64 N.Y. 377 | NY | 1876
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *379
The common-law liability of innkeepers for loss of the property of guests by fire, occurring without the innkeeper's fault or negligence, as declared in Hulett v. Swift (
The burden is upon the innkeeper claiming the benefit of this statute to show that the fire occasioning the loss of the goods of the guest was an incendiary one, and the absence of negligence on his part connected with the transaction. He is exempted from liability when it "shall appear" that the circumstances exist which, under the statute, exonerate him from liability. The defendant relied upon this statute as a defence in this case, and evidence was given on his part tending to show that the fire which destroyed the barn, in which at the time were the horses and wagon of the plaintiff, was the work of an incendiary, and that it was set in the hay loft, to which communication was had through a window of the barn opening into an alley in the rear, which connected two streets. This window had been left open for several weeks, and during this time lumber was piled against the barn, so that a person could easily climb upon it and enter the loft through the open window. The court submitted to the jury the question whether the defendant, in leaving the door of *381 the loft open, was, under the circumstances, chargeable with negligence, and ruled, in substance, that if the jury should find that this was a negligent act which contributed to occasion an incendiary firing of the barn, the defendant was liable for the loss sustained by the plaintiff.
The omission on the part of a bailee to use due care in protecting the property intrusted to him subjects him to liability for loss or injury resulting from such omission; and he is not exempted from responsibility, although the goods have been lost by the felony of a third person, if his negligence furnished the occasion and opportunity for its commission.
In Coggs v. Bernard (2 Ld. Raymond, 909) Lord HOLT, in considering the second sort of bailment enumerated by him, viz.,commodatum, says: "But if the bailee put his horse in his stable, and he were stolen from thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him; but if he or his servant leave the house or stable doors open and the thieves take the opportunity of that and steal the horse, he will be chargeable; because the neglect gave the thieves the occasion to steal the horse." (See alsoDansey v. Richardson, 3 E. B., 165; Schwerin v. McKie,
The defendant called one Trenchard as a witness, and offered to show by him that on the next street west, within forty rods of the barn which was burned, an attempt was made during the same night to fire a building, at a point where the buildings were close and compact, and that kerosene, paper and other combustibles were used in the attempt. This evidence was objected to as immaterial, and it was excluded by the judge. I am of opinion that the evidence offered was admissible. The offer was to show an actual attempt on the same night to burn another building in the same village, by the use of similar means, as the evidence on the part of the defendant tended to show, were used in firing the barn.
The fact in issue, to which this evidence related, was whether the defendant's barn was fired by an incendiary. If there had been a series of incendiary fires in that village previous to and near the time of the fire in question, could not this fact have been shown in aid of the defence? It cannot be denied that in connection with the other circumstances proved, it would have produced upon the mind a strong conviction that the fire in the defendant's barn was also caused by an incendiary.
The proof offered was not merely of facts tending to establish *384 a presumption, that an attempt to fire another building on the same night had been made, but of an attempt made, which failed. There was here no uncertainty as to the collateral fact sought to be proved, and if the fact had been admitted that incendiaries were at work in another place in the village on the same night it would have had a direct and material bearing upon the question as to the character of the fire which destroyed the barn.
This is not the case of the trial of a person charged with the crime of arson in burning the barn. If, on such a trial, it was sought to show, as an independent and disconnected fact, that the prisoner on the same night attempted to burn another building in the same village, it would be inadmissible under the general rule that on the trial of a prisoner for one crime, proof cannot be given that he had committed another. There are some well known exceptions to this rule when the object is to show the quoanimo, as to the transaction on trial. But in investigating in a civil suit a question depending solely upon circumstantial evidence, it would, I think, be holding too strict a rule to refuse evidence such as was offered in this case, which is connected with the principal fact by circumstances which naturally tend to establish it.
There is no fixed and definite rule by which it can be determined whether a collateral fact is so remote as to be inadmissible to support the principal fact sought to be established. The question must, to a considerable extent, be decided in each case, on its own circumstances, and we are of opinion that the proof offered, to which we have referred, ought to have been admitted.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
All concur.
Judgment reversed. *385