ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
1. Introduction
On August 14, 2003, Plаintiff Ashley L. Farmer (“Plaintiff’), by and through her Guardian ad Litem Andrea Hansen, brought this action for enforcement of a judgment pursuant to Cal. Ins.Code § 11580 and for breach of contract against Defendant Allstate Insurance Co. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendant in the amount of $100,000, plus interest thereon, in satisfaction of a judgment rendered in an underlying lawsuit. 1
Now before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, which each present the question whether as a matter of law Defendant had the duty to defend or indemnify its insured in an underlying lawsuit brought by Plaintiff.
II. Background
A. Facts 2
During the period of time relevant to this action, Nadine Varela (“Mrs. Varela”) *886 operated a state licensed child day care business out of the home in which lived with her husband Carlos Varela (“Mr. Varela”). At such time, the Varelas were insured under an Allstate Deluxe Homeowners Policy (the “Varela Policy”), which included an endorsement for home day care coverage.
Between September 1996 and August 1998, Mr. Varela sexually molested Plaintiff 3 on numerous occasions while she attended the day care service and was, thereby, in the care custody and control of Mrs. Varela. In September 1998, Mr. Varela was convicted under Cal.Penal Code § 288.5 and sentenced to six years in prison for sexually molesting Plaintiff.
On October 30, 1998, Andrea Hansen, on behalf of Plaintiff, filed a personal injury action in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Mrs. Varela, individually and dba Varela Family Care, and against Mr. Varela (the “underlying action”). The underlying action included causes of action for assault and battery against Mr. Varela and for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and premise liability against both Mr. and Mrs. Varela. Among the allegations in the complaint was that the incidents of molestation occurred because Mrs. Varela negligently supervised Plaintiff.
Mrs. Varela subsequently tendered her defense of the underlying action to Defendant. In a letter dated December 29, 1998, Defendant informed Mrs. Varela of its decision not to defend or indemnify her in the underlying action because (1) there was no “occurrence” to trigger coverage; (2) coverage was barred by Cal. Ins.Code § 533 4 ; (3) coverage was barred by the Varela Policy’s intentional/criminal acts exclusion; and (4) coverage was barred by the Home Day Care Coverage Endorsement’s exclusion for sexual molestation.
The underlying action proceeded to trial in April 2000. On April 26, 2000, the Superior Court rendered a Statement of Decision, setting forth its statement of factual findings and legal conclusions. The trial court found that Mr. Varela “touched [Plaintiff] in a sexually offensive manner, on no less than three occasions” and, therefore, that Mr. Varela had “sexually battered” Plaintiff. (JSUF, Ex. 4).
As to Mrs. Varela, the trial court’s findings included a determination that “[a]t all times while [Plaintiff] was on the Premises, she was within the care, custody and control of Nadine Varela.” (JSUF, Ex. 4). The trial court also found that Plaintiff “sustained physical and emotional injury while within the care, custody and control of Nadine Varela.” (JSUF, Ex. 4). The trial court listed the “legal basis” for its decision as follows:
A. Nadine Varela negligently failed to use ordinary care or skill in the management of Ashley L. Farmer and as a result thereof, Ashley L. Farmer was injured.
B. Nadine Varela negligently permitted a dangerous condition to exist on her Premises and as a result thereof, Ashley L. Farmer was injured.
(JSUF, Ex. 4 at 2).
Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Judgment was entered severally against Mr. Varela for $400,000, plus costs and post-judgment interest, and severally against Mrs. Varela *887 for $100,000 plus costs and post-judgment interest.
On January 15, 2003, Plaintiff obtained an assignment from Mrs. Varela of all her rights against Defendant under the Varela Policy. Plaintiff, through her Guardian ad Litem, then brought this action on August 14, 2003 to enforce the $100,000 judgment against Mrs. Varela, none of which amount has paid to date.
