FDIC v. DiStefanoFDIC v. DiStefano
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, аs Receiver of New Bank of New England, Plaintiff,
v.
Theodore F. diSTEFANO, Defendant.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
*111 *112 Matthew Thomas Oliverio, Edwards & Angell, Providence, RI, for plaintiff.
Michele A. Theroux, Charles J. McGovern, Philip W. Noel, Providence, RI, for defendant.
*113 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LAGUEUX, Chief Judge.
This matter is presently before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also before the Court is the motion of defendant diStefano to join the United States as a third party defendant. For the reasons set forth herein, both motions are denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant is the former President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Colonial Savings Bank ("Colonial"), a federally insured savings and loan association in Rhode Island. In 1988, defendant borrowed $1,525,000 from Bank of New England Old Colony, N.A. ("Old Colony"). He secured this note with a mortgage of the same amount on a building and property along Pontiac Avenue in Cranston, Rhode Island. In addition to the mortgage, defendant gave Old Colony and its assigns the power to collect rents from this property should defendant default on the note. Seacoast Mortgage Corporation ("Seacoast") and Colonial became tenants in this building.
In January of 1991, the Bank of New England, N.A. ("BNE"), and its subsidiary, Old Colony, were declared insolvent. The FDIC became BNE's receiver, established the New Bank of New England ("NBNE"), and then later became NBNE's receiver. NBNE became the holder of the $1,525,000 note and mortgage. In accordance with
In the meantime, Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") became conservator of Colonial and Seacoast at the end of May 1991. Defendant then became caught in a "bureaucratic whipsaw". The FDIC demanded the rents from the Pontiac Avenue property from RTC, but RTC insisted on placing the rents in escrow until it could determine who was entitled to the money. Defendant postulates that this maneuver cost him a chance to cure the default. In November 1991, the FDIC sought to foreclose on the property. Defendant then filed suit in this Court seeking injunctive relief and making damage claims. The Court issued a temporary restraining order barring foreclosure on November 13, 1991. That order was vacated on November 21, 1991 when the Court determined that
On August 25, 1992, the FDIC filed this suit against defendant seeking to recover a deficiency resulting from the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the property. On October 16, 1992 defendant answered and filed counterclaims against the FDIC for breach of contrаct, violation of equal protection, violation of due process, and conspiracy to defraud. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaims, and later, defendant filed a motion to implead the United States as a third-party defendant contending that the United States is liable for the wrongful conduct of the FDIC. After hearing oral arguments in March, 1993, the Court took the matter under advisement. This phase of the case is now in order for decision.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
As this Court noted in the prior suit between these parties, jurisdiction of the district courts is strictly controlled by statute. In 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), Pub.L.No. 101-73, 101 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified into 12 U.S.C.). The legislation includes an administrative claims procedure for asserting claims against the FDIC or RTC as receiver of a seized institution. Thosе with claims against the *114 failed institution or the receiver must submit them to the receiver within a certain time frame. The receiver then adjudicates the claims in accordance with the procedures set forth in the statute.
DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUS SUIT
The claims that defendant has brought as counterclaims in this case were also asserted by defendant when he sued the FDIC and RTC. In that case, this Court held that it had no jurisdiction оver those claims until the administrative procedure detailed in FIRREA had been followed. diStefano v. Resolution Trust Corp. and FDIC, C.A. No. 91-600L, p. 1-3 (D.R.I. June 25, 1992). The only difference between the claims in the first suit and the ones that defendant now avers is that the present claims are counterclaims. The Court concludes that claims filed as counterclaims must also follow the administrative procedures of
I. FIRREA JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Counterclaims are Claims
A counterclaim is a claim brought by a defendant in opposition to the plaintiff. Black's Law Dictionary 315 (5th ed. 1979). There is no provision of FIRREA that exempts counterclaims from the jurisdictional bar of
The Court recognizes the jurisdictional void presented by its interpretation of FIRREA since it is possible to find subject matter jurisdiction over a case while not being able to adjudicate affirmative defenses and counterclaims which arise in the same law suit. However, this anomaly does not allow the Court to create jurisdiction where Congress has expressly forbidden the Court to exercise such authority.
