Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency

FAIRCLOTHv FAMILYINDEPENDENCE AGENCY 11, 1998, Docket No. 198222.Submitted June at Detroit. Decided October 30, 1998, at 9:10 am. Mary recipients Faircloth and other former of welfare benefits under general program by Department the assistance administered Services, Family Independence Agency, Social now the from 1979 year brought Ingham until fiscal 1991-92 an action in the Circuit against department others, seeking Court and certification of a declaratory injunctive relief, alleging class action and and that the policy determining eligibility for benefits under the (sda) program replaced general state assistance program appropriations regarding assistance violated the acts such years 1992-93, benefits for fiscal 1991-92and 1991 PA 111 and 1992 appropriations provided PA 168. The acts that a who is medically diagnosed incapacitated as and unavailable for work for ninety days eligible at least was to receive sda benefits. The defend- policy provided medically eligible ants’ that clients are for sda if they medically eligible are for medical assistance based on disabil- ity physical impairment or blindness or if have a or mental impairments prevent performance any combination of ninety days policy remunerative work for or more. The defined activity usually work as work or work done for remuneration. plaintiffs alleged policy The that the was invalid because the inter- determining eligibility nal criteria for under 1991 PA subsec- 805(l)(b) tion and 1992 PA was not promulgated as a rule under the Administrative Procedures Act applicants scope and the excluded who fell within the (apa) court, Carolyn Stell, J., denied, of subsection The with- prejudice, certify 8, 1994, out the motion to a class. On June granted partial summary disposition plaintiffs, court for the dеclar- ing the defendants’ invalid and violative of the and the apa acts. The court took under advisement the issue sda grant relief, declaratory ruling whether to further but certified its purposes appeal. as final for The court then considered the

plaintiffs’ postjudgment supplemental motion for relief and ruled general power specific remedy that it would use its fashion declaratory judgment. court, part remedy, enforce its App 391 eligibility of the dis- means to determine the defendants ordered security supplemental ability used for standard Security Act, 42 USC 1382 et (ssi) provisions of the Social income stayed Appeals appealed, fur- seq. the Court of The defendants appeal. pending proceedings the resolution of ther Appeals held: of The Court jurisdiction Appeals defend- to consider the has 1. The Court of apрeal 8, 1994, challenge as order on defendants’ to the June ants’ disposed subsequent of the right of all final order from the of

plaintiffs’ claims. policy finding a rule the constituted erred in 2. The court policy promulgated is an under the The apa. been that should have merely explained language of inteipretive the because it statement interprets agency policy or appropriations acts. Where an the pol- promulgate rule, agency explains the the need not a statute or rights policy icy effect on the if the has a substantial as a rule even not, by interpretive people, an statement is of because of a class definition, a rule under the apa. policy rule it does not constitute a because The defendants’ 3. merely law, but rather and effect of does not have the force by detailing еxplains appropriations the circumstances acts person unavailable for work for at will be deemed under which holding ninety days. in invalid The court erred least promulgated as a rule under the apa. it was not because determining that the conflicted with 4. The court erred in appropriations language acts. ssi, plaintiffs’ argument that since a who receives 5. The disability quali- security, of a or medical assistance because social appropria- 805(l)(a) of the sda benefits under subsection fies for acts, Legislature standard to must have intended a lesser tions 805(l)(b) qualify for than that used under subsection rejected. determining benefits must be SSI remaining plaintiffs’ argument of sub- that the subsections 6. The Legislature’s 805(1) intent that subsection section evince the capable performing encompass applicants 805(l)(b) are who work, dis- their basic needs because of their some but cannot meet apply rejected. Appeals ability will The must also be Court applicable persons falling disability within the standards only qualify persons benefits who can for other subsections to under subsection “sig- language acts does not create 7. nificantly” “substantially” incapacitated standard. 805(l)(b) 8. The chose not to include subsection language calling for consideration of vocational factors such as education, age, previous experience. Therefore, pur- work for poses 805(l)(b), applicant’s capacity of subsection an to work is applicant not measured a minimum number of hours that the activity able to sustain work or a minimum remunerative standard. correctly interpreted 805(1)(b) The defendants subsection as requiring inability perform any an work. Legislature’s 168, 9. The inclusion in 1992 PA subsection 805(l)(b) 111, of the same used in 1991 PA subsection 805(l)(b) approval interpretation was an of the defendants’ of 1991 111, 805(1) requiring incapable PA subsection that a claimant be Legislature’s modify remunerative work. The decision to 805(l)(b) subsection and mandate the use of the SSI standard dur- ing year 1993-94, 805(l)(b) fiscal 1993 PA subsection was not a rejection of the defendants’ use of the more restrictive standard in 1991-92and 1992-93. The matter must be reversed and remanded entry judgment for of a for the defendants.

