as many people will prejudge the program and decide it is not for them before they see the presentation.
USE THE CURIOSITY APPROACH. When you invite a prospect to an Opportunity Meeting, arouse his curiosity. Tell him you have discovered a wonderful financial opportunity that will fit him like a glove! Or, tell him you have seen a money tree and would like for him to take a look at it.”
Thus, in the initial stage, an investor’s sole task is to attract individuals to the meeting.
Once a prospect’s attendance at a meeting is secured, Koscot employees, frequently in conjunction with investors, undertake to apprise prospects of the “virtues” of enlisting in the Koscot plan. The meeting is conducted in conformity with scripts prepared by Koscot. Indeed, Koscot distributes a bulletin which states: “. . . this program is to be presented by the script. It is strongly recommended that you consider replacing any individual who does not present the program verbatim.” The principal design of the meetings is to foster an illusion of affluence. Investors and Koscot employees are instructed to drive to meetings in expensive cars, preferably Cadillacs, to dress expensively, and to flaunt large amounts of money. It is intended that prospects will be galvanized into signing a contract by these ostentations displayed in the evangelical atmosphere of the meetings. Go-Tours, characterized by similar histrionics, are designed to achieve the same goal.
The final stage in the promotional scheme is the consummation of the sale. If a prospect capitulates at either an Opportunity Meeting or a Go-Tour, an investor will not be required to expend any additional effort. Less fortuitous investors whose prospects are not as quickly enticed to invest do have to devote additional effort to consummate a sale, the amount of which is contingent upon the degree of reluctance of the prospect.
B. The District Court
The district court rebuffed the SEC’s effort to subject Koscot’s promotional scheme to the federal securities laws. The SEC argued that the scheme qualified as a profit-sharing arrangement, an interest commonly known as a security, and an investment contract. The profit-sharing theory was rejected because in the district court’s view, a successful recruiting distributor receives not a
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share of Koscot’s profit but rather a fixed fee.
Of more immediate concern is the reasoning employed by the district court in rejecting the SEC’s contention that Koscot sold “investment contracts,” for it is our disagreement with this conclusion that prompts us to reverse. The district court correctly cited the following language from SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. .” (emphasis added)
This test subsumes within it three elements: first, that there is an investment of money; second, that the scheme in which an investment is made functions as a common enterprise; and third, that under the scheme, profits are derived solely from the efforts of individuals other than the investors.
See, e. g.,
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises,
II
Thus, we are called upon to address that which the court below did not consider — whether the Koscot scheme satisfies the first two elements of the Howey test — and that which the district court did consider — whether the scheme satisfies the third component of the test. The latter inquiry entails, in the first instance, a determination of whether the “solely from the efforts of others” standard is to be literally or functionally applied. We address these issues seriatim.
A. The First Two Elements
Since it cannot be disputed that purchasers of supervisorships and distributorships made an investment of money, cf. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra, at 481, our initial concern is whether the Koscot scheme functions as a common enterprise. As defined by the Ninth Circuit, “[a] common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties.” SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra at 482 n. 7. The critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter’s efforts.
That this definition comports with the standard applied by the Supreme Court and this Circuit is witnessed by an examination of the reasoning employed in
Howey, supra,
and in Blackwell v. Bentsen,
“Here it is quite clear that each purchaser looked for the income from his investment to the fruitage of his own grove and not to the fruitage of the groves as a whole. It is quite clear, too, that each purchaser’s income was in no sense dependent upon the purchase or development of other tracts than his own except in the sense that as grove owners generally prospered, each owner of a grove would.” (emphasis added)
“Such persons [investors] have no desire to occupy the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment. Indeed, individual development of the plots of land that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size. Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as component parts of a larger area. A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments.” (emphasis added)
Similarly, here, the fact that an investor’s return is independent of that of other investors in the scheme is not decisive. Rather, the requisite commonality is evidenced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the Koseot meetings and guidelines on recruiting prospects and consummating a sale.
