202 F. 927 | 6th Cir. | 1913
(after stating the facts as above).
During its prosecution before the primary examiner, the claim read thus:
“A nursing nipple embodying a mouthpiece and bottle engaging neck: and an intermediate body portion, abruptly flaring both from said neck and from said mouthpiece and forming an abrupt angle at the point of greatest width.”
This claim was finally rejected on reference to the most pertinent of the. same anticipations now relied upon. On appeal, the board of examiners sustained the primary examiner, but recommended the allowance of a claim which became the first claim of the patent when issued. This history shows that the board thought the application disclosed invention, but that the invention was not' stated precisely enough to identify it as distinguished from the prior art, and recommended this claim as its idea of the proper formulation of the invention which had been so made. The earlier claim provided that the body portion should be abruptly flaring from both the neck and the mouthpiece, forming an abrupt angle at the^point of greatest width. The board evidently thought this “abrupt flare” and “abrupt angle” differed only in degree from Ingram, and sought for language to express the peculiarities of construction which resulted in the observed difference in operation; hence came the requirement that the upper wall of this enlarged portion should be “substantially flat” and the mouthpiece should be “relatively small.”
Undoubtedly, the changes made by Miller were, in physical form, very small and closely approximate to those mere changes in form or in degree which are not patentable; and the case is near the margin line. Controlling precedents cannot' be cited, but the cases on the Grant rubber tire patent show an instructive analogy. The same general point of view which led this court in Goodyear Co. v. Rubber Tire Co., 116 Fed. 363, 53 C. C. A. 583, to hold that patent invalid might not unnaturally be so applied to this case as to reach the same result; while that view of what, in a given case, constitutes invention, which led the Supreme Court to reach a contrary result on the Grant patent (Diamond Co. v. Consolidated Co., supra), might well have similar effect as applied to the facts on this record.
We do not understand the Bullock Case as holding that the claim must always carry within itself everything necessary to determine its concrete applicability, or as intended to be in conflict with the principle that the specification, drawing and claim constitute one instrument, each part of which must be construed with reference to every
In the present case the specification says, and with evident reference to the declared object above recited, that:
“The substantially flat and comparatively wide upper wall of said body portion will still yield evenly under compression whereby any contraction or choking of the opening therefrom into the mouthpiece will be prevented.”
In this connection the “substantially flat” wall means a wall flat enough to act in this manner and to accomplish this result, or, it might be said, a wall characterized by diaphrágm-like yielding rather than by arch-like resistance. This interpretation furnishes sufficient certainty for applying the requirement of a “relatively small” ‘ mouthpiece opening. Clearly, this opening must be large enough to permit the flow of the milk. Clearly, too, if it was almost as large as the extreme diameter of the body portion, there would not be enough of this body portion left intervening between the mouthpiece opening and the extreme diameter to permit the characteristic action.' Clearly, too, the mouthpiece opening must be small enough, and therefore stiff enough, so that, when the mouthpiece is tipped sidewise, the circular opening will distort the diaphragm and remain open rather than itself be collapsed and closed.
There should be the usual interlocutory decree for injunction and accounting; and the record will be remanded for that purpose, with costs of this court to appellant.