B. The Varela Policy
The Varela Policy was issued by Defendant on or about May 17, 1996. Nadine Varela and Carlos Varela are named as the insured persons under the Varela Policy.
The Varela Policy provides that it covers an “insured person” for liability arising from an “occurrence”:
Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.
(JSUF, Ex. 2 at 27).
In turn, the Varela Policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage.” (JSUF, Ex. 2 at 4).
In addition to offering the standard cоverages of a homeowners’ policy, the Varela Policy affords coverage to Mrs. Varela’s day care business through its “Home Day Care Coverage Endorsement.” The Endorsement extends coverage of the Varela Policy “to apply to the home day care business conducted by an insured person at the residence premises.” (JSUF, Endorsement at 1). Pursuant to the Endorsement, the Varela Policy limit for Mrs. Varela’s home day care coverage is $100,000.
The Endorsement covers “bodily injury and property damage arising out of the operation of a home day care business by an inured person at the residence premises for which the insured person receives monetary or other compensation.” (JSUF, Endorsement at 2). However, the Endоrsement expressly precludes coverage for injury or damage arising out of sexual molestation, stating: “We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse inflicted upon any person by or at the direction of an insured person, an employee of an insured person or any other person involved in any capacity in the home day care business.” (JSUF, Endorsement at 2).
The Varela Policy contains three other provisions relevant to this action. First, the policy excludes coverage for intentional or criminal acts:
We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from thе intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person.... This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.
(JSUF, Ex. 2 at 27).
Additionally, the Varela Policy contains a “Joint Obligations” provision: “The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as an insured person. This means that the responsibilities, acts and failures to act of a person defined as insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an insured person.” (JSUF, Ex. 2 at 5).
Finally, the Varela Policy obligates Defendant to defend a suit for covered dam *888 ages: “We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even in the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent.” (JSUF, Ex. 2 at 27).
C. Cross-Motions Before the Court
Plaintiff states that the issue now before the Court is whether, in declining to defend Mrs. Varela in the underlying action and indemnify her for the judgment rendered against her, Defendant breached its contractual obligation to Mrs. Varela. In making this determination, Plaintiff states that the Court must answer three questions of law: (1) Whether the Varela Policy and the Home Day Care Coverage Endorsement (the “Endorsement”) covered Mrs. Varela’s negligent supervision of Plaintiff or the negligent allowance of a dangerous premises condition at issue in the underlying action; (2) Whether because of Defendant’s refusal to defend Mrs. Varela in the underlying civil action, Defendant is bound by the faсtual determinations made by the trial court; and (3) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law and that there was no potential for coverage for four reasons. First, because Mr. Varela’s conduct was not an “accident,” there was no injury-causing “occurrence” to trigger coverage. Second, the Varela Policy states where an insured person sexually molests someone, there is no coverage for any insured. Third, an intentional or criminal act by any insured bars coverage under the Varela Policy for all insureds. Fourth, the Varela Policy’s “joint obligations” provision expressly imputes Mr. Varela’s non-accidental, uncovered conduct to Mrs. Varela and, therefore, Mr. Vаrela’s conduct precludes coverage for the actions of both Mr. and Mrs. Varela.
III. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Rule 56(c) requires summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Tarin v. County of Los Angeles,
That burden may be met by “ ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Id.
at 325,
Only genuine disputes — where the еvidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party— over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. at 248,
B. Standing
Plaintiff has standing to recover from Defendant both as an assignee of *889 Mrs. Varela’s rights against Defendant and pursuant to Cal Ins.Code § 11580.
As noted, the parties do not dispute that on January 15, 2003, Plaintiff obtained an assignment from Mrs. Varela of all of her rights against Defendant under the Policy.
Further, Cal. Ins.Code § 11580 (“Required Policy Provisions”) provides a right of an injured party to enforce a judgment against the tortfeasor’s insurer. Specifically, insurance policies, such аs the one at issue, that insure “[ajgainst loss or damage resulting from liability for injury suffered by another person” must contain a provide “that whenever judgment is secured against the insured ... in an action based upon bodily injury, death, or property damage, then an action may be brought against the insurer on the policy and subject to its terms and limitations, by such judgment creditor to recover on the judgment.” Cal. Ins.Code § 11580(a)(1), (b)(1).
