The Appellate Division reversed the Law Division’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint against the defendant Votator Division of Chemetron Corporation. We granted certification on Votator’s application. 60 N. J. 465 (1972.)
In May 1967 the plaintiff Joseph Farrell was employed by Standard Brands, Inc. at its plant in Pennsauken. While cleaning a machine at the plant, his pant leg was caught on the exposed teeth of an axle-like shaft and he suffered consequential injuries. He duly received compensation benefits from his employer but not until April 1969 did he retain counsel. On April 18, 1969 his counsel filed a complaint against the defendant Reliance Electric & Engineering Company, along with the defendant Reeves Pulley Company, a division of Reliance, and against the defendant “John Doe and/or John Doe, Inc.,” who was alleged to be the assembler, supplier or seller of the machine which caused the injuries. The John Doe appellation was stated to be fictitious, the real name being then unknown to the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that the machine was not equipped with a suitable guard (Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N. J. 402 (1972); Finnegan v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N. J. 413 (1972)), that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff Joseph Farrell were the result of the negligence of the defendants, that the defendants were responsible not only because of their negligence but also under strict liability principles, and that Joseph, along with his wife Edith who sought damages for loss of consortium (Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N. J. 82 (1965)), were entitled to compensatory damages from each of the defendants.
In the course of taking depositions, counsel for the plaintiffs learned for the first time on February 26, 1970 that the name of the defendant Chemetron Corporation appeared on the base of the machine which had caused the injuries; and there was testimony at that time that the name plate data on the base indicated that the machine had been built by
Under date of June 19, 1970 Votator moved to set aside the order amending the complaint on the stated ground that it violated the statute of limitations. On October 19, 1970 the Law Division, being of the opinion that the plaintiffs’ claim against Votator had been barred by limitations, dismissed it with prejudice. This was reversed in the Appellate Division’s
per curiam
which pointed out that “the amendment to the complaint substituting Votator Division of Chemetron Corporation for John Doe related back to the original complaint which was filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations”
(B.
4:9-3); accordingly, it remanded the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. In its petition for certification Votator urged that the Appellate Division erred in its holding that the amendment related back to the date of the original complaint and it cited several New Jersey Supreme and Superior Court opinions, none of which, however, dealt with or bore upon the effectiveness of the filing of a John Doe complaint in tolling the statute of limitations. See Comment, “Unknown Parties: The John Doe Defendant,” 1970
Law and the Social Ordesr
256-68; Note, “Designation of Defendants by Eictitious Names — Use of John Doe Complaints,” 46
Iowa L. Bev.
773-785 (1961); Com
Statutes of limitations are designed to stimulate litigants to pursue their causes of action diligently and “to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims.”
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,
325
U. S.
304, 314,
In
Strully
a foreign object was left in the patient's body during the course of an operation; the patient did not bring her action within the normal period of limitations but did bring it expeditiously after she first knew or had reason to know that she had cause for action. After reviewing all of the pertinent factors we determined that, on balance, the considerations of individual justice far outweighed the considerations of repose (35
