84 P. 242 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1906
Petitioner, one Bud White, was convicted of the crime of petit larceny and was sentenced to "pay a fine of $500 or be imprisoned in the county jail one day for each dollar of said fine." He was subsequently discharged on writ of habeas corpus heard by the judge of the superior court of Mendocino county. Thereafter the district attorney of said county served notice on the attorney for petitioner directing him to "take notice that the people of the state of California ex rel. J. H. Smith, sheriff of the county of Mendocino, state of California, and J. H. Smith, as sheriff of the said county of Mendocino, hereby appeal to the district court of appeal for the third district, state of California, from the order and judgment in the above-entitled action in the above-entitled court and entered on the sixth day of July, A.D. 1905, in favor of Bud White, and from the whole thereof." Whether the district attorney or sheriff could use the name of the people of the state without the *727 consent of the attorney general first obtained is a question raised, but we will not consider it.
Will an appeal lie to this court from the order or judgment? The question arose in 1852, in Matter of Perkins,
But it is contended by appellant that this doctrine has been changed by the recent amendment to the constitution conferring jurisdiction on the district courts of appeal (Const., *728
art. VI, sec. 4), and by the amendment of section
Having in mind the original purpose of the writ, it is difficult for us to perceive the wisdom or reason upon which statutes are based which allow an appeal in cases where the prisoner has been discharged or that deny the right altogether of making a second application to any other court when once remanded. The delay which might and generally would attend the appeal would in many cases work a denial of the very object of the writ, which is to secure the present discharge of the prisoner, and in most cases the value of this bulwark of personal liberty would be so impaired as to lose the distinctive character and office with which it has been clothed ever since King John met the Barons at Runnymeade in 1215, and instead of being the safeguard of human liberty it might become a means of oppression.
In the reply brief appellant contends that the action of the superior court was in excess of its jurisdiction. This contention is based upon the provisions of sections
The appeal is dismissed.
McLaughlin, J., and Buckles, J., concurred.