205 P. 814 | Ariz. | 1922
The question presented by this appeal is the constitutionality of chapter 169 of the Sessions Laws of the Fifth Arizona Legislature, which became a law on the 23d of March, 1921, and reads as follows:
“An act for the relief of Gordon G. Huntington, injured by an explosion while in the service of the state of Arizona, and making an appropriation therefor.
“Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:
“Section 1. That whereas, Gordon G. Huntington, while in the employ of the state engineer of Arizona, sustained personal injuries arising out of, and in the course of, such employment, resulting in the loss of his right eye and the permanent impairment of the sight of his left eye, causing him to be incapacitated to an extent which is hereby declared*530 to be a permament total disability, there is hereby appropriated from the general fund of the state of Arizona, from any moneys not otherwise appropriated, a sufficient amount to pay to the said Cordon C. Huntington the sum of eighty-four dollars and fifty cents ($84.50) per month during the rest of his natural life, which is sixty-five per cent. (65%) of his average monthly wage, computed on the basis of not to exceed one hundred and thirty dollars ($130.00) per month: Provided, that should medical, surgical and hospital or other treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and surgical supplies, become necessary because of said injury, a sufficient further amount to cover same is hereby appropriated.
“Section 2. The Industrial Commission of Arizona is hereby authorized to make proper claims upon the state auditor for the amount herein specified, and the state auditor shall draw his warrant for such amount, and the state treasurer is authorized and empowered to pay the same: Provided, however, that should there be no Industrial Commission, the superintendent of public health is directed, empowered and authorized to carry out all of the conditions and provisions of this act.
“Section 3. The purposes and intent of this act shall be to give compensation to an employee of the state, injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and to the extent herein specified, and not for any other purpose to admit the liability of the state for the injury named in the foregoing sections. Provided, however, that the acceptance of any amount or amounts named in this act shall be a full and complete release of any claim or claims which the aforesaid Cordon C. Huntington may now have or might have against the state of Arizona resulting from the injury described in Section 1 of this act.”
It appears from the complaint and petition of Cordon C. Huntington that, in pursuance of the provisions of this act, he presented to the state auditor' on September 7,1921, two claims against the state, one for $84.50 and one for $146.54, which had been thereto
The only error assigned is the overruling of the demurrer, and the argument in support of this assignment is based upon the following provisions of the state Constitution:
“Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, municipality, or other subdivision of- the state shall .ever give or loan its credits in the aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation, or become a subscriber to, or a shareholder in, any company or corporation or become a joint owner with any person, company, or corporation, except as to such ownerships as may accrue to the state by operation or provision of law.” Section 7, art. 9.
*532 “No local or special laws shall he enacted in any of the following cases, that is to say: . . .
“20. When a general law can be made applicable.” Subsection 20, § 19, art. 4
It is contended that chapter 169, which provides that the state shall pay appellee monthly a certain compensation on account of an injury suffered by him as a result of an accident arising out of his employment by the state engineer, is void because it constitutes a “donation” within the meaning of that part of section 7, article 9, above, which says that “neither the state, nor any county, . . . shall ever . . . make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association or corporation.” If by the term “donation,” as here used, it was intended to prohibit the legislature from making an appropriation of the character provided for in chapter 169, this contention must prevail, otherwise not.
■ Appellee was injured while working for the state under the direction of its engineer, who had charge of the construction and maintenance of its highways, and in the performance of his duties as such employee was necessarily discharging a function of state government, since the highways of the state are built and maintained with public funds for the use of the public and without any idea of profit or gain. And, by the great weight of authority, a state, in consequence of its sovereignty, cannot be made to respond in damages'for the negligence of its agents, servants, or employees which occurs in the discharge of a governmental function, except in those cases 'where it has, by constitutional or legislative enactment, expressly assumed such liability, and this court, speaking through Justice BAKER, held in State v. Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 Pac. 631, that Arizona had not, by any act of its legislature brought itself
It is true that if the act were passed solely in the exercise of gratitude and charity and did nothing more than make a gratuitous present of the public funds, the payments authorized by it would be merely donations; but, since it is clear that it was the. purpose of the legislature in passing it to recognize a moral obligation then resting upon the state and founded upon equity and justice, regardless of the fact that the state was not liable therefor as a matter of law, the question presents itself whether an appropriation made out of considerations of this kind comes within the constitutional provision prohibiting donations. As used in section 7, article 9, this word has the meaning usually attached to it, which appears in Webster’s International Dictionary as a “gift” or “that which is given as a present or gratuitously.” The idea it conveys is that of help voluntarily extended in obedience to
“The power of the legislature to extend the liability of the state or municipal corporations to pay for injuries caused to private individuals is not limited to the establishment of a rule for the future, but it is generally held that the recognition of a moral, equitable or honorable obligation, such as a just man recognizes in his own affairs, will constitute a sufficiently public purpose to uphold a tax, and that a statute is not unconstitutional which requires the appropriation of the public money to pay a designated claim for loss or injury arising out of the relations of the claimant with the public, and constituting a moral obligation to recompense the claimant of such a character that the legislature might constitutionally have established liability, although there was no -legal claim for compensation when the loss or injury occurred. This has been held true whether the absence of legal liability is based upon a general principle of law or upon some irregularity or omission in the statutory prerequisites to liability.”