Reversed and remanded. Cavanagh, J., dissenting part, stated that the defendants’ inter- pretation unjus- of 1991 PA resulted in an tifiably eligibility restrictive standard of benefits that contrary Legislature. was to the intent of the The defendants’ inter- pretation unjust remaining leads to unreasonable and results. The 805(1) support subsections reading of subsection a broader of the disability 805(l)(b). standard Legisla- contained in subsection The 111, 805(l)(b) ture’s reenaсtment of 1991 PA subsection in 1992 PA 168, dispositive subsection Legis- is not a indicator of the approve interpretation lature’s intent to the defendants’ of 1991 PA 111, grant summary disposition subsection The plaintiffs favor of the should be affirmed. — — — Appeal. 1. Courts Jurisdiction Motions and Orders Appeals jurisdiction appeal The Court of right has in an as of from a disposing trial court’s final order of all the claims a case to con- party’s challenge prior partial sider a granting to a order in the case summary disposition order; granting that was not a final an order partial summary disposition provides is not a final order if it proceedings the trial court will conduct further to determine granted regard whether further relief should be with to the claims summary disposition being granted. for which is — — — 2. Administrative Law Administrative Procedures Act Rule Inter- pretive Statements. App 232 requirements rule-promulgation A “rule” for a form with does not include Procedures Act Administrative statement, guideline, instructions, interpretive an informal an the force pamphlet, in itself does not have material that or other merely explanatory; agency an is of law but and effect merely interprets or of law but force and effect does not have the promulgated if as a rule even explains not be a statute or rule need (MCL people rights a class of on the has substantial effect it 3.560[107][h]). 24.207[h];MSA — Program — — Disability Benefits Assistance Services 3. Social Eligibility.' “unavailable,” “incapacitated,” and Legislature’s use of the terms The appropriations acts services in the subsection of social “work” “person years who states that a 1991-92and 1992-93that for fiscal incapacitated medically diagnosed for work as and unavailable is pro- days” eligible assistance for state at least 90 is education, age, gram and that factors such benefits indicates experience previous under the sub- are not to be considered work capacity applicant’s to work is not to be mea- and that an section applicant able that the is the minimum number of hours sured standard; activity or a minimum remunerative to sustain work perform requires applicant remu- be unable to an subsection ‘ eligible (1991 PA for the benefits work in order to be nerative 805[l][b]). 805[l][b], PA subsection Agency’s — (cid:127)— 4. Statutes of Statutes. Law Construction Administrative agency’s presumed an construction of to know of adopts when it reenacts the and that construction statute so construed. McParland and Services Susan

Michigan Legal (by plaintiffs. for the Marilyn Mullane), L. Attorney General, Thomas Kelley, J. Frank A. Harris General, and Susan Casey, Solicitor Attorneys General, for Garrard, H. Assistant Stephen the defendants. Cavanagh Corrigan, C.J., Bandstra, and and

Before: JJ. C.J. In this action challenging the stan-

Corrigan, applications dard for considering for state disability program assistance benefits years fiscal during (SDA) 1991-92 and 1992-93, appeal by defendants the right plaintiffs order granting supplemental relief. The trial court found defendants’ regarding eligibil- sda ity invalid because it constituted a rule that should have been promulgated under the Administrative Pro- seq.-, cedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et MSA 3.560(101) seq. et It also determined that vio- plain lated the meaning appropriations acts for years fiscal 1991-92 and 1992-93, PA 111 and 1992 PA 168. We hold that the policy regarding sda eligibility interpretive was an statement that need not have been promulgated as a rule under the APA and that defendants correctly construed the language of acts. We therefore reverse and entry remand for judgment for defendants. underlying procedural history 1. facts provided The state welfare benefits undеr a general assistance program (ga) by administered Depart ment of Social Services1 from 1979 until fiscal (dss) year 1991-92. The program was not permanent stat utory enactment, but rather was contingent on the Legislature funds for appropriating program line item of the budget. MCL 400.14; MSA 16.414, DSS 400.18; MCL MSA 16.418. The Legislature thus elimi nated GA in 1991 not appropriating funds for the program the dss budget year for fiscal 1991-92. In place, its the Legislature established program the SDA In 28, 1996, abolished the dss effective March newly Family Independence and transferred its duties to the created seq.; seq. Agency. MCL 400.1 et MSA 16.401 et App 391 396 Opinion of the Court recipients. GA former to some assistance to provide 805. PA § 1991 part as pertinent provided PA §

follows: operate a department shall

(1) of social services The eligible disability program. for this Persons assistance state years age needy persons or program include shall minors, emancipated whо meet 1 or more older, or requirements: following security income, supplemental social recipient (a) A disability.

security, due to medical assistance incapacitated medically diagnosed as (b) person A who days. at for work for least and unavailable care, aged, for the (c) foster home A resident of adult county infirmary center. abuse treatment or substance 30-day postresidential person receiving substance

(d) A abuse treatment. acquired having immune- person diagnosed as

(e) A immune-deficiency syn- acquired deficiency syndrome or complex. related drome special through person receiving services

(f) education A intermediate school district. the local pregnant (g) A woman. defined in subsec-

