164 Iowa 587 | Iowa | 1914
The plaintiff claims: That from the 1st day of October, 1899, up to and including the 18th day of November, 1905, at the instance and request of the defendant, he performed work, labor, and services for the defendant as a general farm hand. That he worked in all for the defendant, as such, for forty-four months and eighteen days; that the services so rendered were reasonably worth $1,117.34, on
Appellant assigns six errors. The first five may be grouped under one head, to wit: (1) The court erred in sustaining the motion of the defendant to direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the services were rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant, as a member of defendant’s
Plaintiff testifies : That during the month of August, in 1905, not having any money from Mr. Underwood, he thought he needed a little pocket money. Because of that, he contemplated going up into Minnesota to harvest. That, when defendant heard he was going away, “he said, ‘If you want to work, you can work right on here, and I will give you $25 a month.’ So I stayed and worked then, but he never paid me any money except $10 paid that day. Prior to this time, he had never fixed any price upon the services.” .During all this time that plaintiff was with the defendant, the plaintiff says he never had any dealings with the defendant that had anything to do with the labor performed by him upon the farm. It appears that during all the time, while plaintiff was there and during his absence, plaintiff’s wife and children remained with the defendant and were cared for by him; that during the years up to the 12th of August, 1905, nothing was said between the plaintiff and the defendant as to wages.
It affirmatively appears that there was no express agreement or understanding between the plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff should charge for his services, or that the defendant should pay him therefor, up to August, 1905; that the first talk had between them, touching compensation for services rendered, was in August, 1905, and this talk, as we interpret it, related only to future services to be rendered. At least, this is the apparent understanding of the defendant at that time. It is not claimed by the defendant that this talk of August, 1905, referred to, or had any relationship to, any services theretofore rendered by the plaintiff, and we are satisfied that such a claim, if made, would not be justified by what was said and done at that time, under the circumstances under which the conversation was carried on. It appears from this record that the plaintiff came and went and returned
It is plain from this record that the plaintiff and his family, his wife and children, lived with the defendant as a member of defendant’s family; that that relationship was established and continued during all the time covered by plaintiff’s claim; that they received support from defendant during all this time; that there was no promise, or agreement, or understanding expressed between them as to any compensation to be given plaintiff for his services. If therefore the plaintiff is entitled to recover for any services rendered up to August, 1905, it must be by reason of an implication of law that the services were to be paid for, arising from such a condition of facts: that it is apparent therefrom that the plaintiff intended to charge for his services during that time, and the defendant intended to pay him therefor.
It is a significant fact, in this case, that during all this time plaintiff made no claim for compensation; that he came and went as he pleased; that the defendant assumed no right to direct his coming and his going, or the character or kind of services which 'he should render. It is not sufficient for plaintiff to show that he had a secret intent to charge for his services. The evidence must go further and disclose a mutual
In Scully v. Scully, 28 Iowa, 548, this court, speaking through Judge Cole, in a case involving the question here under consideration, said: “Ordinarily and without more, where one person renders services for another which are known to and accepted by him, the law implies a promise on his part to pay therefor. But where it is shown that the person rendering the service is a member of the family of the person served and receiving support therein, either as child, a relative, or a visitor, a presumption of law arises that such services were gratuitous; and, in such case, before the person rendering the service can recover, the express promise of the party served must be shown, or such facts and circumstances as will authorize the jury to find that the services were rendered in the expectation by one of receiving, and by the other of making, compensation therefor.” This doctrine has found such substantial lodgement in the jurisprudence of this state and has been so consistently followed that the citation of further authority for this rule is unnecessary.
It appearing from the testimony in this case, without dispute, that the plaintiff was, at the time he claims .these services were rendered, a member of defendant’s family, residing therein with his own family, and receiving support as such, that no recovery can be had unless it affirmatively appears, either that there was an express contract to pay for the services rendered, or that the services were rendered under such circumstances as negatives the conclusion that they were gratuitously rendered, and affirmatively shows that there was a mutual expectation between the plaintiff and defendant that one should receive, and the other should pay, for such services as were rendered. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish this state of facts, and we think that he has wholly failed
Now it is apparent from this record that each party asserted then, against the other, all claims which he had and might insist on, in the adjustment of their mutual accounts, and it was the intention - of both parties to adjust all their mutual accounts, and we feel that the record shows that such was not only the intention, but that it was actually done at that time, and, without setting out the record in this opinion, we are satisfied that as to this balance there was, prior to the commencement of this action, a mutual settlement and adjustment of all claims held by each against the other, and this done without any fraud, mistake, or concealment, which might avoid such settlement.
We are satisfied the court did not err in holding that
We find no reversible error, and the cause is — Affirmed.