F.F. v. G.A.D.R.F.F. v. G.A.D.R.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Sоmetime before August 1994, decedent T.D., a hemophiliac, became infected with HIV from the infusion of impure anti-hemophiliac factor blood concentrate (the Factor). The Factor is a commercial product produсed by several pharmaceutical companies, many of whom were sued by recipients of contaminated blood. Decedent T.D. filed such an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The suit was removed to the United States District Court in New Jersey, and thereafter transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, where it became part of a class action suit.
On August 12, 1994, decedent died of AIDS as a result of the HIV infection. The suit continued both as a Wrongful Death Aсtion under N.J.S.A 2A:31-1 to -6, and as a survivorship suit, seeking benefits under N.J.S.A 2A:15-3 for damages incurred by the decedent prior to his death.
In October 1996, the class action was settled. Under the settlement, each living person who had been infected by the Factor during the years 1978 through 1985, was entitled to receive $100,000. For any infected person who had died, the $100,000 was to be paid to that person’s “claimant group,” defined essentially as those persons who would receive derivative claims through the decedеnt.
The suit on behalf of decedent T.D. had been maintained in Illinois by plaintiff F.F., a sistеr of decedent, who had also been named as executrix and sole beneficiary under his will. She claimed that the $100,000 settlement proceeds were payable to decedent’s estate (and thus to her as sole beneficiary of the estate), and she rejected competing claims by a number of decedent’s other siblings. However, instead of proceeding to resolve that dispute via one of the procedures established by Judge Grady, plaintiff filed the present аction in Superior Court in Middlesex County, New Jersey.
In an affidavit supporting her New Jersey complaint, plaintiff stated that she brought this action “to establish her exclusive rights to the proceeds” of the settlement. She sought and obtained an order to show cause, asking the court to direct payment of the proceeds to her as executrix of the estate.
The defendants maintain that issues relating to entitlement to the $100,000 should be resolved in Illinois, where the action had been prosecuted and settled, and where the court had established procedures to resolve such disputes. They also deny plaintiff’s claim to the settlement funds, noting that at least part of the $100,000 represents settlement of a Wrongful Death Action under
Following oral argument, the trial court entered an order providing that the settlement funds “are hereby awarded to the Estate” оf the decedent. The court then directed that “distribution of the funds by the executrix” shall be stayed for forty-five days “during which time the monies shall be held in the trust account of plaintiffs counsel.”
In their appeal, defendants note that, although plaintiff clаims the court’s order represents only a determination to hold the funds in New Jersey pending final determination as to entitlement, the order actually embodies a determination that the estate — rather than the defendants — are entitled to аll of the funds. Defendants claim that determination preempts them from arguing their right to at least a portion of the $100,000, and they argue further that the determination of entitlement should properly be rendered in the Federal Court of Northern Illinois rathеr than in Middlesex County. We agree with both contentions, and thus we reverse.
The order under appeal seems premised on an assumption that the $100,000 must necessarily belong to decedent’s estate, and that any dispute concerning the ultimatе receipt of those funds must proceed in the context of administration of that estate. If that is the premise of the order (and we can see no other basis for the trial court’s determination), it is clearly mistaken.
The claim prosecuted in Illinois on behalf of decedent T.D. included two distinctly different causes of action. One involved claims for damages suffered by decedent prior to his death. Those claims were recoverable under the so-called Survival Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, which рrovides for the decedent’s executor or administrator to recover such damages as the decedent would have received had he been living.
The second claim prosecuted in Illinois was a Wrongful Death Action maintained under N.J.S.A 2A:31-1 to -6. That
The amount recovered in proceedings under this chapter shall be for the exclusive benefit of the persons entitled to take any intestate personal property of the decedent, and in the proportions in which they are entitled to take the same. If any of the persons so entitled were dependent on the decedent at his death, they shall take the same as though they were sole persons so entitled, in such proportions, as shall be determined by the court without a jury, and as will result in a fair and equitable apportionment of the amount recovered, among them,____
Thus, as the Court noted in Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 200,
The cause of action for wrongful death and the deceased’s own cause of action for personal injuries are separate and distinct claims____ The decedent’s personal claim is an asset of his estate; the death claim is not.
[Ibid., N. 34.]
See also Alfone v. Sarno, 168 N.J.Super. 315, 323,
In short, the court’s apparent assumption that the $100,000 settlement proceeds here should be paid to decedent’s executor, to be disbursed as part of his estate, is incorrect. The $100,000 must be proportionally allocated between the claims based on the Wrongful Death Act and the Survivor’s Act. That conflict is, to some extent at least, inherent in many post-death recoveries sinсe, as the court noted in Alfone v. Sarno, “in the usual case both
In cases such as this in which the hemophiliac has died, this typically means survivorship claims of the estate compete with claims for wrоngful death. The beneficiaries of the two claims are frequently different and the [dispute resolution] ... procedures adopted by the District Court were intended to resolve these disputes where the parties could not agree upon а fair division among themselves.
Clearly then, the merits of the competing claims to the $100,000 must be resolved before that sum can be paid to any such claimant, including the executor of decedent’s estate.
The remaining question to be resolved is where that resolution should take place: in the Northern District of Illinois, or in the Superior Court in Middlesex County. It is clear to us that the Illinois Federal Court is the appropriate tribunal to make that decision.
This class action suit was instituted in Illinois, processed in Illinois, and settled in Illinois. Judge Grady, in Illinois, has presided over the matter, has supervised the case and has authority to direct disposition of the settlement proceeds.
The procedures established by Judge Grady are sound and appropriate. The report of Special Master Nicholas J. Bua, provided to Judge Brady and supplied to us on this appeal, demonstrates a firm grasp of the issues in the case, and an accurate knowledge of the appropriate New Jersey law. Under the procedures established by the Illinois court, the dispute between plaintiff and defendants can be resolved either through a report and recommendation by Mr. Bua, submitted to the court for its approval or modification; or by an alternative arbitration procedure. Either makes sense and represents a rational, fair method of resolving the claims of the respective parties.
Defendants maintain that the Superior Court in Middlesex County had no jurisdiction to hear this case. We doubt that is so. Our long arm jurisdictional rule is coextensive with constitutional due process jurisdictional limits. Were there a need to do so, we
However, assuming New Jersey has the constitutional authority to hear this case, it does not follow that it should do so. The matter is already pending and ripe for rеsolution in another tribunal and under sound principles of comity, it is most appropriate that this state defer to the federal court in Illinois to complete its handling and resolution of the matter.
Comity does not rest on a lack of jurisdiction. Rather, it rests on a voluntary recognition of pending judicial proceedings in another forum. “Comity is not a binding obligation on the forum state, but a courtesy voluntarily extended to another state for reasons of ‘practice, convenienсe and expediency.’ ” City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 86 N.J. 55, 64,
Considerations of comity forbid interference with the prosecution of a proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction capable of affording adequate relief and doing complete justice, unless there bе a special equity____ The question is not the existence of the power but the propriety of its exercise in the given case. The rule of comity is grounded in the policy of avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction, unless upon strong grounds, and the general principle that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the issue has precedence.
[O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 179,78 A.2d 64 (1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824, 74 S.Ct. 42, 98 L.Ed. 350 (1953).]
See also Schulmeisters v. Schulmeisters, 281 N.J.Super. 216, 220-22,
Application of the comity principle is most appropriate here. Until now, this entire matter has proceeded in Illinois. The court in Illinois has procedures in place to deal with the present dispute. That court can efficiently adjudicate the parties’ disputes and can
The order of the Law Division is reversed. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed so that further necessary proceedings may take place in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.