*1 July No. 20339. [Crim. 1980.] R.,
In rе JOE a Person Coming Under Juvenile Court Law. FARE, Officer, etc., KENNETH as F. Chief Probation Acting Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.,
JOE Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel Court, Harter,
William T. under appointment by Supreme *5 S. Hanson for Defendant and Roger Appellant. General, Jack R.
Evelle J. and Younger George Deukmejian, Attorneys General, Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorneys Winkler and Robert H. General, Jr., Moore, Edward T. Fogel, S. Clark Assistant Attorney Frederick, Weisman, Slater Dep- William R. R. Hahn and Carol Gary General, and Respondent. for Plaintiff uty Attorneys Hicks, Assistant Capizzi, Michael R. (Orange), Cecil District Attorney Sears, D. Lowell District Attorney, District Oretta D. Attorney, Deputy Meehan, Dis- Jensen, (Alameda), Assistant John J. District Attorney Baldwin, as Attorney, M. District Deputy trict and William Attorney, Plaintiff and Respondent. Amici Curiae on behalf of Opinion minor, R., a Joe filed against court
NEWMAN, petition J. A juvenile (Pen. Code, 211) a murder (Pen. and with two robberies him charged § the court Code, 602.) hearing, After Code, 187). (See & Inst. Welf. § § true, сourt, found all him a ward of the and commit- charges declared ted him Authority. to the California Youth
He the murder appeals, contending allegation support- evidence, ed and the court denied his by motion wrongly (a) certain evidence as the fruit of two search- suppress physical illegal es, searches, (b) threats, and a confession as tainted those coerced his Miranda and in rights.1 obtained violation 1, 1976, as working night On June Renard was Murray manager in the Taco Bell food stand at 60th and Crenshaw Los About Angeles. male, 20 minutes after the minor and another Michael midnight young the service window. As Ryles, approached they approached, Murray saw each at pistol Ryles him. ordered him to take pointing money from the cash and it in a Taco register pair Bell took put bag. ap- denominations, $140 in various proximately large number of including bills, $50 one dollar and about change rolls. also wrapped Murray was forced to surrender cash on his person. mother,
The robbers fled in the car of the parked minor’s nearby. While saw Anderson on a bus driving they Wayne sitting bench Vermont, corner of rob Century they decided to him. They parked the car and him at about approached past 45 minutes midnight. then, asked Ryles Anderson questions at Ander- pointing head, son’s it announced was a robbery. ordered walk
Ryles Anderson to behind sta- nearby buildings—a gas walked, tion and a weight-control center. Ryles As they repeatedly *6 asked for and money; Anderson said he had no Both robbers money. made threats on his life. On direct he examination testified that the mi- said, nor “If you don’t do what he I’ll kill you” and “If don’t says you what do he kill says cross-examination, however, he’ll On you.” Ander- (thе son agreed minor) that the minor never said he would do anything to Anderson. saw Anderson never the minor display gun.
The group stopped behind the and buildings, Ryles ordered Anderson his coat and watch give to the minor. Anderson and complied repeat- attempts 1The by contending minor to raise the murder issue that his Penal Code acquittal section 1118 People’s improperly motion for close case was de recently juvenile nied. Penal Code section 1118 inapplicable proceedings was held (In Joseph re Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 681]). Pending H. 631-632 [159 clarification, legislative insufficiency evidentiary simply by appealing raised must be sustaining allegations. the order petition’s an and alley ed he had no with his toward money. Ryles gestured gun said, for the there.” At that moment Anderson grabbed “Let’s back go 10 seconds. and the two for about gun, struggled with a hit on the back of the head Anderson was During struggle He did not see who to be shaken loose. fist. The blow caused glasses other person hit him knew that it was not and that the only but Ryles minor, who was in back of Anderson. present was and, so, he did saw the mi- Anderson as got possession Ryles’ gun man; nor “Shoot him he’s Ryles got my gun.” running away. yelled, twice, after hit in being Anderson then shot within five seconds Ryles the back of the head. died from the wounds. Ryles There, than half a
The minor ran 101st Street. outside a house less individuals he knew block from the scene of the he met three shooting, one, Demetrius shot. He also told Ryles and told each that had been drive did not want to that he had a in his mother’s car and Hayes, gun hide the for him.2 with the in He asked Demetrius to gun car it. gun individuals, Enos were Hayes, questioned Johnie and Stigall other They repeated after their conversation with the minor. by рolice shortly what he had told them.
