Plaintiffs-appellants Paul and Annette Fabozzi appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, /.). The Fabozzis had a homeowners insurance policy with Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”), which covered their ocean-side home on Staten Island, New York. When the house began to collapse as the result of structural damage, they filed a claim with Lexington. Twenty-six months later, Lexington denied coverage and the Fabozzis subsequently sued. Relying on a policy provision that required any suit to be commenced within two years “after .the date of loss,” Lexington contended that the Fabozzis had waited too long and the limitations period had expired. The district court agreed, granted Lexington’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the suit. This appeal turns on whether, under New York law, the limitations period was triggered when the underlying damage to their home occurred, or when all the conditions precedent to bringing suit had been met. Because, under longstanding New York law, the limitations period did not begin to run until the Fabozzis’ claim against Lexington accrued, rather the date of the accident, we conclude that the action must be remanded. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The Fabozzis purchased their home in 1992, obtaining homeowners’ insurance coverage from a number of companies over the succeeding years. Lexington first insured the property in 2001, aware of the property’s beach-front location, and sold the Fabozzis a specialized “Lex Elite” homeowner policy. When this policy was renewed in 2002, the annual cost of the premiums was $8,710.
The Fabozzis claim that they first became aware of structural deterioration during the course of a renovation that began in 2001. By April 2002, their house had to be propped up to prevent it from fully collapsing. Approximately one month later, on May 13, 2002, the Fabozzis submitted their claim to Lexington. The company, subsequently undertook an investigation to determine the cause of the damage, requesting documents, obtaining an engineer’s evaluation, and ultimately taking Fabozzi’s oral examination in January 2004. Altogether, Lexington’s investigation of the claim lasted more than two years. Ultimately, on July 29, 2004, the insurance company denied coverage, stat *90 ing that the damage was attributable to “wear and tear, deterioration, inherent vice, latent defect, wet and/or dry rot, as well as earth movement” — causes that it said were excluded from coverage. On October, 29, 2004, the Fabozzis sued Lexington, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Fabozzis’ policy contained a contractual limitations clause, which read:
Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is started within two years after the date of loss.
Interpreting this language, the district court held that, under New York law, “the date of loss” was the date the damage occurred, not the date the Fabozzis’ claim was denied. As a result, the court concluded that the two-year contractual limitations period had expired, notwithstanding the fact that Lexington’s investigation lasted more than two years while the plaintiffs’ claim for coverage remained pending. The district court also rejected the Fabozzis’ argument that conduct and statements by Lexington and its brokers tolled the limitations period. Although equitable estoppel is generally treated as a question of fact, the court determined that no genuine dispute precluded summary judgment. On appeal, the Fabozzis argue that the district court incorrectly applied New York’s law on contractual limitations periods and, alternatively, that unresolved factual issues precluded summary judgment on their equitable estoppel theory. We do not reach the latter argument, concluding instead that, under New York law, the Fabozzis’ limitations period did not begin to run at the time of the accident.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner,
B. ' Analysis
The Fabozzis’ policy required that they bring suit “within two years after the date of loss.” They argue that, under New York law, this language means the date on which the cause of action accrues' — that is, the date on which all the conditions precedent to bringing a claim have been satisfied. 1 In their view, New York law distinguishes between the policy language here *91 and language in other policies that, instead, require actions be commenced within a certain period after “the inception of the loss.” Only, this latter’ term of art, or language of equal precision, they argue, can tie a limitations period to the date of the accident or peril insured against. We conclude that the Fabozzis are .correct.
1. State law
In
Steen v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,
The evolution of this requirement was analyzed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17
N.Y.2d 239,
At the same time, however, New York courts continued to regard more generic language — such as policy provisions foreclosing suit a certain period “after loss or damage” — as triggering the limitations period only “from the time that liability accrues under the provisions of the policy.”
Margulies v. Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
While recognizing the long history of this distinction in New York insurance law, the district court relied on three recent cases from New York’s Appellate Division; — most notably,
Costello v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
In a one-page order citing little authority,
Costello,
for example, denied that any distinction existed between the words “date of loss” and “after inception of the loss.” Instead, it stated that “[b]oth phrases have consistently been held to refer to the date of the catastrophe insured against, and
not
to the accrual date of the plaintiffs’ claim against [the insurer] for failure to pay.”
Costello,
Tellingly, the eases cited by
Costello
express no such view of New York law, and certainly do not represent a revision of the long-standing distinction drawn by the New York Court of Appeals. The principal authority,
Myers, Smith & Granady, Inc. v. N.Y. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n,
Costello
also cites
Proc,
*93 2. Application
The Fabozzis’ policy provides that the limitations period would expire “two years after the date of loss,” a threshold that New York courts have long regarded as signifying the date on which the claim accrues, not the date on which damage was incurred.
See Koppelman v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
No. CV-05-2496,
Despite the prevailing rule, Lexington argues that other uses of the word “loss” within the Fabozzis’ insurance policy confirm its interpretation of the limitations provision. While “loss” is used frequently throughout the contract in other contexts, it' is never defined. Instead, the policy’s definitions section refers to “occurrence.” This latter term “means an accident, in-eluding continuous or repeated exposure to ■substantially, the same general harmful conditions, which results ... in (a) ‘Bodily injury’; or (b) ‘Property damage.’” If Lexington intended to draft around New York’s century-old interpretation of its limitations language — by tying this period to the date of the “occurrence” or accident — it could readily have done so. At most, the other uses of “loss” in the contract render that term ambiguous. In the absence of other extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent, it is well-settled law that where an insurer has drafted the policy, as here, “any ambiguity in [the] ... policy should be resolved in favor of the insured.”
McCostis v. Home Ins. Co.,
For limitations purposes, a claim generally accrues only once the conditions precedent to filing suit have been satisfied.
See Steen,
Because we do not have the benefit of full briefing or a district court ruling on this question, however, we decline to resolve it in the first instance. The case is remanded to the district court so that it may consider when the Fabozzis’ claim accrued and whether, in light of this determination, their suit was timely.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Notes
. Before bringing a suit under the policy, the Fabozzis were required to comply with a number of other conditions, including provision of notice, requested records and documents, and an examination under oath.
. The remaining two cases cited by the district court in its memorandum simply point to
Costello
without further analysis or elaboration.
See Klawiter v. CGU/OneBeacon Ins. Group,