37 N.H. 114 | N.H. | 1858
The general principle of the common law is, that the right and disposition of movables is to be governed by the law of the domicil of the owner, and not by the law of their local situation; while the laws of the’ place where real property is situate exclusively govern in respect to the rights of the parties, the modes of transfer, and the solemnities which should accompany them. The title, therefore, to real property can be acquired, passed and lost, only according to the lex rei sitae. Story’s Conflict of Laws, secs. 376, 424, and authorities.
The validity of every disposition of real estate must depend upon the law of the country in which that estate is situate. Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Vezey, Jr., 537, 541; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige 627, 630; Elliot v. Lord Minto, 6 Madd. 16; Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 5 B. & C. 438, [11 Eng. Com. Law 266.]
Vatiel lays it down as a principle of international law,
All the authorities, both in England and this country, recognize the principle in its fullest import, that real estate, or immovable property, is exclusively subject to the laws of the government within whose territory it is situate. See a very large collection of them, in Story’s Conflict of Laws, (2d Ed.) 361, sec. 1428.
Among other applications of the general principle, Story says, if a person is incapable of transferring his immovable property by the law of the situs, his transfer will be held invalid, although by the law of his domicil no such personal incapacity exists. He instances, as an illustration, the case of a married woman, who may be authorized, by the law of her domicil, to alienate her land. Yet, if by the law of the situs she could not do so, her attempt to alienate, by deed or otherwise, would be wholly inoperative and ipso facto void. Conflict of Laws, sec. 431. Executory contracts respecting real estate, such as wills, must be in the form prescribed by the law of the situs, in order to pass title thereto, although good and regular according to the law of the domicil; and no conveyance or transfer of land can be made, whether testamentary, or inter vivos, except according to the formalities prescribed by the local law. The title to land in this country can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the law of the place where the property is situate. Story’s' Conflict of Laws, sec. 435; United States v. Crosby, 7 Cranch 115; Cutter v. Davenport, 1 Pick. 81, 86; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige 220; McCormicks. Sullivan, 10 Wheaton 192; Darby v. Mayer, 11 Wheaton 465.
It is universally agreed that the law rei sites is to prevail in relation to all dispositions of immovable properly, and the nature and extent of the interest to be alienated. If the local law prescribes that no person shall dispose, by
In regard to wills, the doctrine is clearly established at the common law, that the law of the place where real estate is locally situate, is to govern as to the capacity or incapacity of the testator to devise, the extent of his power to dispose of the property, and the forms and solemnities necessary to give the will or testament its due attestation and effect. Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 474, and authorities.
The descent and heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by the law of the country within which it is situate. No person can take except those who are recognized as legitimate hems by the laws of that country, and they take in the proportions and the order which those laws prescribe. This is the indisputable doctrine of the common law. Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 483, and authorities.
The foregoing principles have been distinctly recognized in this State. Heydock’s Appeal, 7 N. H. 496 ; Goodall v. Marshall, 11 N. H. 91.
The third section of the act of July 2, 1822j in force in this State at the decease of the plaintiff, Louisa L. Eyre’s father, is in these words:
“ Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That if there be any child, or any lineal heir of a child, in the descending line, which has no devise or legacy by the will of the deceased father or mother,, and which is not named or referred to in
Under the provisions of this section, there can be no doubt that the father of Mrs. Eyre, if he had been domiciled in this State, could not, by any will making no provision for her, have deprived her of the right, as his only child and heir at law, to inherit his property. Being born after the death of her father, and in no way named or provided for in his will, she must have inherited all his property, as if he had died intestate ; in other words, the will would have been wholly inoperative. .
So far as the real estate situate in New-Hampshire is concerned, the domicil of the father, and the question whether or not, by the laws of that domicil, the birth of a posthumous child operated to nullify the will, are wholly immaterial. The statute of this State forbids the land being transferred by the devise of the father, to the disinheritance of a child born after his death, and not provided for in the will. By our laws, under the circumstances of the agreed case, Mrs. Eyre only, being the sole child of her father, can legally take and hold his lands situate here.
Nor does it make any difference that the plaintiffs are
According to the provisions of the agreed case, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for the undivided half of the demanded premises, as claimed by them in their writ.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.