C. Effect of the Underlying Action on the Instant Action
Plaintiff argues vigorously that in determining whether Defendant was required to defend Mrs. Varela in the underlying action, the Court is bound by the state court’s factual findings because Defendant had an opportunity to defend Mrs. Varela in the underlying action. Therefore, posits Plaintiff, Defendant is collaterally es-topped from relitigating facts actually and impliedly determined by the Statement of Decision and encompassed within the state court’s judgment even though Defendant was not a party to the underlying action.
Defendant does not dispute that it is precluded from relitigating factual issues decided by the state court in the underlying action. However, Defendant argues that it is not bound as to issues not necessarily adjudicated in the state court proceeding. In turn, because the coverage issue now before this Court was not litigated in the underlying action, Defendant contends that may assert coverage defenses in this action.
Just as Defendant does not dispute Plaintiffs contention that Defendant may not relitigate the state court’s factual findings, so Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant may assert its coverage defenses because coverage issues were not litigated in the underlying action. Ultimately then, the parties are in accord: the state court’s necessary factual findings may not be relitigated, but because coverage was not at issue in the underlying action, Defendant may now present coverage defenses.
The caselaw on this matter is straightforward and supports the parties’ position. The California Supreme Court has stated:
An insurer that has been notified of an action and refuses to defend on the ground that the alleged claim is not within the policy coverage is bound by a judgment in the action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the insured. The insurer is not bound, however, as to issues not necessarily adjudicated in the priоr action and can still present any defenses not inconsistent with that judgment.
Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.,
A recent California Court of Appeal case set forth the paradigm of case in which a judgment creditor is seeking to enforce a judgment a tortfeasor’s insurer:
Generally speaking, in an action by an injured party against the party who al *890 legedly caused the injury the court does not adjudicate the issue of insurance coverage. The only questions litigated are the defendant’s liability and the amount of damages. The plaintiff is not concerned with the theory of liability which produces victory; only with procuring the largest possible judgment. Similarly, the defendant is concerned only with avoiding, or at least minimizing, a judgment for the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiffs loss is covered by the defendant’s insurance is not germane to the action, and evidence on that issues would be excluded as irrelevant.
Schaefer/Karpf Productions v. CNA Ins. Co.,
The instant action fits squarely within this general model. The only issues that were necessarily adjudicated in the underlying action pertained to the Varelas’ liability for Plaintiffs injuries. There is no indication that the state court considered whether the Policy afforded coverage to Mrs. Varela. Even if coverage issues were presented in the underlying action, Plaintiff has made no showing, as she must, that the state court made any determinations regarding such issues.
Id.
at 1314,
Thus, the factual findings underpinning the state court’s judgment for Plaintiff are binding on this Court and may not be relitigated by Defendаnt. Of particular importance are the state court’s findings that Mr. Varela sexually molested Plaintiff and that Mrs. Varela negligently allowed such molestation to occur. Conversely, Defendant may assert its coverage defenses in that the issue of coverage was not adjudicated in the underlying action.
D. Coverage
1. The Duty to Defend
Under a liability insurance policy, an “insurer owes a broad duty to defend its insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity.”
Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Barbara B.,
Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, whether damages are ultimately awarded does not impact on the insurer’s duty to defend.
See Horace Mann Ins. Co.,
In California, whether an insurer owes a duty to defend is determined by first looking to the allegations of the underlying complaint and comparing them with the terms of the poliсy.
Horace Mann Ins. Co.,
Even if the complaint does not allege injuries that fall within the terms of the policy, the duty to defend may still arise if facts extrinsic to the complaint “reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy.”
Horace Mann Ins. Co.