The minor at Demetrius’s house until about 5 o’clock in the stayed Demetrius hid his own car at about 6:30. morning. After the Anderson recounted the incident to the shooting, Based described one robber as a dark beanie. on information wearing mug-photo lineup pre- obtained from Enos Stigall Hayes, able to both the minor and pared; identify Ryles. Anderson was At about 8 a.m. five officers went to the minor’s home. did not They believe he would be armed have an arrest warrant and had reason to searched the house and then asked his mother if and dangerous. They said, ahead, do it could search further. She “Go they you’ll anyway.” *7 that she could refuse to consent to the search After an officer explained The was found on a closet shelf in the she a consent form. beanie signed change Inside it wаs a Taco Bell loose bag containing minor’s bedroom. coins. and rolls of talking the one used about here was gun minor was is that the 2The inference robbery. Anderson robbery not in the Bell but
the Taco At about 10 a.m. arrested at his school. police They the minor high (in $115 $58 bills) recovered from his his pocket and dollar from pants shirt At the station he waived pocket. responded Miranda rights with questions statements and exculpatory interrogating denials. The officer loudly accused him of evidence him lying produced against beanie, —including and coins. He then confessed to bag, participa- robberies, homicide, tion in the two but not the and said his was in that, Demetrius’ car. He now claims before he asked that confessing, (The the interrogation be terminated. unclear record on issue below.) discussed
That afternoon went рolice to Demetrius’ house to search for the gun. Demetrius, old, was at The years school. asked his mother for to search his permission car. She consented but could not find the keys. broke, window, His brother entered, then a car and removed the back seats. Police entered and discovered the gun.
After the arrest the Taco Bell was shown a manager, Murray, lineup of 12 from mug photos which he identified the minor and as the Ryles He robbers. his thought identification was made on the day following the arrest.
Murder?
The murder allegation
III) was based
(Paragraph
on the
premise
the minor is liable for the death of his accomplice, Ryles, at the hands
victim, Anderson,
of the robbery
under the doctrine pronounced in Peo
v.
ple
442,
Washington a or committing attempting when he kills while of first murder degree the felon or actually perpetrated is confined to homicide felony, a mur- (62 783.) therefore reversed This court p. Cal.2d accomplice. defendant’s in which robbery station gas der conviction from arising when The occurred killing owner. was killed the station accomplice pistol. brandishing the owner’s office entered accomplice ac- wounding mortally weapon immediately, fired his own owner *8 office, the was shot Defendant, had remained outside who complice. receipts. with the robbery while on foot escaping wounded in such situations on grounds Washington rejected felony-murder that, or attempted did not occur in the perpetration since the killing on that malice could not be ascribed of a perpetration felony, necessary (Id., 781.) concluded that The court felon. at p. basis to the surviving deaths caused by or accidental the purpose deterring negligent rule’s rule to committed killings the extending felons would not be served by resist, extension of victim may Since any robbery their victims. by reasoned, situations, the court would rule such the felony-murder had responded whose victims chance by those robbers punish arbitrarily lethally.3 when, however, be a murderer cautioned, that one may
Washington life, does an intention- he or his accomplice with conscious disregard is death, accomplish- the actual killing even when to cause al act likely observed, Thus, defendants {Id., at p. 782.) the court ed another. by in the cross- killed anyone murderers of battles bemay who initiate gun Washington implicitly conviction Yet defendant’s reversing fire. by is not sufficient robbery armed an concluded that mere participation vicarious, victim resists when the or direct liability, to invoke murder and kills.4 Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d supra, was confirmed
That view subsequently the There, from escaping and his were accomplice 690. while defendant office, defendant shot and and loan of a attempted robbery savings fled, fired and the two a second officer killed Police Officer Davis. As At defendant’s trial for the accom- the accomplice. wounded mortally that defendant could be found was instructed murder the plice’s jury result of the armed was a proximate if the death accomplice’s guilty with- reversed, the instruction had holding This court robbery. had been accomplice whether the the the crucial issue jury drawn from had fired on because defendant prevent robbery killed simply or doctrine felony-murder argument rejected majority Washington 3The rule nor common-law rationale “Neither prevent robberies. was intended to com for a homicide penalty An additional contention.... supports Code this the Penal (Ibid.) best.” haphazardly at robbery victim would deter mitted Burke, guilty of murder when a vic always 4Dissenting, J. contended that a felon Malice, argued, is established he response to the crime. tim or his defender kills in 785-791.) (Id., pp. dangerous situation it creates. felony itself and
505 “When to be follows: rule stated as The was Davis. correct Officer life, inten- for disregard with a conscious accomplice, or his defendant death, or a to and his victim that is cause an act likely commits tionally act, is such the defendant to response kills in reasonable officer attributable, case, not merely a is killing In such of murder. guilty the intentional act but to felony, a to the commission defen- of of disregard with conscious his committed dant or accomplice for (P. 704, added.) italics ...” life.