N. J.
at 449-451); accordingly, we held that she was not barred by limitations, applying the
In
Larson v. Barnett,
101
Cal. App. 2d
282, 225
P. 2d
297 (1950), the plaintiff was injured by a car driven by Earl Barnett, Jr. The car had been sold on the very day of the accident and the plaintiff’s attorney was uncertain as to the identity of the owner. Accordingly he named Earl Barnett, Jr., the driver, and John Doe, the owner, as defendants in a timely complaint, and when he ascertained who the true owner was he applied for and received permission to amend the complaint. By that time the normal statute of limitations had run but the court held that it was not a bar since
In
Maddux v. Gardner,
The petition discloses that it was the intention of plaintiff to sue the engineer of the train and, as there could have been no reason for her to have used the name “John Doe” to designate the engineer, if she knew who was the engineer, it will be inferred that plaintiff did not know his name at the time of the filing of the petition . . . The amending of the petition by inserting the name, Marble, was not the addition of another party to the cause of action but constituted a mere substitution of names. While no service of summons was had upon Marble, within the statutory time, or until after the expiration of one year from the date of the death of deceased, the service of summons did not constitute the commencement of the suit as against Marble. Suit was begun when the petition was filed against John Doe (McGrath v. St. Louis K. C. & C. R. Co.,128 Mo. 1 , 30 S. W.329; City of St. Louis v. Miller, 235 Mo. App. 987 ,145 S. W. 2d 504 ; section 876. R. S. Mo. 1939. Mo. R. S. A.; see, also Green v. Supreme Lodge, etc.,79 Mo. App. 179 ), who was alleged to have been the engineer, and the amendment related back to the time of the filing of the petition. 192 S. W. 2d at 18.
Cf. Wall Funeral Home, Inc. v. Stafford, 3 N. C. App. 578, 165 S. E. 2d 532 (1969).
In
Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Company,
352
Mass.
86, 223
N. E. 2d
807 (1967), the court went beyond the aforecited cases and further than anything called for in the matter at hand. Though Massachusetts has a statute which relates to fictitiously-named defendants
(Ann. Laws Mass. c.
223, § 19 (1955)), the plaintiffs did not proceed under it. They had suffered injuries as a result of escaping gas in their apartment and instituted an action within the normal period of limitations, omitting, however, to name the Boston Gas Company as a defendant. After the normal period of limitations had run, they moved to amend their complaint by adding the Company and their motion was granted. In rejecting the Company’s application for judgment in its favor grounded on limitations, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pointed out that its views with respect to amendments were more liberal than elsewhere; under its broad views a plaintiff who seeks damages for injuries suffered b}»- him may, at any time during the pendency of his complaint, be permitted by the trial judge to amend it by substituting or adding the party liable for his injuries; and since the amendment relates back to the date of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff is not barred by limitations so long as the original complaint was timely. See
McLaughlin v. West End St. Ry. Co.,
186
Mass.
150, 71
N. E.
317 (1904); “Developments in the Law— Statutes of Limitations,” 63
Harv. L. Rev.
1177, 1240 n. 524 (1950);
Annot.,
“Change in party after statute of limitations has run,” 8
A. L. R. 2d
6, 152 (1949);
cf. Mears v. Economy Brake Service, Inc.,
78
N. J. Super.
218 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
40
N. J.
216 (1963);
Bradley v. Powles,
90
N. J. Super. 550 (App. Div.), certif. denied
47
In our own State the pamphlet laws of 1891 (L. 1891, c. 253, pp. 477-78) contained an explicit provision which authorized a plaintiff to sue a defendant under a fictitious name and to amend by substituting the true name when it was ascertained (see also the Practice Act of 1903 — L. 1903, c. 247, para. 43, p. 546); a similar provision was included in the 1898 Act concerning district courts. L. 1898, c. 228, para. 42, p. 566. These provisions were carried forth in title 2 of the revised statutes (R. S. 2:27-42; R. S. 2:32-13), but were not reenacted in the 1951 revision of title 2 (N. J. S. A. 2A:1-1 et seq.)3 evidently because in the interim the 1947 Constitution had taken effect and had broadly authorized the Supreme Court to make rules governing practice and procedure. The liberalizing rules which the Supreme Court adopted shortly thereafter contained nothing to suggest any purpose to narrow earlier practices with respect to fictitiously-named defendants. Of. Rule 3 :17-4 and the comment thereon in Tentative Draft of the Rules Governing the Courts of New Jersey 133-34 (1948).
Rule 7:4-5, originally adopted in 1948 with respect to civil practice in district and municipal courts, expressly provided that where the defendant’s true name is unknown to the plaintiff, process may issue against the defendant under a fictitious name, with appropiate amendment after his true name is ascertained. While no similarly worded rule was originally adopted with respect to the upper courts, the practice was undoubtedly known in those courts
(cf. R. R.
