87 Mass. 221 | Mass. | 1862
So far as this bill seeks to enforce a remedy in behalf of the plaintiffs to prevent the defendants from
But the bill alleges with sufficient certainty and precision another cause of injury to the rights and property of the plaintiffs, which, if well founded, affords sufficient ground for the maintenance of this suit, and for granting relief in equity. It sets forth that the plaintiffs are owners of “ land and a continuous wharf thereon; ” that the defendants, without right or authority of law, have commenced the extension, location and construction of their railroad through and over portions of said 'land, passing through a corner thereof and of the wharf thereon erected, and that they are proceeding to cut off the cap-sill of said wharf and to dig up the earth thereof, with a design to erect permanent structures for the maintenance and use of their said railroad in, upon and over said land and wharf. There can be no doubt that these allegations, if sustained, establish a clear case of a private nuisance, which, if continued and completed, would work serious injury and damage to the land and wharf of the plaintiffs. Upon familiar principles, such a case s cognizable and-relievable by proceedings on the equity side of the court.
Turning now to the merits of the case as disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, we are to consider whether the defendants have violated any right of the plaintiffs, or committed any act of trespass or nuisance on their property, as alleged in the bill. The determination of this question depends mainly on the true interpretation of the first section of the act of the legislature by which the defendants are authorized to extend their railroad to the line of the State of Rhode Island. St. 1861, c. 156. The authority thereby conferred is expressed in terms somewhat loose and indeterminate. It is to locate, maintain and construct a railroad from a point at or near the present terminus of the track of the defendants’ railroad in Fall River in a southerly direction to the line of the State of Rhode Island, to conned
In seeking for a correct and just exposition of this clause of the statute, the first and most obvious suggestion is, that the legislature did not intend to fix with absolute certainty and precision the point of departure for the new road which the defendants were authorized to build. In using language which was so vague and indefinite as to leave open for future determination the location of this point, it is clear that owing to the nature of the ground or for some other sufficient reason it was not deemed expedient or necessary to fix it with accuracy. It is also clear that in thus omitting to designate it, it was their intention to delegate the power of locating it definitively to the defendants or their agents, and to vest in them the exercise of the needful judgment and discretion to carry into effect the authority which they intended to grant. It follows, that unless the defendants have clearly exceeded the limits of this discretion, and have acted either in bad faith or in disregard of the just limits which by a reasonable construction of the words of the statute should be put on their power to fix the terminus a quo, they cannot be deemed to have invaded the plaintiffs’ rights, or be held amenable to process restraining them from prosecuting their work and constructing their road according to the plan and location set out and described in the bill.
If we look to the language of the statute, it is impossible to find in that clause, which empowers the defendants to establish the point of departure of the road, any fixed or definite rule or standard of measurement or distance by which they are to be
But it is strenuously urged in behalf of the plaintiffs that the location of the road across their land and wharf is illegal, because it cannot be thus constructed and maintained without crossing tide-waters and causing an obstruction to a navigable stream, and that no such authority is conferred on the defendants by the act authorizing the extension of their road. It is true that no express authority to pass over navigable water is given by the legislature. It exists, if at all, by implication. But we cannot doubt that where an unrestricted grant of power is made to a corporation to construct a road between two points, it carries with it the right to cross navigable waters, if they intervene in a course or route which is otherwise reasonable and practica ble, and if the road can be constructed withoút destruction of
It was also suggested by the counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendants, under the clause which gave them authority to commence their road at a point near the terminus of their present track and thence proceed in a southerly direction, had no authority to begin at a point northerly of such terminus. We do not see how the plaintiffs’ rights are in any way affected, if in this respect the defendants have acted without authority. But there is no foundation for the suggestion. Nothing in the act requires
On the whole case, we are of opinion that the defendants have not exceeded their lawful authority in constructing their road on the plaintiffs’ land and over their wharf, and that there is no case shown which entitles the plaintiffs to any relief in equity. Bill dismissed.