134 Misc. 778 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1928
Motion by plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings. The answer admits all the allegations of the complaint, except the allegations “ to the effect that the reciprocal provisions contained in section 248-p of the New York State Tax Law were in full force and effect on the date of decedent’s death.” The testator died August 4, 1927. The sole question arising upon this motion is
Is section 248-p general in its application to all taxes upon transfers by non-residents, or is it to be limited to the taxes imposed by article 10-A of the Tax Law, and, therefore, void and ineffective because of the decision invalidating the imposition of such taxes? If the exact letter of the statute controls, the question is readily answered, because that restricts the application of section 248-p to “ the tax imposed by this article.” There being no such tax, section 248-p would have no force or effect. But if the spirit of the act controls, the question may be answered differently. The “ spirit ” is the intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the law. Did the Legislature intend that the reciprocity provisions be restricted to the particular tax imposed by article 10-A, or did it intend that they should apply to any tax which might be imposed on transfers by residents of other States, granting reciprocity? If the latter is the case, we may reject the exact and literal wording of the statute and supply the necessary language to accomplish that purpose. (Bell v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 105 N. Y. 139, 144; Blaschko v. Wurster, 156 id. 437, 442, 443; People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 id. 375, 379; 2 Lewis Suth. Stat. Const. [2d ed.] § 376, pp. 721-723; Sedg. Const. Stat. & Const. Law [2d ed.], p. 255, note a.) It is my opinion that the Legislature intended that there should be such reciprocity as would reheve the resident of the other State from the payment of any New York tax whatever upon transfers of personal property, described in the statute, provided the other State granted a like exemption to residents of New York. The Legislature believed that article 10-A covered the whole subject of transfer of taxes upon non-resident estates; and when it referred in
Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void, unless the provisions are so connected together in subject-matter, meaning or purpose that it cannot be presumed the Legislature would have passed one without the other. (Matter of Village of Middletown, 82 N. Y. 196, 202.) If the remaining provision is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. (Matter of Village of Middletown, supra, 203 ; Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 395; 14 S. Ct. 1047, 1053.) “ If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and is void as to one, it may still be, in every respect, complete and valid as to the other.” (Matter of Village of Middletown, supra, 203.)
Even where a single section attempts or purports to cover two entirely distinct and separable classes of cases, one properly and the other improperly, it may be upheld as to the class which constitutionally may be thus covered, even though condemned as to the other. (Dollar Co. v. Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 220 N. Y. 270, 278.) In such a case the statute can be held entirely void only where it is evident from a contemplation of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it that it would not have been passed
Applying these tests to the statute in question, I am convinced that section 248-p must be regarded as then in full force and effect, and not affected by the invalidity of the taxing provisions of article 10-A. It is fully effective as to all taxes imposed upon the transfers of property by non-residents under any statute in force and effect at the time of decedent’s death.
The motion should be granted, with ten dollars costs. Settle order on notice.
Repealed, and new art. 10-A added by Laws of 1928, chap. 330.— [Rep.