(h) of a disabled A caretaker (f) (a), (b), (e), or above. tions action, legislative with the Contemporanеous determining eligi- developed defendants policy provided ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍The bility 805(1) (b). under subsection “Standard for Determin- heading as follows under the Disability”: ing Disability medically eligible Assis- for State

Clients are medically they eligible assis- for ma if are [medical tance if have a or blindness or based on tance] impairment physical mental or combination and/or Facrcloth v impairments prevents performance which remu- days nerative work for 90 or more. “[a]ny

The further defined the term “work” as activity usually work or work done for remuneration.” policy during year Defendants continued the fiscal 1992-93 because the included identical language year’s appro- in subsection of that priations act. 1992 PA 168, subsection Legislature, however, modified the of sub- 805(l)(b) year provide section for fiscal 1993-94 to person physical benefits for “[a] with a or mental impairment other than substance abuse which meets disability exceрt federal ssi standards, that the mini- days.” mum duration of the shall be 90 805(l)(b). Accordingly, PA 186,subsection defendants policy determining disability discontinued the for 805(l)(b). under subsection February response imple- In 1992,in to defendants’ policy, plaintiffs, recipients mentation of the former program, of assistance under the GA commenced this seeking action certification of a class action and declaratory injunctive alleged and Plaintiffs relief. policy that defendants’ was invalid because the inter- determining eligibility nal criteria for under subsec- promulgated tion was not as a rule under policy applicants the APA and the excluded who fell scope within the of subsection The trial subsequently prejudice, plain- court denied, without certify tiffs’ motion a class. plaintiffs

Defendants and filed cross-motions for summary disposition plaintiffs’ claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10) granted in March 1993. The trial court partial summary disposition plaintiffs for on June App 391 invalid and viola- policy 1994, declaring apa acts. The and the tive of the sda reasoned as follows: court eligibility benefits—(cid:127) policy determining for sda

The rule, and should finding of the Court —is this is a and Michigan promulgated a rule under have been Procedures Act. Administrative narrowly exception interpretive has been statement The by courts, requires be that a statement construed merely explanatory. be [sic] essentially beyond explanatory. elimi- It policy goes

This medically requirement altogether and diagnosed nated the incapacitated, as definition of offer a restricted went on to performance impairment prevents which an days plain meaning The for 90 or more. remunerative work certainly encompass this. incapacitated more than would question force and effect of had the full The eligi- law, was used to determine whether and was sda benefits. ble for policy making through preferred method of clearly promulgation This

process of rules. quo, it should have and those affected affected the status opportunity given an to be heard. been argument that this is some- also finds that the The Court exception Procedures Act to the Administrative how an boilerplate lan- the —a broad because it falls underneath adopted by Act, not guage Social Services is also Court. summary disposition

Therefore, grants to the Court 12, 17, 18, 21, finding the defi- that Plaintiffs on Counts Michigan applied Administra- was violative of the nition as authorizing and also in violation of the tive Procedures Act statute. whether the issue

The court took under advisement declaratory rul- its relief, but certified grant to further appeal. purposes as “final” fоr ings April plaintiffs postjudgment In moved for supplemental 2.605(F), arguing relief under MCR that improperly because defendants had denied benefits to seventy-five percent applicants, defendants must notify previously rejected applicants and determine eligibility appropriate their under an standard: Plain- urged power general tiffs the court to use its to fash- grant necessary ion relief to them the additional relief give declaratory judgment to effect to the because implement sought defendants had not the court’s argued decision. Plaintiffs further the court eligibility should direct that defendants determine means of the standard used for supplemental security (ssi) provisions income Security seq. the Social Act, 42 USC 1382 el The trial court took the motion under advisement hearing July after a 1995. Nine months later, the general power court ruled that it would use its spеcific remedy declaratory fashion a to enforce its judgment. Noting developed that defendants had determining disability, an alternate standard court directed that use the SSI standard because only reasonably it was the “coherent” standard, it Legislature’s effectuated the intent, and defendants expertise using recognized had Next, it. the court personal rejected applicants notice to all was impractical, pro- but concluded that defendants could through vide reasonable notice the mass media and stamp the inclusion of written materials in food mail- ings. (1) Therefore, the court ordered that defendants application include written notices and forms in food stamp mailings during August public (2) air ser- top vice announcements in the seven mar- television prime during kets not less than five times in time Opinion of the Court (3) August air the announce- two weeks of first top five markets not less than ten radio ments working during weeks of in the first two hours times (4) August review SSI standard to 1996, and use the plaintiffs’ applications. then dismissed The court remaining as moot. claims requesting reconsideration, moved for