B. The Jurisdictional Bar
There is a great deal of confusion amongst the courts on how broadly to interpret the jurisdictional bar of
An extremely well reasoned approach to this problem has recently been published by Judge Leif M. Clark of the Western District of Texas Bankruptcy Court. In Re Scott, *115
Although drafted in two paragraphs, the jurisdictional bar breaks down into three distinct provisions.[1] The first provision covers "any claim ... from ... the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver...."
1. Claims from the Assets
The first provision of the jurisdictional bar comes from the first clause of
2. Actions Seeking a Determination of Rights
The second provision of the jurisdictional bar, which comes from the second clause of
The only exception to the jurisdictional bar is contained in its introductory clause: "except as otherwise provided in this subsection."
As can be seen from other sub-sections of the Act, Congress knows how to prohibit a court from taking certain actions. E.g.
3. Claims Relating to Acts or Omissions
The third provision of the jurisdictional bar is contained in
C. Defendant's Claims Fall within the Jurisdictional Bar
In the instant case, defendant alleges that plaintiff's wrongful actions constitute various torts, including constitutional violations, as well as contractual transgressions. As indicated by the preceding analysis, the defendant's tort claims, including the constitutional ones, relate to an act or omission of the receiver and are barred by the so called third provision of the jurisdictional bar contained in
Defendant's contract claim is likewise barred. As a "pure contract" claim, defendant's breach of contract allegation is a rights determination action because it requires the court to sort out the interests and liabilities of the parties concerning an asset held by the receiver. The note and mortgage held by NBNE were assets of that institution. An asset is "Anything owned by a person or organization having monetary value...." and, specifically in the banking industry, "Loans, discounts, investment securities, (government bonds, municipal bonds) and claims against other banks." Thomas P. Fitch, Dictionary of Banking Terms 35 (1990). Other courts have held that the second clause of
If the contract claim is interpreted to be a tort claim, the result is no different. Under that interpretation the claim is excluded by the third provision of the jurisdictional bar encompassing acts and omissions of the receiver. As a result of the section *117 1821(d)(13)(D) jurisdictional bar, defendant's claims are subject to the mandates of the FIRREA administrative claims procedure. In short, defendant's claims must be denied by the FDIC before he can bring those claims to this Court.
D. Timing and Notice
In addition to the interpretive problems noted above, many courts and commentators have struggled over how the coverage of the claims procedure and jurisdictional bar vary with the precise time that a claim arose. Some, including defendant in the present case, havе tried to make a distinction between claims arising before and after an institution goes into receivership. E.g. Rechler Partnership v. Resolution Trust Corp., 1990 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 18724 at *4-5 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1990) (suggesting that the claims procedure applies to claims arising before receivership, but not after). There is nothing in the statute to suggest that it was not intended to apply to claims arising after the institution was placed into receivership. Indeed, the statute specifically applies to claims concerning acts and omissions of the receiver in provision three of the jurisdictional bar.
This reading of the statute is not without its shortcomings, however. The extreme example is the рaradoxical problem of a claim that arises after the claim bar date. As noted above, upon appointment, the receiver sets a date, usually about six months in the future, before which all claims must be broughtthe ubiquitous "bar date".
Such situations are intolerable for several reasons. First, the receiver becomes the sole gatekeeper of claims against it. It has unfettered discretion to deny some individuals with claims any remedy. This is a conflict of interest that implicates the due process rights of the claimant. Second, if claims arising after the bar date may not be brought without the consent of the receiver and those claims concern the property of the claimant, the FDIC could be engaging in an impermissible taking under the Fifth Amendment. C.f., 701 NPB Associates v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,
Those individuals with claims arising before the bar date may have similar problems. The notice provisions of
An interpretation of the statute which avoids those constitutional issues was espoused by the Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Texas. That Court cured the defects by requiring that formal notice be given to each сlaimant along with an opportunity to respond prior to his claim becoming time barred. In re Scott,
As noted by the Court in Scott, its interpretation of FIRREA appears to be in conflict with a previous ruling of the Fifth Circuit. Compare In re Scott
The Constitution mandates that a claimant without official notice as described by
Turning to the case at bar, this Court determines that since the FDIC has failed to give defendant nоtice as required by
E. Defendant's Claims have been denied by the FDIC
However, this Court concludes in this case that the actions of the FDIC constitute a de facto denial of any claims asserted against it by defendant. The FDIC has pursued defendant for the full amount of the deficiency without deducting anything for the claims of defendant. The fact that the FDIC has brought this suit indicates that it has already considered the issues involved. This amounts to an affirmative disallowance of defendant's claims pursuant to 1821(d)(5)(D)(i). In re Scott,
The choice to move past the administrative claims procedure to the merits is reaffirmed when the Court focuses on the pragmatic concerns surrounding the case rather than the statute's dogmatic mandates.