Ultimately then, the insurer faces a substantial task in justifying its refusal to defend the insured: “An insurer has no duty [to defend] only if, at the time of its decision, it can prove that the claim cannot fall within policy coverage.”
National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.
(9th Cir.1997)
2. Whether Coverage was Triggered
As stated above, the Varela Policy covers an “insured person” for liability arising out of an “occurrence.” In turn, an “occurrence” is defined as “an accident ... resulting in bodily injury or property damage.” Therefore, if the conduct of both Mr. Varela or Mrs. Varela is not an “accident,” then coverage under the Varela Policy was not triggered, and Defendant has no duty to indemnify Plaintiff.
Defendant correctly argues, and Plaintiff concedes, that Mr. Varela’s conduct was not an “occurrence” because child molestation cannot bе an “accident.” The California Supreme Court has stated that “child molestation is
always
intentional.”
J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K.,
Thus, in ordеr for coverage to be triggered, Mrs. Varela’s conduct must have constituted an “accident.” Defendant argues that where, as here, negligent conduct is not the immediate cause of the injuries giving rise to liability, but rather merely created the potential for such injuries, the negligent conduct is not a covered “accident.”
In support of this contention, Defendant relies chiefly on
American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, Inc.,
The
American Empire
court based this conclusion on language from two California Court of Appeal cases. In
Maples v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
American Empire
also cites
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Longden,
Though Plaintiff almost completely ignored this issue in its briefs, it is clear that there exists contrary authority. In
Westfield Ins. Co. v. TWT, Inc.,
The Court is inclined to find that Mrs. Varela’s negligent supervision does not qualify as an “occurrence.” Although the context of Maples and Longden is clеarly distinguishable from this case, the analysis of an “accident” set forth in those cases seems applicable here. In Maples, the court was faced with determining whether the negligent conduct that created the potential for the injury causing event should be deemed an “accident.” The Maples court presumably could have found that both the negligent heater installation and the fire itself were “accidents” (and thus “occurrences”), but instead it found that only the event causing the injury was the “accident.” In the instant case, the injury causing events were clearly Mr. Varela’s molestations of Plaintiff — without such behavior, Plaintiff would not have brought the underlying action against the Varelas. In that Mrs. Varela’s negligence enabled Mr. Varela to molest Plaintiff, Mrs. Vare-la’s conduct only created the potential for Plaintiffs injuries. That the Maples court’s task was to determine whether negligent behavior was an “accident” for purposes of determining whether an “accident” occurred within a policy’s coverage period and that this Court’s task is to determine whether negligent behavior was an “accident” for purposes of determining whether coverage was triggered is irrelevant. Like the Maples court, this Court simply must determine whether antecedent negligent conduct constitutes an “accident.”
While the Court feels that Mrs. Varela’s negligent conduct is not an “occurrence” as defined in the Varela Policy, the Court need not decide this issue because other provisions of the Varela Policy unequivocally preclude coverage. Therefore, thе Court assumes, without deciding, that Mrs. Varela’s conduct was an “occurrence” within the meaning of the Varela Policy.
3. Exclusions for Sexual Molestation and Intentional or Criminal Acts
Defendant argues that the Varela Policy’s Sexual Molestation Exclusion and its Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion each preclude coverage for Mrs. Varela’s conduct and, thus, the judgment rendered against her in the underlying action. Because these exclusions contain similar operative language, they are considered together. Once again, the Sexual Molestation Exclusion states: “We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of sexual molestation ... inflicted upon any person by or at the direction of an insured person, an employee of an insured person or any other person *894 involved in any capacity in the home day сare business.” (JSUF, Endorsement at 2) (emphasis added). Similarly, in relevant part, the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion states:”We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal act or omissions of any insured person.” (JSUF, Ex. 2 at 27) (emphasis added).
