Opinion by
William Farley, III, appeals a Delaware County Common Pleas Court order granting summary judgment in favor of Upper Darby Township. The common pleas court concluded that the township was immune from suit under the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (Recreation Act). 1 We affirm.
Farley, a seven-year-old, was injured when he fell from a sliding board at Naylors Run Park. The park is owned and maintained by the township. Farley filed a trespass action against the township. In its answer and new matter, the township asserted immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 2 and, in its amended new matter, immunity under the Recreation Act. The township moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Recreation Act.
Our scope of review of a common pleas court order granting summary judgment is limited to determining
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whether an error of law was committed or the court abused its discretion.
Nordmann v. Commonwealth,
The township contends that, regardless of whether it is an “owner of land” under Section 3 of the Recreation Act, 3 it is immune from suit in light of Section 8542(a) (1) of the Judicial Code (Code). 4 We agree.
This case is controlled by our Supreme Courts reasoning, as articulated by Justice McDermott, in
Department of Environmental Resources v. Auresto,
That Court also granted the Commonwealth immunity under the immunity provisions contained in the Judicial Code. Section §8522(a) of the Code 6 provides, in pertinent part, that the Commonwealths immunity 7 is *538 waived only “where the damages would be recoverable under the common law ... if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.” (Emphasis added.) Based on Section 8522 (a), the Supreme Court in Auresto reasoned:
[WJhile the Commonwealth as an owner of land may not have been contemplated at the time the Recreation Act was passed, it is obvious that at the time the Sovereign Immunity Act was passed the Commonwealths exposure to suit was intended to be the same as a private citizen. Consequently, when the two Acts are read in pari materia the conclusion is inescapable that since a private citizen would have been protected from the present suit so must the Commonwealth.
Id.
at 78,
The township claims immunity based on Section 8542(a)(1) of the Code. This section provides, in pertinent part, that immunity is waived only where “[t]he damages would be recoverable under common law . . . if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity). . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Courts analysis in Auresto, respecting Section 8522(a) of the Code, applies to this parallel provision. We, therefore, hold that the township is immune from suit.
The common pleas court decision is affirmed.
Order
The Delaware County Common Pleas Court order, No. 81-02334 dated July 23, 1984, is affirmed.
*539 Order
Now, December 19, 1986, having previously granted reconsideration, we hereby reaffirm our prior opinion and Order filed September 17, 1986.
Notes
Act of February 2, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1860, as amended, 68 P.S. §§477-1—477-8.
Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, as amended, formerly 53 P.S. §5311.101—5311.803, repealed by the Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693. The subject matter is now covered by Sections 8541-64 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. §8541-64.
68 P.S. §477-3.
42 Pa. C. S. §8542(a)(l).
In Auresto, the Commonwealth filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.
42 Pa. C. S. §8522(a).
Sovereign immunity was reaffirmed by 1 Pa. C. S. §2310 as a bar to actions against the Commonwealth except as specifically waived by the General Assembly.
