Farmer v. StateFarmer v. State
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- Before:
- Adams
Anthоny Bernard Farmer was convicted, following a jury trial, of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
1
Farmer was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under
Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that on the night of April 9, 2001, a deputy from the Douglas County Sheriffs Office responded to an armed robbery call at a restaurant. The store manager and other witnesses described the perpetrator as a young male, between 19 and 25 years old, wearing baggy jeans, a red and black shirt and a scarf on his head. The manager, who appeared visibly shaken after the incident, told police that she had been in her office counting receipts when the man entered and produced a gun. He placed the weapon to her head, took the cash receipts, and fled.
While interviewing the other witnesses, police discovered that Adrian Massey, оne of the restaurant employees, had opened the back door of the restaurant to allow a man known as “Beat Box” to commit the robbery. Massey repeated that stоry at trial. He testified that *832 after leaving the door open, he saw Farmer coming out of the restaurant kitchen and heard the restaurant manager scream that she had been robbed.
Police also interviewed Rodney Brown, a former restaurant employee, who stated that “Beat Box” planned to commit a robbery that night, although he believed that he was going to rob another business. He said that he dropped Massey and Farmer off and later picked Farmer up near the expressway. Brown’s description of Farmer’s clothing that night was similar to that given by the witnesses at the restaurant. Later, Brown took police to the house where “Beat Box” lived. After speaking to his mother, police identified Farmer as “Beat Box,” and Farmer later admitted to police that he went by that name. Brown identified Farmer as “Beat Box” at trial. In addition, the restaurant manager identified Farmer at trial as the man who robbed her.
1. Farmer contends that thе trial court erred in sentencing him to life without parole under
The third felony conviction proffered by the state to support recidivist sentencing of Farmer was in the name of Eric Hobson, which the state contended was an aliаs used by Farmer. As evidence of that conviction, the state produced a certified copy of the accusation and final disposition from Fulton County. Those documents were admissible under
At the subsequent hearing, the state presented a comparison between the fingerprints of Eric Hobson and Farmer. But the investigators who prepared the document were unavailable to testify, and the trial court sustained Farmer’s hearsay objection to the comparison report. The state also produced book-in photographs stemming from the prior conviction, which a police offiсer testified were obtained from the City of Atlanta Police Department Pretrial Detention Center. These photographs also reference Complaint No. 990481096 and bear the namе Eric Hobson. The trial court allowed the photographs into evidence over Farmer’s objections that the documents were hearsay and that the state had not properly authenticated *833 them. The trial court then reviewed the photographs from the Eric Hobson conviction and determined that Farmer was the man in the photos. Thus, the trial court concluded thаt the state had proved that Farmer had three prior felony convictions.
“[T]he quantum of evidence required to sufficiently identify the photograph is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” (Footnote omitted.)
Pless v. State,
247 Ga. App. 786,787 (2) (545 SE2d 340) (2001). While the better practice certainly would have been for the state to obtain a separate certification of the book-in photographs pursuant to
2. Farmer next contends that
Even if armed robbery is considered a capital offense for the purposes of certain Georgia statutes, it is not excluded from the provisions of
Moreover, Farmer’s argument overlooks a long line of cases holding that, although
*834 for the purpose of imposition of punishment — armed robbery is not a capital felony. Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 402 (236 SE2d 759) [(1977)]. The generаl recidivist statute includes — for purpose of punishment — the offense of armed robbery. Davis v. State, 159 Ga. App. 356, 361 (4) (b) (283 SE2d 286) (1981). Under the authority of Collins and Davis, this court has held if death is not a possible sentence, insofar as punishment is concerned, the offеnse cannot be capital, and a defendant charged with armed robbery may be indicted as a recidivist.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Getty v. State, 207 Ga. App. 736, 737-738 (429 SE2d 100) (1993).
3. Farmer argues in the alternative that if armed robbery is subject to the provisions оf
4. Farmer also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the state to submit testimony that the restaurant managеr had agreed to take a polygraph test. He asserts that this was an improper attempt by the state to bolster the manager’s testimony. The record shows, however, that Farmer’s attоrney failed to object to this testimony, and thus he has waived any right to argue the matter on appeal. See Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 166 (5) (539 SE2d 851) (2000).
Even if the matter were properly preserved for our review, no grounds fоr reversal exists. Although a police investigator testified that the manager had agreed to take a polygraph test, Farmer’s trial counsel elicited testimony from him on cross-examination that the test was never administered. “[N]ot every reference to a polygraph requires reversal.” (Citation omitted.) Allen v. State, 210 Ga. App. 447, 449 (3) (436 SE2d 559) (1993). “The mere fact that the jury was apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised.” (Footnote omitted.) Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 15 (4) (534 SE2d 577) (2000). Here, no polygraph was even administered, and thus no inference as to the results of any polygraph test could have been raised. Accordingly, we find no error.
5. Farmer next asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel becаuse his trial counsel failed to properly preserve the errors noted above. We note that Farmer’s trial attorney did properly *835 preserve at least some of the errors he asserts on appeal. Nevertheless, we find that Farmer cannot demonstrate that any purported failure by his counsel resulted in prejudice to him. Thus, he cannot meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984) for showing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Judgment affirmed.
Eldridge, J., concurs. Ruffin, P. J., concurs in judgment only.
Notes
A third charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was dismissed by nolle prosequi order.