First, Defendant contends that because the Sexual Molestation Exclusion bars coverage for any injuries “arising out of sexual molestation,” the plain language of this exclusion exonerates Defendant. Although Mrs. Varela’s negligent conduct enabled Mr. Varela to molest Plaintiff, Plaintiffs injuries “ar[ose] out of sexual molestation.” In other words, Defendant is arguing that Mrs. Varela’s conduct itself did not injure Plaintiff and, therefore, no injuries exist apart from those arising out of Mr. Varela’s molestation. In turn, because any injuries arising out of sexual molestation are excluded from coverage, Plaintiff did not suffer any injuries that fall within the scope of the Varela Policy.
Defendant makes a similar argument with regard to the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion. Given that Mr. Varela’s conduct was both intentional and criminal, this exclusion clearly precludes coverage for Mr. Varela’s conduct. Defendant posits that because the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion bars coverage for injury intended by or reasonably expected to result from the intentional or criminal act of any insured, Mr. Varela’s behavior precludes coverage for the negligent conduct of Mrs. Varela. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs injuries were intended by, or at least could be reasonably expеcted to re-suit from, Mr. Varela’s acts of sexual molestation. Therefore, such injuries could not fall within the scope of the Varela Policy’s coverage regardless Mrs. Varela’s negligent conduct.
In contrast, Plaintiff argues that neither of these exclusions applies to Mrs. Varela’s conduct. Plaintiff emphasizes that Mrs. Varela did not sexually molest Plaintiff nor did she commit any intentional or criminal acts. In that Plaintiffs injuries are attributable to Mrs. Varela’s negligence, Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Varela’s conduct is irrelevant and that coverage attaches.
Numerous cases have addressed the coverage issue herein presented in the context of an exclusion for intentional or criminal acts or other similar exclusions.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert,
*895 The Gilbert court affirmed district court’s finding that the claims against Mrs. Gilbert resulted from intentional acts by “an insured” under the policy (Mr. Gilbert) and, therefore, that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify Mrs. Gilbert. The court stated:
We hold that by excluding insurance coverage for injury of damage intentionally caused by “an insured person,” Allstate unambiguously excluded coverage for damages caused by the intentional wrongful acts of any insured under the policies. The [underlying] complaint seeks to recover damages for injuries intentionally caused by Albert Gilbert, “an insured person” under the policies. Coverage for these injuries is thus precluded whether compensation is sought from Albert or Margaret.
Id.
at 454. (emphasis in original).
See also Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
These cases dictate that the Court must find that both the Sexual Molestation Exclusion and the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion preclude coverage for Mrs. Varela. Paralleling Gilbert, Mr. Varela’s intentional criminal act gave rise to the negligence claims against Mrs. Varela— that is, no negligence claims would have been brought against Mrs. Varela if Mr. Varela had not molested Plaintiff. Moreover, as in Gilbert, the exclusions at issue apply to the conduct of “an insured” or “any insured.” Thus, given the Varela Policy’s language and the nature of both Plaintiffs injuries and the Varelas’ respective conduct, it is clear that coverage is excluded.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs heavy reliance on
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lynette C.,
While the facts of
Lynette C.
are nearly identical to the facts of the case now before the court, the language of the insurance policy in
Lynette C.
dispositively differs from the language in the Varela’s policy. The policy in
Lynette C.
contained two applicable exclusions. Exclusion (b) of the policy specified that the policy did not apply “to any dishonest fraudulent, criminal or malicious act, error or omission of an Insured.”
Id.
at 1077,
to licentious, immoral, or sexual behavior intended to lead to or culminating in any sexual act. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Insured shall be protected under the terms of this policy as to any claim upon which suit may be brought against him, by reason of any alleged licentious, immoral or sexual behavior by an Insured unless a judgment or final adjudication thereof adverse to the Insured shall establish that acts of active or deliberate, licentious, immoral or sexual behavior committed by the Insured with actual licentious or immoral purpose and intent were material to the cause of action so adjudicated.
Id.
