Fannie Mae v 133 Mgt., LLC
2015 NY Slip Op 01780 [126 AD3d 670]
Appellate Division, Second Department
March 4, 2015
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Mark A. Slama and Samuel M. Mizrahi of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants 133 Management, LLC, and Yuda J. Furth appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Graham, J.), dated December 21, 2012, as granted the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and to strike their answer.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the contention of the defendants 133 Management, LLC, and Yuda J. Furth (hereinafter together the Management defendants), the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against them and to strike their answer. The plaintiff established, prima facie, that, as set forth in the provisions of the mortgage, it was not required to give the Management defendants notice of their default or the plaintiff‘s intent to accelerate the debt (see Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone, 45 AD3d 958 [2007]; Long Is. Sav. Bank of Centereach, F.S.B. v Denkensohn, 222 AD2d 659 [1995]). Moreover, the plaintiff‘s commencement of the action and filing of a notice of pendency constituted a valid election to accelerate the maturity of the debt (see Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone, 45 AD3d at 958). In opposition, the Management defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Management defendants’ remaining contentions are either academic or without merit. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.