See
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
supra
at 482; United States v. Herr,
B. The Third Element — Solely from the Efforts of Others
As was noted earlier, the critical issue in this case is whether a literal or functional approach to the “solely from the efforts of others’’ test should be adopted, i. e., whether the exertion of some effort by an investor is inimical to the holding that a promotional scheme falls within the definition of an investment contract. We measure the viability of the SEC’s advocacy of a functional approach by its compatibility with the remedial purposes of the federal securities acts, the language employed and the derivation of the test utilized in Howey, and the decisions in this circuit and other federal courts.
1. The Legal Standard
We begin our analysis by noting that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are remedial in nature,
9
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
A literal application of the
Howey
test would frustrate the remedial purposes of the Act. As the Ninth Circuit noted in SEC v. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
supra
at 482, “[i]t would be easy to evade [the
Howey
test] by adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.”
See also
Lino v. City Investing Co.,
Moreover, a close reading of the language employed in
Howey
and the authority upon which the Court relied suggests that, contrary to the view of the district court, we need not feel compelled to follow the “solely from the efforts of others” test literally. Nowhere in the opinion does the Supreme Court characterize the nature of the “efforts” that would render a promotional scheme beyond the pale of the definition of an investment contract. Clearly the facts presented no issue of how to assess a scheme in which an investor performed mere perfunctory tasks. Indeed, just prior to concluding that the sales of units of citrus grove development, coupled with contracts for cultivating, marketing and remitting the net proceeds to investors constituted sales of investment contracts, the Court observed that “the promoters
manage, control
and
operate
the enterprise.”
The derivation of the “solely from the efforts of others” test also tends to belie a talismanic approach to its application. The Court reasoned in
Howey
that Congress intended that this test be applied because it had been crystallized by prior state court interpretations.
Subsequent case-law also supports the conclusion that the
Howey
test is not possessed of the talismanic quality ascribed to it by the court below. In SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.,
Moreover, a significant number of federal courts invoking the
Howey
test, have either given it a broader more salutary application or endorsed such an application in principle. Thus, in several cases where the scheme required or envisioned the possibility of participation by an investor in the enterprise, courts nevertheless found an investment contract
*482
to exist.
See
Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc.,
In view of these developments and our analysis of the import of the language in and the derivation of the Howey test, we hold that the proper standard in determining whether a scheme constitutes an investment contract is that explicated by the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra. In that case, the court announced that the critical inquiry is “whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.” Id. at 482. 14
Contrary to the view of the district court, our adoption of this test represents no fundamental departure from the standard we have previously applied. Indeed, our canvass of the cases presenting an investment contract issue to this court,
see
Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones,
supra;
SEC v. MacElvain,
supra;
Buie v. United States,
supra;
Lynn v. Caraway,
2. Application of the Test to the Instant Facts
Having concluded that the district court mispereeived the controlling standard, it becomes incumbent upon us to determine whether Koscot’s scheme falls with the standard adopted. The deference customarily tendered to fact findings rendered by a district court is inappropriate where, as here, the findings are tainted by application of an erroneous legal principle.
See
Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,
Our task is greatly simplified by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., supra. The promotional scheme confronting the Ninth Circuit is largely paralleled by that exposed before this court. Dare to be Great, (Dare) which like Koscot, is a subsidiary of Turner Enterprises, offered five plans in its self-improvement program, three of which entitled an investor to earn money for coaxing additional prospects into the Dare fold. To a purchaser of a plan denominated Adventure III, costing $2,000, Dare proffered tutelage on sales motivation and sales ability and authority to sell Adventures I, II and III. Remuneration for a sale of each plan amounted to $100, $300 and $900 respectively. Dare bestowed the same benefits upon investors of Adventure IV but with the additional opportunity to receive $2,500 compensation for sales of Adventure- IV to new prospects. This plan cost $5,000. A purchaser of the $1,000 plan would receive basically the same benefits as would a purchaser of Adventure II, i. e., the sales material, and was empowered to sell the plan. Financial gain would inure to him after his seller consummated a sale with two prospects steered by him to his seller. The purchaser would then be entitled to sell plans on his own, being remunerated at $400 per sale. Alternatively a purchaser who lures three people into the scheme would be entitled to sell the $1,000 plan without buying it himself.
