Ex Parte Weaver Weaver
Thе petitioners now before us, Robert Weaver and Frances Weaver, sued Robert‘s former employer Kimberly-Clark Corporation and other defendants for negligently or wantonly installing, maintaining, or repairing a catwalk and its handrail in a pulp аnd paper mill while Kimberly-Clark owned the mill and employed Robert and, by such negligence or wantonness, causing Robert‘s injury, which occurred after Robert‘s employment with Kimberly-Clark had terminated and after Kimberly-Clark‘s ownership of the mill, the site of the injury, had tеrminated. Robert was injured in a fall caused by the failure of the handrail, which “gave way.”
Kimberly-Clark moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, §
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Weaver v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., [Ms. 2991238, November 30, 2001] 871 So.2d 814 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001). Relying on Fields v. Jantec, 317 Or. 432, 857 P.2d 95 (1993), the Court of Civil Appeals held that Kimberly-Clark was entitled to invoke the exclusivity provisions of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, §
The Weavers have petitioned us for a writ of certiorari, which we have granted, to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. The Weavers present a question of first impression: whether “a former employer of an injured former employee can avail itself of [the] Workers’ Compensation [Act] exclusivity immunity when an employee-employer relationship existed at the time of the defendant/former employer‘s negligent act, but not аt the time of the injury to the plaintiff/former employee.” (Weavers’ brief, p. 1.)
The first argument to us by Kimberly-Clark is that a procedural default by the Weavers before the trial court justifies its entry of summary judgment. Kimberly-Clark argues that the Weavers did not opposе the motion for summary judgment with factual evidence as ordered by the trial court but opposed the motion for summary judgment only with authorities and argument on the law. Kimberly-Clark further argues that this Court, therefore, should strike the opposition the Weavers filed before the trial court.
This argument by Kimberly-Clark fails for two reasons. First, because a moving party‘s entitlement to summary judgment depends not only on the absence of a genuine issue of material fact but also on the propriety of judgment as a mаtter of law, Rule 56(c)(3), Ala.R.Civ.P., and Dobbs v.Shelby County Econ. Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So.2d 425, 428 (Ala. 1999), the Weavers were entitled to rely on the impropriety of summary judgment as a matter of law. Second, Kimberly-Clark failed to move to strike the Weavers’ opposition before the trial court. “Our review is limited to the issues that were before the trial court — an issue raised on appeal must have first been presented to and ruled on by the trial court.” Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Ala. 1992). Therefore, this Court will proceed to analyze the issue of first impression presented by this petition for the writ of certiorari.
“On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil appeals.” Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996).
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule 56(c)(3), Ala.R.Civ.P., and Dobbs v. Shelby County Economic Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So.2d 425 (Ala. 1999). The court must accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. System Dynamics Int‘l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So.2d 419 (Ala. 1996). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court, de novo, applies the same standard as the trial court. Dobbs, supra.”
Ex parte Kraatz, 775 So.2d 801, 803 (Ala. 2000).
“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect tо the intent of the legislature as manifested in the language of the statute. Gholston v. State, 620 So.2d 719 (Ala. 1993). Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the language of the statute is conclusive. Words must be given their natural, ordinary, commonly understood meaning, аnd where plain language is used, the court is bound to interpret that language
to mean exactly what it says. IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Associates Corp., 602 So.2d 344 (Ala. 1992).”
Ex parte State Dep‘t of Revenue, 683 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala. 1996). “Sections of the Code dealing with the same subject matter are in pari materia. As a general rule, such statutes should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each.” Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451, 453 (Ala. 1977) (citations omitted). “Courts must liberally construe the workers’ compensation law `to effectuate its beneficent purposes,’ although such a construction must be one that the language of the statute `fairly and reasonably’ supports.” Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., 706 So.2d 729, 733 (Ala. 1997) (quoting Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp., 477 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala. 1985)). Accord Ex parte Taylor, 728 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala. 1998), and Yates v. United States Fid. Guar. Ins. Co., 670 So.2d 908, 909 (Ala. 1995).
The exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, §
“Except as provided in this chapter, no employee of any employer subject to this chapter, nor the personal representative, surviving spouse, or next of kin of the employee shall have a right to any other method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and from a cause originating in such employment or determination thereof.”
§
”The rights and remedies granted in this chapter to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his or her personal representative, parent, dependent, or next of kin, at common law, by statute, or otherwise on account of injury, loss of services, or death. Except as provided in this chapter, no employer shall be held civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer‘s employee, for purposes of this chapter, whose injury or death is due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged in the service or business of the employer; the cause of which accident or occupational disease originates in the employment. . . .”