Defendants to send its order to allow them that the court amend sep- stamp recipients preapplication in a to all food present applicants mailing, then to which could arate appli- Family Independence Agency for a full (fta) requested court further that the cation. Defendants providing notice because reconsider the method of agree air stations would not radio and television during public the court- service announcements period would and some television stations ordered The court sell air time for the announcements. not reconsideration, but deniеd defendants’ motion for notify rejected period extended the for defendants applicants eligibility and shifted the and redetermine public announcements to the first two weeks service stayed however, fur- Court, of November 1996. This appeal. proceedings pending resolution of this ther

n. JURISDICTION reject plaintiffs’ initial this We contention jurisdiction over the trial court’s June Court lacks summary disposition granting partial 1994, order timely appeal not claim an because defendants did court certified its order from that order. trial partial summary disposition judg- granting a “final 2.604(A).2 merit” under the former version of MCR certification, Mere however, does resolve whether actually McCarthy an “final.” Associates, order is & App Washburn, 676, 680; Inc v 194 Mich 488 NW2d (1992). final, 785 If the order is not this Court lacks jurisdiction under MCR In case, 7.203. Id. this the 8, 1994, June order was not a final order because it explicitly provided proceedings that additional would regarding grant occur whether the trial court would respect further relief on the claims with to which it summary granted disposition. had See Children’s Hosp v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 670, 677; 450 Mich 545 (1996). Accordingly, juris NW2d 592 this Court has challenge diction to consider defendants’ to the June appeal right 8, 1994,order on defendants’ of from the April actual final order entered on 30, 1996, which disposed plaintiffs’ of all of claims.3

m. THE APA argue Defendants that the trial court erred in find- ing promul- their invalid because it was not gated agree. as a rule under the We We review apa. question this of law de novo. Watson v Bureau of Michigan Supreme The Court amended the court rule to eliminate this procedure May 1995, July effective 1995. The current version of MCR only permits 2.604 certification of an otherwise nonfinal order as a final receivership order and other similar actions. improperly rеly Advisory Defendants on Comrn’r v Ins Board of Michigan Fund, App 566; State Accident 173 Mich 434 NW2d 433 (1988), proposition they may appeal by right for the either from an judgment challenge order certified as final or wait until the final to repudiated interpretation ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍This order. Court has the Accident Fund of this jurisdiction Perry (On Court’s under MCR 7.203. Adams v Furniture Co Remand), App 1, 8; (1993); Dynamic 198 Mich 497 NW2d 514 Klco v Training Corp, App 39, 41; (1991). 192 Mich 480 NW2d 596 App 232 Mich 644; 569 NW2d 878 Lottery, 224 Mich State (1997). subject rule-promulgation require to the fia Base Coalition

ments of the See Detroit apa.4 Handicapped Dep’t Social Rights Human 172, 183; 428 NW2d 335 Services, requires agency give pro “The an notice of apa posed changes, public hearing, rules or rule to hold proposed rule or rule changes and to submit Joint Committee on Administrative Legislature’s approval.” Dep’t Rules for review and AFSCME v n Health, 1, 9, 8; Mental 550 NW2d 190 . (1996) agency’s process An failure to follow this ren Clonlara, Ed, ders the rule invalid.5 Inc v State Bd оf 230, 239; (1993); Dep’t 501 NW2d 88 Blank v Corrections, App 385, 392; 222 Mich 564 NW2d 130 of , lv 459 Mich 878 (1997) gtd (1998). 400.6(1); 16.406(1) grants power promulgate MCL MSA the fía the necessary programs “rules or desirable for the administration of under 400.1b(l); 16.401(2)(1), Social Welfare Under MCL MSA the [the Act].” appropriations in annual acts involved this case are considered “as a time- Therefore, predecessor, limited addendum to act.” the ha and its the th[e] power promulgate program. had the rules to administer the sda dss, reject Dep’t We defendants’ contention that under v Blank Correc tions, App 385, 392; (1997), gtd 564 NW2d 130 lv 459 Mich 878 (1998), concluding apa the trial court erred in that In violated the supra 392-401,

Blank, §§ at this Court held that 45 and 46 of the MCL apa, 24.245; 24.246; 3.560(145), 3.560(146), requiring legislative MSA MCL MSA approval agency rules, Court, however, for are unconstitutional. This remaining portion apa §§45 found the of the enforceable because and 46 interfering object apa could be severed from the without with valid the supra casе, Blank, comply the act. at 401-402. In this defendants did not any requirements rules, merely provi promulgating with of the for the Accordingly, sions held unconstitutional Blank. Blank is not control ling. policy rule, In the event defendants’ a invalid fail constituted it is for comply rule-promulgation procedures apa ure to with those that survived Clonlara, Ed, 230, 239; Blank. See Inc v State Bd 501 NW2d parsed AFSCME, supra Supreme

In at our Court MSA “rule,” 24.207; the APA definition of a MCL 3.560(107): statement, (1) agency regulation, “rule” is: “an stan-

