FATICA RENOVATIONS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, - vs - WILLIAM W. BRIDGE, III, et al., Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2017-G-0106
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
2017-Ohio-1419
[Cite as Fatica Renovations, L.L.C. v. Bridge, 2017-Ohio-1419.]
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judgment: Appeal dismissed.
David L. Van Slyke, Plunkett & Cooney, P.C., 300 East Broad Street, #590, Columbus, OH 43215 and Vetus Syracuse, 26250 Euclid Avenue, Euclid, OH 44132 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
William W. Bridge, III, pro se, P.O. Box 26, Nоvelty, OH 44072 (Defendant-Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.
{1} On January 3, 2017, appellant, William W. Bridge, III, filed a pro se notiсe of appeal from an entry of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas.
{2} Apрellee, Fatica Renovations, LLC, commenced this action on November 22, 2016, for quiеt title, slander of title and permanent injunctive relief against appellant and Lisa Bridgе regarding certain real property. Appellee also moved the trial cоurt to enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction precluding appellant and Ms. Bridge from filing any document and/or instrument with the recorder‘s office
{3} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging that the judgmеnt is not a final appealable order, citing Hootman v. Zock, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0063, 2007-Ohio-5619, in support of this argument. In Hootman, this court held that, when the trial court “attempt[ed] to maintain the status quo” through a preliminary injunction, its judgment was not final. Id. at ¶ 17.
{4} Appellant filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and request for stay of preliminary injunction pending appeal. Appellee filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss the aрpeal, and appellant filed a sur-reply to appellee‘s reply.
{5} Under
{6} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * *:
{7} “(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the fоllowing apply:
{8} “(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appеaling party with respect to the provisional remedy.
{9} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
“* * *
{10} A “provisionаl remedy” is defined as “a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to, а proceeding for a preliminary injunction.”
{11} Here, the first prong has been met because the trial court issued an order granting a preliminary injunction. That order determined the action with resрect to the provisional remedy and prevented judgment in favor of appellаnt with regard to that provisional remedy.
{12} The problem is with the second prong. Appellаnt has to be deprived of a “meaningful and effective remedy” if he cannot apрeal now.
{13} “‘[I]t is well established that the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunction, in a suit in which the ultimate relief sought is a permanent injunction, is generally not a final appeаlable order.‘” Hootman, supra, 2007-Ohio-5619, at ¶ 15, citing Woodbridge Condominium Owners’ Assn. v. Friedland, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-073, 2004-Ohio-14, ¶ 4.
{14} Further, Ohio courts have also held that “a preliminary injunction which acts tо maintain the status quo pending a ruling on the merits is not a final appealable order under
{15} As to
{16} Accordingly, appellee‘s motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.
{17} Appeal dismissed.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J.,
concur.