ANTHONY FALTZ, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Nos. 14-CO-0978 & 23-CO-0507
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
July 11, 2024
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and EASTERLY and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
James Millikan, with whom Leslie W. Kostyshak, Matthew J. Revis, and Destiny T. Stokes were on the brief, for appellant.
David P. Saybolt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Kacie Weston, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: Appellant Anthony Faltz and two friends were driving a stolen Ford Crown Victoria in February 2002. While fleeing from police, they ran a red light and crashed into another car, killing two people. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers on the scene identified Dorrell Ingram as the driver of the car and the government filed murder charges against him. After a DNA sample from the center of the driver‘s-side airbag was found to contain DNA from Mr. Faltz, however, the government dropped charges against Mr. Ingram and brought a second-degree murder charge against Mr. Faltz. At the encouragement of his appointed trial counsel, Mr. Faltz pled guilty to two counts of involuntary manslaughter.
Mr. Faltz seeks review of the trial court‘s denial of his motion to vacate his convictions and sentence pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act (“IPA“),
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
A. Car Chase and Accident
On February 19, 2002, Anthony Faltz and twin brothers Dorrell and Darryl Ingram crashed a stolen Ford Crown Victoria car into the passenger side of a Nissan Maxima while fleeing police, killing the two people inside the Nissan. Mr. Faltz testified that the Ingram brothers stole the Crown Victoria and then picked Mr. Faltz up from his house; each of them then took turns driving the car for several hours. On their way back to Mr. Faltz‘s house, a police cruiser approached. Moving away from the police vehicle, the Crown Victoria hit a parked vehicle and then a marked police car before speeding off into a full-blown chase. The Crown Victoria then ran a red light and crashed, killing the two people in the other car.
There are conflicting accounts as to who was driving the Crown Victoria at the time of the accident. During the 2022 hearing
The MPD officers present at the scene identified the driver as Dorrell Ingram, who fled on foot before police apprehended and arrested him. Officers Gregory Phifer and Herman Hodges witnessed the accident from one or two blocks away and reached the vehicle within seconds of the crash. Officer Phifer later testified that he immediately grabbed the rear passenger emerging from the passenger side of the car and dragged him to the driver‘s side. Both officers testified that they saw the driver emerge from the driver‘s seat and run into a nearby wooded area. Officer Phifer apprehended both passengers and then stayed with them and the vehicle. He then described the fleeing suspect to a third officer, Officer Byron Purnell, who had subsequently arrived. While canvassing the area, Officers Purnell and Hodges saw someone fitting Officer Phifer‘s description of the fleeing driver and arrested him, later identifying him as Dorrell Ingram. The MPD officers also identified the rear passenger as Mr. Faltz and the front passenger as Darryl Ingram. After arriving at the scene, MPD Detective Kimberly Metivier instructed Officer Phifer to write out his descriptions of the Ford‘s occupants and where they exited the vehicle. In written reports, Detective Metivier noted that Dorrell Ingram was identified as the driver “[d]ue to the overwhelming available physical evidence and witness observations.”
The government charged Dorrell Ingram with second-degree murder as the driver of the car. However, the government reversed course after DNA testing by the FBI, conducted using technology available at the time, excluded Dorrell Ingram as a DNA contributor to a sample recovered from the driver‘s side airbag and showed that Mr. Faltz‘s DNA could not be excluded as a match. The FBI‘s lab report also stated that the specimen “contained DNA from more than one individual.” Mr. Faltz was then charged with second-degree murder and all charges against the Ingram brothers were dropped.1
B. Guilty Plea (2006)
Once charged, the court appointed Ferris Bond to represent Mr. Faltz. Mr. Faltz later testified that he told Mr. Bond he was not the driver and thus wanted to go to trial. On the morning of jury selection for the trial, the prosecutor offered Mr. Faltz a plea offer for two counts of involuntary manslaughter. Mr. Faltz later testified that he agreed to the deal because Mr. Bond told him both that his DNA was all over the airbag and that he would likely receive a maximum fifteen-year total sentence.
