| N.Y. App. Div. | Jul 1, 1903
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff was, prior to the 6th day of January, 1896, warden of the city prison in the city of New York, and on the 21st day of January, 1896, he was dismissed from that position by the defendant who was then commissioner of corrections, having jurisdiction over the city prison. The plaintiff was ■ subsequently reinstated by an
Upon the trial the plaintiff, after testifying to his removal and the proceedings instituted for reinstatement, was asked ‘how much he expended for counsel fees in these proceedings, and to enforce the order of the court reinstating him. That was objected to by the defendant, upon the ground that such counsel fees could not be recovered in this action, which objection was overruled and the defendant excepted. He then testified to the payment to his counsel of various sums of money, between January 11, 1896, and February 16, 1898, amounting to upwards of $1,300. There was then introduced evidence tending to show that the value of the services rendered "by counsel for the plaintiff in these proceedings exceeded that amount, which was admitted under an exception by the defendant. There was no claim that the plaintiff sustained any damage in ■consequence of his removal, except the counsel fee that he was compelled to pay to obtain his reinstatement. The plaintiff was "paid his salary from the time of his removal until his reinstatement, and
At the end of the plaintiff’s case, and again at the end of the whole case, the defendant moved for a dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that the plaintiff having received all emoluments, of the office accrued during the period that he was suspended, and the taxable costs and disbursements, both in the certiorari proceeding and in the contempt proceeding, can recover no damages. That motion was denied and the defendant excepted. The court submitted to the jury the question whether the defendant removed the plaintiff for partisan, political, personal or other cause, except incompetency and conduct inconsistent with the position held by him, and charged the jury that if they should determine the question in favor of the plaintiff the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, and then the only question was, what it cost the plaintiff to secure his reinstatement. Counsel for the defendant excepted to the charge that allowed the plaintiff to recover for counsel fees and expenses incurred in securing his restoration, whereupon the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $800, and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant appeals.
The adjudication in the certiorari proceedings was conclusive upon the question as to the illegality of the plaintiff’s removal, and all the testimony as to the motive of the defendant and . his statement of the reason for removal was for that reason immaterial. The only question was as to the damages that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in consequence of the illegal removal. The statute is specific that the damages to be recovered are the damages “ as for an act wrongfully done.” The wrongful act was the removal of the plaintiff, and it was the damage that resulted from that wrongful act that he was entitled to recover. If he lost the salary' or other compensation to which he was entitled that would clearly be the damage that would flow from the wrongful removal, or if he lost his position and was not reinstated, the value of the position taken from him would be an injury that flowed from the wrongful act of removal, but it was the damage caused by the wrongful act to which he was entitled, not what he paid his counsel for reinstate
In Bishop v. Hendrick (82 Hun, 323) the court, in discussing this question, say: “ It is quite apparent that the defendant, in seeking to retain this property, the title to which has been adjudged in the plaintiff as administrator, has subjected him or-the estate-which he ■represents, to a large amount of trouble and expense, but the law provides indemhity in the way of costs to be taxed in an action, and in a proper case' to an additional allowance to be recovered by the successful party in a regular proceeding in the action; and while under the order of reference to which we have referred, and under which the- referee acted in this case, any damage which, within -the ordinary and well-settled rules of damages, the plaintiff suffered by reason of the conversion of any of this property, and which,' in. an action of trover' or replevin might be recovered, was legally allowable under this order in this action. But I know of no rule of law that would include extra counsel fees for legal services beyond taxable costs and extra allowances given by the Code of Civil Procedure in an action of this character.” The court then, referring to the class of cases where an injunction has been granted in which the obligors, upon an undertaking given to. obtain the injunction, were liable for the counsel fees necessarily incurred in getting rid of the process, say: “ In all these cases and cases of a kindred character the damages were' awarded upon the express agreement and undertaking on the part of the defendant to pay the same, and both parties acted under and had a right-to rely upon-the
It follows that the judgment and order appealed from must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Tan Bbunt, P. J., O’Bbien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred ; Laughlin, J., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
I am of the opinion that this judgment should be affirmed.' If the Legislature intended to limit the recovery in cases- like this to the loss of salary, it would, I think, have merely given á right of action for the damages sustained, as that would have sufficed. The remedy offered by the statute, however, is broader. It not only gives a right of action for damages, but expressly provides that the damages are recoverable “ as for an act wrongfully done.” This language is significant and must be given effect. The Legislature foresaw that legal proceedings for reinstatement or appointment would be necessitated by the failure of the appointing power to recognize the. rights of the veteran, and it was undoubtedly intended to afford a remedy for reimbursement for the expenses, thus incurred as well as for the loss of salary. The cause of action given .-by this statute is, in this regard, analogous to a cause of action for' malicious prosecution, or false arrest or imprisonment, where by the wrongful act expenses and counsel fees are necessarily incurred in legal proceedings to obtain one’s liberty or protection in property fights. In such cases the wrongdoer is answerable, in a subsequent action, for damages including counsel fees. So I think he should be in the case at bar. In order to insure the proper administration of the veteran preference law without evasion for political or other reason's, the Legislature conferred upon veterans, in case their constitutional or statutory rights are not respected, this right of action as for a wrongful act and public policy requires that we should give the statute a liberal construction.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.