Any attempt by defendant to file a claim with the FDIC at this late date undoubtedly would result in the denial of the claim. The FDIC has been in a dispute with defendant for several years and it seems certain that his claims would be summarily denied. Futility alone cannot serve as a basis for a determination that defendant's claims have been denied. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. The Satter Companies,
Furthermore, judicial economy must be considered. This dispute has been on this Court's calendar for over two years in various guises. This is the Court's second written decision on the matter. There have been numerous hearings before the Court and volumes of memoranda, as well. To dismiss defendant's claims, force him to submit them to the receiverwhere they would certainly be denied, and then wait for him to "re-sue" on the same claims in the instant case, would be an enormous waste of time and money.
Finally, It should be noted that Congress' expressed intent in enacting FIRREA was to, "dispose of the bulk of claims against failed financial institutions expeditiously and fairly." H.R.Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 419 reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 215. To force defendant to return to the claims procedure two years after it closed and then file claims in this Court for a third time would fly in the face of Congress' desires. Congress also noted that the claims procedure was enacted to, "enable the FDIC to dispose of the bulk of claims against the failed financial institution without unduly burdening the District Courts." Id. This dispute has been a burden on this Court аnd disposing of it on the merits is the best way to fulfil the mandate of Congress to avoid future burdens and delays.
This Court, therefore, decides that the actions of the FDIC in bringing this case for recovery of a deficiency constitute a de facto denial of the claims of defendant. Such a determination accords with the practicalities involved in this particular situation. Accordingly, the jurisdictional bar contained in
The Court wishes to make it clear that the present case is exceptional. This case involves claims that are certain to be denied by the FDIC and thus, would return at a later time to be litigated in this Court. This case does not resemble the core receivership claims where a depositor or vendor sues for *120 debts. To conclude that defendant's claims have been denied by the FDIC and move on to the merits of the case immediately is logical and accords with the concerns of Congress. Any other result would elevate form over substance. Therefore, unless the doctrine of sovereign immunity blocks the assertion of these counterclaims against the FDIC in this case, the Court can proceed to consider them on the merits.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Not only do sovereign immunity issues confront the defendant in his counterclaim against the FDIC, but they also arise from his motion to join the United States as a third party under
A. The Doctrine Generally
The doctrine of sovereign immunity dictates that, "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit." United States v. Mitchell,
The sovereign immunity of the United States extends to its agencies. See Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin.,
There are two limited exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity which must be examined in this case. First, the Federal Tort Claims Act if applicable provides an avenue for relief. Second, the "sue and be sued" clause in the legislation delimiting the FDIC's powers provides a potential source for the waiver of sovereign immunity.
B. Torts against the FDIC through the FTCA
The FTCA allows a plaintiff to sue the government for certain torts. The First Circuit has noted, "The Federal Tort Claims Act contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for certain negligent or wrongful acts by government employees acting within the scope of their employment." Hydrogen Technology Corp. v. United States,
The FTCA limits the type of claims that may be brought against the United States. Certain intentional torts are not actionable under the FTCA.
