In 1936 thе Commissioners of the District of Columbia commenced ,a proceeding in the court below to condemn land necessary for the extension of 8th Street, Jackson Street, and Kearney Street, in the City of Washington. The condemnation statute of the District of Columbia
The undisputed facts are these: In 1893 Thomas Armat and John M. Com-stock, as trustees, owned a large tract of land lying in the District of Columbiа, which they divided into blocks, lots, and streets, under the name “West Brookland”. A plat of the property was recorded by them in the office of the Recorder of Deeds as an exhibit to a deed conveying one оf the lots. Thereafter in 1897 they conveyed to John M. Comstock certain of the subdivided lots described as follows: “all Block numbered (23) Twenty-three, containing 30,422-®%oo square feet, and also Lots Numbered (7) seven to 11 contаining in the aggregate 15,838-9Jioo square feet, all of said Lots and Blocks being in Thomas Armat and John M. Comstock Trustee’s subdivision known as West Brookland’, as per plat of said subdivision recorded in the Office of the Recorder оf Deeds for the District of Columbia in Liber numbered 1848, at folio 496 et seq. one of the Land Records for the District of Columbia, together with all and singular the improvements, ways, easements, rights, privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, or in anywise appertaining.” The lots thus conveyed to Comstock were shown on the plat as abutting on 8th street, Keokuk Street (now Kearney) and Joliet Street (now Jackson) ; but the plat was nevеr recorded in the surveyor’s office
Appellants are the successors in title of John M. Comstock. Their contention in this suit is that the conveyance to Com-stock of the lots and blocks described above carried with it the fee to the center of the abutting streets, and that, as successors in title of Comstock, they own to the center of the streets abutting their property, and to the full' width of the streets where there was no land in the original subdivision abutting on the other side of the street.
In 1898 (the development probably having failed of its object) Armat and Com-stock, trustees, conveyed to ‘Baker and MaGuire, trustees, all the original tract оf land except that portion conveyed to -Corn-stock and that portion conveyed to three other persons. Appellee Schrider, trustee, is the successor in title of Baker .and MaGuire, trustees, and as such claims title to the whole' of the land which has been condemned. In other words, Schrider, contends that no part of the property shown on the plat as streets became vested in fee in Comstock and that, at most, Comstock and his successors in title acquired an easement over the street. The property when subdivided was unimproved, and neither then nor afterwards were any streets actually cut through or improvеd.
From what has been said, it will be seen that the question is whether appellants’ predecessors in title took the fee to the center of the streets and to the full width of the streets where the streets were shown on thе edge of the plat with no land in the subdivision abutting on the other side, or whether they acquired only an easement over the streets. The court below sustained appellee Schrider’s contention that appellants had only an easement, and, on the theory that this easement had not been impaired, awarded the entire sum of money to appellee.
In our opinion the decision is wrong. We have never had oсcasion to pass on this question but we think there can ‘ be no doubt that it is an established rule of the common law that a conveyance of land bordering on a road or street carries the title to the centеr of the road or street if the grantor owns that far, unless the terms or circumstances, of the grant indicate a limitation of its extent by the exterior lines thereof or unless an intention to retain title to the street cleаrly appears from the conditions of the conveyance. Banks v. Ogden,
Judge Taft cites in support of the rule: Stark & Wales v. Coffin,
When appellants’ predecessor purchased the lots in question, the streets upon which those lots abutted had not been opened and, in fact, were never opened. But we think this is immaterial in the operation of the rule. Trowbridge v. Ehrich, supra; Coppin v. Manson, supra. And we also think that the specifiсation of the area to the lot conveyed is not of itself sufficient evidence of the grantors’ intention to reserve to themselves title to the beds of the abutting streets, Geddes Coarse Salt Co. v. Niagara L. & O. P. Co.,
Second. It is insisted on behalf of appellee, however, that, even though the rule is as we have stated it, appellants and their predecessors in title have been guilty of such laches as to estop them from obtaining relief in a court of equity, and also that the evidence is legally sufficient to give appellee good title by adverse possession.
The trial court, in deciding the case, discussed the question of abandonment and laches and made a conclusion of law thаt, if appellants ever had any right to assert a claim of ownership in fee to the land in question, they were estopped and barred by reason of laches in not asserting it from 1898 until the present time. On the other hand, the court did not decide or hold that appellee had shown title by adverse possession, and in the lower court appellee clearly relied on his claim of record title and not on title by adverse possession. We think it cannot be contended that fee simple title to real property may be lost by abandonment, laches, or estoppel. Even an easement acquired by express grant cannot bе so lost. Brunthaver v. Talty,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
T. 25, Sec. 51-71, D.C.Code 1929, id. Sec. 58 Supp. III.
Title 25, Secs. 51, 66, 70, D.C.Code 1929.
Title 25, Sec. 65, D.C.Code 1920.
Title 25, Secs. 433, 452, D.C.Code 1929.
Johnson v. Grenell,