The court, in finding that Mrs. Lopes was entitled to indemnification, relied on Exclusion (1): “Undoubtedly, exclusion (l)’s exception, in isolation, can reasonably be read to protect one insured against claims based on a second insured’s sexual conduct so long as the first insured has not engaged directly in that conduct.”
Id.
at 1079,
The court recognized that its interpretation of Exclusion (1) may have created “an ambiguity” when read in light of the policy as a whole and Exclusion (b) in particular, but found that “under settled principles of insurance contract interpretation that ambiguity must be construed against [the insurer].”
Id.
at 1079,
In so holding, the Lynette C. court distinguished Gilbert on the ground that the relevant insurance policy in Gilbert did not contain language analogous to that found in Exclusion (1) of the policy at issue in Lynette C. Likewise, Lynette C. is inapplicable to the case at bar because the Varela Policy does not contain a provision similar to Exclusion (1). Rather, similar to Gilbert, the Varela Policy expressly excludes coverage for any intentional or criminal act of “any insured.” Additionally, the Varela Policy excludes coverage for any injury arising out of acts of sexual molestation by “an insured.”
*897 Therefore, Gilbert is the controlling authority, and Lynette C. is inapposite. As a matter of law, both the Sexual Molestation Exclusion and the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion preclude coverage for Mrs. Varela.
4. “Joint Obligations” Provision
Defendant further argues that even if the Sexual Molestation Exclusion and the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion do not preclude coverage for Mrs. Varela, then the Policy’s “Joint Obligations” provision does so. Once again, the Joint Obligations provision states: “The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as an insured person. This means that the responsibilities, acts and failures to act of a person defined as insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an insured person.” (JSUF, Ex. 2 at 5).
Castro v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Though at the time of the killing, Ariel Cook and his mother Carmelita were insured under a homeowner’s policy issued by Allstate, Allstate refused to defend or indemnify. Thus, after Castro received a stipulated judgment of $100,000 against Mrs. Cook, he obtained a complete assignment of Mrs. Cook’s rights against Allstate and brought suit to enforce the judgment pursuant to such rights.
In determining whether Allstate owed Mrs. Cook a duty to defend, the district court focused on the Joint Obligations provision in the Cooks’ policy, which contained identical language to the Joint Obligations provision in the Varelas’ policy. The district court interpreted the Joint Obligations provision, in light of the policy’s criminal acts exclusion, as “expressly im-pos[ing] joint liability for the criminal acts of an insured; that is, such conduct precludes coverage of any other insured under the policy.” Id. at 1155. The court then held that Allstate did not owe Mrs. Cook a duty to defend because there was no potential for coverage: “Because Carmelita Cook’s alleged liability in the underlying Castro lawsuit arose out of the criminal and/or intentional acts of Ariel Cook — an “Insured Person” under the Policy — the court determines the Policy did not provide coverage as a matter of law.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff concedes that Mr. Vare-la’s conduct is excluded from coverage under the Policy by virtue of the Sexual Molestation Exclusion and the Intentional or Criminal Acts Exclusion. In that the plain language of the Joint Obligations provision imputes Mr. Varela’s conduct to Mrs. Varela, Mrs. Varela is also barred from coverage under the Policy on account of these exclusions.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court finds as a matter of law that Defendant had no duty to defend, and thus has no duty to indemnify, Nadine Varela. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [17] and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [21].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks costs of suit and attorneys’ fees.
. The facts relevant to this action are undisputed and are set forth in the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”).
. Plaintiff, who was bom on February 22, 1988, was then between the age 8 and 10 years old.
. § 533 states: “An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s agents or others." Cal. Ins.Code § 533 (West 1993).
. Notably, the cases cited above that found negligent supervision to be an "occurrence” did not cite Maples or Longden.
. During the relevant period, the Gilberts were insured under two successive homeowner's insurance policies. The first policy excluded coverage for "[bjodily injury or property damage intentionally caused by an insured person.”
Gilbert,