{¶ 2} On October 30, 1999, Martin was the subject of a restraining order barring contact with his estranged wife and being on her property. That evening, despite the restraining order, Martin appeared on her property in an attempt to talk to his children. Police officers, including Amburgey, arrived on the scene in response to an emergency phone call. The situation ultimately resulted in a confrontation between Martin and the police during which Martin fired his shotgun and wounded Amburgey.
{¶ 3} In his deposition, Martin testified he could not remembеr anything leading up to the confrontation with the police. He did remember that after leaving his wife's house, he was standing in the middle of a street when he felt a terrible pain in his lower back. He then saw "fire flying out of the muzzle" before a bullet grazed his face. Afraid they were going to kill him, Martin swung to the side and fired his 12-gauge Winchester shotgun once. After another bullet hit him, he fell to the ground. As he was falling down, the shotgun went off twice. Martin testified that although the shotgun went off three times, he only remembered firing the first shot. Martin also testified that he has owned firearms for hunting and trapshooting since he was 14, and that he was aware of the risk of firing a weаpon at someone. Martin testified that he had no thoughts that evening of causing harm to others and that it never was his intent to shoot Amburgey or anyone elsе.
{¶ 4} In July 2000, Martin pled guilty, inter alia, to felonious assault against Amburgey in violation of R.C.
{¶ 5} On January 23, 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance, determining it had no duty tо defend or indemnify Martin because the homeowner's policy excluded intentional acts from coverage. Specifically, the trial court found that "when [Martin's] plea is considered in conjunction with the factual circumstances of the incident, reasonable minds could only conclude that * * * Mаrtin intended to fire the shot that wounded Officer Amburgey. Since Officer Amburgey's injuries resulted from * * * Martin's intentional act of shooting a gun, where the resulting injury was reasonably fоreseeable, [Martin's] actions are excluded from coverage under the terms of his homeowners policy." Appellants now appeal the trial court's decision, raising the following single assignment of error:
{¶ 6} "The trial court erred [by] granting summary judgment to farmers insurance finding a conviction for feloniоus assault barred coverage as a matter of law."
{¶ 7} Appellants argue that the trial court erred by determining Farmers Insurance had no duty to defend or indemnify Martin in the underlying tort action solely on the basis of Martin's felonious assault conviction resulting from his guilty plea. Appellants argue that a felonious assault conviction is not conclusive evidence of an intent to injure.
{¶ 8} Martin's homeowner's policy with Farmers Insurance excludes from coverage "bodily injury or property damage which * * * is either (a) caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured; or (b) results from any occurrence causеd by an intentional act of any insured where the results are reasonably foreseeable." In Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio v.Swanson (1991),
{¶ 9} Martin pled guilty and was convicted of felonious assault against Amburgey as a result of his firing his shotgun and injuring Amburgey during the confrontation with the рolice. R.C.
{¶ 10} Appellants argue the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance solely on the basis of Martin's felonious assault conviction. Citing to Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.Machniak (1991),
{¶ 11} We note at the outset that the trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of Martin's conviction "in cоnjunction with the factual circumstances of the incident[.]" In addition to the felonious assault conviction, the trial court also noted (1) that Martin remembеred deciding to shoot the gun at the police after feeling pain in his lower back because he believed they were trying to kill him, (2) his use of weapоns for hunting since he was 14 years old, and (3) his awareness of the danger of firearms since that age. The trial court noted that "[u]nder the circumstances, [Martin] was aware that firing his gun would likely cause bodily injury."
{¶ 12} In Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill (1987),
{¶ 13} In Baker v. White,
Clermont App. No. CA2002-08-065,
{¶ 14} "[A] criminal conviction, in and of itself, may conclusively еstablish intent for purposes of applying an intentional-acts exclusion. * * * The crime of felonious assault requires the offender to act `knowingly.' * * * In examining this issue, the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that a conviction involving the mental state of `knowingly' is sufficient to establish an intent to injure and trigger an intentional acts exclusion, as long as the exclusion is not restricted only to intentional acts, but also includes the expected results of one's acts. * * * Thus, a conviсtion for felonious assault, because it involves the mental state of `knowingly,' is sufficient to trigger an intentional acts exclusion." Baker,
{¶ 15} In light of our decision in Baker, we find that Martin's conviction for felonious assault was sufficient to establish intent under the intentional acts exclusion in the homeowners' policy in this case. The exclusion included not оnly acts that were "intentional," but also acts that were "reasonably foreseeable." We therefore find that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in fаvor of Farmers Insurance. Appellants' assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 16} Judgment affirmed.
Powell and Walsh, JJ., concur.