Opinion by
This is an appeal by claimant from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review disallowing credit for clаims for total unemployment filed during February and March, 1947. The case presents a narrow question of statutory construction. For ten years, January 1, 1937, to February 3, 1947, claimant was employed as general superintendent of the Braeburn Alloy Steel Corporation, at a sаlary of $12,000 a year. On February 3, 1947, the corporation released claimant, because of a change in management, and gаve him a check in an amount equivalent to February and March salary, although it was not legally required to make the payment. Claimant registered for work and filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits on February 4, 1947. He filed a waiting week claim and compensable claims for the eight following weeks- of total unemployment. The bureau denied compensatiоn upon the ground that claimant was not “unemployed” prior to April 1, 1947, within the meaning of section 4 (s) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, as amended and relettered 4 (u) by the Act of May 29, 1945, P. L. 1145, § 1, 43 PS §753 (u). On appeal the referee reversed the decision of the bureau, and upon further appeal the board of review reversed the decision of the referee. Section 4 (u), Act of May 29, 1945, P. L. 1145, 43 PS § 753 (u), provides as follows:
“ ‘Unemployment’- — An individual shall be deemed unemployed with respéet to any week during which he performs no services and with respéet to which no remuneration is paid or payable to him, or with respect *11 to any week' of less than his full-time work if the remuneration рaid or payable to him with respect to such week is less than his weekly benefit rate: Provided, That for the purposes of this sub-sectiоn, (i) vacation pay and similar payments, whether or not legally required to be paid, and (ii) wages in lieu of notice, separatiоn allowances, dismissal wages and similar 'payments, which are legally required to be paid, shall be deemed, in accordancе with' rules and regulations of the department, remuneration paid or payable with respect to the week or weeks for which such payments are "made.”
Under the provisions of section 4 (u), an- employe does not become unemployed with respect to any week unless each of two factors has been established: (1) That he has performed no services during the particular week, and (2) that no remuneration-is’paid or payable to him with respect to such week. The question in the present case is whether or not the check with the notation “salary for February and March,” which claimant received, constituted “remuneration.” Claimant contends that under the proviso in'section 4 (u) the reference to “dismissal wages and similar payments, which are legally required to be paid,” as constituting’ “remuneration” necessarily excludes from that category all dismissal payments voluntarily or gratuitously made.
If the subject of dismissal payments were not dealt with in any other section of the Unemployment Compensation Law, there might be some merit to claimant’s argument, as “A principle frequently applied in interpreting statutes is that ‘the mention of one thing implies the exblusion of ’ another thing: expressio unius est ex-clusio alterius.’ ”
Fazio v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,
We are obliged to conclude from the language used in the Act that, if the term “wages” is equivalent to the term “remuneration,” less the various categories specified, then the term “remuneration” must be equivalent to-the term “wages,” together with the specified categories of payments. Consequently, a voluntary dismissal payment is “remuneration,” and the employe who receives it does not become unemployed until the end of the period for which it was paid. Such a construction of the Unemployment Compensation Law is in accord with the well-recognized principle that, effect must be given, if possible, to аll the provisions of the statute. Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, § 51, 46 PS § 551;
Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review,
Furthermore, we think claimant’s, position is untenable under the declared purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law. “Section 3 of Article I (Preliminary Provisions) of the Unemployment Compеnsation Law (Act of December 5, 1936, P. L. 1937, p. 2897 [43 PS § 752]), constitutes a Declaration of Public Policy , with respect to the aims and purposes of the legislature •in establishing a system of unemployment compensation. It is not a mere preamble to the statute, but-a constituent
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part of it and is to be considered in construing or interpreting it”:
Department of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
. The provisions in section 4 (u), (x) were obviously designed, inter alia, to' prevent the payment of benefits during periods of idleness where the claimant has received money, the payment of which relates to the particular period of idleness. This purpose is in accord with the general purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law, which is to alleviate the rigors of unemployment.
Baigis Unemployment Compensation Case (Cien Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review),
Decision is affirmed.