History
  • No items yet
midpage
694 F. App'x 561
9th Cir.
2017

Winnie B. FANG, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-17227

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 14, 2017 * San Francisco, California Filed July 24, 2017

561

Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,** District Judge.

law indicating that, under these facts, Officer Willette violated the law. See Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 971.

AFFIRMED.

William Wayne Palmer, Esquire, Attorney, Palmer Law Group, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

James Rutten, Esquire, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Benjamin J. Horwich, Attorney, John B. Major, Attorney, Munger Tolles & Olson, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

* **

MEMORANDUM***

Dr. Winnie Fang filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction requesting that the district court dismiss the ongoing arbitration between Fang and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. and order the arbitration panel to comply with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules. Fang appeals the district court‘s denial of that motion. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and we affirm.

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [ (1)] [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, [(2)] that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor, and [ (4) ] that an injunction is in the public interest.”1 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Alternatively, “a preliminary injunction could issue where the likelihood of success is such that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff‘s favor,” so long as the plaintiff demonstrates irreparable harm and shows that the injunction is in the public interest. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks, citation, and alter-ation omitted). Under either approach, “at an irreducible minimum,” the party seeking the injunction “must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.” Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation and alteration omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fang‘s motion for a preliminary injunction, because Fang failed to provide any argument that the four Winter elements are met. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 (noting that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish” the four Winter elements).

AFFIRMED.

Notes

1
A temporary restraining order and a motion for an injunction are analyzed under the same standard, so we address them together. See Stuhlbarg Int‘l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
***
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Case Details

Case Name: Fang v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 24, 2017
Citations: 694 F. App'x 561; 16-17227
Docket Number: 16-17227
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified
and are not legal advice.
Log In