| Ark. | Apr 1, 1899
(after stating the facts.) The question presented by this appeal is a very simple one, and relates to the appropriation of payments. The right of appropriation belongs to the debtor, and, when he owes a creditor more than one debt, he can, in making a payment, appropriate it to whichever debt he pleases. If the debtor makes the payment generally, without appropriating it to any particular debt, the creditor may then appropriate it to any debt due from the debtor making the payment. Bell v. Radcliff, 32 Ark. 645" date_filed="1878-05-15" court="Ark." case_name="Bell v. Radcliff">32 Ark. 645. But the creditor cannot appropriate the payment to the debt of a third party, for which the payer is not liable. If the debtor was a firm of partners, the creditor cannot, without its consent, appropriate moneys paid by the firm to the individual debts of one or more of the members of the firm. Feucht v. Evans, 52 Ark. 556" date_filed="1889-11-15" court="Ark." case_name="Feucht v. Evans">52 Ark. 556.
Now, we do not suppose that the learned judge before whom this cause was tried would differ with us on the proposition of law above stated, or that he intended to give to the jury a different rule of law; but the instruction given by him to the jury on this point was not full enough, and liable, under the facts in proof, to be misunderstood and to mislead the jury. The note upon which this action is founded was given for a firm debt, and there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff-creditor had, without the consent of said firm, appropriated money paid by the firm to the individual debts of certain members of the firm. This, of course, the creditor had no light to do. But the instruction complained of told the jury-that, in the absence of any direction by the debtor, the creditor could apply the payment to any indebtedness he chose to apply it to, without confining them to the debts of the firm making the payment. The defendant objected to this instruction, and prepared and asked another instruction, stating the law correctly, and so that it could'not be misunderstood, which the judge refused to give. The refusal to give such instruction was, in our opinion, under the circumstances as stated in the bill of exceptions, prejudicial error, for which the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted. It is so ordered.