91 Wis. 182 | Wis. | 1895
In Slaughter’s Adm'r v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 383, the rule is stated to be that the representations, to entitle a party to ¡relief, “ must be representations relating to a matter as to which the complaining party did not have at hand the means of knowledge. Where means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the subject of the purchase is equally open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of those means and opportunities he will not be heard to say, in impeachment of the contract <of sale, that he was drawn into it by the vendor’s misrepresentations.” The same doctrine is laid down in Mamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415, where it is said that “ the present ■means of knowledge concerning the subject matter of the representations of the party complaining, and whether he knew or might home known the truth, aside from such representations, are always material questions in such a case, and •cannot be ignored where there is any proper evidence upon which they can be raised;” that the rule in cases of fraud •by false representations is not to be extended to the protection of those who, having the means in their own hands, ¡neglect to protect themselves; that the rule as to fraudulent representations in respect to the sale of personal property generally is equally applicable to the sale of real estate; and “that if the defects in the subject matter of sale are patent, or such as might or should be discerned by the exercise of ordinary vigilance, and the buyer has the opportunity of inspecting it, the law does not require the seller to aid and assist the observation of the purchaser.” Kerr, Fraud & M. 101; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 368.
The law requires men, in their dealing with each other, .to exercise proper vigilance and apply their attention to •those particulars which may be supposed to be within the reach of their observation and. judgment, and not to close
Aside from the representation as to the value of the farm,, the only other fraudulent representation found by the jury was “ as to the amount of hay ” the place produced. The contract was made at a time so near the usual period of cutting hay that the jury may have been able to conclude from the evidence that the defendant might have fairly judged of its truthfulness by an inspection of the crop then growing. But, be this as it may, their answer to the eighth question is nevertheless conclusive in this respect, as well as in respect to the representations as to value, that, under the circumstances, shown in the case, the defendant ought not to have relied upon these representations as true without doing more than he was shown to have done to ascertain their truth or falsity. This was a question for the jury, under proper instructions
By the Court.— That part of the judgment denying equitable relief as prayed for in the complaint is affirmed, and that part of the judgment awarding damages, upon the •counterclaim against the plaintiff, to the defendant, is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to render judgment on the special verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The appellant is to recover costs in this court.