Thus Gilbert held that resistance the rob- clearly provoked only by is for of itself no basis a malice for bery finding implied necessary Gilbert, in murder as was Washington, liability. Implicit assump- tion act on which that life-threatening liability is premised must be and be something underlying itself must a beyond felony cause proximate of death.
In Taylor Court v. Superior Cal.3d 578 131], P.2d this court to determine what again sought dangerous would conduct be to impose Washington-Gilbert murder sufficient li- There ability. defendant was with murder after of charged one his was accomplices killed a liquor store robbery. Preliminary hearing Daniels, evidence indicated that the Smith and accomplices, entered the (owned store West) by Mr. and Mrs. for purposes armed robbery while defendant waited outside in a car. Daniels told West getaway Mr. to “put the in the money and then ordered him to bag” lie on the floor or “we’ll have an execution here.” He “chattered insanely,” repeatedly to Smith’s and referring to gun threatening “blow head [Mr. West’s] off” if West moved. Smith seemed “apprehensive” acted if as “he was waiting something big happen.” While Daniels was forcing West, Mr. West to the floor Mrs. ladder, on a standing nearby drew a pistol and fired fatal shots at Smith. Mr. West seized also a shot at Smith. At the same time were seen from sparks Smith’s gun, pointed direction; in Mrs. West’s and a bullet later was from dislodged the wall behind where Mrs. West been standing. had
In an oрinion joined by Chief Justice and Justices McComb Wright Sullivan, Justice Burke affirmed denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. The opinion noted that the crucial test under Washington is conduct “whether the a defendant or accomplices sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance support finding implied (Id., 583.) malice....” It conceded that resistance p. provoked solely robbery impose Washington-Gilbert insufficient murder li ruled, however, a trier of fact could find ability. majority *10 execution, sufficient conduct” in the robbers’ threats of “provocative their floor), coercive to Mr. West him to lie on the approach (forcing and their and nervous manner that the victims apprehensive suggested (P. were in 584.) circumstances the trier great danger. Under those of fact could conclude that Daniels and Smith had “initiated” a reasonably battle, (Ibid.)5 gun Mrs. West did fire though first.
In Tobriner) dissents Justice Peters vigorous Justice and (joined by Justice Mosk that argued orders to hand over under threats of property (See Code, violence are 211, 211a, inherent in armed Pen. robbery. §§ 213.) By allowing a of malice because the finding implied rob- merely bers voiced the actually conditional threats in the already implicit crime, dissenters, said the underlying the had created Taylor majority an arbitrary liability had obliterated the “additional conduct” limi- tation established in Washington Gilbert. 585-592 (Pp. opn. [dis. Peters, Mosk, 592-594 J.], opn. J.].)6 [dis.
Here the
People argue
the minor’s conduct in the Anderson rob-
bery was as “provocative of lethal resistance” as that found sufficient
for murder
in
in
liability
Taylor. They
(1)
on
rely
particular
his
part
moving Anderson
from relative
away
at the
safety
bus
into
lighted
stop
the
(2)
shadows of nеarby
his
buildings,
repeated threats and references
recently
Washington-Gilbert
liability
5This court held more
murder
cannot be
imposed
“provocative
for
accomplice
People
the
conduct” of the
who was killed.
v. An-
475,
that,
Cal.Rptr.
tick
First, we blow to Anderson’s the minor’s the back of head dur- reject as a basis of his death. ing struggle responsibility Ryles’ feared Anderson testified he had for his life from moment the rob- He bers and announced their intention. decided to displayed fight *11 when, him, for the and after weapon Ryles robbing shoot Ryles suggest- ed move from shadows even they building alley to an darker. It was then, declared, Anderson that he knew be he would “executed” unless he for the stated fought He that when he for the gun. grabbed pistol he Indeed, it. anticipated to use the minor’s having though subsequent blow Anderson not dislodged said it was severe glasses, enough fоr to him “notice it.”
