Ex Parte Ward
Ward is currently seeking the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis, maintaining that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in that his lawyer failed to request or move that Ward be transferred back to juvenile court because he was a “child.” In essence, Ward is attacking the
In October 1975, the Alabama legislature passed the Judicial Article Implementation Act, Act No. 1205. Among the sweeping provisions of that Act was Article 5, currently codified, as amended, as
The United States Supreme Court has recently spoken on the subject of the rulemaking powers of federal appellate courts; its statements also have clear application to state appellate courts as well. In Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47, 106 S.Ct. 466, 470, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), that Court stated:
“It cannot be doubted that the courts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the management of litigation. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346, n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, n. 10, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (approving exercise of supervisory powers to require district court inquiry concerning joint representation of criminal defendants). Indeed, this Court has acknowledged the power of the courts of appeals to mandate ‘procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.’ ”
(Citations and footnote omitted.)
This Court has the inherent authority to promulgate and implement rules binding on inferior courts as to which we are charged with superintendence and control. Pankey v. City of Mobile, 250 Ala. 566, 35 So.2d 497 (1948). This authority is rooted in our constitution, which mandates that “[t]he supreme court . . . make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and procedure in all courts.”
There are, however, some limitations on our authority to promulgate and effectuate rules. “[R]ules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any party.”
Ward maintains that he was entitled to be treated as a “child” at the time of the proceedings instituted against him and thus to be accorded all of the procedural safeguards of Article 5 of the Act.
Ward correctly points out that the substantive provisions of Act No. 1205 became effective on October 10, 1975, the date it was approved. As a general rule, a statute becomes effective upon approval if the legislature has not otherwise specified a date on which it will take effect. Drs. Lane, Bryant, Eubanks Dulaney v. Otts, 412 So.2d 254 (Ala. 1982); National Sec. Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 281 Ala. 152, 199 So.2d 851 (1967). We are also cognizant that Article 5 of the Act repealed all prior law governing juvenile proceedings and replaced it with a new body of substantive law. See In re Bolden, 358 So.2d 795 (Ala. 1978).
Section 5-102 of the Act provided that “[t]he supreme court shall promulgate rules governing procedure in the juvenile court.” This was obviously a matter requiring the utmost haste and attention; all prior procedural law had been expressly repealed by § 5-153 and there were, at that time, no procedural rules to govern juvenile proceedings. The Act did, however, give us express authority to promulgate and implement all rules necessary for the administration of juvenile proceedings. See Judicial Article Implementation Act, Act No. 1205, Regular Session 1975, §§ 5-102, -118, and -120(a).
Having not had the opportunity by the effective date of Act, October 10, 1975, to promulgate what we deemed to be satisfactory, adequate, and effective rules to govern juvenile procedure, we issued a Resolution and Order on December 1, 1975, creating an advisory committee of learned scholars and members of the bench and bar to assist us in promulgating procedural rules that would fully and fairly enable the lower courts to apply the substantive aspects of Article 5. We also, in that Resolution and Order, “conclude[d] that Article 5 shall become effective January 16, 1977, statutory provisions currently effective remaining in full force and effect until that time.” See also the Code Commissioner‘s note to
From the vantage of hindsight, however, we are persuaded, and are constrained to hold, that our Resolution and Order violated the very letter of
In the context of juvenile proceedings, a party‘s age is a component of the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction over crimes committed by persons under a certain age; in this manner, age is inextricably tied to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. As of October 10, 1975, when Article 5 became law, “under seventeen” at the time of the offense became the age limit for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction by the juvenile court during the period pertinent to this appeal. Our Resolution and Order attempted to suspend Article 5 and temporarily reactivate the former juvenile code provisions; this would have made the subject matter jurisdictional age limit “under sixteen.” Because the Resolution and Order, if valid, would have restricted the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, we must likewise conclude that it was ineffective. Because the regulation of subject matter jurisdiction is not within the province of this Court, we must conclude that Article 5 of the Act became effective when approved.
Thus far we have held that the substantive portion of Article 5 became effective
Therefore, Ward was entitled to the benefits of the procedural provisions of the Code of 1940, which were in effect until the new Rules of Juvenile Procedure became effective, such provisions to be applied in conjunction with the substantive provisions of Article 5 of Act No. 1205. This is so because the measuring age of Article 5 was “under seventeen” at the time of the offense; Ward obviously qualified.
Article 5 created substantive rights for qualified juveniles, which this Court‘s rules could not abridge.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court with instructions to order the trial court to issue the writ of error coram nobis.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGAL