40 F. 105 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern California | 1889
Without noticing the technical objections urged to the answer and cross-bill filed by the intervenors, I think the more substantial objections thereto well taken. The bill was filed for the foreclosure of a certain mortgage, executed on the 2d day of April, 1888, by the defendant, the San Diego Street-Car Company, to the complainant as trustee, to secure the payment of 250 first mortgage bonds of $1,000 each, alleged to have been issued on that day by the said street-car company, payable on the 1st day of April, 1908, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, on the 1st days of April and October of each year, such interest payments being further evidenced by coupons attached to the bonds. The property thus mortgaged was the line of street railway then owned by the defendant company in the city of San Diego, Cal., its franchises, and all property of every kind used or in any way connected therewith, and also ail franchises and property that might thereafter be accquired by the defendant corporation for the purpose of its line of railway, and all branch lines, extensions, side tracks, and switches that might be thereafter constructed. The mortgage contained a provision that, in the event default should be made by the mortgagor company in the payment of any installment of interest,' and such default should continue for 60 days, the principal sums of the bonds should, at the election of the holders of 126 of them, become due and immediately payable; and in such case the complainant, as trustee, might institute suit in any court of competent jurisdiction for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and might prosecute such suit to a final decree and sale. The bill alleges that the mortgagor company failed to pay the interest due on the 1st day of October, 1888, on the bonds issued and then outstanding, and that such default in the payment of said interest has continued for 60 days and more, and that the holders of 126 of said bonds, and more, have elected that the principal sum secured by all the bonds issued and outstanding under the said mortgage has become and is due and immediately payable, and that the holders and owners of more than 126 of said bonds have requested, in writing, the complainant to commence this suit and foreclose the said mortgage.
With respect to the answer of the intervenors, who are A. Klauber, S. Steiner,, P. L. Castle, and D. Choate, it is sufficient to say that, as neither of them has ever been made a defendant to the suit, either by the original bill or otherwise, there are. no allegations calling for an answer on their part. The answer of the intervenors to the bill has, therefore, no place in the records, and should be expunged.
The cross-bill filed by the intervenors against the complainant and the defendant in substance sets up this state of i'acts: The defendant corporation had constructed and was operating a street-car line from the busi
The contract of April 2, 1888, refers to that of September 30,1887; recites the fact that pursuant to it the street-car company partially constructed the line of railway therein contemplated and provided for along the route designated by the intervenors, and that the intervenors had procured the passage of ordinances of the city granting them a franchise for the construction and maintenance of the road as contemplated in and by the contract of September 30th; and then proceeds that “whereas, matters of controversy have arisen in the construction of the terms of said contract, [of September 80, 1887,] and as to the meaning thereof, and it being deemed to the best interest of all parties that said road should be completed at tlio earliest possible moment, in the most economical manner, and to the greatest advantage of each of the parties thereto, now, therefore, this contract [that of April 2, 1888] is made and entered into for the purposes hereinaller set forth by this instrument, each waiving all rights and privileges hereafter accruing under the said contract of September 30th, and covenanting the one witli the other to the following effect, to-wit:” (1) The stroet-car company to complete the line of road in accordance with certain plans and specifications annexed to the contract, and to construct il between certain points marked, respectively, “Station A” and “Station B” on a certain exhibit attached to the contract and made a part of it. (2) All expenses incurred by reason of a change of the road provided for by the contract to be borne by the company, but the intervenors to pay the company §2,000 as compensation for making the change. (3) The intervenors to obtain the
By the contract entered into between the intervenors and the defendant street-car company on the 8d day of December, 1888, the contract of April 2, 1888, was so changed, in consideration of $12,695.88, paid to the company by the intervenors, as to provide that the company should operate the whole of the line of road from the intersection of D and Twelfth streets in the city of San Diego, up Switzer canon, through ■the Klauber, Steiner, Choate, and Castle addition to the intersection of Pacific avenue with Steiner street, in said addition, for a period of 10 years from December 8,1888, and in such operation to run not loss than three regular passenger trains over the entire length of said road each and every day during said term, unavoidable delays and accidents alone excepted; and further agreeing that, if the company should at any time within said 10 years fail to run the trains as stipulated, then, as a penalty for such failure, to forfeit to the intervenors all of said road from said intersection of -D and Twelfth streets to said intersection of Pacific avenue and Steiner streets, together with all the franchises, bridges, trestles, culverts, ties, rails, road-bed, and right of way of said road between
The cross-bill alleges that the defendant street-car company constructed and equipped the lino of railroad provided for by the contracts, but solely with funds paid by the intervenors thereunder, and that the in-tervenors procured and transferred to the company the franchises and rights of way, and made the payments as they agreed, aggregating in amount §73,695.88, all of which the defendant company received under and in pursuance of the contracts. It is further alleged in the cross-bill that the defendant company operated the said road in accordance with its said agreements until on or about the 25th day of February, 1889, which was a date subsequent to the commencement of this suit, the bill herein having been filed February 18, 1889. And it is averred “that said intervenors have been informed, and upon such information and belief allege, that prior to February 18, 1889, some of the bondholders represented by the plaintiff and the defendant corporation, conspiring and confederating together, agreed between themselves to file a bill of complaint in the United Htaies circuit court of the southern district of California, asking for a foreclosure of a mortgage of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, alleged to have been given by the defendant to the plaintiff, and that the entire property of the defendant, the San Diego Street-Car Company, should be sold by virtue of proceedings to be had thereunder, and that by such sale thereof to deprive these inter-venors of their rights obtained by virtue of these contracts, and to agree to appoint the president of the defendant corporation the receiver, and thereby secure to themselves the aforesaid rights, franchises, privileges, and so forth, belonging to the aforesaid railroad extension as their property, and to operate said road according to their own advantages, and deprive the intervenors herein of all interest in said extension and the use of the same; and that, acting in furtherance of said conspiracy and fraudulent combination aforesaid, after Milton Santee had been appointed receiver, he, the said receiver, stopped the running of trains over the extension of said road constructed with the money furnished by the inter-venors herein for the purpose of depreciating, and does thereby so depreciate, the value of said extension, and will, if continued, entirely ruin the same, and cause the same to become entirely worthless; since which time the defendant and the receiver appointed by this honorable court to take charge of and operate said road have wholly neglected and refused to run any trains over said lino of road or any part thereof, and the said defendant and its receiver still refuse to operate said line of road, whereby, and by reason of said failure and refusal of said company to operate the entire line of said road as in said contracts provided, the advantages of said contracts have been wholly lost to the intervenors, and since which time they have been, and are now, deprived of the advantages provided for in said agreements; and the right to have and demand a conveyance from said defendant of the entire line of the extension of
From this statement it is very clear that the claim set up by the in-terveüors to the property referred to in the cross-bill is adverse to the complainant as .well as the defendant to the suit. They not only allege that that portion of the road which was constructed under the contracts set up in the cross-bill, with the franchises and rights of way therefor, was not covered by the mortgage, but assert title in themselves as against both complainant and defendant by reason of the alleged failure of the receiver to operate such portion of the road, and ask that he be decreed to execute a conveyance thereof to them. It is well settled that such adverse claims cannot be litigated and settled in a foreclosure proceeding. Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; McComb v. Spangler, 71 Cal. 423, 12 Pac. Rep. 347. Of course, under the decree of foreclosure no greater interest can be sold than the mortgagor had at the time of the execution of the mortgage, or subsequently acquired. Rights superior to his are in no wise affected; and where property is subsequently acquired by the mortgagor, which is embraced by the terms of the mortgage, if it is acquired subject to conditions, a purchaser at a judicial sale under the mortgage would undoubtedly take subject to the same conditions. But while, in my opinion, the questions sought to be raised by the interven-ors cannot be litigated and determined in this proceeding, I think it proper to direct the attention of counsel for the complainant and the de