That “rabbit act taken in punch” certainly malicious conscious life, for disregard since it could have allowed foreseeably to Ryles Anderson, and prevail shoot or at least caused the to ac- discharge However, fails cidentally. it to meet requirement second Washington-Gilbert-Pizano murder it did since liability provoke Anderson’s lethal resistance and was not the cause of proximate Ryles’ Court, (See Pizano v. 131; death. Cal.3d at Superior supra, 21 Tay- p. Court, lor v. 583.) 3 Cal.3d at Superior supra, p. on In
For their re view Tyrone B. contrary rely heavily (1976) 58 884 People Velas- Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. v. [130 245] (1975) 53 quez 547 Both Cal.App.3d are distin- 11]. defendant, Each initiated guishable. involved a assault deadly part which lethal victim. (Tyrone predictably produced resistance from B., supra, at p. 890 on [unprovoked knife assаult robbery victim]; Velasquez, supra, p. deadly initiated battle resist- [defendant ing arrest].) Neither opinion suggests ineffectual blows struck after the victim has initiated a battle are a murder basis for liability. whether,
We thus must decide to commencement of the prior struggle Anderson, between Ryles the minor committed intentional and ma- acts, licious in addition to the underlying robbery, proximately caused Ryles’ death. We conclude he did not. Before struggle began he had done no more participate than in an armed His actively robbery. repeated admonitions to do what “he’ll Ryles said or kill you” were di-
rected toward safe completion underlying felony. warnings explicitly and commands were conditional and aimed at An- obtaining he said or did Nothing suggested derson’s Anderson was property. he or be killed whether not.7 The going coоperated to minor simply dangerous voiced threats inherent in the That alone already felony. finding Washington-Gilbert is insufficient for a murder even when it lethal helped response. victim’s provoke in moving did the Anderson the bus participation Nor minor’s from shadows, than into the a distance of less constitute life- stop yards, conduct in addition to the All evidence underlying felony. threatening that this movement was effected the risk solely indicates first lessen Robbers become lia- that the would be observed. do not robbery strictly ble for a their victim because encounter him at a killing by simply they therefore move him dis- spot purposes too visible their a small tance their To murder complete robbery in order assess safely. this the for- depend arbitrarily on basis would cause on liability guilt *12 ’ in which the robbery tuitous circumstances occurs.8 We that desire to move Anderson further into isola- recognize Ryles’ tion, occurred, that after the had had might suggest Ryles robbery However, the unconditional intent to kill. no statements or conduct of It minor indicated assent to that decision. therefore does form ba- sis for the minor’s for death. liability Ryles’ Taylor, with There the ma- supra.
Our conclusion can be reconciled conduct provocative inhering stated that jority correctly beyond necessary Washington-Gilbert for murder robbery liability. an armed there would support It the facts particular proved concluded demeanor suggested conduct because robbers’ of additional finding violence. The record gratuitous and a instability propensity peculiar kill to prepared here no similar indication that minor yields We with the demands. complied not Andersоn robbers’ whether or III the complaint Paragraph hold that the allegations therefore be sustained. cannot the con entire situation placed in context of the are 7Even if the minor’s statements which killing this time Ryles unconditional had threatened no
clusion is the same. conduct, agreed. minor, have be deemed to own or could by his remarks felony would to” “in addition holding here was conduct 8A movement sufficiently nondangerous to insulate robberies are imply a rule that some armed The not. respond, others are lethally while when liability victims robbers from Gilbert apparent. a doctrine seems anomaly of such Bag Seizure Taco Bell With Coins The trial court denied the minor’s motion suppress the Taco Bell with coins that bag police found in the beanie on the closet shelf. He contends that seizure illegal (1) of the items invalidated their admissi- bility him on the against Taco Bell made his robbery charge, confession to both robberies inadmissible because confrontation with the (See items was used to induce his confession. v. Johnson 541, 401, Cal.2d 450 P.2d 43 A.L.R.3d 366].)
The court ruled that the seizure without warrant was validated mother’s consent to the search of the house. He contends the evi dence required a that her finding consent was coerced fear and therefore ineffective.