C. Initial Section 23-110 Proceedings
In 2009, Mr. Faltz filed a pro se motion under
At an April 25, 2011, evidentiary hearing on the Section 23-110 motion, and in supplemental motions, both Mr. Bond and Mr. Faltz testified. Mr. Faltz testified that though he understood that he was being charged as the driver of the car, he thought he was pleading to being a passenger in the car. Mr. Bond disputed Mr. Faltz‘s claims that he had not explained the elements of the charges or plea deal and that he had promised the deal would lead to a shorter sentence. Additionally, he stated that he had hired an investigator to speak with the Ingram family, talk with the owner of the stolen vehicle, and speak with Mr. Faltz‘s mother. Mr. Bond also testified that after the prosecutor told him that Mr. Faltz‘s DNA was “all over” the airbag, he did not consult any experts nor follow up as to how much DNA was actually found on the airbag. During the hearing, Mr. Harn, Mr. Faltz‘s appointed post-conviction counsel, also did not present any DNA or accident-reconstruction experts.
On April 9, 2013, the trial court rejected Mr. Faltz‘s claims that Mr. Bond had provided him constitutionally ineffective assistance and that his guilty plea should be withdrawn because he never admitted to being the driver of the car. Citing Mr. Faltz‘s understanding of the charges against him and the range of possible sentences, as well as his failure to present evidence that Mr. Bond‘s investigation was deficient, the trial court found that Mr. Faltz had not established prejudice sufficient to substantiate an ineffectiveness claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The trial court also rejected Mr. Faltz‘s assertion that he had established a sufficient basis to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude from the DNA evidence that Mr. Faltz was the driver and that Mr. Faltz‘s “admission of guilt” and failure to challenge his role as the driver in open court indicated that he understood the charges against him.
D. Additional DNA Testing
On April 7, 2015, after seeing a March 6, 2015, Washington Post article calling into question DNA results from the District of Columbia‘s crime lab, Mr. Faltz filed a pro se motion pursuant to the IPA,
Mr. Faltz, through new counsel, approached expert Dr. Norah Rudin to interpret the second sample using a cutting-edge method called “probabilistic genotyping,” which assigns likelihoods to DNA profiles rather than a binary “match/no match” approach. The probabilistic genotyping approach was not available in 2002 when the FBI first tested the DNA found on the Crown Victoria‘s airbag. Dr. Rudin found that evidence supporting the presence of Dorrell Ingram‘s DNA in the second sample from the edge of the airbag was “about 100 times stronger” than that of Mr. Faltz.
E. IPA and Additional IAC Claims
With the discovery of the new DNA evidence interpreted by Dr. Rudin, Mr. Faltz continued to pursue his IPA claim alongside additional claims for ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to
At the hearing on the IPA and additional IAC claims, from November 15-17, 2022, the parties submitted a joint stipulation containing the testimony of the police officers who responded to the crash, several of whom identified Dorrell Ingram as the driver of the Crown Victoria. In addition to reiterating the statements he made at his first Section 23-110 hearing in 2011, Mr. Faltz testified that Mr. Harn never mentioned the possibility of retaining expert witnesses for the Section 23-110 proceedings. He also reiterated that he pled guilty because he had been told that his DNA was all over the airbag and that the Ingram twins were planning to testify that he was the driver; he testified that he would not have pled guilty if he had known that Dorrell Ingram‘s DNA was also present on the airbag.
Mr. Faltz presented the testimony of three expert witnesses. One expert, Stephen Mercer, testified that the representation of both Mr. Bond and Mr. Harn fell below professional standards for defense attorneys due to their failure to scrutinize the DNA report. Dr. Rudin also testified as an expert about her interpretation of the DNA sample using probabilistic genotyping. After her testimony, the government presented another DNA expert, Dr. Bruce Budowle, who critiqued Dr. Rudin‘s methodology for crediting false “peaks” in the sample. Though Dr. Budowle disputed aspects of Dr. Rudin‘s approach and the comparative strength of the two profiles, he agreed that Dorrell Ingram was a likely contributor, along with Mr. Faltz, to the sample on the edge of the airbag.
