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Farris v. Conger
490 S.W.3d 684
Ark. Ct. App.
2016
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*1 laVL, Findings Fact and App. Law Conclusions of FARRIS, M.D., Appellant Felicia the circuit court entered Before decree, Gary filed a motion the foreclosure fact findings of and conclusions specific Cynthia L. CONGER C.P.A. 52(a) Ark. R. P. Civ. pursuant of law Management, decree, subsequent The court’s Appellees entered, findings of fact and con set forth law, although precise not the

clusions of No. CV-15-622 Gary had and conclusions findings Arkansas, Appeals Court of Gary argues now requested. I, II & III. DIVISIONS 52(a). Rule comply court failed to disagree. We Opinion April Delivered 52(a) impose not

Rule does judge; trial

severe burden on the brief, definite,

judge need make

pertinent findings of fact and conclusions

upon the contested matters. CenterPoint Green, 2012 Ark.

Energy Gas Trans. Co. v. 413 S.W.3d 867. The need explain why way

not it found the facts the give

it did or detailed reasons for its deci Rather, findings

sion. should be appellate enough to enable

court to the factual basis and understand

analytical process by which the trial court The rule

reached its decision. Id. does

require specific findings every ‍​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍on each and question arising

factual in the lawsuit. Wallace,

Weathersbee v.

686 S.W.2d 447 the circuit court addressed the issues,

relevant and the basis for its rul-

ings purрose is clear. therefore see no be served a remand on this issue.

Affirmed. JJ., Vaught, agree.

Virden and Grp., Consequently, Pipeline to the Cochran fee award. Joint topic. do not Louisiana v. address See *2 three-year statute of limitations attendant agree actions. af- and firm. dispute.

The facts of the case are not in Farris and entered into a contract CWM agreed provide which wealth- CWM management services to Farris. No- On op- vember Farris learned of an portunity purchase parcel of real es- sale, tate at a foreclosure and she asked money Fidelity CWM to transfer from her personal Investment account to her check- account so that she could at Far- property the sale. CWM advised |2that initiating timely ris the cutoff for (FRWN) Federal Reserve Wire Network money p.m. transfer was 3:00 on Novem- 13; however, ber did not initiate the CWM p.m. transfer until 3:21 also initiated CWM transfer, Clearing an Automated House transfer, rather than a FRWN which days would take several to clear. The property was sold someone else ultimately pur- sale. Farris was able to property, spend chase the she had to but $51,843.98 $22,286.70. to do so instead of com- Farris filed breach-of-eontract Co., PLLC, Rock, by: Little Cullen & 10, 2013,1 plaint against CWM on October Cullen, appellant. Tim for J. that, asserting by failing to transfer funds, had breached its written CWM Hargis, appellee. David fоr agreement with her. wealth-management WHITEAKER, Judge PHILLIP T. restitution, profits, lost costs sought fees, interest, puni- and prejudgment Farris, M.D., | appeals from an ]Felicia damages. tive filed a motion CWM County Court order of the Pulaski Circuit grounds that Farris’s com- dismiss ‍​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍on the summary granting judg- the motion for tort, than in con- plaint sounded in rather by appellees Cynthia Conger ment filеd tract, three-year thus the statute of (collec- Management for a action had ex- CWM). found tively, The circuit court subsequently filed a motion pired. CWM of action sounded in that Farris’s cause summary judgment, asserting the same contract, for rather than in negligence, reasoning. that her was barred 2005). 56-111(a) (Repl. five-year