She testified that five or six officers entered the house unannounced
with drawn
search,
conducted a
guns,
and asked her to
the written
sign
consent
after their
only
search was
complete. She stated she
virtually
officer,
because she
signed
however,
was afraid. An
testified that he was
one of five
minor,
who went to the house to arrest the
whom
be-
they
lieved to bе armed and dangerous. Two went to the rear
prevent
an
escape.
door;
answered;
others knocked on the front
the mother
they
entered,
announced their purpose,
and went
through
house
looking for the minor.
obtained her written
They
consent
after ex-
only
*13
her
plaining
right
to refuse and before searching for evidence.
that
Accepting
officer’s
the trial court
testimony,
found the
properly
consent to be
(1977)
v.
voluntary.
James
19 Cal.3d
(People
99 [137
447,
Cal.Rptr.
By brief filed supplemental after we mi granted hearing, nor’s for the first attorney time argues mother’s consent was (See vitiated by of the illegality police Burrows entry. v. Superior (1974) 238, Court 166, 13 Cal.3d 251 Cal.Rptr. 529 P.2d [118 590] is immediately following illegal entry voluntary].) Illegal [consent is ity claimed on two grounds.
The first 844, is noncompliance with Penal Code per- section which mits an officer to make a forced for an arrest “after entry only having demanded admittance and for which admittance explained purpose is desired.” The statute requires officers to themselves entering identify (Greven (1969) 287, as such. v. Court 71 Cal.2d 291-293 Superior [78 510 504, went two of the five who Only 455 P.2d
Cal.Rptr. 432].) in have been the ones who house here were uniform. They might door; entered were in plain watched the back in that case ones who said, “We’re clothes. When the answered door an officer mother son, The Joe” or “We’re for Joe.” officers looking your here to arrest unannounced, then entered. the mother testified entered Though they she first saw them that were of- any they she did not claim doubt when thus seems requirement ficers. The statute’s self-identification satisfied. The of the lack of an ground illegality entry other asserted (1976) 16 263 Cal.Rptr. arrest warrant. v. Cal.3d Ramey [127 (filed 629, three to the 545 P.2d more than months events prior 1333] here in held a warrantless arrest in defendant’s home is question) in the absence circumstances. Such circumstances illegal exigent where fresh pursuit have been found the arrest was continuous {Peo (1979) 800, 825, 808-811 592 ple Cal.Rptr. v. Escudero 23 Cal.3d [153 (one-hour P.2d pursuit)), suspect or the armed and probably 312] 142, 168-169 escape v. Frierson 25 Cal.3d likely (People [158 281, 599 Cal.Rptr. major early P.2d or 587]), emergency morning (Cleaver hours taxed v. Court severely police facilities Superior 297, 24 984]). Cal.3d 306-307 594 P.2d he was first about the case at investigating officer said called where he an spent a.m. his home. He to the scene of the killing, went hour to an hour and a returned to the station interviewed half. He with the seven nine The last interview was possible robbery witnesses. Anderson, victim, arrived at the at least an hour. The took him. minor’s home about to arrest a.m. establish insufficient to appears exigent evidence alone
Though a.m., we do not know a warrantless arrest at circumstances justifying if been made illegality have might what additional showing exigency trial for attack had been in the court as a ground asserted entry *14 we search. Accordingly, of the consent the validity the mother’s ing for reversal on appeal. as basis illegality do now consider the claimed not 927, (1979) Cal.Rptr. 934 Cal.App.3d Kizzee 94 v. (P eople [156 cited.) cases 784], did au that his consent
The minor contends mother’s further pennies, empty of Bell and rolls of bag thorize the seizure the Taco she inside the He concedes that and loose roll-wrapper, change bag. with the he shared a youn- could consent to search of bedroom properly
511
closet, which
entered without
police
opening any
and of the
brother
ger
395,
(See
(1979) 24
404
Cal.Rptr.
In re Scott K.
Cal.3d
door.