[A] dard, policy, general applicability,” ruling, or instruction implements applies (2) law or adminis- “that or enforced prescribes agency, organization, tered the or that the procedure, practice agency of the . . . .” or provides, however, further that a “rule” The statute include, among excep does not other enumerated interpretive an tions, instructions, form with “[a] statement, pаmphlet, a an informational guideline, other material in itself does not have the force merely explanatory.” and effect of law but MCL MSA 24.207(h); 3.560(107)(h).6 an policy We conclude that defendants’ was inter- subject pretive statement, promulga- not a rule to the requirements merely tion of the because it APA, explained acts. We reject plaintiffs’ argument policy constituted it altered quo rule because the status and substan- tially rights public. affected the of the general argue “guideline” Plaintiffs do not that defendants’ was a apa. guideline agency A is “an statement or declaration of agency follow, which the intends to which does not have the force law, agency or effect of and which binds the but does not bind other person.” 24.203(6); 3.560(103)(6). promulgate guideline, MCL MSA To provide joint committee, agency Legislative must notice to the Ser- Bureau, requеsted agency vice the Governor and “each who writing proposed may per- for advanced notice of which action affect son,” provide sixty-day period 24.224(1); and written comment. MCL Plaintiffs, however, 3.560(124)(1). have abandoned the issue MSA whether promulgated guide- is was as a invalid because it not by raising appeal. Phinney Perlmutter, App line not it on See 222 Mich 513, 544; (1997), Joerger Service, Inc, 564 NW2d 532 and v Gordon Food App 167, 172; 224 Mich 568 NW2d 365 232 Supreme our Court has Although suggested dicta a policy rights public that the effect has on the may require Michigan rule, its as a see promulgation Farm Bureau v Bureau Workmen’s Compensation, Detroit 408 Mich n 150, 4; 289 NW2d 699 (1980); Coalition, supra Base at 184-185; Clonlara, supra at 247-248, courts have Michigan focused on the effect of an unpromulgated policy only where the agency policies procedures establishes under a broad grant authority a program. See, administer e.g., AFSCME, supra, and Palozolo v Dep’t Social Ser- vices, App 530; 473 NW2d 765 (1991). Under those circumstances, policies may the agency have the force and effect of law because the relevant statute provide specific does not standards for eligi- bility and administration of the program. policies are interpretive they statements because do not merely interpret explain the statute or rules from which the agency authority. derives its Rather, establish the substantive standards implementing Boyd v Civil Service Comm, program. See App 226, 236; 559 By NW2d 342 (1996). contrast, where an agency policy interprets or explains a stat- rule, ute or the agency need not promulgate it as a rule even if it has a substantial effect on rights people a class of interpretive because an statement by not, definition, a rule under Michigan apa. Farm Bureau, supra at 148.

Before the Legislature appropriated monies to fund a GA program administered accor- DSS dance procedures. with DSS rules and MCL 400.14; MSA 16.414, MCL MSA 400.18; 16.418. The Legislature did not dictate who was eligible program. See, for the PA e.g., 1990 200. In the SDA funding program, how- v 405 eligible Legislature established who was ever, the 805(l)(b) and 111, PA subsection 1992 benefits. 1991 “person provided 805(1)(b) a 168, PA medically incapacitated diagnosed as and [was] who days” eligible 90 was for work for at least unavailable policies unlike the at issue Thus, receive benefits. supra, supra, Palozolo, defendants’ AFSCME, policy have the force of law because subsec does not 805(l)(b) governs eligibility and it remains the tion meaning responsibility to determine the of the court’s Dep’t Rights Civil contained therein. See Corp, App 366, 93 Mich ex rel Parks v General Motors adopted by plurality (1979), NW2d 240 a 373-374;287 opinion Supreme Michigan 412 Court as its only (1982). NW2d 16 The court need 610; Mich interpretat give appropriate deference to defendants’ App Corp, supra, 374, ion.7 General Motors Mich policy Accordingly, n does not consti 5. have the force and tute a rule because it does not merely statutory explains law, effect of but rather by provision detailing the circumstances under which will be deemed “unavailable for work for at days.” least 90 mistakenly argue

Plaintiffs further that defendants required promulgate as a rule were their provision appro- because it conflicted with the priations purportedly explained. it acts that Even assuming, arguendo, is more restiic- that the 7 By contrast, applies three-part determine the valid- this Court test to ity agency’s of an The rules must be within the matter covered rules. enabling statute, comply underlying legislative intent, must with the arbitrary caрricious. Dep’t Corrections, and must be Luttrell v not 93, 100; Dep’t (1984); 365 NW2d 74 Natural Binsfeld 779, Resources, App 785-786; 434 NW2d 245 232

Opinion Court statutory provisions, tive than the this factor is of no consequence. Supreme rejected plaintiffs’ Our Court argument supra ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍quoting Wayne in Clonlara, 243, at Twp Metropolitan Davila, School Dist v 969 F2d (CA 1992): interpretation supported by enabling

An act is an interpretation, Otherwise, “wrong” invalid not a rule. inter- pretive might statements become rules with the force of premise promulgated law on the false were in apa procedures. reviewing accordance with the “[B]ecause disagrees agency interpretation court with an does not legislative.” render it