And also in 25 E. C. L., at page 402, appears the following:
“The legislature has a right to appropriate the public funds in discharge of the state’s duty, whether the duty be legal or only moral. And the discharge of such an obligation'is always regarded as a legitimate exercise of governmental power. An appropriation made in discharge of a moral obligation resting upon the state must be regarded as being for a public purpose, and within the constitutional powers of the legislature, and the fact that a private person may receive the benefit of such an appropriation does not constitute the act of appropriation a private one.”
See, also, Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1278, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83, 77 S. E. 264, 80 S. E. 367; Cole v. State of New York, 102
It is difficult to define, with absolute accuracy, just what is included in the term “moral or equitable obligation,” but in all those cases in which the appropriation of the public funds of the state has been upheld upon this ground the state has received some benefit as a state, or the claimant has suffered some direct injury “under circumstances where in fairness the state might be asked to respond — where something more than a mere gratuity was involved.” People v. Westchester Nat. Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 15 A. L. R. 1344, 132 N. E. 241. “In some instances,” says the court in this case, “claims have been allowed where beneficial services have been performed for the state (Cole v. State, 102 N. Y. 48, 6 N. E. 277); in others where property was furnished it (O’Hara v. State, 112 N. Y. 146, 8 Am. St. Rep. 726, 2 L. R. A. 603, 19 N. E. 659); or the state received money for land the title to which proved defective (Wheeler v. State, 190 N. Y. 406, 123 Am. St. Rep. 555, 83 N. E. 54); or work was done, the expense of which in equity the state should bear (Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Canal Board, 204 N. Y. 471, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1228, 97 N. E. 964). In another class of cases the legislature has authorized payment where the claimant had been injured by the negligence of the servants of the state. Splittorf v. State, 108 N. Y. 205, 15 N. E. 322.”
Appellee was not injured by the negligence of the agents, servants, or employees of the state but as a result of an accident arising out of the employment or occupation in which he was engaged. However, “the equity or justice of a claim which the
The only cases cited by appellant holding to the contrary are from the Supreme Court of California, whose constitution contains a provision similar in meaning to section 7, article 9, but in which the word “gift” appears, instead of “donation,” and in construing it the broad doctrine that a “mere moral obligation will not make a transaction other than a gift” has been laid down in the following
It follows, therefore, that the appropriation in payment of appellee’s claim does not constitute a donation, and, since the power of the legislature to render the state liable for injuries of the character of appellee’s is unquestioned, that chapter 169 does not violate section 7, article 9, of the Constitution.
It is urged that this act is void because it violates subsection 20 of section 19, article 4, prohibiting the enactment of special legislation “when a general law can be made applicable.” We are unable to accept this view, however, because it is the general doctrine “that the legislature is the sole judge whether a provision by a general law is possible under a provision in the Constitution, to the effect that no special law shall be enacted in all cases where general law can be made applicable.” 36 Cyc. 991. And there appears no reason why the general rule should not govern in this instance. Before enacting chapter 169, the legislature undoubtedly considered whether a general law could be made applicable to its purpose, and we must assume from the fact that it passed a special one that, in its judgment, the former would not meet its requirements. And, unless it appear very clearly from the character of the appropriation that a general law would have been sufficient, the court would not be justified in holding that a co-ordinate branch of the government abused its discretion in passing a special one. In this instance the adequacy of a general law is not clear, for it was not a matter of the application of a general law to the legal liability of the state for injuries received by its employees while serving in a governmental capacity, but whether a general act could have been made applicable to moral obligations which had arisen or might there
“There are many matters that might very justly and properly be considered by the legislature in determining the merits of claims of the same general nature as relator’s, which could not well be embodied in a general law. For instance the needs of the claimants and those dependent upon them might very properly influence the legislature in determining the amount it would apply to discharge an obligation purely moral. [Italics ours.] The most that we can say is, that it is doubtful if a general law would be as proper to accomplish the purpose which the legislature had in view as the special appropriation, and we must resolve the doubt in favor of the validity of the act.”
And the fact that the law was passed for the benefit of only one individual does not make it special legislation, since it was enacted to satisfy an obligation resting upon all the people who constitute the state. The discharge of such an obligation is merely the performance of a public act, and an appropriation for it is not expending the public funds for >a private purpose. Woodall v. Darst, above; 25 R. C. L. 402.
It is also suggested that if the state did assume liability for appellee’s injury by the passage of this act, its necessarily retroactive operation invalidates it under the constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws. But this term, as we understand it, refers to statutes dealing with criminal matters, though it appears in section 25, article 2, of the Constitution, in connection with the clause prohibit
It follows, therefore, that appellant’s demurrer was properly overruled and that the order making the alternative writ of mandate peremptory was rightly entered. Hence the judgment is affirmed.
BOSS, C. J., and FLANIGAN, J., concur.