324 Mass. 45 | Mass. | 1949
The claimant, a boss carder at a woolen mill in Newton, became separated from his employment when the mill was destroyed by fire on October 3, 1946. He received unemployment benefits until on or about April 1, 1947, when said benefits based on the claimant’s earnings during the year 1945 were exhausted. He filed a new benefit year claim on April 8, 1947, based upon his earnings in 1946. This claim was accompanied by a written statement of facts, signed by the claimant, which disclosed that he had not applied at any mill for work as a boss carder as that would be “a violation of ethics” for the reason that it would appear that he was endeavoring to take the job away from the one who had it; that he was continually in touch with salesmen and other mill men, to ascertain whether there was any vacancy as a boss carder; that he would accept other employment but did not know just what type of work would be suitable; and that he refused to accept work in Auburn, New York, as that was too far away. ÜiThís Written claim for benefits, it appeared that in answer to a direction to give the names and addresses of the last three employers from whom he sought employment he stated, “Various salesmen and mill men.” He also stated that he would accept a job which paid $65 for a five day week. In reply to the question whether he would accent a.nv work other than as a boss carder he answered. “Yes & No.” The director refused to approve the claim on the ground that the claimant was not available for work and had not established hlFavailability for work because of his failure actively to seek employment. Upon appeal to the board of review, the claim was heard by an examiner. The claimant testified that a boss carder does not have to apply to a mill for a job; that if a mill needs a carder, it communicates with him; that before he worked at the Newton mill he had been i a carder at another mill on three different occasions; that
The applicable provision of the employment security law, G. L. (Ter. ’Ed.) c. 151A, as appearing in § 1 of c. 685 of St. 1941, is contained in § 24, which, in so far as material, provides that “An individual, in order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter, shall ... (b) He capable of and available for work and unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted . . ..” The question presented is whether the claimant was “available for work” during the period for which he sought the payment of benefits. These words have not been defined by the said chapter. In so far as the determination of this question is one of fact, our duty is to examine the record and to determine whether there is
The design of our employment security law “is to afford relief to those who have been employed in the selected kinds, of business since the effective date of that law when they are thrown out of work through no fault of their own.” Howes Brothers Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 296 Mass. 275, 282. Relief is furnished by a system of benefits payable in certain amounts for designated periods to employees who are unemployed through no fault of their own and who have complied with prescribed conditions required to become eligible to receive the benefits. The employee must be able and available for work and ready and willing to obtain suitable employment. He must act in good faith and make a reasonable effort to secure such employment of a kind which he is qualified by experience and training to perform. He cannot withdraw from the labor market but must remain in that market seeking employment m order to remain eligible for benefits. That means more than waiting for a iob to seek him out. Benefits are never to be considered as inducements for idleness. On the other hand, benefits are not to be denied simply because an employee has not become reemployed. To do so would thwart the beneficent purpose of the law to furnish something by way of reimbursement to a limited extent to one who has sustained a loss of wages because of the inability of industry to furnish steady employment. Reasonable opportunity to secure employment diminishes with’the wane of industrial production., One is not to be deprived of benefits if he is compelled to remain idle simply because-there are not enough jobs for all those who are
A finding different from that adopted by the board was not required by law, and the judge of the District Court was in error in making a different finding in his first decision and
The decision of the District Court is reversed and instead a decision is to be entered adjudging the claim to be invalid.
So ordered.
Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144. Loew’s Inc. v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 231. Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 43 Del. 274; affirmed 43 Del. 553. Claim of Jackson, 68 Idaho, 360. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 316 Mich. 468. Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 321 Mich. 178. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540. Wagner v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 355 Mo. 805. Hunter v. Miller, 148 Neb. 402. Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N. H. 48. Muraski v. Board of Review of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, 136 N. J. L. 472. Bergen Point Iron Works v. Board of Review of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, 136 N. J. L. 645. Matter of Heater, 270 App. Div. (N. Y.) 311. Canton Malleable Iron Co. v. Green, 75 Ohio App. 526. Copeland v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, 197 Okla. 429. Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43. Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission, 204 S. C. 37. Jacobs v. Office of Unemployment Compensation & Placement, 27 Wash. (2d) 641.
As the result we reach would be the same whether or not the judge had the power to change his decision after an appeal had been taken and nearly three months after the first decision was made, we need not decide the question. See Waucantuck Mills v. Magee Carpet Co. 225 Mass. 31; Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 162, 163.