Therefore, we conclude that that trial court erred holding policy that defendants’ was invalid because it promulgated was not as a rule under the apa. 805(1)(B) rv. SUBSECTION OF THE APPROPRIATIONS ACTS argue Defendants next that the trial court erred in determining that their cоnflicted with the lan- guage appropriations agree. of the acts. We This questions statutory including Court reviews law, interpretation, supra de novo. Watson, at 644. Although responsibility it remains our to determine meaning give “appropriate of the statute, we def- agency’s interpretation. erence” to the See General Corp, supra, App Motors 93 Mich 373-374.This Court ordinarily defers to the construction of a statute agency charged applying with it unless the inter- pretation “clearly wrong.” Jones-Jennings v Hutzel Hosp (On Remand), App 94, 105;565 NW2d 680 407 v Opinion Court

A. STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION purpose construing is to ascertain statute, In our specific language meaning of the the reasonable Corp, General Motors statute. Cf. Gross v (1995); Mahrle v 158-159;528 NW2d 707 147, Mich App (1996); NW2d 56 Danke, 343, 348; Interpretation: generally, A Fed- see, Scalia, Matter of (Princeton, Courts & the Law NJ: Princeton Uni- eral pp versity 1997), construction is Press, 23-25. Judicial plain ordinary permitted meaning where the and statutory language is clear. Isaac, Ruff supra (1997); 1, 8; Watson, NW2d 55 at 644. concluding

In trial case, this court erred plain meaning violated the policy interpreted acts. Defendants’ 1991 PA subsection and 1992 PA provided “person 805(l)(b), which that a medically incapacitated diagnosed [was] who days” eligible for work for at least was unavailable policy explained to receive sda benefits. Defendants’ heading this under the “Standard for Deter- Disability”: mining medically Disability eligible

Clients are for State Assis- medically they eligible if are for ma on disabil- tance based ity physical or blindness or if have a and/or mental impairment impairments prevents or combination of which days performance remunerative work for 90 more. “[a]ny

The further defined the term “work” activity usually done for remuneration.” work or work pеrson reject plaintiffs’ argument a We that since security, ssi, receives social or medical assis- who 232 Mich Opinion Court disability qualifies tance because of a for sda benefits 805(l)(a) appropriations acts, under subsection must have intended a lesser standard qualify 805(l)(b) under subsection than that used purposes determining person ssi benefits. A engage disabled for if ssi he is unable to activity” by gainful impair- “substantial reason of an expected ment “which has lasted or can be to last for period a continuous of not less than twelve months.” 1382c(a)(3)(A). Legislature, 42 USC however, reasonably could have decided to authorize benefits gainful employ- for someone who is unable to sustain disability, ment for twelve months because of a sub- require 805(l)(a), higher section but threshold for disability incapacitates those whose them for less year, 805(l)(b). example, than a Legislature subsection For

could have reasoned that a who is incapacitated year may for less than a be able to bor- support pay row funds to himself and off the debt resuming gainful employment. Leg- after Further, the islature could have used the SSI standard in subsec- 805(1)(b) incapacity by tion if it intended to measure gainful-employment standard. We will not assume Legislature inadvertently that the omitted from sub- requirements section subsumed under 805(l)(a), subsection and then on the basis of that assumption, apply requirements those to subsection Farrington See Petroleum, Inc, Total 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 reject plaintiffs’

We likewise contention that the remaining 805(1) subsections of subsection Legislature’s acts evince the intent that 805(l)(b) encompass applicants who are capable performing work, some but cannot meet v Opinion the of Court disability. The because of their

their basic needs of apply specific categories to remaining subsections persons care, residential people (persons receiving treatment, victims, substance abuse receiving AIDS per- students, women, special pregnant education Persons in these person). for a disabled caring sons benefits even if do not sat- qualify for categories We will isfy requirements 805(l)(b). the of subsection statutory lan- construing the not, guise under disrupt legislative applying scheme guage, applicable persons falling standards only can persons subsections to who within the other qualify for benefits under subsection statutory to construe the instant

We also decline a or “substan- creating “significantly” standard where the tially” incapacitated Legislature It is well established employ language. did not of words in statutes eschew the insertion “[w]e necessary meaning or to give intelligible unless prevеnt absurdity, regard without to our own esti- Great Lakes mate of the wisdom of the legislation.” Comm, Corp Employment Security Steel aff’d App 656, 661-662; (1967), 150 NW2d 547 Here, Mich 249 has used these very signify something adverbs in other statutes to complete-impairment standard. less than total- See, 257.39a; (defining “per- MCL MSA e.g., 9.1839(1) handicap” purposes of the Vehi- Michigan manent 330.2001a(5); 14.800(1001a)(5) MCL MSA Code), cle chapter “mental illness” for (defining Code), 440.2608(1); Health MCL MSA Mental buyer’s to revoke his 19.2608(1) (governing right under the Uni- acceptance nonconforming goods 257.1403(3)(a); and MCL Code), form Commercial Opinion of the Court 9.2705(3)(3)(a) (creating presumption that a MSA attempts reasonable number of have been made to repair a defect in a new motor vehicle for Michigan law). guise the lemon Wewill not, under the appropriations interpreting acts, the write into the provision Legislature acts a that the has deсlined to enact. See Autio v Proksch Co, 517, Constr (1966). 524; 141 NW2d81 plaintiffs’

