147 N.Y.S. 644 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1914
I concur in the reversal of this judgment on the ground that the evidence did not justify a submission of the case to the jury. I also agree that the errors pointed out by my brother Laughlin are such as to require a reversal.
McLaughlin and Scott, JJ., concurred.
This is a statutory action to recover for the death of Bernard Fearon which was caused by an ash hoist descending upon him in the basement of defendant’s building at 346 Broadway, borough of Manhattan, New York, while he was in its employ on the night of February 5, 1912. The decedent was forty-six years of age and in the best of health. He had had considerable experience as a coal passer and fireman and was a licensed fireman. He was employed by the defendant as a coal passer and commenced work for it the night before he met with the accident. One Loughlin, a fireman in the employ of the defendant, and who was related to decedent by marriage, knowing that the defendant required the services of a man to take the place of one injured, brought the decedent to the defendant’s building the night before the accident and presented him to the defendant’s first assistant engineer, Anderson, who was then going off duty, saying that “ here was a coal passer,” and the assistant engineer instructed Loughlin in effect to put decedent to work as a coal passer, and, as Loughlin was then going on duty for twelve hours, he, without further directions from the assistant engineer or any one else, assumed to assign work to the decedent as assistant to him as fireman in charge of the boñers. Loughlin testified that the first work decedent did was to wheel coal and that the next work done was removing ashes from the fires, and that, while the decedent was wheeling coal he informed decedent that" he would get the ash cans which were “ on the elevator shaft,” by which he meant in the vault or room under the Leonard street sidewalk in which a hoist elevator leading to the sidewalk had been installed and was operated, and he did, but that
The evidence shows among other things that the fireman was responsible for the condition of the fires and for keeping up steam, and that the duties of the coal passer were to assist the fireman, but that the fireman was not responsible for the coal passer’s work and that they worked together in shoveling coal and feeding the fires and shaking down the furnaces and helped one another; that there was always a watch engineer on duty at night vested with authority to give orders to the firemen, coal passers and other employees if and when necessary, and that the firemen worked eight hours and the coal passers twelve hours ordinarily, but they received the same per diem wages.
The decedent came to work on the night of the accident at six o’clock. There were on duty that night watch engineer Punch, who was in general charge, one Sheehan, an oiler, whose duties carried him to the engine room, the fire room and the pump room, one Morgan, as fireman, and the decedent as coal passer. Morgan had been working two hours before the decedent appeared. There were three furnaces in a row in the boiler room on the basement floor. The first work decedent did that night was to wheel coal to the furnaces, and before he did so Morgan said to him, “We will start to get some coal out.” Morgan then told him to clean the fire, which involved removing the ashes from-under the grate and putting it into cans, which work they did together. There were in the boiler room when they started work about thirty empty ash cans. After removing* the ashes from one grate they burned some rubbish- and next wheeled more coal and then cleaned another fire, and after that they started "to get more coal and were about to clean the third fire. Morgan testified that the decedent then opened the door of the third furnace and remarked that “ it was a pretty fat fire, pretty heavy one, he meant,” and walked away towards the elevator shaft; that at that time about twenty-six of the thirty empty cans had been filled; that as they finished cleaning the second fire the decedent asked Morgan if he had “ taken the rest of the cans out of the elevator shaft,” and was informed that he had; that the
The defendant’s building is at the southeast comer of Broad
The negligence charged, and upon which the learned counsel for the respondent claims that the verdict may be sustained, is in not furnishing the decedent with a safe place within which to perform his duties, in not warning him of the danger, in not properly lighting the place, and in maintaining a defective elevator. There is evidence tending to show that the elevator could be accidentally started by merely touching the drum or by any slight movement of the chain. Other evidence tends to show that this elevator was in such condition to the knowl
W§ find, however, some material errors in the record preju
I am of opinion that the appellant was entitled to the instructions requested. All material evidence with respect to Mon gan’s duties and authority has been stated, and it does not show that he was intrusted with superintendence or was performing the duties of a superintendent, or that he gave any negligent order to the decedent. He had no authority to give orders. Punch was the immediate superior of both and he was on duty at the time and he alone was authorized to give orders. Subject to an appeal to or orders from him, the firemen and coal passers were expected to work together, and what is claimed to have been orders from the fireman were merely suggestions as to the next work to-be done in order to keep the fires in proper condition; and, while it may be conceded that it was for the fireman to determine the order in which the coal passer was to perform his duties, the evidence would not warrant a finding that the fireman had supervision over him while performing his duties. Morgan, therefore, was a coemployee. Moreover, as already stated, there is no evidence that Morgan gave the decedent any negligent order or directed the decedent to go into the elevator shaft, and he must have gone there for purposes of his own or pursuant to what was said to him by Loughlin the night before.
I am also of opinion that an error was committed in receiving a group photograph of decedent and two of his children,
There were other errors committed in permitting an expert for plaintiff to testify, not what conditions would cause the elevator to lower without pulling the ring or using the chain or turning the drum, but as to what, in his opinion, caused it to fall on the occasion in question; and in the rejection of evidence with respect to decedent’s habit of becoming intoxicated, which bore on his probable earnings, and was competent on the question of the financial loss sustained by his wife and children. It should be sufficient to draw attention to these errors without discussing them in detail to prevent a repetition of them on a retrial.
It follows that the judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Clarke, J., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. Order to be settled on notice.