On the issue of accident reconstruction, Mr. Faltz presented expert C. Gregory Russell and the government presented two expert witnesses, Michael Miller and Brian Chase. Mr. Miller responded to the crash in his then-role as an MPD officer in the Major Crash Investigations Unit. Though he did not perform an accident reconstruction on the night of the collision, he did
The trial court rejected Mr. Faltz‘s IPA claims, emphasizing the presentencing letter Mr. Faltz wrote to the court expressing remorse at being “the cause” of killing the two people in the Nissan. The trial court declined to address Mr. Faltz‘s IAC claim against Mr. Bond, stating that it had already done so in its April 9, 2013, order. Additionally, the trial court found Mr. Faltz‘s IAC claims against Mr. Harn to be meritless because Mr. Faltz “has repeatedly acknowledged his guilt in this matter.” As to the additional DNA evidence, the trial court found that even if the evidence Mr. Faltz raised could be classified as new, it did not prove that he was more likely than not actually innocent. In particular, the trial court credited Mr. Chase‘s testimony that “it would be impossible for the driver to miss the center of the driver-side airbag.”
II. Discussion
A. IAC Claims
We review a Section 23-110 motion for abuse of discretion, evaluating the trial court‘s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172, 1195 (D.C. 2016). A counsel‘s performance is constitutionally ineffective if their errors, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” prejudice their client. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A defendant who pled guilty can establish that their counsel was constitutionally ineffective by establishing a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 364-65 (2017) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
Mr. Faltz argues that Mr. Bond‘s failure to consult DNA and accident-reconstruction experts left him without a viable defense to the centerpiece of the government‘s case against him, and thus drove him to accept the plea offer despite his innocence. Mr. Faltz also contends that Mr. Harn‘s identical failure to engage DNA or accident-reconstruction experts precluded him from establishing an IAC claim against Mr. Bond. Even if we were to agree with Mr. Faltz that both his trial counsel2 and post-conviction counsel3 performed
We are not persuaded that, but for Mr. Bond‘s failure to engage DNA or accident-reconstruction experts at the pre-trial stage, Mr. Faltz would have insisted on going to trial. It is true that the FBI‘s DNA report, which Mr. Bond received, stated that the sample “contained DNA from more than one individual,” which is a fact that Mr. Faltz claims Mr. Bond never shared with him. But Mr. Faltz undisputedly remained the major contributor to the DNA sample from the center of the airbag, the only sample at issue at the time. We see no evidence to suggest that consultation with DNA or accident-reconstruction experts, within the confines of then-available technology, would have altered the FBI lab report‘s findings. Further, though the DNA evidence was essential to the government‘s case against Mr. Faltz, its potential weaknesses were not necessarily central to Mr. Faltz‘s defense. As Mr. Bond emphasized during his testimony at the first Section 23-110 hearing, “every police witness the government was going to call at one time or another had indicated that Mr. Ingram had been driving and Mr. Ingram had actually committed the offense.” The circumstances of Mr. Faltz‘s guilty plea are distinct from that of the defendant in Lee, 582 U.S. at 362, where the parties did not dispute that Mr. Lee would have proceeded to trial if his attorney had properly advised him of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. There is no such clarity here. Given the results of the FBI‘s DNA lab report, in light of contemporaneous technological limitations and the strength of eyewitness accounts for Mr. Faltz‘s defense, we conclude that Mr. Faltz has not established that there is a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on going to trial if Mr. Bond had only consulted with DNA or accident-reconstruction experts.
B. IPA Claim
Mr. Faltz argues that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of the government‘s accident-reconstruction experts—Mr. Miller and Mr. Chase—and, separately, contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by wrongly relying on his plea as evidence of his guilt. Under our reading of the record, the nexus between evidence of Mr. Faltz‘s innocence—including his guilty plea—and the admitted expert testimony is such that we must consider both issues together in reviewing the trial court‘s assessment of Mr. Faltz‘s IPA claim. We conclude that a remand is necessary to conduct an analysis of the admissibility of the government‘s proffered expert testimony under Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016) (en banc),4 and for the trial court to grapple with the full set of evidence that Mr. Faltz presented of his innocence.
We review a claim of error in admitting expert testimony for abuse of discretion, affording the trial court “a great degree of deference.” Lewis v. United States, 263 A.3d 1049, 1059, 1064 (D.C. 2021). However, the trial court errs if it acts “for an improper or legally insufficient reason, if its ruling lacked a firm factual foundation, or if the trial court otherwise failed to exercise its judgment in a rational and informed manner.” Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663, 683-84 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding
(a) the expert‘s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (abrogating Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977), and holding that the standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) governs the admission of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases).