We further decline invitation to follow the Security federal courts’ construction of the Social Act determining meaning when the reasonable Michigan provision. plaintiffs correctly As note, ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍sda this Court, courts, like the federal would hold invalid agency impose higher rules that standards for disabil- ity Zebley, than set forth in the act. See Sullivan v 521; 493 US 885; S Ct 107 L Ed 2d 967 Unlike the case, acts involved in this Security explicitly grants however, the Social Act SSI people “any engage benefits to who are unable to in gainful activity.” substantial The act also mandates the consideration of vocational factors. 42 USC 1382c(a)(3). Congress drafting Like in the Social Security Legislature Act, our has evinced its intent incapacitation that a determination of by include the consideration of vocational factors expressly prоviding language so within of a Disability statute. For instance, the Worker’s Com- pensation Legislature Act, defined the term “disability” employee’s wage as a “limitation of an earning capacity qualifi- in work suitable to his or her training personal resulting injury cations and from a 418.301(4); or work related disease.” MCL MSA 17.237(301)(4). Leg- This Court has also held that the signaled islature its intent to consider vocational fac- phrase act Michigan using in the no-fault tors from mentally incapacitated earning” “physically or the determination of statutory provision regarding pur- of a terminates for dependency when the DAIIE, Vovak v survivor benefits. poses receiving NW2d 193 con- App 81, 84-86; (1980), MSA Given the 500.3110(3); 24.13110(3). MCL struing consid- calling inclusion of Legislature’s language can statutes, factors in other we eration of vocational only chose conclude that statutory in 1991 PA include similar 1992 PA subsection that defen Thus, holding the trial cоurt erred appro of the plain meaning dants’ violated the it for the courts to priations Importantly, acts. is not public policy legislation. debate the wisdom or of this n Dep’t Treasury, 534, 553, 22; Nummer v 448 Mich Ready-Power NW2d 250 see Co v Dear (1995); 533 We do born, 519, 525; 336 Mich 58 NW2d 904 construe the lan not do so here. Our function is to appropriations exists, acts as it not to guage 180, 192; Mich Morgan Taylor, v legislate. “incapacitated,” (1990). Giving NW2d 852 the terms “unavailable,” meanings, and “work” their common does not take into account voca 805(l)(b) subsection previous age, education, tional factors such as experience. such, applicant’s capacity As an to work mea of subsection is not 805(l)(b) work that he is able sured a minimum number of hours activity minimum remunerative to sustain work or a correctly inter Accordingly, standard. defendants inability requiring an preted 805(l)(b) subsection perform any wоrk. 232 Mich B. LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF DEFENDANTS’ CONSTRUCTION Even if we concluded that language acts was we ambiguous, would defer agency’s interpretation to the Legislature because the approved for determining eligibility 111, under 1991 PA when it enacted 1992 PA subsection 805(l)(b), which contained the identical language contained 1991 PA plaintiffs subsection 805(l)(b). correctly While note that a attempt failed to amend a statute is ordi- narily not legislative evidence of approval of an Rogers Detroit, agency’s construction, see 125, 162-164; 579 NW2d 840 (1998) J. dissent- (Taylor, ing), presumed to know of the agency’s construction of a adopts statute and such a construction when it reenacts the language so con- strued. See Canterbury Health Care, Dep’t Inc v Treasury, App 23, 30; 558 NW2d 444 (1996). Welfare legislation presents an application of unusual these principles because the Legislature must reestab- lish year the SDA each рrogram by appropriating funds for the in a program line item of the FLA See budget. Dep’t Saxon v Social Services, App 689, 699-700; 479 NW2d 361 (1991). Thus, the Legislature’s inclusion same in subsection 805(l)(b) of 1992 PA 168 was not a attempt failed amend act, but, an rather, constituted the reenact- ment of the language by construed defendants as requiring that claimant be incapable of remu- nerative work. mistakenly

Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature’s modify decision to subsection 805(l)(b) and mandate the use of the SSI year standard fiscal during 1993-94, 1993 PA signaled disapproval the of defendants’ v years. Although prior policy this Court two for the contro soon after a enacted an amendment can view legislative versy regarding has arisen as a statute original interpretation basis, and, on that act Harper Progressive give Casu effect, it retroactive alty 263 NW2d 764, 768; Co, Ins Leg light (1977), In to do so here.8 we decline 805(l)(b) in subsection to reenact islature’s decision yeаr appropriations 1992-93,we do act for fiscal adopt Legislature’s the ssi decision to not consider rejection use defendants’ as a 1993-94 standard for in 1991-92and 1992- restrictive standard of the more determining Accordingly, trial court erred 93. violated the that defendants’ correctly con defendants acts because 805(l)(b) and the subsection strued reenacting approved subsection that construction Jones-Jennings, year 805(l)(b) 1992-93.See for fiscal supra Canterbury supra at 30. Care, Health 105; at entry judg and remand for We therefore reverse ment for defendants. light trial court that the

In of our determination declaring invalid, we do defendants’ erred in arguments.9 remaining not address retain We do not and remanded. Reversed jurisdiction. J., concurred.

