43 F. 661 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Missouri | 1890
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the petition, the first question to be determined is whether the district court had jurisdiction, by a writ of habeas corpus, to declare the judgment of the state court a nullity, and discharge the petitioner from the imprisonment imposed by it. The district courts of the United States do not possess any supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the criminal courts of a state. Nor can the writ of habeas corpus be made to perform the office of a wait of error or appeal. Errors in law, however numerous and gross, committed by the trial court in a causo within its jurisdiction. can only be reviewed by appeal or writ of error in the court exercising supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the trial court in the particular case. It is only where the trial court is without jurisdiction of the person or the cause, and a party is subjected to illegal imprisonment in consequence, that the writ of habeas carpus may be invoked, and the party discharged from the illegal imprisonment. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 Pet. 568: Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Ex paste Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381; Ex parte Carll, 106 U. S. 521, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535: Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; In re Lane, 135 U. S. 443, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760; In re Wight, 134 U. S. 136, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Hans Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, page 756, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1263.
In the caso at bar, the criminal court of Jackson county had plenary jurisdiction of the person, the place, the offense, and the cause, and everything connected with it. The petitioner was indicted for violating a criminal statute of the state. The statute defining and punishing the offense was a valid law. The indictment sufficiently charged the offense,
“But that court had jurisdiction of the offense described in the indictment on which the prisoner was tried. It had jurisdiction of tho prisoner,, who was properly brought before the court. It had jurisdiction to hear the charge and the evidence against the prisoner. It had jurisdiction to hear and to decide upon the defenses offered by him. The matter now presented was one of those defenses. Whether it was a sufficient defense was a matter of law on which that court must pass, so far as it was purely a question of law, and on which the jury, under the instructions of the court, must pass, if we can suppose any of the facts were such as required submission to the jury. If the question had been one of former acquittal, — a much stronger ease than this,— the court would have had jurisdiction to decide upon the record whether there had been a former acquittal for the same offense; and, if the identity of the offense were in dispute, it might be necessary on such a plea t® submit that question to the jury on the issue raised by the plea. The same principle would apply to a plea of a former conviction. Clearly, in these cases, the court not only had jurisdiction to try and decide the question raised, but it is its imperative duty to do so. If the court makes a mistake on such trial, it is error which may be corrected by the usual modes of correcting such errors; but that tho court had jurisdiction to decide upon the matter raised by the plea, both as matter of law and of fact, cannot be doubted. This article 5 of the amendments, and articles 6 and 7, contain other provisions concerning trials in the courts of the United States, designed as safeguards to the rights of parties. Do all of these go to the jurisdiction of the courts?’ And are all judgments void where they have been disregarded in the progress of the trial? Is a judgment of conviction void when a deposition has been read against a person on trial for crime because lie was not confronted with the witness, or because the indictment did not inform him with sufficient clearness of the nature and cause of the accusation?”
To the same effect is Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780, where it is held that the fact that an alien sat on the grand jury that found the indictment, and that the petitioner was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, did not render tho judgment void, and did not, therefore, give the court authority or jurisdiction to discharge the petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus. The criminal court of Jackson county having plenary jurisdiction of the petitioner’s ease, neither the district court nor this court has any jurisdiction to inquire into the regularity of the proceedings in that court.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the petitioner is remanded to the custody of the state authorities, in execution of the sentence of the state court. There is nothing in the record to show what order, if any, the district court made under section 3 of rule 34 of the supreme court, regulating appeals in habeas corpus cases: but there seems to be no reason to apprehend that the petitioner will not he forthcoming to answer the judgment of the state court.
Note. It has been held in England, upon great consideration, by the unanimous judgment of all the judges, affirmed on error in the exchequer chamber, that at common law a court may, in its discretion, discharge a jury in a criminal case before verdict, and that that discretion is not reviewable on error; and that a defendant cannot avail himself of an abuse of this discretion to defeat a conviction on a second trial. Winsor v. Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289, 390. Upon the question of the construction of the fourteenth amendment on the point suggested, hut not decided, in the principal case, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, and particularly what is said on pages 534 and 535. And in Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 448, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930, where the views of Mr. Justice Matthews, expressed on pages 534 and 535 of Hurtado’s Case, are reaffirmed by Chief Justice Fuller. And see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303.