41 Cal. 29 | Cal. | 1871
Upon petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It appears by the petition filed in this case that the prisoner is now detained at the Penitentiary by the Warden, pursuant to the judgment of the District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, adjudging him to suffer certain imprisonment there as a punishment for the crime of manslaughter, of which he had been convicted in that Court. It is also averred in the petition that from thát judgment the prisoner has taken an appeal to this Court, which is yet undetermined, and that he is pecuniarily able to give bail for his appearance if he should be permitted to do so.
The statute (Cr. Pr. Act, Sec. 509) provides that a person charged with such an offense as manslaughter may be admitted to bail before conviction, “as a matter of right,” but (Sec. 512) after conviction “as a matter of discretion” merely.
If we are to consider this application as made to our discretion under the statute, the petition is insufficient, in that it sets forth no fact or circumstance whatever upon which it would be possible for us to exercise an intelligent discretion in determining the application. It is not averred, for instance, that any injustice has been done the prisoner in the course of the judicial proceedings had in the District Court; nor that any error of law intervened to his prejudice
The argument, however, which was made in support of the petition denies the constitutionality of the statute in so far as it enacts that a conviction already had shall take away the right to bail, and leave it a question to be determined by the mere discretion of the Court, upon the facts appearing in the particular case. In support of this view the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 7) is cited. Its language is as follows: “ All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”
Upon this it is claimed that the Constitution first announces the general rule that “ all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties;” it next declares the only admissible exception to the rule,, i. e. “eaqútal offenses;” and, lastly, narrows this exception to those capital offenses “ in which the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”
It is insisted that the language of the Constitution is sufficiently broad to embrace not only a case where no trial has been had, but equally a case in which a conviction of an offense, less than capital in degree, has occurred; that the Constitution does not regard the particular stage of proceedings which the prosecution may have reached, but only the grade of the offense involved as being less than the capital grade. It is said that at common law an application for bail was addressed solely to the discretion of the Judges,
The literal interpretation insisted upon—following, as it does, the mere words of the Constitution—would not only
The application must be denied and the prisoner remanded, and it is so ordered.
¡Neither Mr. Justice Temple nor Mr. Justice Sprague expressed an opinion.