Bandstra, year 805(l)(b) 1993-94 was not techni- for fiscal The new subsection expired previous cally at because the an amendmеnt year fiscal 1992-93. the end of additionally plaintiffs argue exhaust their failed to Defendants initiating and that the trial this action remedies before administrative supplemental plaintiffs granting relief. court erred App Opinion by Cavanagh, J. part {concurring dissenting J. in and Cavanagh, join part). parts majority opinion. I n and in of the I part dissent from iv, however, I because believe that interpretation defendants’ of 1991PA 111, subsection 805(l)(b) unjustifiably resulted in an restrictive stan- eligibility disability dard of benefits that was con- trary Legislature. to the intent of the provides 805(l)(b) persons eligible

Subsection disability program for the state “[a] include medically diagnosed incapacitated who is and days.” unavailable for work for at least 90 To deter- eligibility provision, Department mine under this developed following of Social Services (dss) policy: medically eligible Disability

Clients are for State Assis- they medically eligible tance if are for ma assis- [medical based on or blindness if tance] have a physical impairment and/or mental or combination impairments prevents performance which remu- days nerative work for 90 or more. “[a]ny

Defendants defined the term “work” as work or activity usually work done for remuneration.” statutory provide General rules of construction plain ordinary language if the and of a statute is clear, judicial necessary permit- construction is neither nor Meyer Jewelry ted. Co v Johnson, (1998). 180; 581 NW2d 734 However, if a literal con- produce struction aof statute would unreasonable unjust purpose and results inconsistent with the may depart the statute, the court from a literal con- Security Processing struction. Rowell v Steel Co, 445 354; 518 NW2d409 Opinion by Cavanagh, J. interpretation subsec- I believe that unjust and leads to unreasonable tiоn “work,” the terms contend that Defendants results. “job” “employment,” such fac- are not limited days worked, the and hours the number of tors as wages educa- received, or an individual’s amount person training. to a who is available Hence, tion and job pays an hour that one dollar one hour at a work ninety-day period during to benefits. is not entitled a by if few, be met for entitlement can Such a standard hospitalized any, suffer who are other than those disability three- to twelve- for the entire from a severe period. month Legislature according defendants, to

Thus, anomaly. following PA Pursuant to 1991 intended recipient supplemental 805(l)(a), a 111, person security (ssi) eligible A for benefits. income engage purposes if he is unable to for ssi is disabled impair- activity” gainful an because of in “substantial year 42 USC or more. lasts for one ment 1382c(a)(3)(A). 111, 1991 PA subsec- However, under 805(l)(b), disabled for more who is tion year ninety days can receive but less than one than perform completely only unable to if he is benefits any compensation. work for amount amount of statutory provisions be con- should Furthermore, carry provisions light out related of other strued Farrington purpose Legislature. v Total 209; ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍ 501 NW2d Inc, Petroleum, remaining of subsection subsections reading support 805(1) a broader PA in subsection contained standard thirty-day people receiving 111 authorized benefits recipients sufferers, treatment, AIDS substance-abuse Opinion by Cavanagh, J. special pregnant services, education women, and persons. caretakers of disabled See subsections 805(1)(d)-(h). Undoubtedly people some in each of categories engage these can in some remunerative may work, but not be able to maintain sufficient employment support Only themselves. those who ninety days are disabled for more than but less than year subject one are to the Draconian standard adopted by defendants. approving interpretation

In of the stat majority ute, the relies on the fact that the § year, reenacted 805 for the 1992-93fiscal 1992 PA despite Legislature adopted the fact that the year, SSI standard for the 1993-94fiscal PA 186. statutory provide The rules of construction longstanding, interpretation consistent administrative charged of a statute those with its execution is weight ought entitled to considerable not be cogent Ludington overruled without reasons. Service Corp Acting Comm’r Ins, 444 Mich 481, 490; interpreta NW2d 661 However, defendants’ legislative provision long tion of the at issue is not standing weight. and is therefore entitled to less legislative process, Given the realties of the I do single find the reenactment of dispositive Legislature’s be a indicator intent. grant plaintiffs’ I would affirm the trial court’s summary disposition. motion for

Case Details

Case Name: Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency

Court Name: Michigan Court of Appeals

Date Published: Feb 3, 1999

Citation: 591 N.W.2d 314

Docket Number: Docket 198222

Court Abbreviation: Mich. Ct. App.