C. Intentional Torts Claims against the United States
Two of defendant's claims fall within
Defendant further alleges a breach of contract by the FDIC. He has not specifically alleged any facts to support the claim that the FDIC breached a contract. The only contracts involved were the note and mortgage. Defendant admits to being in default under those agreements. Furthermore, his answer and counterclaim does not give any indiсation as to the nature of his "contract claim", but it is clear to the Court from the various hearings and memoranda filed that this particular claim sounds in one of two tortseither a rephrasing of his conspiracy to defraud claim or a claim that the FDIC interfered with his lease contract with Colonial.
From the outset of defendant's various lawsuits, his claims have been based on the alleged fraudulent conduct of FDIC and RTC. In fact, in his Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, defendant referred to his claims as "allegations of tortious conduct and constitutional violations," at p. 2. His answer and counterclaim does not indicate what conduct constituted a breach of contract, in what manner a contract *122 was breached, or even which contract was breached.
Furthermore, defendant's attempt to implead the United States asserting the same "contract claim" supports the interpretation that the claim sounds in tort. In his motion to join the United States as a third-party, defendant pleads the FTCA as the sole source of jurisdiction. The FTCA does not apply to breach of contract claims. Davis v. United States,
It appears to the Court that defendant's alleged breach of contract claim is simply a rephrasing of his conspiracy to defraud claim. In which case, as noted previously, the claim is excluded by
D. Intentional Torts Claims against the FDIC
Defendant makes his conspiracy to defraud and breach of contract claims against the FDIC as well as the United States. The FDIC's empowering legislation contains a "sue and be sued" clause.
E. Constitutional Claims
Defendant alleges that the conduct of the FDIC constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights of due process and equal protection under the federal and Rhode Island constitutions. The Ninth Circuit has recently held that so called constitutional torts are not cognizable under the FTCA. Meyer v. Fidelity Savings,
The second type of excluded claims, known as the "implicitly excluded" claims, fall without the coverage of the FTCA. The statute provides that the FTCA only pertains to causes of action for which, "a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
The situation is different for plaintiff, FDIC. Through its empowering legislation, the FDIC has the power to "sue and be sued".
F. Recoupment Claims
Finally, defendant asserts that his counterclaims are really claims for recoupment and, therefore, need no independent jurisdictional basis. Recoupment is the right of the defendant to have the plaintiff's monetary claim reduced by reason of some claim the defendant has against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the plaintiff's claim. United Structures of America, Inc. v. G.R.G. Engineering, S.E.,
The reasoning behind restricting the recoupment exception to only defensive claims is that a claim whose object is only to reduce or eliminate the government's claims does not implicate recovery from the United States Treasury. It therefore does not raise the same sovereign immunity concerns as a suit which seeks to recover money in addition to defeating the government's claim.
In the present case, two claims remain excluded by the FTCA, the conspiracy to defraud claim and the "contract" claim. Defendant's position is that the activities of the FDIC interfered with his ability to cure the default оn his mortgage. Plaintiff's claim is for the deficiency on the mortgage which arose from that default. These two issues clearly fall within the same transaction and occurrence. Under the recoupment exception, therefore, defendant may recover on the tort and "contract" claims if he succeeds on the merits, but only up to the extent of the FDIC's recovery.
In summary, if defendant succeeds on the merits of either or both of his constitutional tort claims against plaintiff FDIC, he can recover affirmatively. Moreover, if he succeeds on the merits of either or both of his other two counterclaims (based on conspiracy to defraud and "contract") he can only recover in recoupment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, this Court concludes that the four claims asserted *124 against the putative third-party defendant, the United States, are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the motion to implead the United States under
It is so ordered.
NOTES
Notes
[1]
(D) Limitation on judicial review
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over
(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver, including assets which the Corporation may acquire from itself as such receiver; or
(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the Corporation as receiver.
[2]
(ii) Certain Exceptions
Clause (i) shall not apply with respect to any claim filed by any claimant after the [bar date] and such claim may be considered by the receiver if
(I) the claimant did not receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file such claim before such date; and (II) such claim is filed in time to permit payment of such claim.
[3] The opinion of the Fifth Circuit was based on narrow statutory grounds and it did not examine the constitutional ramifications.
[4] The RTC as receiver is subject to the same provisions of FIRREA as the FDIC.
[5] That section states,
"The Provisions of this chapter and
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contractual rights...."