§
Section
“(a) If the injury or death for which compensation is payable under Articles 3 or 4 of this chapter was caused under circumstances also creating a legal liability for damages on the part of any party other than the employer, whether or not the party is subject to this chapter, the employee, or his or her dependents in case of death, may proceed against the employer to recover compensation under this chapter or may аgree with the employer upon the compensation payable under this chapter, and at the same time, may bring an action against the other party to recover damages for the injury or death, and the amount of the damages shall be ascertained
and determined without regard to this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
“Our Work[ers‘] Compensation Laws were adopted from those of Minnеsota and the Minnesota construction of their laws is of persuasive value to this court.” Eley v. Bruner-Lay Southern Corp., 289 Ala. 120, 125, 266 So.2d 276, 281 (1972). In dissenting from the main opinion in Weaver v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., supra, Judge Crawley succinctly stated the rationale and the holding of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Konken v. Oakland Farmers’ Elevator Co., 425 N.W.2d 302 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988):
“[T]he Minnesota court concluded that a former employer is not an `employer’ because the definition of `employer’ (`any person who employs another to perform a service for hire‘) is cast in the present tense, and a former employer is, therefore, a `person other than the employer’ against whom a third-party action can be maintained. [Konken v. Oakland Farmers’ Elevator Co.,] 425 N.W.2d [302] at 305 [(Minn.Ct.App. 1998)]. The Alabama definition of `employer’ is, like the Minnesota definition, also cast in the present tense. See §
25-1-20(2) , Ala. Code 1975 (defining `employer’ as `any person employing 20 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, including any agent of that person‘). The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, like the Minnеsota Act, also contains exclusivity provisions limiting a worker‘s remedies as against his employer, see §§25-5-52 and25-5-53 , Ala. Code 1975, but not as against third parties, or `part[ies] other than the employer,’ see §25-5-11(a) , Ala. Code 1975.“In Konken, the Minnesota court, quoting the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, statеd:
“‘In this common law action brought for injuries sustained [after the sale of assets], [the former employer] and its related business entities stand as third parties rather than as employers in relation to plaintiff and thus cannot use the fortuity of a prior emрloyment relationship as a basis for invoking the [exclusive-remedy provision].’
”Konken, 425 N.W.2d at 305-06 (quoting Hull[v. Aurora Corp. of Illinois], 89 A.D.2d [681,] at 682, 454 N.Y.S.2d [39,] at 40 [(1982)]).”
871 So.2d at 820 (emphasis added). See also Duvon v. Rockwell Int‘l,Inc. 116 Wn.2d 749, 807 P.2d 876 (1991).
In Fields v. Jantec, Inc., 317 Or. 432, 857 P.2d 95 (1993), the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a contrary and minority view that a former employer who had complied with its statutory duty of maintaining workers’ compensation insurаnce, whether self-insurance or carrier-provided-insurance, O.R.S. §
After the Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the case before us, the Illinois Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a former employer of a subsequently injured former employee is entitled to the exclusivity immunity of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. Hunter v. Southworth Prods. Corp., 333 Ill. App.3d 158, 775 N.E.2d 238 (2002). In Hunter, ExxonMobil Corporation purchased and installed a hydraulic lift table in one of its plants. ExxonMobil subsequently hired Jeffrey Hunter to work as an electrician in the plant. Approximately nine months later ExxonMobil sold thе plant to Tenneco Packaging, Inc. After the sale of the plant, Hunter continued working at the plant for Tenneco. Shortly thereafter, while Hunter was performing maintenance on the lift table, it killed him by collapsing on him. Hunter‘s widow sued the manufaсturer of the lift table. The manufacturer filed a third-party action against ExxonMobil and Tenneco. ExxonMobil pleaded the exclusivity immunity of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act as a defense and asserted it in a motion for summary judgment. The trial court dеnied the motion for summary judgment, and ExxonMobil appealed the denial.
Expressly rejecting the rationale of Fields, supra, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the Illinois Legislature could have expressly limited the exposure of former employers under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, but did not do so. The Illinois Court of Appeals held that a former employer is not an “employer” as defined in the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and thus is not “entitled to protection of the exclusivity provision of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act.” Hunter, 333 Ill. App.3d at 165, 775 N.E.2d at 243.
6 Arthur Larson Lex K. Larson, Larson‘s Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.01[3], p. 100-6 (2002), states that ”[t]he controlling fact in еstablishing exclusiveness [of the remedy] is the relationship of the parties at the time of occurrence of the injury. Their relationship at other times, such as the time of the employer‘s [injury-causing] misconduct or the time of bringing the suit, is immaterial.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
An essential element of the exclusivity immunity of §
The language of the exclusivity provisions read together with the definitions of “employer” and “employee” do not “`fairly and reasonably’ support” an interpretation that these statutes protect fоrmer employers from actions by former employees for injuries sustained after the termination of the employer-employee relationship. Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., 706 So.2d at 733 (quoting Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp., 477 So.2d at 411). Thus, we agree with Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Illinois Court of Appeals, and L. Larson in rejecting the claim of immunity in such a case. Konken, supra, Hunter, supra, and 6 Larson, Larson‘s Workers’ Compensation § 100.03[3]. Accordingly, we reject the interpretation adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Fields, supra. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, BROWN, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., dissents.
LYONS, J