As in the Koscot scheme, the initial task of a purchaser of a Dare plan was to lure prospects to meetings, denominated Adventure Meetings. These were characterized by the same overzealous and emotionally charged atmosphere at which the illusion of affluence fostered in Opportunity Meetings was created and relied upon in securing sales. The Adventure Meetings were run according to script but, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “The Dare People, not the purchaser-‘salesmen’, run the meetings and do the selling.”
“In this case, Dare’s source of income is from selling the Adventures and the Plan. The purchaser is sold the idea that he will get a fixed part of the proceeds of the sales. In essence, to get that share, he invests three things: his money, his efforts to find prospects and bring them to the meetings, and whatever it costs him to create an illusion of his own affluence. He invests them in Dare’s get-rich-quick scheme. What he buys is a share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of Dare. Those efforts are the sine qua non of the scheme; . those efforts are what produces the money which is to make him rich. In essence, it is the right to share in the proceeds of those efforts that he buys. In our view, the scheme is no less an investment contract merely because he contributes some effort as well as money to get into it.”
The recruitment role played by investors in Koscot coincides with that played by investors in Dare to be Great. That investors in the latter did not participate in Adventure Meetings while they do in the Koscot scheme is insignificant. Since Koscot’s Opportunity Meetings are run according to preordained script, the deviation from which would occasion disapprobation or perhaps exclusion from the meetings, the role of investors at these meetings can be characterized as little more than a perfunctory one. Nor does the fact that Koscot investors may have devoted more time than did Dare investors to closing sales transmute the essential congruity between the two schemes. The act of consummating a sale is essentially a ministerial not managerial one, see Mitzner v. Cardet International, Inc. et al., supra at 1267-1268, one which does not alter the fact that the critical determinant of the success of the Koscot Enterprise lies with the luring effect of the opportunity meetings. As was noted earlier, investors are cautioned to employ the “curiosity approach” in attracting prospects. Once attendance is secured, the sales format devised by Koscot is thrust upon the prospect. An investor’s sole contribution in following the script is a nominal one. Without the scenario created by the Opportunity Meetings and Go-Tours, an investor would invariably be powerless to realize any return on his investment.
Ill
We confine our holding to those schemes in which promoters retain immediate control over the essential managerial conduct of an enterprise and where the investor’s realization of profits is inextricably tied to the success of the promotional scheme. Thus, we acknowledge that a conventional franchise arrangement, wherein the promoter exercises merely remote control over an enterprise and -the investor operates largely unfettered by promoter mandates presents a different question than the one posed herein. But the Koscot scheme does not qualify as a conventional franchising arrangement.
We are mindful of the caveat expressed by Justice Brennan, concurring in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,
Accordingly, this cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1970) provides as follows :
“(1) the term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”
. Section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
. The definition of security enunciated in § 3(a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970) is substantially identical to that contained in the Securities Act.
See
Tcherepnin v. Knight,
In addition to the aforementioned relief, the SEG sought the appointment of an equity receiver and an order directing an accounting of Koscot’s operations.
. The district court left little doubt that the scheme is fraudulent. It noted the following :
“In reviewing the record in this case, it is plain that defendants’ program is a get-rich-quick scheme in the worst sense. Poor, unwary persons have been induced by high-pressure sales tactics to part with their money, and very few have harvested the large returns they were led to believe were common for those participating in the program.”
The district court initially stayed the entry of its judgment because it had been notified by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation that transfer of this case along with a plethora of others was being considered. Upon being apprised by the Panel on MultiDistrict Litigation that the motion to transfer had been tentatively denied, the district court lifted the stay. (R. 1038).