[155
(1974)
671,
Should Scott K. be applied 1, 409, 10 559 P.2d Cal.Rptr. v. Kaanehe 19 Cal.3d [136 new consti as follows: “Whether a decision 1028], judicial establishing retroactive effect is given customarily tutional standards is to be ‘(a) determined factors: the to be by following purpose weighing standards, (b) served the new the extent of reliance law enforce by standards, (c) ment authorities on the old the effect on of retroactive of the new standards.’ administration of justice application (St 293, 1199, (1967) 388 297 L.Ed.2d v. Denno U.S. [18 ovall 1203, accord, 404, In re 3 Cal.3d 1967]; S.Ct. Johnson 569, ‘It is clear that the 841].) 475 P.2d also factors reliance and burden on the administration of are of justice significant relevance is a close one question when after only retroactivity Johnson, of the new rule is considered.’ re 3 Cal.3d purpose supra, {In 404, 410.) Decisions have been made retroactive generally fully only where the vindicated is one which is essential to the right integrity hand, fact-finding process. On other is not custom retroactivity when the interest to be vindicated is one which is arily required merely Johnson, (In collateral to a fair determination of or innocence. re guilt therein.) 410-413 and Cal.3d cases cited Burrows Su supra, [v. Court, 13 Cal.3d falls within the latter perior clearly supra, 238] Exclusion is not to ensure the category. necessary reliability and the at trial. No evidence fact-finding process compulsion present seized is As the rule entirely exclusionary trustworthy. purpose of in those law illegal circumstances is to deter conduct enforcement exclusion of evidence seized to the of a officials, prior pronouncement (Italics (Id.)” decision does not further with that decision. compliance *15 added; (1965) omitted.) Cal.3d 368 Cal. fn. See too In re 62 Lopez [42
512 188, Court 100 380]; P.2d v. Cal. Rptr. Superior (Harris) 398 People 20, 1980).) den. Feb. Cal.Rptr. (hg. 386 App.3d [160 880] that, even K. a rule if apply Those here. Scott announced principles new, not its far from clear. The rule’s had before announcement been but to process aim was not to de- protect integrity factfinding ter invasion of minors’ property privacy rights. Accordingly, rule does apply not retroactively. From Gun Demetrius’ Car
Seizure.of suppress The of the court’s of his motion to complains minor denial police searching Hayes, seized while the car Demetrius a minor, it with the consent of Demetrius’ mother. She did not was say car, Demetrius’ did not ask. The court denied suppres- sion, her consent In Scott K.'s nonretroactivi- light effective. holding not denial need be disturbed. ty
Admissibility of Confession The officer testified the substance the minor’s con- investigating fession to and a participation testimony tape the robberies. That sup- recorded the confession were admitted after denial of a motion to minor, charge, Thereafter in an effort to refute murder press. testified to in the participation robberies. introduction of a confession constitutes reversible er
Improper (1979) 691, 684, ror. Braeseke 25 Cal.3d 704 Cal.Rptr. v. (People [159 cited.) 602 P.2d and cases General re 384], mistakenly Attorney 221, (1977) Cal.Rptr. lies on v. 19 Cal.3d Enriquez [137 171, be deemed harmless 261], may 561 P.2d for a rule that error admission, an not con a reasonable doubt. involved beyond Enriquez fession, clear in The distinction is made and thus is controlling. 163, (1977) 20 Cal.3d v. People McClary 620], P.2d the confession. excluding advanced for
Three are grounds with the seized made in to confrontation response One is that it was that ground as legal we the seizure regard and coins. Since cap, bag, are that the confession The other grounds need not be considered. the interro threats, request elicited after coerced by cease. gation
The content the officers’ of of the minor was interrogation presented (1) in three the ways: tape which the court by playing recording, deemed an officer’s and largely unintelligible, by testimony, counsel’s unsworn statements as to own
The continued: argument Counsel, is “The Let me ask because this one in you, point Court: just was not able to understand. What is the the conversation that I just said, next either after Joe ‘That’s all I thing by party that said indicate that? want tell Do either of notes you’? your Well, the next in notes is that my one of thing “[Defense Counsel]: Joe, ‘Joe, you might said to there’s not know something officers it, I law,’ and then him his take gave interpretation, about the last I have in rule. That’s the notes. felony-murder thing my Perhaps, else. Counsel has something I did hear that. I assumеd were they some reference to
“The Court: rule, is understanding but it your about the talking felony-murder next that occurred after? thing that’s the very honest, be I don’t have a recollection specific To “[Defense Counsel]: was, I think it and it of it it’s the next I see in notes. thing my ” sense, . . . happened would make in terms of what there. different version: What “The Court: prosecutor gave slightly statement ‘That’s do to make with to Joe’s regard comments have you all I want to tell you’? all, was his statement. The First of I don’t think that
“[Prosecutor]: indicate, was, think, ‘That’s all I got *18 (1978) 595, v. 21 tary.” Jimenez Cal.3d 611 (People Cal.Rptr. [147 172, 580 P.2d 672].) The confession here was not invalidated “ex- press implied or v. promises leniency” (People McClary, 20 supra, 218, 228) Cal.3d or .of by “deception.. type reasonably likely pro- to (in 764, cure an (1974) untrue statement” re 10 Walker Cal.3d 111 177, Cal.Rptr. 518 1129]).9 P.2d The court had to no rule duty [112 loud, aggressive accusations of to lying amounted coercive threats. noted, As the the minor was judge then 18 nearly years old.