4:30-4(d)) and the omission was presumably inadvertent; in any event, on February 25, 1969 a pertinent rule was promulgated, effective September 8, 1969 and applicable to civil practice in the superior, countjr and surrogate’s courts. It specifically provided that if the defendant’s true name is unknown to the plaintiff “process may issue against the defendant under a fictitious name” and directed that, prior to judgment, the plaintiff shall on motion “amend his complaint
In the matter at hand the plaintiffs sufficiently met the stated requirements in the rule that the fictitious name be designated as such and that there be “an appropriate description sufficient to identify him.” R. 4:26-4; but cf. Karandontes v. Ferrell, 7 N. J. Misc. 807 (D. Ct. 1929). The complaint set forth that John Doe was the assembler, supplier or seller of the machine which was located at Standard Brands’ plant in Pennsauken and which caused his injuries, that the name John Doe was fictitious, and that the complaint would be amended as soon as the real name was ascertained. The normal period of limitations was about to run out and the plaintiffs’ counsel, acting in good faith, set forth in the complaint all the information he was then able to obtain. Thereafter he proceeded with diligence towards ascertaining the true name, amending the complaint, and serving the defendant Yotator. Under the circumstances it would disserve the rule’s broad remedial purposes if it were construed to require more.
The plaintiffs’ cause of action was not changed, nor was a new party added by the amendment identifying Yotator as the true party referred to under the fictitious name John Doe in the original complaint. The amendment related back to commencement of the action
{R.
4:9-3), and the date of the filing of the complaint
{R.
4:2-2) rather than the date of service
{R.
4:4-1) was the crucial time fixing such commencement. See
Pressler, supra,
at 465, 419, 424. Despite the foregoing, it is urged that since Yotator’s name did not appear as a party defendant in the plaintiffs’ complaint within two years after the occurrence of the accident, Yotator
While our courts have not subscribed to the breadth of the foregoing
(State v. Standard Oil Co.,
5
N. J.
281, 293 (1950) ,
aff'd,
341
U. S.
428,
In
Strully, supra,
35
N. J.
434, more than 4 years from the date of the wrongful act had elapsed when the plaintiff instituted her action. The defense rested on the 2-year limitation in
N. J. S. A. 2A
:14~2 and the cases of
Weinstein v. Blanchard,
109
N. J. L.
332
(E. & A.
1932) and
Tortorello v. Reinfeld,
6
N. J.
58 (1950) which had given it rigid application. Adopting the discovery principle, • we
The defendant Yotator, by manufacturing the machine which the plaintiffs assert was distributed without being equipped with a suitable guard, admittedly placed itself in jeopardy of a subsequent cause of action. That action, though brought years later, may be held timely on a proper balance of considerations of individual justice and repose as in cases such as-
Strully, supra,
35
N. J.
434; and it may be held timely on a similar balance where, as here, the plaintiffs in good faith brought their action expeditiously against the manufacturer under a fictitious name, identified it by amendment as soon as they discovered its true name, and served the amended complaint diligently thereafter. The defendant Yotator does not assert prejudice or reliance nor is it in any just position to do so; clearly it has no vested right in its own formulation of the 2-year limitation bar. See
Strully, supra,
35
N. J.
434;
New Market, supra,
51
N. J.
419;
Diamond, supra,
51
N. J.
594;
Rosenau, supra,
51
N. J.
130. There is no suggestion that the lapse of time has resulted in loss of evidence or impairment of ability to defend; nor is there any suggestion that the plaintiffs have been advantaged by it. Justice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs their day in court on the merits of their claim; and the absence of prejudice, reliance or un
Affirmed.
For affirmance — Justices Jacobs, Hall and Mountain. and Judges Confokd and Sullivan — 5.
For reversal — None.