See
In Re Glen W. Turner Enterprises Litigation,
. The district court in SEC v. Turner Enterprises,
. The parameters of the phrase “commonly known as a security”, like those of the phrase “interest in a profit sharing arrangement” are largely unrefined in federal law. They have, however, been defined by state courts. For an extended analysis of such developments, see Comment, Pyramid Marketing Plans and Consumer Protection: State & Federal Regulation, 21 J. of Public Law 445 (1972).
. The thrust of the inquiry under the risk capital test is whether the investor has subjected his money to the risk of an enterprise over which lie exercises no managerial control.
See
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
We would note that there is some overlap between the risk capital approach, as employed by the district court in
Turner
in determining whether an interest is commonly known as a security, and the managerial control test utilized by the Court of Appeals in
Turner
in defining whether an investment contract exists. The overlap can be ascribed to the fact that the element of managerial control is implicit in the risk capital test as derived from Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,
. A more stringent interpretation of the commonality requirement is reflected in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities Inc.,
. The remedial purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, were expressed as follows:
“The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion, . . .”
See Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, S.Rep.No.47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
. The district court discounted State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co. as a case materially different from the one presented before it, noting that in the
Gopher Tire
program, an
*481
investor’s return was not directly linked to his own effort.
See
. The Supreme Court also cited four circuit court cases as support for the “solely from the efforts of others” test.
See
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
. The Tenth Circuit in Andrews v. Blue,
. In several other cases, the federal courts have given limited expression to a functional application of the
Ilowey
test by emphasizing that it is the managerial role performed by an investor that differentiates an enterprise from one involving a conventional investment contract. Such emphasis, implying, as it does, that the exertion of some effort by an investor is not antagonistic to a finding that an investment contract exists, belies a literal application of the
Ilowey
test. Thus, in Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
“. . . [Defendant has not endeavored to show that it was prevented from directing the operations of the restaurant or that it lacked the requisite knowledge, skill or expertise to undertake that task. * * * We contrast the usual investor-promoter situation, where the shill of ingenuity of the investor does not determine the success or failure of the venture and where the investor’s fortunes parallel those of the promoter, to the present situation, where River City Steak’s enterprise stands or falls independently of Mr. Steak’s success or failure.” (emphasis added).
. This test derives support from the language employed in Lino v. City Investing Co., supra; Nash & Associates Inc. v. Lum’s of Ohio, supra; 1050 Tenants v. Takobson, supra; Mitzner v. Cardet International Inc., et al., supra: and the cases cited in note 13 supra, where the element of investor managerial control was emphasized as a critical index in determining whether or not an investment contract existed.
This test also comports with the position adopted by the SEC. Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971), reported in 1971-72 Transfer Binder CCH Fed.Sec.L.Rep. # 98446, provides as follows :
“It must be emphasized that the assignment of nominal or limited responsibilities to the participant does not negative the existence of an investment contract; where the duties assigned are so narrowly ' circumscribed as to involve little real choice of action or where the duties assigned would in any event have little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by the promoters, a security may be found to exist. As the Supreme Court has held, emphasis must be placed upon economic reality. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co.,328 U.S. 293 ,66 S.Ct. 1100 ,90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946). While the Commission has not taken the position that a franchise arrangement necessarily involves the offer and sale of a security, in the Commission’s view a security is offered or sold where the franchisee is not required to make significant efforts in the operation of the franchise in order to obtain the promised return.”
Since a ruling fashioned by an agency charged with administering a statute, though not dispositive, is entitled to great weight,
e. g.,
Zeller v. Bogue Electric Maufacturing Corp.,
. In addition to misconceiving this court’s approach to prior investment contract adjudications, the district court overstated the prophylactic bent assumed by the Ninth Circuit which decided
Turner.
We note that in Chapman v. Rudd Paint and Varnish Company,