A more question is raised the that the perplexing interroga- claim was tion continued after illegally defendant asked its termination. used, On that issue the court ruled: “I do not find the language said, when defendant ‘That’s all I have to or ‘That’s all I want got say,’ to as say,’ his self-incrimination considered in asserting privilege against context, its it point the conversation in which occurred and what followed afterwards.”
If at
time the minor indicated in any manner that he
any
did not
further,
wish to talk
him;
the police were
to cease
required
questioning
and any admission or confession obtained from further
interrogation
(Miranda
would have been
(1966)
inadmissible.
v. Arizona
384 U.S.
436,
694, 722-724,
473-474
1602,
L.Ed.2d
86 S.Ct.
10 A.L.R.3d
[16
974];
v. Superior
(1975)
406,
Court
People
13 Cal.3d
410
(Keithley)
617,
Cal.Rptr.
585].)
530 P.2d
A
halt
desire to
the interrogation
[118
(See
be indicated
mаy
in a variety
ways.
(1978)
v.
People
Pettingill
231,
861,
21 Cal.3d
238-241
Cal.Rptr.
circumstances he was the defendant if asking Spinale probably Lieutenant ing, was little else there felt that the lieutenant interview as to end the ready (P. the statement.” the defendant took how and that to talk about 297.) defen- conclusion the court’s support
Here record seems variance in is no material There the interview. seek to halt dant did not defense counsel According used. the words each version of side’s the officer con- after said, immediately I to say” “That’s all have minor asked, the officer Also at that point him with adverse evidence. fronted I us?”; “That’s all replied, and defendant to tell “Is that all want you said, “That’s defendant to the prosecutor tell According want to you.” *19 “paraded veracity his the challenged I to after officer say” all got It was denials.” his various had disputed of that things to him a series that inference prosecutor’s the the endorse not unreasonable for court with it. was, and I’ll stick my story, That’s defendant was saying what Jimenez, 21 before v. People supra, was made ruling The court’s of 595, 608-609, (1) the has burden prosecution held that Cal.3d doubt, (2) a it reasonable of a confession beyond voluntariness proving correct standard in applied be trial courts cannot presumed of volun (3) prior rulings we should uphold rulings, prJimenez a result more probability if there is no reasonable tariness only been reached had the correct stan have favorable to defendant would and it disputed, the material facts are hardly dard been Here applied.10 for of vol requirement proof probable not that application seems would have the result. changed reasonable doubt untariness beyond court is minor to be a ward of juvenile declaring The order In other murder. allegations charging reversed as it sustains insofar the minor to the Youth committing The order it is affirmed. respects reversed, is for further proceedings and the case remanded Authority with this opinion. consistent Mosk, J., J., Tobriner, J., concurred.
Bird, C.
arising
promises
leniency. The same
from
with involuntariness
10Jimenez dealt
Miranda
in violation of
was obtained
questions whether
confession
principles apply to
Cal.Rptr.
13
Cal.App.3d
fn.
(See
v.
rights.
[153
Ramirez
789].)
as it
insofar
absolves
CLARK,
majority opinion
J.
I dissentfrom
I
accomplice.
for the murder
defendant of vicarious responsibility
reaffirm, while
retroac
insofar as the majority
denying
further dissent
to,
re
K.
