FACTORY ASSOCIATES & EXPORTERS, INC., Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Defendant-Appellant, v. LEHIGH SAFETY SHOES CO. LLC, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Counter-Defendant-Appellee.
No. 08-1835-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 29, 2010.
110-113
David S. Bloomfield, Jr., (David K. Orensten, of counsel, on the brief), Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, OH, and Albert J. Millus, Jr., of counsel, on the brief, Hinman, Howard & Kattell, LLP, Binghamton, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: WALKER, PIERRE N. LEVAL and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Factory Associates & Exporters, Inc. (“Factory Associates“) appeals the February 4, 2008, 2008 WL 314557, judgment of the district court to the extent the court: (1) granted summary judgment for Lehigh Safety Shoes Co. LLC (“Lehigh“) and dismissed all claims asserted in the original and amended complaints except for Factory Associates’ claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; and (2) found in favor of Lehigh after a bench trial on the remaining claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual background, procedural history and issues raised in this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court‘s judgment.
We review a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. N.Y. State Rest. Ass‘n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir.2009). “On appeal from a judgment after a bench trial, we review the district court‘s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Mixed questions of law and fact are also reviewed de novo.” Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir.2008).
To prevail on a claim of breach of ex
Factory Associates argues that an ambiguity exists “as to the existence and applicability of a binding limited warranty” because “the quotation and purchase order are silent on the limited warranty,” and the district court erred by considering “extrinsic evidence outside of the ‘four corners’ of the quotation and purchase order” in granting summary judgment as to the express warranty claim. Factory Associates admitted, however, that it saw the “Promise Plus 6 Month Warranty” in the Lehigh catalogue from which it ordered the safety shoes at issue. Additionally, though the shoes were ordered in early 2002, Factory Associates did not complain of the alleged defects to Lehigh “until the end of 2003, beginning of 2004,” which is well after the warranty had expired. On summary judgment, the district court did not err in considering Lehigh‘s “Promise Plus 6 Months Warranty,” which was limited to the period of “six months (180 days) from the date of purchase” and stated that “[t]he warranty provided herein is in lieu of all other express warranties.”1 Based on the undisputed fact that Factory Associates knew of Lehigh‘s limited warranty and failed to complain about the safety shoes it purchased from Lehigh in the time prescribed by that limited warranty, summary judgment was properly granted to Lehigh on Factory Associates’ breach of express warranty claim.
Regarding the claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Factory Associates argues that the district court committed legal error by requiring it to prove that Lehigh knew or should have known that the shoes would be stored for over a year, despite the court‘s finding “that the particular purpose of the safety shoes was for use in Nigeria.” According to Factory Associates, “the amount of storage time is wholly irrelevant under these facts,” and “to the extent that storage conditions are deemed legally relevant, Lehigh, not Factory Associates[,] has the burden of proving an affirmative defense of misuse or misapplication.” The district court, however, did not find “that the particular purpose of the safety shoes was for use in Nigeria.” Rather, the court found that although “Defendant unquestionably knew that its shoes were being sold to Plaintiff for storage in [a] warehouse in Nigeria pending sale to ... customers, ... [w]hat is missing ... is sufficient evidence ... that Defendant knew that the shoes would sit in [the] warehouse for more than one year (during which time
Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