1. A breach-of-cоntract claim has § limitations. Ark.Code Ann. 16- statute of motion granted McQuay Guntharp, court CWM’s what different. The circuit The court found the that in summary judgment. supreme explained such circumstances, appellate contained a claim of court “must contract, reaching but then noted that look to the itself’ its regarding then becomes whethеr the conclusions the statute of limita “the the contract is the sort of tions. 331 Ark. reference to *3 Horn, (citing O’Bryant the of specific promise transforms 584 v. 297 617, (1989); Dunlap from one for into one Ark. 764 S.W.2d 445 the action 5, agreement.” McCarty, of the written v. 284 Ark. 678 S.W.2d 361 for breach (1984)); Goldsby Fairley, that it did not and that the see also v. 309 court concluded (1992) (in 380, upon “based mak complaint was 831 S.W.2d 142 application as a contract claim.” Ac- the determination on the claim cloaked limitations, court determined that the statute this court looks cordingly, the itself, complaint despite to the the fact that claim was barred the statute laFarris’s granted the trial court had summary judg granted limitations and CWM’s sum- ment). scope judicial focus when mary-judgment motion. deciding whether a contract or tort statute Ordinarily, ‍​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍grant our review of a of sum- applies upon is based A circuit mary judgment is well settled. in “gist” allegations of the raised the com may summary judgment when grant plaint. Tony genuine no issues of material there are Woods, Ltd., 134, 136, 75 Ark. moving litigated, party fact be and the judgment as a matter of law. is entitled to Co., Corp. Mfg. v. Breaux 2013 Ark. Lucci upon authority, Based the above 3, 2013 WL 6280857.Once the turn our attention to Farris’s moving party prima has established a facie determining In “gist” complaint, of her summary judgment, op- entitlement to alleged, we must look to the facts as Ar proof proof must meet posing party kansаs does not recognize pleadings, notice the existence of a Moreover, and demonstrate materi- pleadings. only fact Id. Id. at al issue of fact. 3-4. We determine alleged complaint facts are treated summary judgment appropriate true, theories, if plaintiffs was not the specu lation, presented statutory interpretation. based on whether evidence or Wor Kirchner, moving party of the den v. 243; a material Dockery Morgan, motion leaves fact unanswered. light at 4. in the

Id. We view evidence S.W.3d 377. party against most to the whom favorable Farris’s states that her filed, resolving the' motion was all doubts action is one for breach of contrаct. In against the moving party. and inferences order the contract statute of limitations However, a different applies standard apply, there must have been a breach of appeal. a specific promise. Sturgis v. Thus, the circuit dismissal Ark. court’s 977 S.W.2d 217 of Farris’s was based on determine its whether Farris’s tort, characterization of the nature of her sounds contract or in we must finding which in the agree resulted court’s determine what contractual cause of action Farris’s was barred the ment she contends was breached. In her running count, of the statute of limitations. breach-of-contract Farris occurs, analysis following: our When this is some- Farris, quoted by that sentencе Management graph. had ex- As Conger Wealth Fidelity pro- control over Dr. Farris’s declares that shall endeavor to “[w]e clusive By agreeing and timely Account. cess all Account transactions in a Investment they Dr. would exe- assuring argues Farris thus manner[.]” be- in timely of funds fashion cute transfer process cause CWM did not her account available to manner, that the funds [would be] so in a timely transaction it breached failing and in property agreement. its written so, breached the do the defendants writ- sentence, entirety That is not the of that Management Services con- ten Wealth full, however. it reads as follows: ‘We tract with Dr. Farris. process endeavor all Account shаll The defendant’s breaches of contract manner, transactions but do not to, include, failing but are not limited any nor represent warrant such trans- arrange for execution of the *4 processed action shall be or effected in transaction as directed Dr. Farris |fithe day Broker-Dealer on same as re- timely | compliance a and in ^fashion in a quested.” This is more the nature of 5 of the written Man- paragraph disclaimer, specific promise. rather than a agement agreement. Moreover, to the extent that it can be proximately This breach of contract promise, promise as a it is a to construed damages caused Dr. Farris financial perform diligently. to attempt would not have occurred otherwise. The becomes wheth then complaint The crux of Farris’s can promise perform diligently er to funds from one CWM failed transfer form the basis of a breach-of-contract sufficiently timely account to another claim. The answer is that it cannot. to enаble her to manner Sturgis supra, supreme Specifically, Farris property she desired. “proceed court held that a failure to dili of contract in CWM’s gently” was not a breach of a for execution of the arrange failure “to promise nothing negli but was more than by Dr. brokerage transaction as directed in gence. Similarly, Tony Smith сompli- Farris in a and in fashion Woods, supra, this court held paragraph O’Bryant, ance with 5.” In su- perform that a contractual pra, supreme court that a com- stated detailed duties to the best of one’s “knowl plaintiffs that the plaint must show cause “at edge, ability,” repre skill and most upon writing of action was based general duty represent appel sented] for the order statute diligence. lants with A violation of that apply. written contracts to We therefore is, definition, obligation nothing more paragraph turn to 5 of the contract. Tony Trucking, than negligence.” “Execution of Paragraph captioned 5 is 138-39, at 331. Brokerage Transactions” and addresses court caselaw is thus clear that arranges Supreme how CWM for the execution of perform of a failure to dili- allegation securities transactions. The an negligence. Farris al- paragraph explains gently bulk of the how CWM amounts to paragraph 5 of arrange through leged will for such transactions that CWM breached аpplicable portion engage agreement. a broker-dealer and will best however, nothing practices accomplish brokerage paragraph promises transac- Farris, however, attempt perform diligent- than points portion tions. to a more such, face, para- ly. in that As on its Farris’s particular of one sentence specifically cir- Farris then stated that she was a contract claim. The raise does not damaged given Conger’s perform failure to concluding not err in did cuit court as- under the contract. Because must complaint sounded in Farris’s allegations giv- are true that, sume that Farris’s result, as a the com- negligencе and legal question presented point en the plaint was time-barred. —a agree all procedure on which we would —I Affirmed. hold that the circuit court erred con- C.J., Gruber, ViRden, Gladwin, Hix- cluding was time- JJ., BROWN, son, agree. barred. JJ., Glover, Hoofman, Harrison, majority’s opens affirmance the law dissent. statutes of limitations to a pleading Isdegree encourage that will more Harrison, Judge, dissenting.