In denying Mr. Faltz‘s motions to exclude the government‘s accident-reconstruction expert testimony, the full extent of the trial court‘s analysis was as follows:
I‘m going to deny that one — request to exclude their testimony. That goes more to the weight versus the admissibility of these witnesses. If Detective Miller — there‘s testimony that he was perhaps — he was on the scene and he‘s able to provide that testimonial evidence, and if the defense‘s expert is relying upon the reports of other experts, including Miller and Chase, then I don‘t see why they should be excluded.
The trial court‘s written order does not substantively address the admissibility of the experts’ testimony. In dismissing Mr. Faltz‘s motion to exclude the government‘s accident-reconstruction witnesses, the trial court appears to state only that Mr. Faltz concedes the reliability of the government‘s witnesses because his own expert relied on the same reports. But we see no evidence in the record demonstrating that Mr. Faltz‘s accident-reconstruction witness relied on the Miller report. By making a conclusory statement that the testimony of Mr. Miller and Mr. Chase went to weight rather than admissibility, without engaging in any further analysis, the trial court fell short of its gatekeeping role in admitting expert testimony under Motorola. 147 A.3d at 755-56. The government contends that all the evidence from experts on both sides was laid out in the hearing and, thus, the trial court implicitly conducted an admissibility analysis. But Motorola states that Rule 702 “expressly requires” the trial court to determine whether an expert reliably applied principles and methods to the case at hand, id. at 757, and we discern no application of Rule 702 or Motorola in the trial court‘s ruling.
A Motorola analysis would have allowed for an opportunity to assess the fact that Mr. Miller‘s reconstruction of the crash took place four years later, as well as Mr. Chase‘s misunderstanding that Mr. Miller‘s report was conducted “immediately following the crash . . . [with] critical scene physical evidence which dissipates over time . . . forensically mapped and documented.” Here, there was no analysis of Mr. Faltz‘s request to exclude the government‘s accident-reconstruction experts, and we conclude that a remand for further analysis as required under Motorola is necessary.
Admitting the government‘s accident-reconstruction experts without conducting a Motorola analysis is not, as the government contends, a harmless error. An error is harmless if “we can say, ‘with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.‘” Gardner v. United States, 140 A.3d 1172, 1183 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 968 n.12 (D.C. 2000)). On the accident-reconstruction
Interwoven with the expert issue is Mr. Faltz‘s claim that the trial court failed to grapple with the full set of evidence presented at the November 2022 hearings to demonstrate his innocence.5 We review the trial court‘s IPA ruling for abuse of discretion. Richardson v. United States, 8 A.3d 1245, 1248-49 (D.C. 2010). As the IPA sets out:
In determining whether to grant relief the court may consider any relevant evidence, but shall consider the following:
(A) The new evidence;
(B) How the new evidence demonstrates actual innocence;
(C) Why the new evidence is or is not cumulative or impeaching;
(D) If the conviction resulted from a trial, and if the movant asserted a theory of defense inconsistent with the current claim of innocence, the specific reason the movant asserted an inconsistent theory at trial; and
(E) If the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the specific reason the movant pleaded guilty despite being actually innocent of the crime.
Citing Mr. Faltz‘s “repeated[]” statements that he was “responsible for the murder in this case” and the accident-reconstruction conclusions of Mr. Chase, the trial court determined Mr. Faltz and his accident-reconstruction witness to be non-credible and found that the evidence of his innocence fell short of a preponderance. We discern no clear error in the trial court‘s determination of Mr. Faltz‘s credibility. See Stringer v. United States, 301 A.3d 1218, 1228 (D.C. 2023) (noting that we review the trial court‘s credibility determinations in the IPA context for clear error).6
However, Mr. Faltz presented other evidence of his innocence beyond his own testimony. He put forward evidence of
The government acknowledges that the trial court‘s IPA analysis was done “in a fairly cursory fashion,” but argues that the court “was not obligated to do it in a more fulsome way.” Further, the government argues that the trial court‘s credibility determination of Mr. Faltz “goes a long way to making it very tough” to establish an IPA claim. However, the IPA requires that courts “shall” consider various factors, including “the specific reason the movant pleaded guilty despite being actually innocent of the crime.”
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Mr. Faltz‘s IAC claims but remand his IPA claim to the trial court for further analysis of the experts’ admissibility and evidence of Mr. Faltz‘s innocence consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.