18 Colo. 279 | Colo. | 1893
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a salutary rule which requires a party to try his cause thoroughly at nisi prius before seeking a review in an appellate court of any supposed errors nor in the record proper. A party neglecting to present in apt time to the trial court objections to its rulings or decisions at the trial will not, as a rule,:-be heard in the appellate court to complain of such rulings or decision. To permit him to be so heard would be manifestly unfair to the opposite party; besides, it would have the effect of transferring the real trial of almost every litigated cause from the nisi prim court to the appellate tribunal. See City of Durango v. Luttrell, ante p. 123, and cases there cited.
“ Unless objections are reasonably made upon specific grounds and exceptions properly taken in the trial courts, the rulings of such courts, in actions at law, cannot be reviewed in the appellate tribunals. If this were not the rule, the spectacle would be presented of causes tried upon one theory in the court of nisi prius, and decided upon a different theoiy in the court of appeals. The rule is, therefore, general in actions at law, that no objection to a ruling made on the progress of the trial is available upon error or appeal unless it was first made and ruled upon in the court below.” 1 Thompson on Trials, § 690.
Counsel for plaintiff in error cites Doss v. Craig, 1 Colo. 178, wherein it is said, that in an action for unlawful detainer under section 5, chapter 35, Revised Statutes, the plaintiff must aver and prove a demand in writing for possession of the premises which he seeks to recover. The Doss case was an action by a landlord against his tenant for holding over after the expiration of the term; and the court said that the demand required in such an action “ is analogous to the demand required in replevin.” The comparison is pertinent. The general rule in replevin is, that where possession of the goods has been illegally obtained by the defendant, the plaintiff need not make a demand for the return thereof before commencing his action. So in an action of this kind, no demand is necessary where the entry complained of was forcible and illegal. There is a distinction in this respect between an action for a forcible and illegal entry, and an action for unlawful detainer after a peaceable and lawful entry. Miller v. Sparks, 4 Colo. 303; Grice v. Ferguson, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 36;
The fact that the defendant Mary was the owner of the property in fee, the defendant Henry having no interest therein, does not affect their status or liability in this action. If, as charged in the complaint, Mrs. Farncomb leased the premises to plaintiff, and while he was in the lawful possession and occupancy thereof, defendants jointly made an illegal and forcible entry therein, both were jointly liable in a possessory action of this kind. This was not an action to try the title. The gist of this action was the tortious entry. The owner of the fee, as well as a stranger to the title, may be guilty of an unlawful and forcible entry upon premises demised to his own tenant. Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631.
The cases of Wilbur v. Maynard, 6 Colo. 483, Irwine v. Wood, 7 Colo. 477, and Brown v. Kennedy, 12 Colo. 235, cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, are not in point in this case; those were actions of a different nature ; they were actions upon contract; and there is no intimation in either case that an appellate court should review an assignment of error alleging misjoinder of parties or the improper uniting of causes of action in an action ex delicto, where no objection on that ground was made in the court below, and where there was no objection to .the finding or judgment so as to authorize a review of the case upon the evidence.
The judgment of the county court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.