Brandon J. plain- to ask circuit courts decide how a characterized. tiffs should be |7I majori- from dissent respectfully development not a on the This is desirable circuit Like the court before ty’s opinion. whole, especially given gate the wide this it, judged the Far- court ‍​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍has merit of creates. arguably case focusing rather than claim ris’s contract circuit the sole issue was before the ap- The claim-characterization doctrine it dismissed Farris’s amended court when line of plied this case stems from short accepting allegations all of her complaint: *5 primarily complaints cases that involved true, lоoking only at the amended and where a was character- claim the written contract that complaint and purpose ized as a contract claim for the of it, allege did she the Farris attached avoiding periods the shorter limitations claim “gist” purpose a contract for the of apply that in tort cases. As the typically five-year the statute- deciding of whether majority recognizes, itself when or two period applies? of-limitations The answer apply, more statutes of limitations could yes. winning she has a or is Whether then must determine the core of the courts not before us. losing claim is by looking solely at the case 466, v. Ark. McQuay Guntharp, 331 963 fundamentals, turns on and a This case (1998). But if is doubt S.W.2d 583 there pleading party is that a basic tenet applied, on which statute should be courts claim if a contract she “assertfs] states gives a plaintiff should favor the one a valid and enforceable con- existence of more, less, Sturgis not time. v. defendant, plaintiff tract and between 41, 48, 335 Ark. 977 220 S.W.2d thereunder, obligation of the defendant (“If two or more statutes limitations defendant, damages and violation apply, generally long- the statute with the resulting plaintiff from the breach.” period govern.”). est limitations will This Health, 238, 244, Perry Baptist v. 358 applied basic rule was not in this case. (2004). 189 58 S.W.3d certainly to her amended a writ- The time-bar can turn attached plaintiff between the and has satisfied Ar- ten whether parties’ fact-pleading requirements. it governed stated that wealth- kansas’s view, however, management relationship. McQuay, supra. my also factu- She ally alleged Conger sufficiently breached the Farris stated a contract agreement by failing correctly part, and time- because “a breach of contract is ly merely a tort if it consists execute transaction as the not treated as (nonfeasance) required Conger written contract to do. a failure to act as distin-