unfortunate decision
In
Scott
tive effect
this court’s
671, 595 P.2d
105],
Anderson disarmed Ryles him, no threat derson believed defendant was defendant would assistance, well have not shot Ryles come Anderson Ryles’ might but rather held him at until the arrived. How- simply gunpoint ever, defendant had come to assistance seconds before when An- Ryles’ Therefore, derson was him for the when struggling with pistol. Ryles defendant, man; him, shouted to “Shoot he’s Anderson got my gun,” *20 (Ander- could conclude defendant would do so and that he reasonably son) had to shoot to himself the two protect from assailants.2 Ryles
Admittedly, Anderson did not that he testify engaged the analysis However, he suggested. was to required react to a com- instantaneously reject the during minor’s blow to the back of struggle Anderson’s head the 1‘[W]e as a of responsibility Ryles’ basis his for death. Anderson testified he had feared for his life from the moment gun the robbers a displayed and announced their intention. He fight when, him, decided to weapon Ryles for the robbing Ryles shoot sug after gested they then, building move from alley the shadows an to even darker. It was declared, Anderson fought that he knew he would be ‘executed’ he gun. unless for the He grabbed Indeed, stated that when he pistol for the he anticipated having to it. use though subsequent the dislodged minor’s glasses, blow his Anderson said it was not se enough vere for him to ‘notice it.’ That punch’ certainly ‘rabbit a malicious act [U] life, disregard taken in conscious for foreseeably since it could Ryles have allowed to Anderson, prevail and shoot discharge or at least caused accidentally. the to Hоw ever, it fails meet requirement Washington-Gilbert-Pizano the second of murder liability it provoke since did not proximate Anderson’s lethal resistance and was not the Ryles’ (Ante, cause of 507-508.) death.” pp. 2Although personally pistol defendant had used robbing the fast food stand min earlier, Nevertheless, utes he did not weapon during brandish a robbery. the Anderson that, armed, reasonably Anderson could conclude unless Ryles defendant were would him, man; him, not have shouted got gun.” he’s my “Shoot was a significant conduct malicious which defendant’s situation of
plex consciously signifi- assessed not have may That Anderson element. not done so does recall having or may defendant’s conduct cance of In situations of shooting Ryles. role in his did not a crucial play mean it recall of victim’s exclusively we focus on this should not of sort Rather, wе malicious conduct. to the defendant’s subjective response man, opportunity given a reasonable consider whether should also con- of the defendant’s the significance mind to assess presence this it. duct, Applying resistance by been lethal provoked would have the mur- for responsible was vicariously defendant I conclude standard der of his accomplice. com- court and of the juvenile defendant ward orders declaring affirmed without should be Authority the Youth him to
mitting modification.
Richardson, J., concurred. in that J., part the reasons MANUEL, expressed Dissenting—For is re- that the defendant concluding of Justice Clark opinion dissenting from dissent respectfully I accomplice, murder of his sponsible court. juvenile this reversing judgment court judgment their notes recollections from listening to the The officer’s tape. testimony pеrtinent was to the present threats; claim only respect with coercive did allegedly it the touch issue whether of the minor asked for termination the interview. At the outset the interview the minor received adequate Miranda warnings. The officer the testified: For first 30 or 40 the minutes minor denied guilt gave answers. He then was exculpatory accused loudly, with terse emphatically, “bullshit”) language (e.g., of lying about his whereabouts during previous hours and how he had acquired the found in his currency possession. Next he was told about the cap, bag, and coins found in his home. After that he confessed. on Subsequently suppress, oral the motion to defense argument counsel stated: “Now, I recognize reflects the tape police officer giving That, however, this man his Miranda rights. does not end the young discussion.... “At point, confession, one during officers, to the police Joe says ‘That’s Iall have to And I say.’ believe this is after the at which point lorio, Sergeant Joe, who was person ran primarily interrogating down, will, if the Court found, ‘parade horribles’ had they tending to show that that man was involved in a young homicide. After that, the question was—let me see if I can it from be- get my notes. I lieve that the was ‘Is that all question want to tell And you us?’ Joe’s I response ‘that’s all want to tell you.’ “Now, interview', that is before second we portion to which referred, have in which he an indication that he would talk gave to the police officers and did give facts that him in the inculpated homi- cide and in the robberies.”
Notes
he I as notes my statement made different, of as- and that was in the context which is a little bit to say,’ think, challenged had been by I denials. He previous his serting, statements. veracity with to the respect previous lorio Sergeant that had disput- him a series of things had paraded lorio Investigator denials. ed his various issue, point, at this I think Let me it. pinpoint just “The Court: officers police minor—explaining is the the minor—not does issue I the factual think that’s to cease? interrogation that he wants that statement. how construe you point squarely construe Well, I the Court should think way “[Prosecutor]: accusations, what Iorio’s of Sergeant is that the face statement all truth; ‘that’s lie, reasserting he was just not the was a he was saying with it.’” to stick going I’m story. ‘that’s namely, my I to say;’ have got The facts stated in the officer’s and the testimony attorneys’ argu- ments offer no basis for setting aside the that the confession was finding advice or it voluntary. exhortation that would be “[M]ere better for the accused to tell the truth when either unaccompanied threat or a promise does not render a confession subsequent involun-