2 N.J. Eq. 44 | New York Court of Chancery | 1838
This bill was fded by Andrew Howell in his life-time, for the foreclosure and sale of the premises con
It is very evident that the defendant himself has no personal knowledge of the transaction, but relies on and believes the information given him by Mr. Cammann. He answers in a guarded manner, and with great propriety.
The single question raised by these pleadings, is, whether the bond and mortgage is tainted with usury? If so, I can have no alternative hut to declare them void. But before I can do this, seeing that such a result is highly penal in its character, destroying the whole demand of the complainants as founded on the bond and mortgage, I ought to be well satisfied that the case proved comes within the true construction and meaning of the act against usury, and the proof from the mouth of competent witnesses. 1 have already stated that the defendant, by his answer, dearly relies on information received from Augustus F. Cam-¡maim: and when I examine the evidence, I am equally clear that the defendant must rely on the evidence of the same person to sustain his cause.
This witness is objected to by the complainants, first, because his name appears, as one of the makers of the thousand dollar note, and it is against public policy that a man shall be allowed by his own evidence to destroy a negociable instrument on which his name appears.
If this was a new question, it would present matter for grave’ deliberation, for 1 confess >4 have ever felt a great reluctance to-the admission of such a witness ; but since the case of Roseveli v. Gardner, in 2 Pennington, 791, I consider it settled that this objection cannot, alone, exclude the witness. The practice has been, and so I consider the rule settled in New-Jersey, that the witness is competent. But this objection cannot apply to th©' present case, This action is not founded on the note.- That watt
The second objection is more serious, on the ground of interest. It seems that this witness is the only party really interested in the loan of the thousand dollars. The defendant, Auten, is only security for Cammann, and I can perceive no good reason why a recovery on this bond and mortgage will not-make him directly liable to Auten for the money. With this strong’ impression on this point against the competency of the witness, I incline still to allow his testimony, letting the objection go to his credit rather than to his competency.- I do so from a- desire to settle the case on its merits, as moie satisfactory to all the parties, and because no objection was raised to the witness at the time he was sworn, when, as was truly said by the defendant’s counsel, it was in their power to have released the witness, and thereby made him competent.
I am, then, to examine this case upon the whole evidence, the most material of which is that of Augustus F.- Cammann. The first section of the statute against usury, provides, “ that no person shall, upon any contract, take directly or indirectly, for loan of any money, wares, &c. above the value of seven dollars for the forbearance of one hundred dollars for a year.” This is a case under the old law, prior to the 4th of July, 1S24. The second section provides, “ that all notes, bills, bonds, mortgages, &c. made for the payment of any money so to be lent, on which a higher interest is reserved or taken, shall be utterly void.” It is clear, that to constitute usury, there must be a contract in violation of the act. In 2 Saunders on Pleading and, Evidence,-493, it is said, “ To constitute usury under the .act, there must be a contract with an unlawful intent to take illegal interest.” And in 1 Camp. 149; “ it must be shown that there was a contract or agreement for usurious interest: for if the interest appear to have been reserved by mistake,, or upon an error in computation, the contract will not thereby be avoided.” It has also been held, that the contract must be tainted with usury in concoction, and any subsequent corrupt contract will not invalidate it.
Taking these principles as true, and giving full credit to the testimony of Mr. Cammann, I cannot see how this contract can be made out to be usurious. From his own case, there Was no contract between him and Andrew Howell ever made, by which he was to pay more than the legal interest for this money. Being in want of money, Cammann applied to Andrew Howell for if, and was told by him that if he would give his note with one John Miller, and endorsed by Thomas Auten, that he could-raise the money on it. That such note, for a thousand dollars,was accordingly made and handed to Andrew HotVell. No money, it would seem, was paid until after the note was executed and delivered to Andrew Howell. What were the te'rms of the contract? Was Howell to have any thing beyond the legal interest for the loan of the money? This is the material question. The witness answers it explicitly; Referring to the note, he says, “ there was nothing but common interest for the consideration.” This is the language of the witness, and he afterwards explains the meaning of the word common interest, as used by him in this expression, to be legal interest. Throughout his whole evidence,- he complained of the treatment of Andrew Howell, in not paying him the whole of the thousand dollars, as a breach of good faith; not as a withholding, upon any express or implied contract at the lending of the money that he might do so, but as being contrary to both. We have,- then, this case. Howell agrees to lend Cammann, upon his note with 1 security,©ne thousand dollars. By the contract, he was to be charged no - thing but the legal rate of interest. Howell pays him a part of the money by a Mr. Hoagland at one time, being two hundred and fifty dollars, and a part at another time, but withholds, contrary to good faith, a part of the money. Is this usurious within the meaning of the statute ? Howell is clearly indebted to
There appears to have been other transactions between these; parties,- and which were blended in the settlement of the note.Cammann thought proper, contrary to the usual course of business, to give the-note first, and depend on-Howell’s paying him' the money afterwards.
The evidence of James Cain- relates to a conversation-he had-with Howell on this subject, in 1827. He went to see him about-a note- of Stephen Perrine. This must have been after Cammann had set up usury in- this case, as the defendant, in his answer, says if, was in the spring of 1824 that he told Howell that Cammann meant to- set up the 'plea of usury against the note. The amount of this conversation with Mr.- Cain, was,- that the Perrine note was turned into this Oammann note; and Howell said he meant to- wait the result of this suit before he disposed of
Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion, that the contract on which the bond and mortgage in this case were given, was not usurious within the meaning and true construction of the statute on that subject, but that the same are a valid security to the extent of the money advanced by Howell on the same to Cammann, and of the liabilities of Cammann which were settled thereby. I shall direct a reference to a master, to ascertain the amount due on the same, in conformity with this opinion, with direction to .allow the defendant a credit for any part of the thousand dollars which was never paid or accounted for by Andrew Howell to Augustus F. Cammann on the loan.