689 affirmatively wrongful majority Moody, an act The doesn’t guished from address (misfeasance).” though Nat’l it invoke two Morrow v. First does other cases 568, 550 Springs, Bank Hot 261 Ark. its conclusion Farris’s com- com plaint possibly Farris’s amended could not assert a contract S.W.2d plaint necessarily allege misfea claim. does Instead, alleges sance. she The first case is attorney-malpractice an perform in with a failed to accordance case, Sturgis, 335 Ark. 217. S.W.2d term. consis wholly contractual That is Here, no particular professional-responsi- See, e.g., a contract Zu tent with claim. bility malpractice ar- rule or statute was Plus, v. Architecture 328 Ark.

fari gued court to the circuit so as to bring this (1996) (plaintiff’s com Sturgis’s case within orbit. The second plaint sufficiently pled a breach-of-contract put |10stock my colleagues Tony case in is five-year ap claim and period Woods, Ltd., plied). S.W.3d 327 .recently, correctly, There, ap- This court their clients sued accountant in con- plied gist-of-the-eomplaint rule tract tort because the accountant Tarvin, Moody allegedly caused IRS audit. The con- There, Moody alleged that provisions he sustained tract that case were admit- injuries a main- physical tedly serious caused broad—“duties [for the accountant person perform] tenance who worked for the Tar- knowledge, to the best of his skill, park they ability” vins at the trailer owned. acknowl- —and Moody edged contended that the had a circuit Tarvins that the court’s “conclusion provide duty living him with a safe that the action is environment as a result of landlord- supported their the fact further relationship they tenant knew or original complaints by appellants filed al- leged negligence, should have known of the maintenance but were soon *6 person’s violent tendencies. Id. аmended to include of contract.” Moody 138-39, a attached written landlord-tenant Id. at 55 S.W.3d at So 330-31. contract to his unlike Tony distinguishable Id. But is case, case, too, question there was a a whether from this technical matter. Moody signed And even the contract. problem deepest majority with the in Moody primarily contract addressed opinion point legal finery is pet yard rent payments, policies, and preexisting whether cases can be suffi- maintenance. Id. The contract said noth- not, ciently distinguished from this one or protecting harm about tenants from interpret but that it must contract befall third-party’s that could them at a conclude that written can’t hand. affirmed the circuit court’s possibly promise. actionable judgment summary favor Tarvins’ because, tack again, This is a curious once Moody’s complaint because not come did fundamental tenets of contract law oppose alleging close to contract and the parties the maneuver. What the under- deadline to filе tort expired. claims had paragraph stood a certain mean—and the conduct it could or could not cover—is presented Moody a case in which the often the merits contract reject See, justifiably courts were asked case. Prochazka e.g., v. Bee-Three Dev., LLC, plaintiffs characterization of сom- Ark. App. her own plaint. Moody. But this case Maybe provision is far from paragraph in the then concluded that the amended that is not actionable com- a disclaimer plaint solely com- sounded tort. com- that Farris asserts her

manner time-barred, answer, plaint should not have been Maybe not. Whatever the plaint. especially defending party no has contract-interpre- as a when strikes me the issue presented any why applying reason claim’s merit. point on the tation longer period prejudi- ‍​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‍would be allure to end this case I understand the cial. record developed given court. But on the in the circuit made Hoofman, JJ., join. Glover and whole, deny unwilling I am a limitations ar- merit decision based lnon in an grounded that is uncommon

gument inherently claim-characteriza- slippery The circuit court’s decision

tion doctrine. (1) it consid- be reversed because

should material

ered outside

Case Details

Case Name: Farris v. Conger
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Date Published: Apr 27, 2016
Citation: 490 S.W.3d 684
Docket Number: CV-15-622
Court Abbreviation: Ark. Ct. App.
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